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Abstract 
This thesis comprises an overview of heahh care transition in post-communist countries and two 
original contributions to the subject's literature. The background chapter establishes the 
meaning of post-communist transfonnation by presenting key socio-economic changes and 
characterising health care systems emerging from transition. 
The first original study develops, substantiates and statistically applies a model of hospital 
governance transition. The model goes beyond the traditional public-private delineation and 
identifies five stages of hospital governance: (1) the integrated Semashko model. (2) 
decentralised hospital management, (3) devolved hospital ownership, (4) corporatisation, and 
(5) privatisation of hospitals. Each stage corresponds to a distinct distribution of decision 
powers, financial risks and residual claims between the sector participants. These 
characterisations can be seen as efficiency factors associated with decentralisation. Extending 
on previous studies primarily concerned with financing arrangements, this model constitutes a 
more complete picture of economic incentives and the managerial capacity in the sector. The 
econometric analysis of 22 countries over the 22-year period 1989-2010 is based on a random 
trend model. Notable findings include devolution of ownership leading to increases in acute care 
lengths o f stay, numbers of admissions, and selected measures of mortality attributable to 
hospital care. Corporatisation of hospitals is found to be associated with increased acute lengths 
of stay and bed occupancy rates. The findings suggest that decentralisation and autonomisation, 
as introduced in the region, did not contribute to the intended de-emphasising of inpatient care. 
Higher utilisation rates coinciding with increased mortality may imply that territorial 
governments trade-off quality for quantity of care when they are given authority over hospital 
care provision. Refonn design features and resource constraints persistent in the transition 
systems offer possible explanations of this. 
The second study examines health care accessibility in seven countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, over the five years 2005-2009. through the lens of individual-level unmet needs for 
examination or treatment. Investigated are the magnitude and nature of access barriers as well as 
the structure of inequality. The study design based on logit and multinomial logit models of 
individual socio-economic characteristics permits the interpretation of findings in absolute and 
comparative tenns and shows the problem dynamics. Health care is most easily accessible in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. Affordability issues and prohibitive waiting times are prevalent 
in Poland and the Baltic States. Mobility and information represent relatively minor access 
barriers. The poorest households, the unemployed, working age cohorts, and women are more 
exposed than the population at large to problems in accessing health care. Over the analysed 
period access conditions generally improved. The outcomes show that substantial differences 
exist between the countries that constitute an arguably homogenous group of post-communist, 
new EU member states. This suggests there are policy lessons to be learned from peer transition 
countries. The nature o f access barriers is indicative of gaps in coverage and inadequacy o f 
public sector resources relative to need, which call for systemic solutions. 
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Terms and definitions 
T h e purpose of this complementary section is to briefly review the terms most commonly used 
throughout this thesis, in order to clarify ambiguit ies and to establish a working terminology for 
the reader. While for many terms discussed below various deflnit ions can be found in the 
literature, exploration and reconciliation of those deflnit ions is beyond the scope of the section. 
Instead, short explanations are provided. 
Geographic terms 
A variety of labels are used to address the region of interest: former Eastern Bloc, Former 
Soviet Republics, Europe/Central Asia, Eurasia, Central-Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwea l th of Independent States (CEE/CIS) , Europe and CIS, etc. (Shakarishvili & Davey 
2005) . Recognising the lack of standardised terminology, this study employs the fol lowing 
groups, det lni t ions and acronyms: 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) comprises ( I ) Central Europe (i.e. the Visegrad Group): 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia; (2) Eastern Europe (the Baltic States): Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and (3) Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. In Chapter 6, the acronym CEE7 
refers to the seven countries of the Visegrad Group and the Baltic States. 
Figure I: Map of the post-Semashko region 
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The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) encompasses countries o f i 1) Eastern Europe: 
Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, (2) Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and (3) 
Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. Admittedly, the 
definition of the CIS is not accurate in terms of present membership, as Georgia withdrew its 
membership in 2008, while Ukraine and Turkmenistan arc informal (de facto) members. 
However, the term continues to be used in the literature for the purposes of identification of this 
subset of Former Soviet Republics. 
Throughout the dissertation, the 22 countries comprising the region of interest are together 
referred to as CEE/CIS, Eastern Europe, the post-communist countries, the post-Semashko 
countries, the transition countries, or the region. 
Post-communist transition 
The term "transition" is indicative but not specific. It neither points at a specific transformation 
nor conveys an economic theory to explain the process. Historically, the term may relate to 
classical transition of the industrialised economies in the late 19th century, neoclassical 
transition of post-war democracies, market-oriented refonns in non-Communist countries of 
Western Europe and South America, as well as Asian post-Communist processes (China, 
Vietnam) (Papava 2005). Here, "transition" indicates the process of moving from a centrally 
planned state-owned economy to a market-based, pluralistic economy. The term concerns the 
evolution of a broad socio-economic environment in the 22 countries of the former Eastern 
Bloc, starting from the fall of communism in 1989-1993. This evolution includes both various 
system reforms and exogenous trends. In reference to the health and health care facets of the 
process, the terms "health transition" and "health care transition" are used, respectively. 
Following prominent writers such as Janos Komai (e.g. Kornai & Eggleston 2001b), the terms 
"communist" and "socialist" are used interchangeably. 
Health care system and its objectives 
The Semashko model refers to core mechanisms of the Soviet health care system common for 
the 22 countries, which include centralisation, integration, state ownership and input-orientated 
resource allocation. The model is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.2. 
The Ministry of Health is a generic name for any ministry bearing the primary responsibility for 
the health (care) system. In reality, its competencies have gone under different names in the 
region, sometimes in combination with those of other ministries (e.g. welfare, social affairs). 
The Ministry of Health is assumed to be the executive arm of the central government with 
respect to health care affairs. 
A health carc system, broadly defined by the World Health Organisation (2000), encompasses 
all the activities whose primary purpose is to promote, restore or maintain health. Objectives of 
a high-performing health care system include, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2004), high quality care and prevention, accessible health care, 
responsiveness for patient and consumer satisfaction, acceptable costs, sustainable financing, 
and economic efficiency. 
Performance (of a hospital or health system) relates to the achieved level of explicit or implicit 
objectives that may include effectiveness, efficiency, equity, responsiveness, quality, 
affordability, sustainability of financing, cost containment, outputs or outcomes. Efficiency, 
unless otherwise indicated, concerns economic efficiency that comprises both the productive 
and allocative aspects. 
Hospital care takes the inpatient or outpatient form. The former typically involves a stay of at 
least 24 hours, although it permits episodes shorter than 24 hours ("one-day hospitalisation") in 
the case of death or discharge to another health establishment ( W H O HFA-D13). Ambulatory 
care, occurring within a single day, is provided in clinics or hospitals, the latter being outpatient 
hospital care. The definitions of inpatient and outpatient care may differ to an extent between 
countries, and consequently there may be minor misalignments in data reported internationally. 
When the context is unambiguous, the words "unit", "facility" and "establishment" are 
sometimes used instead o f "hospital", for the purpose of providing a linguistic variety in a 
lengthy manuscript dealing predominantly with hospitals. The terms "doctor" and "physician" 
are used as synonyms. "Provider" implies a medical professional or an organisation providing 
health services. In a broad sense, in decentralised systems, territorial health authorities and sub-
national governments are providers of health care, in so far as they can decide about networks, 
capacities and processes of the hospitals they own or supervise. 
Social health insurance is a mandatory, usually payroll-based, system of contributions for health 
care financing that also serves the goals of risk and income solidarity. "Voluntary health 
insurance" refers to non-statutory, prepaid financing schemes an individual may choose to join 
in order to protect against out-of-pocket expenses. 
With respect to provider payments, budget-based financing indicates a set pool of funds 
periodically allocated to a provider, often according to an adjusted previous year's budget and 
following a line-itemisation. Fee-for-service refers to a situation where the provider is paid a 
contracted fee for every defined unit o f service it supplies to the patient. The "unit" is broadly 
understood and may take various forms, e.g. a concrete medical procedure (test, examination, 
surgery), or a day of hospitalisation. The units o f service are typically unbundled and unrelated 
to the patient condition, although specific implementations vary considerably between systems. 
The payment mechanism can be used to reimburse individual physicians as well as provider 
organisations (e.g. a hospital) contracted with a third-party payer. Patient-based (or case-mix) 
payments are primarily based on patient characteristics, such as diagnosis and age, but in 
principle independent from the actual medical procedures provided to the patient. Diagnosis 
related groups (DRGs) are the most common category of patient-based payments. 
Corruption, in health care or otherwise, usually involves the use of public office for private gain 
however the mechanisms, stakeholders, objectives and legal classifications of corruption vary 
considerably. One of its common forms is making informal (envelope, under-the-table) 
payments by patients to doctors who are in position to ration medical care within the public 
system. Such payments are aimed at securing higher quality of care, shorter waiting time, or 
other benefits, and often put other patients in a relative disadvantage. 
Other generic terms follow the World Health Organisation dellnitions (Roberts 1998). 
Decentralisation and other institutional change 
Decentralisation is a "downward" or "outward" transfer of authority, power and responsibility. 
Decentralisation modes include delegation (a transfer within an organisation), de-concentration 
(between administrative levels), devolution (between political levels) and privatisation (from 
public to private ownership) (Bankauskaite & Saltman 2007). 
Governance is the institutional environment that defines the structure and appointment of 
managing bodies, the scope of their autonomy, decision rights and responsibilities, as well as 
mechanisms of accountability and principal stakeholders. 
The terms "institution" and "institutional" are understood in the broad sense of humanly devised 
formal and informal constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction (North 
1991). Following this definition is a distinction between institutions and organisations. 
Autonomisation is a process of empowering political and organisational governing bodies by 
increasing the scope for their decision-making. 
A corporation is an organisation that operates under the private sector law and is subject to the 
rules of corporate governance, reporting, etc., of its respective commercial sector. This is in 
contrast to public company status that grants a separate set of rules and often privileges such as 
subsidies. Both private and public bodies may be the sole or majority owners of corporations 
Corporation, commercial (trade) law company and joint-stock company are used 
interchangeably in the literature and thus considered synonyms. Corporatisation is a process of 
transforming public organisations into corporations. 
The terms "non-profit" and "not-tbr-protlt" are used alternately in reference to organisations 
that retain their surplus revenues for statutory use rather than distributing them as profits or 
dividends. 
The discussion at times abstracts from a regional (regions) or local (district or municipality) 
division, instead referring to sub-national (or territorial) governments. The levels of government 
are assumed to correspond to catchment areas of hospitals under their management. 

PART I: 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 

Chapter I: 
Introduction 
1.1. The theme 
The theme of this dissertation was inspired by the book by Janos Kornai and Karen Eggleston 
"Welfare , choice and solidarity in transition. Reforming the health sector in Eastern Europe". 
Published in 2001 (Komai & Eggleston 2001b), the book analysed points of departure and 
offered reform guidelines for post-communist health care systems (HCSs). This involved both 
general principles of reform, such as ethical postulates and fundamental coordination 
mechanisms, and specific recommendat ions for financing, delivery and regulation. From the 
exposure to their book came a realisation of the monumental change that has been taking place 
in Eastern Europe. Leaving behind the communist model of health care necessitated setting new 
grounds regarding the competing principles of individual sovereignty and solidarity; it also 
required unprecedented rules for the co-existence of the public and private sectors. Put into 
practice, shedding burdens of the past has been an experience full of hardship. 
The process has had implications of a great magnitude. Its materiality is perhaps best illustrated 
by basic demographic and economic parameters shown in Table 1.1: the region 's population in 
2009-10 was 382m (down from 387m in 1989-90). The gross domestic product per capita in 
terms of purchasing power amounted 11,708 (9,504 in 1989-90) dollars, corresponding to the 
total G D P of 4,477bn (3,679bn) dollars. Per capita expenditures on health almost doubled to 
reach 709 dollars, and in the aggregate terms accounted for 271bn dollars. The public share of 
health expenditures was 65 (previously 71.5) per cent, and life expectancy at birth 71.1 (70.2) 
years. Relative to the European Union (EU), in 2009-10, the post-Semashko region amounted 
77 per cent of the population size, 37 per cent of per capita and 29 per cent of total purchasing 
power GDP, 22 per cent of per capita and 17 per cent of total expenditures on health, 86 per 
cent of the public share of total health expenditures, and 89 per cent of life expectancy at birth. 
The comparat ive figures illustrate the size of the region and the largeness of social and 
Table 1.1: The post-Semashko region, selected characteristics 
Arinciua J.OH J.UV H,VUI IZJ ZIO jy.o 4U.O /Z.J 
Azerbaijan 7.16 9.05 4,754 8,913 203 524 61.2 20.3 70.8 73.8-
Belarus 10.19 9.49 6,434 12,494 205 700 68.7 77.7 71.8 70.6 
Bulgaria 8.72 7.53 7,529 11,490 404 789 81.4 .54.5 71.5 73.8 
Czech Republic 10.33 10.52 16,367 22,575 972 1,778 84.9 83.7 71.8 77.5 
Estonia 1.57 1.34 10,146 16,561 367 999 53.0 78.7 70.6 75.3 
Georgia 4.80 4.45 6,138 4,552 273 461 62.5 23.6 72.2 73.8 
Hungary 10.37 10.00 13,120 16,958 781 1,242 84.4 69.4 69.7 74.5 
Kazakhstan 16.35 16.32 7,089 10,916 315 468 62.3 59.4 68.8 68.7 
Kyrgyzstan 4.39 5.45 2,524 2,008 125 124 66.7 56.2 68.5 68.8 
Latvia 2.66 2.24 10,109 12,948 391 866 56.1 61.1 70.5 73.3 
Lithuania 3.70 3.29 12,500 15,534 447 1,094 72.0 73.5 71.8 73.2 
Moldova 3.70 3.56 4,583 2,790 179 326 74.4 45.8 69.1 69.4 
Poland 38.11 38.18 8,182 17,352 415 1,295 80.3 72.6 71.1 75.9 
Romania 23.20 21.44 7,853 10,921 304 609 61.4 78.1 69.6 73.6 
Russian Federation 148.29 141.75 12,626 14,183 381 720 66.8 62.1 69.7 68.8 
Slovakia 5.30 5.43 12,693 20,164 754 1,772 84.9 65.9 71.2 75.4 
Tajikistan 5.30 6.88 2,961 1,940 177 116 72.6 26.7 69.5 l i . f 
Turkmenistan 3.67 5.04 3,749 7,422 187 185 66.4 59.4 65.2 66 .1 ' 
Ukraine 51.89 45.87 8,063 6,029 266 466 69.7 56.6 71.0 69.7 
Uzbekistan 20.51 28.23 2,002 2,786 118 162 72.1 47.5 69.3 70.5 ' 
CEE/CIS 387.05 382.37 9,504 11,708 357 709 71.5 65.0 70.2 71.1 
EU 498.19 31,257 3,152 75.2 79.8 
' 2 0 0 4 , - 2 0 0 7 , ' 2005, 1998 
C E E / C I S totals calculated as popula t ion-weighted averages ot the individual countrv values, with the except ion of popula t ion total, which is a 
s imple sum, and the publ ic share o f T E H , which is weighted by THH. EU values (2009) were taken f rom the W H O H F A - D B . 
Source : World Bank, World Deve lopmen t Indicators, 2012 . 
economic implications tliat health sector transition has had in Eastern Europe. The sheer scale of 
the affected population justilies the urgency of problems discussed in this and other studies of 
post-Semashko HCSs. In addition, comparing the post-communist countries against the EU 
reveals some of the region's fundamental economic problems, most notably the scarcity of 
capital and low levels of labour productivity. 
The problems addressed by this dissertation are also motivated by the relative scarcity of 
research activity and evidence in the post-communist countries. This shortcoming is contrasting 
with the need for reliable infomiation to guide numerous fundamental health care reforms: 
mistakes made at initial stages of any project are often costly and irreversible at later stages. 
Inadequate research efforts have stemmed from various reasons, including historical under-
reliance on evidence, underdeveloped information systems and reporting standards, as well as 
the lack of transparency and stability of processes. Importantly for economists, markets remain 
secondary in Eastern European health care, whereas the prominence of the state continues. 
Some of these problems echo throughout the following chapters. 
Kutzin el al. (2010b) argue that "the label 'transitional' is no longer helpful in understanding the 
[CEE/CIS] countries". Their implication of Eastern European health transition being a closed 
chapter coincides with post-communist countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary 
and Poland progressing from the World Bank's (WB) upper middle to high income 
classification. While the systems emerging from transition continue to struggle with unresolved 
problems, new pressures are quickly approaching: resurging infectious pathogens, diseases of 
civilisation, population ageing and fiscal pressures vis-a-vis health cost inflation. The mix of old 
and new challenges calls for a thoughtful consideration of resources, processes and priorities. 
For a number of reasons, economically evaluating health care reforms of post-communist 
countries is a formidable task. The Fall of Communism was a turning point in the history of the 
affected countries, breaking the historical continuum and creating conditions for liberalisation 
and fast development. Within a few years of the transition the societies embraced such concepts 
as entrepreneurship, consumerism, and individualism, which were non-existent or suppressed 
under the previous regime. Markets for goods and services appeared; the ideas of needs and 
wants were redefined. Looking at this turbulent and rapidly evolving institutional environment it 
is difficult to link causes and effects. This is particularly true for in health care systems, given 
their weight in the economy and the complex nature. A number of features of this complexity 
are discussed in the seminal paper by Arrow (1963): irregularity and unpredictability of 
demand, the sensitive nature of the patient-physician relationship, product uncertainty, special 
supply condifions, problems in pricing, and limitations of insurance. A contemporary view of 
characteristics distinguishing the economic nature of health care is encapsulated by Folland et 
al. (2012) who highlight (a) presence and extent of uncertainty, (b) prominence of insurance, (c) 
problems of information, (d) large role of non-profit firms, (e) restrictions on competition, (0 
role of equity and need, (g) government subsidies and public provision. The above list is 
indicative of a difficulty in applying neoclassical economics as a tool for understanding health 
care systems at large. The difficulties are amplified in the setting of post-communist transition, 
where markets remain an allocation mechanism secondary to the bureaucratic coordination of 
the dominant public sector. Here, the market failures of externalities, public goods, abuse of 
market power, information asymmetry and uncertainty are compounded by government failures: 
self-interest, policy myopia, regulatory capture, disincentive effects, and so forth. 
Despite the heralded end of transition, many of its mechanisms are still insufficiently described 
or understood. Among the most prolific topics in the literature of Eastern European health 
policy are the financing model for raising revenue and allocation through provider payments, 
privatisation of primary and outpatient care, and selected areas of public health. The selection of 
research questions for this dissertation is intended to provide a complementary view. 
1.2. Research questions 
In the broad terms, this present dissertation aims to enhance our understanding of the post-
communist countries' problem in the organisation of health care and to generate 
recommendations rooted in both theory and evidence. More specifically, there are two problem 
areas that the manuscript addresses. The first one, which concerns autonomy, ownership and 
legal fonns of hospitals, aims at explaining the "hospital governance" dimension of HCS 
transition, and indicating desired directions and extents of the hospitals sector transformation. 
The second sheds light on accessibility of health care by providing new evidence on unmet 
medical needs from seven post-Semashko countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE7). This 
study links to the theme of the thesis by the observation that considerable variation in health 
care accessibility exists despite the fact that the seven HCSs originated from the nearly 
homogenous Semashko system. The existing variation in performance can be linked to reform 
choices made throughout transition, thus indicating the most successful reform trajectories. 
Consequently, research questions for Part II of the thesis are the following: (1) Does the region-
wide transformation of the hospital sector form a pattern? (2) Can elements of this pattern be 
argued to have distinct economic characteristics? (3) What are expected impacts of the 
hypothesised transformation phases on hospital sector performance? 
Part III, on the other hand, is an attempt to establish whether (1) there are systematic differences 
in unmet medical needs between seven post-Semashko health care systems, (2) the identified 
differences can inform us about HCS performance in terms of medical care accessibility, and (3) 
the accessibility outcome can be linked to HCS design choices made during transition. 
1.3. O r i g i n a l con t r i bu t i on 
The research questions also highlight the areas where this dissertation provides original 
contributions. Part II recognises the centralily of governance arrangements from the standpoint 
of economic incentives. It is the first attempt to identify region-wide patterns in the changing 
hospital sector, inclusive of a discussion of their economic significance and a statistical 
veritlcation of implications for performance. Considering the fact that the broader economic 
literature of hospital governance has mainly focused on industrialised countries, this study 
extends the scope of discussion onto a considerable number of new countries and offers new 
evidence coming from health care systems of a unique background. 
The innovativeness of Part III relates both to it generating new evidence and in contextualising 
this evidence for the discussion of peer performance. While studies have previously relied on 
the dataset of European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), this 
present thesis uses the data in a more meaningful way: to produce longitudinally and cross-
sectionally comparable evidence that sheds light on both absolute and relative performance of 
HCSs that have evolved from the same root of communist medicine. The new evidence on 
unmet medical needs stands on its own merits by infomiing health care policy about 
accessibility of health care. However, the particular comparative context enables additional 
interpretations in terms of benchmarking performance of post-Semashko systems, thus 
indicating the successfulness of individual country transition paths. Lastly, the contribution of 
the study extends to the presentation of results from multiple statistical models in original, 
legible layouts. 
1.4. Policy relevance 
There are many points of tangency between the analyses and findings of this dissertation and 
health care policy. Part II addresses numerous issues persistent in the hospital sector. It suggests 
that those issues cannot be resolved by using more sophisticated payment mechanisms only. 
Chapter 4 reviews intricacies of the incentive environment and makes suggestions with regards 
to aligning external and internal incentives. Many interdependencies and possible synergies 
have been overlooked in the process of transition, which perpetuated old deficiencies. Given the 
materiality of hospitals in general, and their special position in the Semashko and post-
Semashko HCSs, an improved understanding of the hospital evolution may facilitate the reform 
process of the less advanced countries and help identify problem areas in the systems at the 
forefront of transition. With respect to this. Part II offers a conceptual model of transition that 
goes beyond the public and private delineation, theoretically and empirically explores 
implications of various stages of hospital transformation, suggests desired ownership forms and 
governance arrangements, and summarises mistakes made in transition. 
Part III maintains the perspective of parallel post-Semashko health care systems, however, 
addresses a different problem with a narrowed-down scope both in terms o f the number of 
countries and the length of the time dimension. As mentioned previously, the policy relevance 
of this is two-fold. Firstly, in each of the analysed countries, evidence of unmet medical needs 
will help policy-makers target vulnerable groups and ensure higher equity of health care access 
and utilisation. Secondly, the comparative structure of the study reveals differences in 
performance that are likely emerge from varying systemic capacities of financing, provision and 
regulation of health care, including the governance arrangements presented in Part II. This may 
suggest models of health care that are more successful than others. Such comparative evidence 
may be particularly useful in combating prejudices entrenched in post-communist systems, such 
as those regarding competition, decentralisation and financial discipline. 
1.5. Choice of countries 
The selection of countries for Part II is based on the operation of the Semashko model prior to 
1989. In contrast to some other studies of post-communist countries, this criterion excludes a 
number of countries, most notably of Southern Europe. This is because the countries o f former 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia emerged from Communism with highly 
decentralised health care involving social health insurance and provision organised by "self-
managed communities of interesf (Cain et al. 2002). The fundamental disparity between the 
centralised Semashko and decentralised Yugoslavian model would prove problematic in 
characterising transition trajectories. Instead, assuming the latter group out allows exclusively 
focusing on the inheritance and features of the centralised and integrated model of health care. 
After the Fall of Communism, the 22 selected countries took health reform approaches that 
varied in comprehensiveness, vision and pace, resulting in diverse transition paths. Thus, 
conceptually, this dissertation is based on the idea of a natural experiment that occurred within 
the former Eastern bloc and originated from a common entry point. The adequacy o f this 
interpretation is examined in Chapter 2. Countries in scope for the study in Part 111 are a subset 
of the above, with the subset composition determined by the availability of data in the EU-
SILC. 
1.6. Structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation is organised in Parts and Chapters. Part 1 comprises this current introduction as 
well as an explorative study of post-communist transition. The aims of the background study in 
Chapter 2 are to (1) indicate broad social and economic aspects of the transformation most 
relevant for the health care sector, (2) outline the nature and challenges of health care systems in 
transition, (3) show main directions of research in the field and assess the completeness of 
literature, (4) justify and contextualise the remaining chapters by showing their contents vis-a-
vis identified gaps in the literature. 
Chapter 2 recognises that the period of transition has been a time of great socio-demographie 
and economic change for the former Soviet bloc societies, and has not been without 
consequence for the health systems. A few aspects are highlighted: the institutional environment 
fundamental for any form o f economic activity, macroeconomic growth and downturns that 
underlie available HCS resources, as well as social and demographic trends that determine 
health needs, production, and outcomes, e.g. economic inequalities, population ageing, 
education, and burden of disease. Secondly, the dissertation necessitates an overview of basic 
common and distinguishing characteristics of the 22 countries it is concerning. By identifying 
idiosyncrasies present in the region, the background enables an identification of relevant peer 
groups, a contextualisation o f discussion and an assessment of reforms relative to challenges, 
capacities and available resources. Thirdly, the chapter summarises developments in HCS 
reflected in the literature of the subject. This includes key elements defining health systems 
(mechanisms for revenue collection and allocation, new prerogatives for the public and private 
sectors), the consistency and quality aspects of reform, as well as deficiencies and challenges to 
be faced by any reform. Finally, the chapter sets the stage for the study in Part II by discussing 
problems specific for the hospital sector. 
Part II presents an original study of transforming hospital sector governance in post-Semashko 
countries. The study corresponds with a growing number of publications on the subject of 
hospital governance, and counterpoises the literature predominantly focused on industrialised 
countries of the EU, the United States (US) and Australia (c f Smith et al. 2012). The choice of 
the subject is based on the observation that this is a relatively unexplored, if not neglected, topic 
in comparative studies of health care in CEE/CIS. A literature overview in Chapter 2 will show 
that the aspects of revenue collection, pooling, purchasing, basic basket definition as well as 
privatisation of primary and ambulatory care have so far been most extensively analysed. 
Meanwhile, consequences of the shifting powers from the central government toward territorial 
governments and increasingly autonomous hospitals have received less attention. Part II will 
argue that this re-balancing of responsibilities has been a key component of the post-Semashko 
transition. 
Part II o f the dissertation consists o f three chapters: narrative and explorative (Chapter 3), 
theoretical (Chapter 4), and econometric (Chapter 5). Chapter 3 summarises the individual 
experience of each country, which it generalises to a model of hospital governance transition. 
Recognising this process leads to proposing an extended typology of post-communist HCSs that 
improves our understanding of transition compared to classifications based solely on the 
financing arrangement. Moreover, reviewing hospital governance in 22 countries offers a good 
opportunity to reflect on good practices and common mistakes made in this region-wide 
process. Chapter 4 discusses economic implications of the process in question. It starts off by 
outlining mechanisms for resource allocation in the communist system and the meaning of its 
departure. It then refers to the arguments o f decentralisation, corporatisation, and economic 
models o f hospital behaviour in order to indicate overall expected impacts o f changing 
governance on hospital operation. Chapter 5 econometrically verifies the theoretical predictions 
of Chapter 4 in the context of the processes mapped in Chapter 3. The statistical analysis uses 
the random trend model (Wooldridge 2002) in a panel data setting (22 countries over the period 
1989-2010) to estimate the impacts of the governance settings represented with dummy reform 
variables, while controlling for economic incentives of provider payments and other parameters 
of the hospital sector. Hospital performance is represented with 48 measures of resources, 
utilisation, and mortality (i.e. 48 models are independently estimated). Other than sections on 
methods, data and results, the chapter thoroughly tests the robustness of outcomes by exploring 
alternative specifications. 
Part 111 contains a study of health care accessibility in Eastern Europe through the lens of 
individual-level unmet needs for examination or treatment. Investigated are the magnitude and 
nature of access barriers as well as the structure of inequality in seven countries over the period 
2005-2009. This chapter links to the theme of the dissertation by focusing on a peer sub-group 
of post-Semashko health systems, as per discussion in Chapter 2.3. It also sheds light on the 
varying levels of health care accessibility and equity, which may be affected, among other 
things, by higher standards of accounting and governance imposed on the provider 
organisations, an aspect of transition discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4. Given similar 
background and a shared history institutional development, the identified differences may be 
attributable to strategic choices in reforming those systems. 
The dissertation closes with a chapter that summarises key findings and binds them together in 
conclusions and recommendations. 
Chapter 2: 
Selected socio-economic aspects of post-communist health care transition 
2.1. T h e s tar t ing point 
The characteristic that binds together the 22 countries in scope for this dissertation is that prior 
to 1989 they operated the Semashko health care model. The model was named after Nikolai 
Aleksandrovich Semashko, a USSR public health leader and the 1918-1930 Health Commissar, 
who supervised the health sector organisation after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 when 
medical services became nationalised in the anti-market and anti-profit Marxist movement 
(Ebeling 2008). The Semashko system spanned over the USSR as well as its satellite countries 
and provided a Soviet alternative to the Bismarck model of social insurance and the Beveridge 
model of the welfare state. 
This health sector was consistent with the rules that founded the Soviet economy at large. The 
State assumed full ownership of capital as a factor of production. The system was funded by the 
state with resources collected at local, regional and federal levels; pooling took place in the 
central budget allocated between ministries. There was no distinction between financing and 
provision. Input-oriented resource allocation was based on historical continuation. Inputs' sizes 
were considered indicators of prestige in the non-financial economy, and the inputs obsession 
made it practically impossible to disinvest. The lack of downsizing was also a result of the 
philosophy of extensive, rather than intensive, economics. The assumption that bigger was 
better was reflected in central plans that orchestrated the operation of the economy. Allocation 
was rigid in the sense it did not allow transferring of resources between line-item budget 
categories. 
The State also exercised top-down control through a hierarchical structure headed by the 
Ministry of Health (MOH). All executive decisions were made by the MOH officials. Hospital 
directors were nominated and played a passive role of administrators rather than managers. 
They were left no discretion in the scope o f provided services, modes of provision, facihty 
organisation or expansion. Purchasing of medicaments and equipment was carried out at the 
central level. The sector decision-making was highly political and personal influence was an 
important factor in achieving any goal. Obtaining extra resources was primarily a matter of 
personal intluence and only to a minor extent subject to efficiency or equity considerations. 
Ministries other than the MOH , such as defence, education, transport and infrastructure, and 
internal affairs, operated independent systems for their elites and employees. In the USSR, 15 
republics were in charge of their health care systems, however, they operated under close 
control of the central department in Moscow. This led to the paradox of a centralised and 
hierarchical yet territorially and departmentally fragmented system (Davis 2010). 
In line with communist thought primarily concerned with heavy industry and working class 
welfare, the health sector was considered a non-productive sector and health care professionals 
were treated as a non-priority group. Primary care was provided by paediatricians, 
gynaecologists and generalists of low pay, status and qualification (Grielen et al. 2000). The 
priority given to the health sector at large was reflected in salaries: despite the highest levels of 
education attainment, medical workers were paid below the national average salary, in 
particular, below the epitomised industrial workers" salary. Moreover, the job often involved 
allocation to remote or countryside areas, putting additional burden on the health labour force. 
Gender inequalities existed as a majority of the medical staff was female. 
While resting on the same broad premises of state ownership, equity and free care, the 
communist health system evolved following the 20th century advancements in medicine and 
public health. Epidemiology, hygiene and sanitation, breakthrough medical discoveries such as 
the invention of penicillin and the rise of modern clinical medicine were among the factors that 
affected system organisation and pushed it towards an increasing reliance on hospital care. The 
health system also followed the broader political developments. Kornai (1988) illustrates how 
personal freedoms expanded in Hungary between the early 1950s and mid-1980s. The freedoms 
encompass professional choices (education, first job, change of job, working hours, overseas 
employment) and consumer choices (food, other consumer goods, housing, transport, medical 
services, child care, recreation and travel). Historically distinct is the hard Stalinist period, after 
which some thawing took place in the 1970s and 80s, resulting in the late 1960s revolutions in 
Hungary and the early 1980s Solidarity movement in Poland. These social changes had 
implications for how tightly the HCS were controlled by the political apparatus, particularly in 
the satellite countries. 
Despite being justified as people-orientated, the communist system suffered from serious equity 
issues. Admittedly, the first-contact medicine and hospital care were accessible geographically 
and available free of charge. In reality, the availability of health care facilities, accessibility of 
carc and its quality was liighly dependent on system tiers, ranging From good in the elitist, to 
medium in cities and poor in rural areas. Shortages in medical supplies forced substitution with 
inferior quality and promoted those well-connected and wealthy who were able to pay off in 
cash, in kind or by exchanging favours. The creation of informal networks was inherent to the 
communist system, which supported and necessitated these arrangements to exercise control and 
allocation (Paldam & Svendsen 2000). The political elite enjoyed a different exclusive tier of 
health care altogether. Moreover, in the face of officials' arbitrariness, personal intluence led to 
promotion of politicians' home regions and cities, which perpetuated inequalities. Overall 
equality and security was low, and resulting health protection only basic. 
Milton Friedman (1996), in his comment on Health Maintenance Organisations, drew a parallel 
to socialist health care as a warning against depersonalisation of medicine. Said 
depersonalisation occurs when the patient does not value "free" care and, in facing zero price, 
disregards the cost of provision. The physician, on the other hand, is concerned with 
perfomiance indicators, sees the patient as a "subject" and perceives him or herself primarily 
accountable to the employer. HMOs, Friedman argued, similarly to the socialist medicine 
deprive the individual of choice and dignity. Moreover, both systems introduce incentives that 
break the traditional relationship of trust and responsibility. 
In the environment where the State monopolised the provision of nigh all goods and services, 
responsiveness to citizens' needs was minimal and whimsical. The patient had no choice of 
provider and no venue for appeal against decisions or for complaints about poor quality of care 
(Komai & Eggleston 2001a). Clerks enjoyed the position of power and clients were considered 
"petitioners" with no voice to challenge the public behemoth. Anecdotal evidence tells 
indifference and unfriendliness were means for extracting informal fees by staff whose attention 
could be bought. Malpractice litigations were either non-existent or ineffective, as quality issues 
and disciplinary problems had the status of internal issues. Moreover, personal influence often 
protected doctors from facing any responsibility for medical errors. The doctors' untouchability 
granted by the self-defensive physicians' lobby persists to this day. In 1998 Poland, sentences 
were passed in 1.4 percent of malpractice complaints (Sandauer 1999). 
A distinguishing feature of the Semashko model was the emphasis it placed on hospital care. 
This came at the expense of marginalised primary care and neglected lifestyle issues of 
alcoholism, inadequate diets and working conditions, all of which meant forgoing highly cost-
effective preventive measures and adversely affected health outcomes. This became apparent in 
the comparative perspective: the Eastern Bloc lagged behind when western health systems 
benefited their populations with life expectancy increases in the latter half of the 20th century. 
Andreev et al. (2003) show that avoidable mortality rates in Russia and the Baltic States in the 
1960s were on a par with the United Kingdom (UK). However, towards the end of the century 
the communist countries failed to matcli the British system in eliminating avoidable deaths. This 
straggle was particularly pronounced in the USSR and then Russia, in consequence of avoidable 
mortality and other reasons, between 1965 and 1999, the life expectancy gap between Russia 
and the UK grew from 3.6 to 15.1 years for males and 1.6 to 7.4 for females. In Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary in the 1980s, avoidable mortality increased and then reduced slowly, compared to 
considerable monotonic decreases in six western countries (Bojan et al. 1991). This divergence 
illustrated the problems of economic efficiency and the incapacity to innovate. In particular, the 
Eastern Bloc failed to keep up with the West when new pharmaceuticals and surgical 
procedures were being widely introduced in the early 1970s (McKee 2005). However, Ensor 
(1993) argues that only a portion of the increases in life expectancy and mortality gaps between 
communist and Western countries were amenable to HCS inefficiencies. Environmental and 
lifestyle factors were substantially more material, which nonetheless revealed the inability of the 
health system to respond to those problems. 
The Semashko system proved effective in the post-war decades when modem health systems 
were being built. Expanding health system capacity through physician training and investments 
in basic physical infrastructure resulted in unprecedented levels of accessibility, most notably of 
inpatient care, although the quantity of care was prioritised over its quality. At those early stages 
the input drive provided an opportunity for increasing the densities of facility networks and the 
number of doctors per unit of population. This translated into the availability of hospital beds 
and equitable access to specialised care for entire populations, if with preferred treatment of 
industry workers and state employees. Public health and the emphasis on epidemiology was 
another achievement of the evidence-based communist medicine (Borowitz & Atun 2006). 
Extensive vaccination programmes covered nearly 100% of children ( W H O HFA-DB). This 
statistic was the ultimate propaganda material, and an alleged proof of the Soviet system 
superiority over capitalism. These developments were paralleled by provision of clean water, 
improvements in sanitation, hygiene, nutrition, education, control of infectious, occupational 
and environment-related diseases. Altogether, these factors led to declines in child and maternal 
mortality rates as well as standardised death rates (SDRs) in various disease categories, ergo 
large improvements in health status across the population until the early 1960s (Borowitz & 
Atun 2006). The increasing life expectancy was a result of the system's orientation towards 
containing communicable diseases, such as malaria, yaws, leprosy and tuberculosis, which 
posed the major health challenge over a couple of decades after World War 11. 
It was only after the epidemiological shift to non-communicable diseases when the system 
showed its limitations: a lack of flexibility, the negligence of primary care, the lack of health 
promotion as a part of public health strategy, and the failure to control and counteract risk 
factors such as high consumption of dietary fat as well as drinking and smoking habits. These 
deficiencies resulted in a great burden of self-induced cardiovascular, stroke and cancer diseases 
and disallowed further mortality decreases that unfolded in Western Europe. Nonetheless, the 
Semashko system maintained its hallmark features: universal entitlement, a high level of 
protection against health-related financial risks, and emphasis on equality and solidarity if at the 
expense of efficiency (Shakarishvili & Davey 2005). Expectations thereof persist in the 
transition societies. 
To some extent, the Soviet model resembled some European systems. In particular, it shared 
features of the National Health Service model in being a unified national system for service 
delivery, publicly owned and administrated, and funded through general taxation, albeit with 
lower levels of aggregate health spending. In 1991, the USSR health care expenditures 
amounted to less than 4% of its GDP, compared to 6% in the UK, which also represented the 
lowest level among the O E C D countries. This reflected the perception of the health sector as a 
non-productive area of the economy (Borowitz & Atun 2006). After the initial period of relative 
success, the system started to stagnate and collapse under the weight of the self-imposed 
development philosophy, input orientation and the grandiosity of the Communist planning. 
Growing hospital networks greatly contributed with their high upkeep, mediocre quality and a 
lack of flexibility in targeting the changing nature of health needs. Adaptation to the changing 
needs related to lifestyles and civilisation was beyond its reach, due to the inherent lack of 
flexibility. The system design inevitably promoted and rewarded corruptive behaviours, which 
lead to the growth o f an unofficial circulation of goods and services. The informal allocation 
became a material part of the communist economy. 
Rowland and Telyukov (1991) summarise the problems that post-Soviet health care systems 
faced on the brink of transition. They report four groups of problems, relevant to all communist 
countries, but considerably more severe in the Soviet Republics than in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Firstly, there are environmental factors, most notably high prevalence of smoking, poor 
dietary and lifestyle practices, meagre living conditions and hazardous labour conditions. 
Secondly, health system factors include dramatic shortages in basic inputs for health care 
production, including facilities, equipment, medical supplies and wages. Rowland and Telyukov 
illustrate these conditions with the fact that in rural areas of Soviet Republics, 27 per cent of 
hospitals had no sewage system and 17 per cent had no running water. The third problem 
concerns an intentional overreliance on hospitals, intensified by the lack of consideration for 
primary health in polyclinics and ambulatory care centres. The region had the highest numbers 
o f hospitals and hospital beds per unit of population in the world, the longest lengths of stay, 
and vast numbers of highly specialised mcdieal professionals trained to staff those facilities. 
Fourthly, the authors indicate the low priority given to the health sector at large, which 
materialises in low levels of funding expressed as a share of GNP; this is coupled with the 
rigidity o f planning, a lack o f efficiency incentives, low morale of health workers, and an utter 
lack o f confidence in the system by all its stakeholders. 
At the dusk of communism virtually all CEE/CIS countries operated this classical Semashko 
system. Minor design variations that took place before 1989 (discussed in Chapter 2.3) did not 
affect its principal mechanisms. The system became the region 's inheritance and the burden 
carried over into the period of transition. In some progressive countries of CEE, health care 
organisation has been largely redefined with the aim of neutralising deficiencies of both excess 
and shortage. However, the more intangible aspects of the communist system such as attitudes 
and corruption left an enduring burden across the region, and hampered the reform process. 
2.2 . A n ins t i tu t iona l t r a n s m u t a t i o n 
2.2.1. From central planning to market allocation 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe have recently seen a dramatic change in how their 
economies operate and perform. In just over twenty years they transitioned from central and 
planned into market-based, open economies, marking their presence in the global economy. The 
challenges of transition from centrally planned to free market economy were unprecedented. In 
case of most countries this transformation entailed a marked convergence to Western socio-
economic systems. Kornai (2006) enumerates its six most important characteristics: ( I ) a shift to 
the capitalist economic system and (2) democracy; (3) completeness, in encompassing the 
economy, the political sphere, ideology, legal systems and the society; (4) non-violence and (5) 
and peacefulness in starting off and spreading out without a military confiict; (6) progressing at 
a remarkable pace over 10-15 years. 
Deep structural changes and marketisation were high on the CEE/CIS reform agenda. This was 
a result of bottom-up freedom aspirations of the populations but also a strategy advocated by the 
World Bank and other advisory organisations. Recipes for creating the free market economy 
relied on the ingredients of stabilisation, liberalisation and deregulation, a rapid shift f rom 
shortage to surplus economy, privatisation and structural ownership changes, as well as 
integration with Western Europe (Lipton et al. 1990). Some outcomes of these experimental 
reforms were increased income inequalities, an early recession and a fall in economic outputs 
ranging from 15 per cent in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe to 40 per cent in CIS, 
accompanied by an accelerated economic growth in most countries (World Bank 2002). The 
initial recession was primarily caused by (a) a rapid shift from a sellers ' market to a buyers ' 
market, (b) the transformation of the real structure of the economy, (c) disruptions in 
coordination, (d) financial discipline and enforcement of efficiency, and (e) the backwardness of 
the financial sector (Komai 1994). 
A retrospective account reveals a number of approaches rather than a unifying theory of post-
socialist transition. Papava (2005) argues that the term does not imply any specific concepts, 
approaches or definitions. Instead, it is a broad term that is used in reference to a number of 
cases and lines of thought that apply to political, social and economic contexts. Key political 
choices conccrncd gradual change or "shock therapy", a process of approaching to a market 
economy or a search for the "third way" or "market socialism", organic private sector growth or 
"accelcrated privatisation", as well as a redctmilion of state ownership and public choice 
(decentralisation. New Political Economy). Furthermore, the emerging private sector was far 
from homogeneous (Winiecki 2000). Substantial differences existed between the privatised 
enterprises formerly operated by the state and the generic private entrepreneurship that was 
further diversified by linn sizes and industries. Komai (2000b) emphasised that the private 
sector could only achievc its full capacity through organic development. Former State 
companies, privatised or corporatised, would often carry old system's fallacies of the 
monopolistic power, obsolete technologies, oversized staff, bureaucratic practices and deep-
rooted inefficiencies. 
The transition paths have differed between the countries over the 20 years since the fall of 
Communism. Some have remained largely unreformed (e.g. Belarus), whereas some others 
made great development steps. For example, in 2006, the Czech Republic and Estonia met the 
World Bank's definitions of high income countries, and were later joined by Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia (World Bank 2013). These countries have also become the European Union 
members, which marked their comprehensive institutional transformation. The World Bank 
(2002) highlights structural changes of the first ten years of transition, by the same token 
identifying the factors that contributed to differences in performance between post-communist 
economies. Among these factors are: imposing market discipline and hard budget constraints 
upon inherited state enterprises and encouraging the growth of new enterprises independent 
from the state; introducing measures against corruption, theft and asset-stripping; managing the 
burdens of protectionism, special privileges, industry cross-subsidies and inefficiencies; 
strengthening the financial systems; privatisation, restructuring and promoting market entry; 
rapid growth of small enterprises; managing the tax burden; building a market-friendly 
institutional and policy framework; de-politicising enterprises; de-monopolisation; investor and 
private-property protection; rule of law and legal certainty; flexibility of labour markets; fiscal 
discipline and sustainability; and reforming the oversized welfare sector. Kornai (2000b) 
observed that a shift from socialist to capitalist economy yields the best results when the change 
is gradual and organic. Impelling a high pace of transformation led to inferior reform quality, 
stability and sustainability, factors that are decisive for macroeconomic success in the medium 
and long term. Experimentations with hybrid social markets and continued public ownership 
were also found to be predictors of economic underperformance. 
Moreover, the "negative social capital" had adverse implications for the pace of transformation. 
The strength of informal networks broke general trust and destroyed social capital, a problem 
that became visible after the move to a market system that rewarded cooperation. Paldam and 
Svendsen (2000) operationalised the idea of social capital and measured its abundance, 
establishing a correlation between replenishing the pool of social capital and fostering social 
and economic growth. The low levels of the public good "trust" stand out as a major obstacle to 
the region's development (Fukuyama 1995). 
The post-communist transition was a historically unique event that brought about a complete 
transformation in a peaceful way. The historical weight of this achievement could not be 
overstated. However, the new reality has been a disappointment for many. Among the troubles 
that emerged in the process were growing inequalities, financial and employment insecurity, 
persistence of corruption, indolent politics and faulty legislation. There were also cognitive 
problems, including the disillusionment related to the perceptions of breaking the social 
solidarity contract, a division between the winners and losers, cancelling certain social safety 
net privileges, and hostility towards vicious capitalism (Kornai 2006). 
A highly unionised and bureaucratised welfare sector lagged behind in reform. There was a lack 
of clarity in reform goals and functioning and the tax burden of various social services remained 
largely unclear. Restoring proportions being between the overblown welfare promises and 
economic sustainability led many beneficiaries towards poverty (Komai 1997). The welfare 
reforms contributed to the overall disappointment. 
Finally, there was the problem of the state paternalism that Komai (1988) dubs "the greatest 
despotism imaginable". The socialist oppression put restrictions on property and 
entrepreneurship, choice of profession, job and working conditions, consumer choice, household 
savings and investment. The limited freedom had its economic as well as moral implications. 
Therefore, cautious of the continuity of the de-humanised bureaucratic system, Komai 
advocated personal and economic freedom as a basis for overall transformation and for health 
care system reform in particular (Komai & Eggleston 2001b). 
2.2.2. Institutional implications of the doctrine change 
The change of regime had implications going far beyond market allocation as understood in 
neoclassical economics: in fact, it touched upon all levels of social and economic life. New 
Institutional Economics (Williamson 1998, 2000) provides a comprehensive framework that 
enables accounting for its full ramifications. So far as the purpose of institutions is to create 
order and reduce uncertainty, non-market institutions determine the feasibility and profitability 
of economic activity (North 1991). From the institutional perspective, the metamorphosis of 
post-communist countries has been the most profound. 
At the level of social embeddedness, the events of 1989-91 catalysed a redefinition of values, 
traditions and cultural norms that in an undisrupted course of history would have taken 
cenluries. Open and liberalised martcet economies gave rise to consumerism and exposed tlie 
populations to the western world of possibilities and increased expectations of quality and 
responsiveness of goods and services. The societies adopted income stratification and 
individualism, and the family fabric o f society has been subject to gradual change with 
implications for household production, informal exchange and caring. In those aspects, 
transition marked a new era of fast paced convergence to Western countries. Altruistic beliefs 
perpetuated, but the scope of individualism and solidarity had to be rebalanced. This had 
implications for the redistributive function of the government, and new measures for 
maintaining efficiency while reducing inequalities were required. New expectations, needs and 
wants applied to health care as much as to other consumption patterns. Legal regulations were 
rewritten accordingly, beginning with the constitution, to set the fundament for the new socio-
economic order. New organisational, legal and ownership fornis emerged in compliance with 
this institutional environment, relying on markets and structure integration to optimise 
production and transaction costs. Finally, markets for goods, services and production factors 
enabled resource allocation based on price and quantity equilibria rather than input-driven 
central plans and rationing. This resulted in a rapid shift from shortage to surplus economy. 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2003) argued that successful transformation was determined by 
flexibility o f institutions rather than their optimality. The case for attributing growth to 
institutions was weakened by evidence of institutional development being endogenous rather 
than exogenous and a high degree of substitutivity of institutions. This is notwithstanding the 
fact that government credibility and protection of property rights are indispensable for economic 
growth. Engerman and Sokoloff concluded that societies with good institutions are more 
flexible and adapt better to changing internal and external conditions, while societies with poor 
institutions are unable to respond to changing conditions and take advantage of their 
opportunities, advantages and knowledge. 
Assuming a historical perspective, Chavance (2008) considered "stylised facts" about post-
communist transition: differences in reform strategies, macroeconomic performance, enterprise 
perfomiance and response to changes in ownership and governance. He concluded that powerful 
fonnal and informal rules underiay different transition trajectories. Thumer & Kotzian (2001) 
demonstrated that similar institutional approaches can enhance our understanding of health care 
systems, their complex networks of formal and informal interactions, wants and needs, 
transition paths, as well as market failures. 
2.3. Similarities and dissimilarities of the transition countries 
The transformation of CEE/CIS health care systems, including the process explored in Chapters 
3 to 5, can be seen as a natural experiment (McKee 2005) with set initial conditions and 
outcomes varying accordingly to the choice of HCS reforms and other relevant determinants. 
The reforms are in focus of the subsequent chapters. Instead, the aim o f this section is to discuss 
the remaining two assumptions: that of a homogenous starting point and of a variation in other 
factors relevant to HCS performance. The concept of one region has an inherent fallacy o f 
implicitly putting countries such as the Czech Republic and Turkmenistan in one league. In fact, 
across the region, there exists a large variation in macroeconomic as well as broader human 
development conditions. Therefore, understanding the cultural, economic and environmental 
diversity is central to obtaining valid results, contextualising the findings as well as reaching 
binding, generalisable conclusions. 
2.3.1. A shared inheritance 
Described in Chapter 2.1 are basic characteristics of the Semashko model. The study o f hospital 
governance in subsequent chapters assumes that these features were shared across CEE/CIS and 
constitute a common point of entry into transition. In reality, some deviations from the standard 
model existed, especially in the provision of primary and ambulatory care. For one, the scopes 
of curative and preventive tasks of primary care differed between countries. Grielen et al. (2000) 
established that General Practitioners (CPs) in CEE provided more comprehensive care and 
more often engaged in prevention than their CIS peers. A GP tradition existed in Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania, where in 1980 60 per cent of doctors were GPs. In contrast, the share of 
GPs in Bulgaria was negligible. Private practice was tolerated in Hungary, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia, while it was strictly illegal in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. In Hungary, 16 
per cent of health professionals were involved in private practice (Davis 2010). In Poland, prior 
to 1989, primary and ambulatory specialist care was provided privately, under the conditions of 
obtaining an administrative permit and maintaining employment in a public health care 
institution (Saltman et al. 2007). Local idiosyncrasies also concerned the extent of territorial 
governments and private sector participation. Quasi-decentralisation arrangements delegated 
facility management (Kyrgyzstan) or ownership (Latvia) to districts and municipalities. In 
Hungary social insurance made minor but material (approx. 10%) contributions to health 
expenditures. Patient fees for non-essential services were more common in CEE than CIS. The 
rules for central planning were in some cases modified, e.g. in Poland the allocation of resources 
to providers was based on the numbers of admissions, while in Hungary some market-based 
indicative planning was exercised. The main dividing line was between the USSR representing 
the classical model of Communist political economy, and satellite CEE countries that 
represented its minor deviations (Komai 1992, 2000b). Furthermore, while based on unchanging 
foundations, the systems evolved in time, with the narrow heterogeneity of the Stalinist period 
widening in the later decades of political thawing. This short summary illustrates that local 
variations related primarily to primary and ambulatory care. On the other hand, the hospital 
sector with its core concepts of allocation and organisation was considerably less variant. 
Therefore , the assumption of a shared starting point is not a strong one as far as the hospital 
sector is concerned. 
2.3.2. Diverse economies and transition pathways 
The situation is much less uniform in terms of economic and institutional development. The 
substantial initial di f ferences became more pronounced, which is illustrated by the regional 
range of Human Development Index values doubling from 0.15 in 1990 to 0.30 in 2000. 
Throughout the 2000s, after the socio-economic shock of transition had been largely absorbed, a 
limited but steady convergence took place, which is reflected by the range decreasing to 0.26 in 
2010 (Table 2.1). Globally, no post-communist country qualifies as "very high human 
development" (2010 HDI score greater or equal to 0.902). Half of the 22 countries are areas of 
"high human d e v e l o p m e n f (score between 0.753 and 0.901), nine fall into the group of 
"medium human development" (score between 0.631 and 0.752), while Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan nearly miss this category instead qualifying as " low human development" (United 
Nations Development Programme 2013). 
This institutional diversity inspired researchers to identify clusters of countries that would 
enable further analysis and customise policy recommendations. A classification of political 
systems based on the Freedom House annual ratings of political and civil liberties was proposed 
by the World Bank (2002). The four resulting groups were (a) competitive democracies of CEE, 
(b) concentrated political regimes (e.g. Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania), (c) war-
torn regimes (Armenia, Albania, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan), and (d) non-competi t ive 
political regimes ([Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan). The clusters of countries 
are good predictors of various indicators of political development, e.g. veto point index, 
political executive turnovers, cumulative progress in transition towards market economy, or 
state capture index. 
Fenger (2007) considers 19 indicators of governmental programmes, social situation and 
political participation. Based on a cluster analysis he argues that CEE/CIS region can be divided 
into three groups of welfare regimes: (a) Central and Eastern European, (b) former USSR, and 
(c) developing welfare states such as Romania, Moldova and Georgia. The first and second 
clusters have established governmental social programmes; however, CEE generally performs 
better with respect to income inequality, health outcomes and other measures of social 
development . The third group is less developed in terms of social and welfare parameters. In all 
post-communist clusters the levels of trust, social programmes and social situation are 
considerably lower than in comparator O E C D countries. The differences are so large that 
CEE/CIS clearly form a separate socio-welfare group and do not seem to fit into the Western 
typology of conservative-corporatist , social-democratic, and liberal systems. Fenger also 
concludes that a convergence between East and West is occurring, liowever, at a slower pace 
than expected. 
Table 2.1: Human Development Index in CEE/CIS, selected years 
Country 1990 (...) 2000 2005 2010 
Albania 0 .66 0 . 7 0 0 .73 0 .75 
A r m e n i a 0 .63 0 . 6 5 0 . 7 0 0 .72 
A z e r b a i j a n 0 ,73 
Be la rus 0 .73 0 . 7 9 
Bulgar ia 0 .70 0 .72 0 .76 0 . 7 8 
C z e c h Republ ic 0 .82 0 . 8 6 0 . 8 7 
Estonia 0 .73 0 . 7 9 0 .83 0 . 8 4 
Georg ia 0.71 0 . 7 4 
H u n g a r y 0.71 0 . 7 9 0 .82 0 .83 
K a z a k h s t a n 0 . 6 6 0 .72 0 . 7 4 
K y r g y z s t a n 0.61 0 .58 0 .60 0 .62 
Latv ia 0 .70 0 . 7 4 0 .79 0 .81 
Lithuania 0 .73 0 .76 0 .80 0.81 
Moldova 0 .65 0 .59 0 .64 0 .65 
Po land 0 .78 0 .80 0 .82 
R o m a n i a 0.71 0.71 0 . 7 6 0 .78 
Russ i an Federa t ion 0 .73 0.71 0 .75 0 .78 
Slovakia 0 .75 0 .79 0.81 0 . 8 4 
Taj ik is tan 0 .62 0 .53 0 .58 0.61 
T u r k m e n i s t a n 0 . 6 9 
U k r a i n e 0.71 0 .67 0 .72 0 .73 
U z b e k i s t a n 0 .62 0 . 6 4 
C E E / C I S r a n g e 0 .15 0 .30 0 .28 0 . 2 6 
Global min 0 .20 0 .23 0 .26 0 . 3 0 
Global m a x 0 .88 0 .92 0 .95 0 .95 
Source; United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports, 2013. 
CEE/CIS range represents the spread between the highest and the lowest reported values, illustrating the varying 
severity of the 1990s' socio-economic shock and the 2000s ' slow convergence of the region. Global minimum and 
maximum are the lowest and highest values reported across 186 surveyed countries. The lower boundary is set by 
Niger or Democratic Republic of the Congo, the highest - by Norway or Australia. 
2.4. M a c r o e c o n o m i c and s o c i o - d e m o g r a p h i c cha l l enges of transi t ion 
2.4.1. National product and aggregate health spending 
Health care transition cannot be Fully explained if detached from the broader economic change. 
Given the high GDP dynamics and low initial health expenditures as share of income of post-
communist countries, this area provides for an impactful aspect of HCS inputs. Higher national 
income ceteris paribus generates more resources to be used in the health care process, leading to 
better outcomes at any level of HCS efficiency. In line with the hypothesis of luxury good at the 
national level (Getzen 2000), the effect of growing GDP is typically magnified by increasing 
shares of national income being allocated for health expenditures. Common to nearly all post-
communist countries was also an early deterioration of both macroeconomic output and health 
outcomes. Although reasons for the worsening health status were more complex and featured a 
broader destabilisation of social conditions, the decline in GDP offered an important factor 
driving the HCS instability (Nemec & Kolisnichenko 2006). 
Every CEE/CIS country experienced to some extent a macroeconomic decline, and in 
consequence decreasing real wages, inflation, increasing inequality and poverty. Health care 
revenue collection was disturbed by a turbulent political environment, tax base constrained by 
decreased economic output, growing informal sector, weak tax authority capacity to raise 
revenue, war and conllict, external influences (the EU, aid donors, etc.) as well as legal 
uncertainty, changing rules of the social contract and faltering trust in the state. Mossialos and 
Dixon (2002) refer to the above as contextual factors of revenue collcction: situational, 
structural, environmental and cultural. Expenditure pressures necessitate greater financial 
resources obtained through increased taxes, which in turn induce more informal sector 
economic activity that diminishes the tax base. This vicious circle perpetuates in countries with 
weak tax authorities and leaking social benefit systems. 
The lack of stability prompted the search for an alternative, stable source of health care revenue, 
outside of political influences over the central budget. As a result, nearly half of the analysed 
countries turned to social health insurance contributions. However, the payroll-based earmarked 
contributions did not avoid the problems that undermined tax-based financing. The contribution 
base declined in many countries as a result of population ageing and higher dependency 
burdens, unemployment, low shares of economically active population (creating the extra 
burden of vast groups claiming disability benefits and early retirements), declines in incomes, 
public and private companies" bankruptcies, and various fornis of tax evasion (Preker et al. 
2002). 
The fiscal context is essential in explaining regional differences and attained levels of health 
objectives, on a par with health care system reforms. The level of government health care 
spending depends on its fiscal capacity (i.e. tax base) and on the priority given to health 
(reflected by the share of budget allocated). With respect to the latter, the low-priority approach 
to health care typical of the communist systems persisted in many countries, particularly in the 
lower income brackets in CIS. The international pattern of higher income countries relying more 
on government spending generally holds in CEE/CIS. This prioritisation contributes to 
explaining differences in achieved health policy goals at any given level of income. Considering 
both above factors, there has been a great variation in the region. However, despite ongoing 
reform and dynamic economic growth, countries tend to maintain their relative positions 
(Kutz in&Jakab 2010). 
Table 2.2 illustrates regional differences in the national product, the depth of the economic 
recession that followed the fall of Communism, and the expansion of economies throughout the 
2000s. Except for one Poland, all countries experienced an economic decline over the period 
1990-1995. By 2010, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Ukraine, did not manage 
to regain the 1990 levels of economic output. Despite varied rates of growth, countries largely 
inaintained their relative positions: the correlation between 1990 and 2010 GDP p.c. ranks is 
very high at 0.9. 
Tabic 2.2: Real gross domestic product and growth dynamics 
GDP* GDP as % of 1990 GDP 
Country 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Albania 3,910 92 123 156 196 
Armenia 2,938 58 78 139 167 
Azerbaijan 4,754 39 52 95 187 
Belarus 6,434 65 90 133 194 
Bulgaria 7,529 91 95 130 153 
Czech Republic 16,367 95 103 124 138 
Estonia 10,146 77 108 163 163 
Georgia 6,138 29 41 59 74 
Hungary 13,120 89 104 129 129 
Kazakhstan 7,089 63 76 123 154 
Kyrgyzstan 2,524 49 60 68 80 
Latvia 10,109 61 84 129 128 
Lithuania 12,500 59 76 114 124 
Moldova 4,583 40 36 52 61 
Poland 8,182 110 144 168 212 
Romania 7,853 92 87 119 139 
Russian Federation 12,626 62 68 94 112 
Slovakia 12,693 85 100 127 159 
Tajikistan 2,961 35 33 51 66 
Turkmenistan 3,749 55 62 127 198 
Ukraine 8,063 48 46 69 75 
Uzbekistan 2,002 73 82 100 139 
* G D P p.c. PPP$ 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2012. 
The relationship between the HCS and the economy is a bilateral one. There is a strong 
macroeconomic case for strengthening the health system; conversely, a weak HCS will impede 
the GDP growth and undermine the country 's international competitiveness. Suhrcke et al. 
(2005) observe that health and wealth are subject to a mutually reinforcing feedback loop. There 
are various approaches to explaining this relationship: individual, household and macro-level 
economic impacts, cost-of-illness, as well as "full income" indicators of social welfare that 
account for health as both a consumption and investment good. At the individual and household 
level, health proxies can be used to explain productivity, wages, labour force participation, 
absenteeism, provision of informal care, educational outcomes, etc. At the macroeconomic 
level, health is a well-established predictor of growth and contributes to explaining wealth 
di f ferences between high and low income countries. Cost-of-i l lness studies capture resources 
used for medical treatment as well as productivity lost due to poor state of health. In developing 
countries, the burden of disease relates primarily to communicable diseases, maternal 
conditions, nutritional deficiencies; in developed countries, instead, the challenges are of non-
communicable nature, including cardiovascular, diabetes, injuries and mental disorders. "Full 
income" measures of the economic output, e.g. Human Development Index, correct for 
shortcomings of GDP by factoring in non-market goods such as health outcomes. Furthermore, 
the HCS directly contributes to the economy as one of its biggest industries, with the average 
share of health in GDP at 6.61 per ccnt in the 22 countries ( W H O HFA-DB, W H O estimates, 
2009). In terms of the labour market, in 25 EU countries, health and social care amount to ca. 9 
per cent of all workforce (Suhrcke et al. 2005). In sum, investing in health care is essential for 
closing both health and income gaps between and within industrialised and emerging countries. 
2.4.2. Trends in social and demographic determinants of health 
The transition countries faced severe difficulties in securing financial assets for an uninterrupted 
HCS operation. On the other hand, parallel changes affected the demand for health and 
eff iciency of health production (Grossman 1972). These include higher educational attainment, 
higher demand for health care and expectations of quality (result of higher income, education 
and open borders), population trends (zero or negative growth rates coupled with population 
ageing), the changing structure of disease burden including chronic diseases but also relatively 
high risk factors leading to infectious and acute conditions (Waters et al. 2008). In particular, 
environmental and lifestyle changes that result in cost pressures on the HCS were triggered or 
amplif ied by the shifting doctrine. In so far as these factors are subject to regional differences, 
they are relevant for the discussion of regional differences in the HCS performance. Briefiy 
discussed below here are selected factors, with the aim of indicating broad ramifications of the 
changing socio-demographic landscape. 
Economic inequalities 
The magni tude of increases in inequality alone distinguishes the post-communist region (World 
Bank 2000b). The complexity of the post-communist transformation and the break in 
institutional continuity had immense implications for the political, economic and social life as 
well as likely adverse consequences for economic development (World Bank 2000c). Increases 
in poverty and unemployment were accompanied by less tangible costs of displacement, the loss 
of social belonging, uncertainties, growing inadequacies of knowledge and skills, as well as an 
emerging division between winners and losers of the transition process. Economic insecurity, 
deterioration of the health and education systems, and growing social strains all contributed to 
the inequalities that emerged not only in the economic but also psychological and social 
d imens ions . T h r o u g h o u t the 1990s, e c o n o m i c inequal i t ies increased cons iderably (Table 2 .3) in 
both higher and lower income countr ies . Ta j ik i s tan , Moldova , and The Russian Federat ion were 
par t icular ly s t rongly afTected, wi th Gini coef f ic ien t increases o f near ly 20 points . A l o n g wi th 
income, inequal i t ies by age, educat ion , area and health s tatus deepened , wi th a no tab le 
except ion of gender d i f fe rences that were subject to a dec l ine ( H e y n s 2005) . In the 2000s , in 
parallel to expand ing economies , the inequali t ies s o m e w h a t lessened. T h e s e changes were l ikely 
to have an impact on health care access and util isation, and consequen t ly on health ou t comes . 
Chap te r 6 provides ev idence on this p rob lem in a compara t ive s tudy o f seven C E E countr ies . 
Table 2.3: Inequal i ty of househo ld d isposable i n c o m e dis tr ibut ion (Gini coef f ic ient ) 
Country 
GDP* 
2000 
Income Gini coefficien! 
1989-90 2001-02 2008 
Taj ik is tan 9 6 9 28.1 4 7 . 0 32 .6 ' 
K y r g y z s t a n 1,507 27 .0 37 .7 37 .3 
Uzbek i s t an 1,632 28 .0 26 .8 37 .3 
Moldova 1,657 25.1 43 .5 35 .3 
A r m e n i a 2,295 25.1 30 .9 
T u r k m e n i s t a n 2,322 27 .9 
A z e r b a i j a n 2,490 30 .8 37 .3 33 .7 
Georg ia 2,502 30.1 45 .8 41 .3 
Ukra ine 3,696 22 .8 36 .4 27.5 
Alban ia 4 ,800 28 .2 34.5 
K a z a k h s t a n 5,406 28.1 29 .3 
Be la r t j s 5,810 22 .9 24 .5 27 .2 
R o m a n i a 6 ,838 23 .7 35 .3 31 .2 
Bulgar ia 7 ,118 23 .3 37 .0 
Latvia 8,529 26 .0 35 .8 36 .6 
R u s s i a n Federa t ion 8,613 26 .5 4 5 . 6 42 .3 
Lithuania 9 ,518 26 .3 35 .7 37 .6 
Estonia 11,002 28 .0 39 .3 
Po land 11,753 27.5 35 .3 34 .2 
Slovakia 12,726 26 .7 26 .9 
H u n g a r y 13,674 22 .5 26 .7 
C z e c h Republ ic 16,887 19.8 23 .4 
• GDP p.c. PPP$, ' 2007 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2012; Heyns, 2005; United Nations Development Programme, 
Human Development Reports, 2013. 
T h e age s tructure of populat ion 
T h e general unders tanding is that populat ion age ing is a process that is a rgued to result in m a j o r 
f inancial pressures on health care sys tems. The cost pressures are projected to increase despi te 
the cost per individual fal l ing over t ime ( O E C D 2006) , d u e to "hea l thy age ing" policies and the 
fact that m a j o r health costs c o m e at the end of life (Zwei fe l et al. 1999). The prob lem of 
increas ing d e m a n d for heal th care and long term care is coup led with a g rowing d e p e n d e n c y 
ratio that de te rmines the level of h u m a n and f inancial resources avai lable in the HCS. 
Population ageing is a global trend that constitutes another source of pressure on the transition 
systems. Between 1990 and 2010, nearly all CEE/CIS countries (with the exception of 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) experienced considerable increases in the share of population aged 
65 and more (Table 2.4). Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia have the most aged populations, with the 
said measure in excess of 17%. In the region at large, the share of population aged 65 and more 
increased from 37.9m in 1990 to 46.6m in 2010, corresponding to 9.8% and 12.2% of the total 
population, respectively. 
Table 2.4: Share of population aged 65 or more (% ) 
C o u n t r j 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Albania 5.3 6.2 7.4 8.4 9.7 
Armenia 5.6 8.4 10.0 12.0 11.1 
Azerbaijan 4.2 4.7 5.6 6.8 6.6 
Belarus 10.6 12.5 13.4 14.4 13.6 
Bulgaria 13.1 15.1 16.6 17.2 17.5 
Czech Republic 12.5 13.1 13.7 14.0 14.8 
Estonia 11.7 13.6 15.2 16.7 17.2 
Georgia 9.3 11.3 12.5 14.6 14.3 
1 iungary 13.4 14.3 15.1 15.7 16.5 
Kazakhstan 5.9 7.2 6.8 7.9 6.8 
Kyrgyzstan 5.0 5.4 5.5 5.6 4.4 
Lat\'ia 11.9 13.6 15.6 16.9 17.8 
Lithuania 10.9 12.3 13.9 15.2 161 
Moldova 8.3 9.0 10.0 11.2 11.2 
Poland 10.1 11.1 12.3 13.2 13.6 
Romania 10.4 12.0 13.4 14.8 14.9 
Russian Federation 10.2 12.1 12.4 13.8 12.8 
Slovakia 10.1 10.6 I I .1 11.5 12.1 
Tajikistan 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.9 3.5 
Turkmenistan 3.8 4.1 4.3 4.6 4.1 
Ukraine 12.2 13.8 14.0 16.1 15.5 
Uzbekistan 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.7 4.4 
Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2012. 
Education and schooling 
There are inany mechanisms through which education can be linked to risk factors, health 
production, utilisation of medical care and health outcomes. Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006, 
2012) provide comprehensive overviews of various linking mechanisms as well as international 
evidence thereof Education displays a positive correlation with per capita income, which 
connects to different lifestyles as well as occupational diseases. The basic hypothesis posits that 
ceteris paribus additional years of education contribute towards better health outcomes. Table 
2.5 demonstrates the growing educational attainment in the post-communist countries. Between 
1990 and 2010, mean years of schooling increased in all countries by 1.8 years on the average. 
In Hungary , Kazakhs tan , Latvia, and Lithuania, this t ranslated to an increase of over 3 0 % . The 
Czech Republ ic and Estonia are regional leaders in the quant i ty of educat ion, with the ave rage 
period of school ing exceed ing 12 years . 
Tabic 2.5: M e a n years of school ing , ages 25+ 
Country 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Albania 7 .6 8.5 9 .3 9 .9 10.2 10.4 
A r m e n i a 9 .6 10.1 10.4 10.8 10.8 10.8 
Bulgaria 8.5 8 .9 9 .3 9 .4 9 .7 9 .9 
C z e c h Republic 10.5 10.9 11.4 11.9 13.1 12.3 
Estonia 8.8 9 .3 10.5 11.7 11.9 12.0 
H u n g a r y 8 .8 8 .7 10.4 11.2 11.5 11.7 
K a z a k h s t a n 7.0 7 .7 8 .8 9 .9 10.2 10.4 
K y r g y z s t a n 7.4 8.1 8 .6 9 .2 9 .2 9 .3 
Latvia 6 .9 7.5 8 .8 9 .4 10.1 10.4 
Lithuania 7.5 8 .3 9.1 9 .9 10.7 10.9 
Moldova 7.3 8 .0 8 .6 9 .0 9 .4 9 .7 
Poland 8.3 8 .4 9.1 9 .5 9 .7 10.0 
R o m a n i a 8 .6 9 .0 9 .5 9 .9 10.1 10.4 
Russ ian Federa t ion 7 .8 8.5 8 .9 9 .6 9 .7 9 .8 
Slovakia 10.4 10.6 11.2 11.2 11.6 11.6 
Taj ikis tan 8.3 9 .0 9 .6 9 .9 10.0 9 .8 
Ukra ine 8.2 9.1 10.4 10.7 11.1 11.3 
Source: Barro & l-ee, Educational Attainment Dataset. 2011. 
Diseases of civil isation 
While disabil i ty adjus ted life years at tr ibutable to communicab le diseases and injur ies remain 
high in C E E / C I S as compared to Western Europe, in 2000 the leading contr ibutors w e r e 
ischaemic heart disease and cerebrovascular disease, fo l lowed by mental d isorders (Powles et al. 
2005) . Lifes tyle changes conducive to the occurrence of those condi t ions were in part t r iggered 
or enhanced by the ongoing t ransfomiat ion . The overall burden of chronic condi t ions and 
diseases of civil isat ion is increasing at a high pace, const i tut ing another source of cost pressures 
on the HCS and risk on individuals and households (Suhrcke et al. 2007) . Overwe igh t and 
obesi ty are one of the ma jo r concerns; if unchecked, obesi ty and associated i l lnesses can 
generate up to 6 % of total health care expendi tures , and impose fur ther costs in the fo rm of lost 
product ivi ty (Knai et al. 2007). These factors may hinder historical t rends in economic g rowth 
and improving health outcomes . 
C E E / C I S shares the global pat terns of risk factors and diseases of civi l isat ion, in such aspects as 
mental i l lness, microbial resis tance to antibiotics and re -emerg ing epidemics , with the 
possibil i ty of regress ions in human deve lopment . Table 2.6 exempl i f i es with fact by col lat ing 
selected indicators of early and late stages of t ransi t ion. Diabetes and cancer b e c a m e more 
Table 2.6: Selected indicators related to diseases of civilisation 
Diabetes prevalence 
(%) 
Cancer prevalence 
(%) 
Circulatory system 
diseases (hospital 
discharges per 
100.000) 
Mental & nervous 
svstem conditions as 
% of all death causes 
Tuberculosis 
incidence (per 
100.000) 
Count ry 1991 2009 1990 2005 1992 2010 1989 2009 1989 2010 
Albania O.ll 399' 767 2.3 3.2- 21.8 13.5 
Armenia 1.05 1.45 0.62 0.82 831 1,262 0.7 0.5 19.6 43.3 
Azerbaijan 0.62 1.21 0.43 0.28 1,175 584 1.1 0.8 ' 42.9 70.6 
Belarus 1.19' 2.08 1.20' 2.01 3^27 ' 6,126 1.0 1.7 36.4 52.7 
Bulgaria 1.12 1.71 3.07 1,881 3,617 0.8 1.0 25.6 32.0 
Czech Republic 4.76 7.47 1.83 4.62 2,475 3,086 1.1 1.3 18.4 6.0 
Estonia 1.60 2.77' 2,397 3,327' 0.9 2.9 26.9 21.1 
Georgia 1.13 1.56 0.58 0.67 938 982 0.6 0.9 29.8 104.6 
1lungar> 2,799 3,678 1.6 3.2 35.6 15.4 
Kazakhstan 0.70 1.10 0.63 0.79 1,499 1,858 0.7 1.1 80.5 120.7 
Kyrgyzstan 0.39 0.59 0.46 0.37 1,142 1,403 1.0 1.2 49.7 103.8 
Latvia 1.20 2.99 1.43 2.42 2 3 8 2,884 1.0 1.8 32.1 40.8 
Lithuania 0.94 2.16 1.13 1.99 2,680 4,490 1.6 1.5 37.5 53.2 
Moldova 1.03 1.54 0.84 1.04 1,607 2,418 0.9 1.5 52.5 115.7 
Poland 1,894 2,885' 1.2 1.9 42.6 18.3 
Romania 0.66 2.73 0.80 1.64 1,773 2,982 1.4 1.0 63.4 85.8 
Russian Federation 1.24 1.88" 1.13 1.67 2,074 3,479' 0.8 1.1 42.8 83.0 
Sloval<ia 3.76 6.22 0.34 0.48 2,282 2,689 1.0 1.3 28.5 7.1 
Tajikistan 0.37 0.25 0.24 0.11 841 933' 1.1- 1.2' 50.7 91.5 
Turkmenistan 0.39 0.32 0.23' 0.21 1,060 1,698 0.9 60.9 64.1 
Ukraine 1.68 2.58 1.30 1.84 2,696 3,744' 0.9 1.4 39.2 74.1 
Uzbekistan 0.45 0.42 0.29' 0.32 1,249' 1,653 0.9 1.2' 53.1 59.8 
Average increase 68.7% 39.1% 41.6% 43.4% 38.9% 
' 1991, - 1992, ^ 1993, •• 1994. ^ 2003, ^ 2 0 0 4 , ' 2005, ^ 2006, ^ 2009 
Source: World Health Organisation, European Health for All Database, 2012. 
prevalent among patients in the region, with respective increases of 69% and 39%. Circulatory 
system diseases are putting higher pressure on the health systems, with an average 42% increase 
in related hospital discharges per unit of population. The share of mental and nervous system 
conditions among all causes of death increased by 43% between 1989 and 2009, which reflects 
the growing burden of ill mental health. Finally, the region took a step back with respect to the 
control of tuberculosis. The numbers of newly diagnosed cases per unit of population grew by 
39% between 1989 and 2010. 
Other factors exogenous to health systems 
Selected risk factors continue to play an important role in driving premature mortality. McK.ee 
and Shkolnikov (2001) identify injuries, violence, alcohol consumption, smoking, poor nutrition 
and a rapidly changing environment as highly relevant to low life expectancy of men in 
CEE/CIS, as compared to women and men in Western Europe. Moreover, Stuckler et al. (2009), 
in a hotly debated paper (Gerry et al. 2010, Earle & Gehlbach 2010, Stuckler et al. 2010), 
attributed increasing short-term adult male mortality rates to rapid mass privatisation, through 
the channels of stress and unemployment. In addition, strife and conflict occurred in the region 
as highly destabilising forces for health care systems. For example, the Kosovo crisis and 
consequent flow of refugees resulted in a 20 per cent population increase in Albania in a matter 
of 40 days, with an enormous impact on the HCS and its reforms that were in progress at that 
time (Nuri 2001). 
2.5. E m e r g i n g health care sys t ems 
2.5.1. Motivations for change 
The transformation of former Semashko systems runs in parallel to overall social and economic 
transition. It was thus marked by the same features of reducing direct state involvement and 
control through decentralisation, pluralisation, empowering a variety of stakeholders, as well as 
introducing market signals and elements of competition in resource allocation (Preker et al. 
2002). The universal objectives encompassed reducing the excess capacity and over-dependence 
on hospital care, strengthening primary care, improving microefficiency, providing conditions 
for innovation, flexibility and responsiveness, as well as enhancing accountability and 
transparency. At the same time, there was a strong public expectation of maintaining the 
universality of the public scheme. Despite these similarities, the timing, pacing and scope of 
change varied between countries. 
Health care system reform was motivated by a range forces (Shakarishvili & Davey 2005). First 
was the presence of the socialist inheritance with low system efficiency and deteriorating 
excessive networks of facilities, adjustment of which was inhibited by the state monopoly. The 
burden also included poor and deteriorating health outcomes, compared to Western Europe. 
Secondly, the recessions discussed above caused substantial reductions in health care budget 
allocations. Thirdly, there was a general consensus that health should be given a higher priority 
in the national econoinic and social policy agenda, contrasting with the non-productive status it 
was given in the previous system. Recognising the strategic importance ofhealth would take the 
tbrm of higher proportions of national income devoted to health care as well as building 
conditions For individual success and international competitiveness. Fourthly, there was the 
ideological drive to depart from the communist system, fuelled by the influence of international 
organisations and a blind belief in western ways. 
There is a sizeable body of literature describing, analysing and assessing refomis in health care 
systems of the region in the last two decades. Financing aspects of health reform stand out in 
prominence as far as the literature on the topic is concerned. This special attention given to 
health care financing and payment mechanisms is reflected on the following pages. The aim of 
this section is to provide a health system context for the discussion and analysis of changes in 
the hospital sector governance in Part 11 of the thesis. 
2.5.2. General reform directions 
Shakarishvili and Davey (2005) as well as Rechel and McKee (2009) provide syntheses of 
broad reform patterns in the region. The chief reform among those identified is dissolution of 
the integrated systems of budget financing and state provision and subsequent replacement of 
general tax financing with social health insurance in half of the analysed countries. This was 
seen as a fonn of decentralisation as it transferred the health financing prerogative from the 
government to a public agency. Given the dominant public ownership of health providers, this 
had important implications for the nature of payer-provider relations, which shifted from 
integrated and budget-based to contractual and often involving an element of competitive 
tendering. These contractual relations, in turn, relied on establishing new payment mechanisms 
for provider reimbursement. Incentives conveyed by various increasingly sophisticated provider 
payment systems influenced both the quantity and quality of medical services supplied in the 
public system. Overall, the gravity of social health insurance (SHI) has been so large it is 
branded a catalyst for transition (Ensor & Thompson 1998). 
Another major characteristic of health care transition in a large group of countries is 
pluralisation and empowerment of various sector stakeholders with new responsibilities, 
incentives and rights. For one, this involved the abovementioned shift of planning, contracting 
and monitoring of provision from the MOH to autonomous or semi-autonomous SHI agencies. 
Secondly, it took the form of transferring the responsibility for health care from the MOH and 
its regional branches to respective structures of sub-national government. This de-concentration 
concerned tools that gave the territorial authorities the power to shape their health networks. 
such as setting capacities througin planning and development strategies, licensing, etc. Thirdly, 
ownership of the majority of facilities (bar national centres and university hospitals) was either 
devolved to sub-national governments or privatised. The expansion of the private sector was 
pronounced in primary and ambulatory care, less so in the hospital sector. The private sector 
growth was fostered by both privatisation of public facilities and establishing new provider 
organisations by international and domestic entrepreneurs. Fourthly, the pluralisation 
encompassed handing control over the medical profession lo specialised professional 
associations, including licensing, developing guidelines, setting norms and conducts of practice, 
monitor implementations of changes, auditing, and at times partaking in negotiating provider 
contract conditions. 
Another group of reforms concerned strengthening primary care, often through encouraging 
general practice centred on family medicine, as well as reinforcing public health, while de-
emphasising hospital care. These efforts meant to re-introduce balance between prevention, 
outpatient and inpatient care. 
As observed by Ensor (1993), all the above changes assumed, explicitly or implicitly, a shift 
towards individual choice and personal responsibility. The shift from general taxation to 
earmarked payroll tax marked a change from universal entitlement to individual entitlement 
linked to the payment of obligatory contributions. Improving information systems enabled 
identification of eligible individuals, a function that had been weak in the initial years, thus 
accentuating the equity concerns of terminating the universal entitlement. These processes led to 
increases in individual health-related financial risks. More often, however, an unintended by-
product of the reforms was a soaring reliance on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments resulting in 
substantial inequalities in health care utilisation. 
Table 2.7 below provides information on basic characteristics of transition and post-transitions 
HCSs in terms of health care financing. Notable is an overall increase in health care spending in 
terms of its share of GDP, which between 1990 and 2010 averaged 2.1 percentage points, and 
was as high as 7.8 points in Moldova and 5.7 points in Georgia. In absolute terms, over the 
same period, Albania, Belarus, and Poland, more than tripled their per capita health 
expenditures. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan show a decline in 
real per capita health expenditures. The generally decreasing participation of public sources in 
health care financing (from 70.3% in 1990 to 56.9% in 2010, on the average) translates directly 
into higher OOP spending, because of the negligible role of private voluntary prepayment 
schemes. The context and significance of these outcomes is explained in the subsequent 
sections. 
T a b l e 2.7: Basic in format ion on health expendi tures in C E E / C I S 
Countr>' 1990 
TEH pc (PPP$) 
1995 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 2 0 1 0 
TEH as a share of GDP (%) 
1990 1995 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 2010 
Public share of 
1990 1995 2 0 0 0 
TEH (%) 
2 0 0 5 2 0 1 0 
Albania 156 116 305 417 501 4.0 3.2 6.4 6.8 6.5 84.0 49.9 36.1 40.2 39.0 
Annenia 123 110 150 199 216 4.2 6.5 6.5 4.9 4.4 59.8 30.8 17.4 30.4 40.6 
Azerbaijan 203 109 116 351 524 4.3 5.9 4.7 7.8 5.9 61.2 23.8 18.5 11.3 20.3 
Bulgaria 404 350 426 717 789 5.4 5.1 6.0 7.3 6.9 81.4 73.3 59.6 58.4 54.5 
Belarus 205 289 372 582 700 3.2 6.9 6.4 6.8 5.6 68.7 71.7 76.6 76.5 77.7 
Czech Republic 972 1,092 1,105 1,474 1,778 5.9 7.0 6.5 7.2 7.9 84.9 90.9 90.3 83.7 83.7 
Estonia 367 494 582 826 999 3.6 6.3 5.3 5.0 6.0 53.0 89.8 77.5 77.2 78.7 
Georgia 273 90 175 310 461 4.4 5.1 7.0 8.6 10.1 62.5 5.2 17.6 22.3 23.6 
Hungary 781 854 961 1,414 1,242 5.9 7.3 7.0 8.3 7.3 84.4 84.0 70.7 69.7 69.4 
Kazakhstan 315 208 225 354 468 4.4 4.6 4.2 4.1 4.3 62.3 64.0 51.0 62.0 59.4 
Kyrgyzstan 125 85 70 100 124 5.0 6.9 4.7 5.8 6.2 66.7 57.6 44.3 40.9 56.2 
Lithuania 447 397 618 832 1,094 3.6 5.4 6.5 5.9 7.0 72.0 74.2 69.7 64.6 73.5 
Latvia 391 357 508 804 866 3.9 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.7 56.1 66.3 54.4 55.9 61.1 
Moldova 179 156 102 198 326 3.9 8.5 6.1 8.4 11.7 74.4 68.7 52.6 49.8 45.8 
Poland 415 493 649 856 1,295 5.1 5.5 5.5 6.2 7.5 80.3 72.9 70.0 64.7 72.6 
Rotnania 304 356 515 609 3.9 5.2 5.5 5.6 61.4 70.3 67.7 80.2 78.1 
Russian Federation 381 419 465 615 720 3.0 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.1 66.8 73.9 59.9 62.0 62.1 
Slovakia 754 656 836 1,139 1,772 5.9 6.1 6.6 7.0 8.8 84.9 88.5 85.0 72.1 65.9 
Tajikistan 177 32 45 73 116 6.0 3.1 4.6 4.8 6.0 72.6 41.5 20.4 23.6 26.7 
Turkmenistan 187 63 94 152 185 5.0 3.1 4.0 3.2 2.5 66.4 60.3 79.6 63.3 59.4 
Ukraine 266 263 205 386 466 3.3 6.7 5.6 6.9 7.7 69.7 61.5 52.1 55.2 56.6 
Uzbekistan 118 76 93 95 162 5.9 5.2 5.7 4.8 5.8 72.1 69,6 44.1 47.9 47.5 
Source: World Health O g a n i s a t i o n , European Health for All Database , 2012. 
G iven negl igible levels o f private voluntary health insurance in the region, decreas ing public shares of TKII largely re fleet the g r o w i n g rel iance on out -of -
pocket payments . 
2.5.3. Public revenue collection and pooling 
Revenue collection 
With respect to the public system revenue, three groups can be identified. Firstly, there are 
countries that rely primarily on general and local taxation in financing their health care 
expenditures. This may be a result of non-reform (e.g. Belarus, Ukraine), or an introduction of 
social insurance that accounts for a minor proportion of public health funds (e.g. Russia f rom 
1993, Albania from 1995, Georgia between 1995-2004, see Table 3.2). In those countries, tax 
revenue is typically a combination of local, regional taxes and national (federal) funds, which 
depending on local priorities are used for recurrent services, upkeep and investment, as well as 
for equalisation between regions orchestrated by the central government (Preker et al. 2002). 
Secondly, there are states that used to belong to the first group but whose public HCSs collapsed 
as a result of the previously discussed pressures and disturbances. In 2010, there were seven 
countries where public spending accounted for less than half of TEH ( W H O HFA-DB): 
Azerbaijan (20.3%), Georgia (23.6%), Tajikistan (26.7%), Albania (39%), Armenia (40.6%), 
Moldova (45.8%) and Uzbekistan (47.5%). In these countries private expenditures are the 
dominant form of health financing, and voluntary prepayment alternatives to O O P payments 
failed to fill in the coverage gap of the public system. 
Thirdly, there are countries that replaced the tax-based model with what is broadly referred to as 
Social Health Insurance. The term SHI is often used as a label for any system that detaches 
health care fund collection and pooling from general taxation and instead links it to payroll-
based social insurance contributions. However, it does not unambiguously determine the system 
operation. The heterogeneity of CEE systems shows that actual implementations may 
substantially deviate from the original Bismarck social security model or its present variations 
in Western European countries. 
There are a number of aspects that contribute to the vagueness surrounding the term SHI. For 
example, establishing a quasi-independent agency for contracting with providers need not have 
implications for how funds are collected. In Albania, the Health Insurance Institute financed 
primarily through taxes is responsible for paying to medical care providers and for the 
reimbursement of qualified generic drugs (Marku 2010). Similarly in Latvia, tax revenues are 
raised and pooled by the National Revenue Service, and accordingly to an allocation by the 
Ministry of Finance transferred to the State Compulsory Health Insurance Agency, which 
carries out the contracting of providers (Tragakes et al. 2008). 
Moreover, the calculation of contributions is not in each case based on payroll earnings or 
subject to a limit. Kuszewski and Gericke (2005) enumerate the idiosyncrasies of the Polish 
system: contributions are calculated based on all revenues from employment and non-
agricultural economic activity (closely corresponding to personal taxable income), there is no 
ceiling for contribution size, various bases are applied for calculating contribution rates (e.g. a 
preferential treatment of farmers who enjoy full benefits in exchange for token payments), and 
insurance coverage and contributions are unrelated to health risks. For the above reasons, 
Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra (2009) classify the Polish as well as Latvian systems as not being 
"pure" SHI. Those systems have also been referred to as quasi-tax or earmarked-tax hybrids. 
Among the payroll-based systems, variations exist in the size of social insurance contributions 
and their nominal split between employers and employees. Komai and Eggleston (2001b) show 
that among 10 CEE countries in 1997 the size of contributions ranged from 3.4 to 23.5 per cent 
of earnings, divided in various proportions between employers and employees with 50:50 being 
the most common distribution. 
Another distinguishing feature is the share of SHI in the overall health expenditures. Can a 
system financed in 1/3 from taxes, 1/3 SHI contributions and 1/3 from OOP expenditures be 
justified as a social insurance model? One way of settling the key establishing feature of a SHI 
system may be the reliance on contractual payments that provide marginal revenue and thus 
alter incentives faced by providers. The marginal revenue has to be distinguished from budget 
allocations that may comprise a major part of the overall budgets of provider organisations. The 
presence o f contracting, competitive tendering, improved transparency and accountability, as 
well as non-budget payment mechanisms are features more prominent and influential in terms 
of resource allocation than the measures of revenue collection. The problem of inadequacy (or 
meaninglessness) o f the "tax vs. SHI " division was highlighted by Kutzin (2001) who observed 
that countries may alter their allocation mechanisms without altering the sources of funds. This 
can explain the case of Hungary, where in 2009 SHI contributions accounted for 32.5% of TEH, 
yet the system was generally regarded as SHI. In fact, the Hungarian SHI explicitly covers only 
recurrent spending on services, while capital and maintenance costs are covered from central 
government grants (Gaal et al. 2011). In Moldova, a SHI system complementary to tax 
financing was based on contributions originally set at 4% of payroll salary split evenly between 
employers and employees, and further offset by a 2% decrease in income tax. SHI revenue 
generated this way was intended to incentivise the providers otherwise relying on tax-based 
budgets (Atun et al. 2008). In Russia, 2/3 of hospital resources come from line-item budgets. 
However, hospitals are also reimbursed based on a DRG system and at the margin could be 
expectcd to respond to its incentives. However, evidence shows the efficiency gains have not 
materialised due to deep-rooted managerial practices, DRG system faults and its low impacts on 
hospital budgets (Tragakes & Lessof 2003). Similar problems marked the development of case-
mix payments in the hospital setting in Kyrgyzstan (Ibraimova et al. 2011). Nonetheless, the 
overall effects o f adopting a purchaser-provider split and a contracting model in this country 
were positive, resulting in improvements in the scope, quality, efficiency and equity of care 
(Atun 2007). 
Witli respect to the above, it can be argued that some countries made a more complete transition 
towards SHI. Looking broadly at the region, however, general tax revenue persisted in health 
care financing mixes, from being the dominant form of financing in unreformed HCSs, as in 
Belarus, to complementary functions of central government grants for capital investments and 
territorial governments' subsidies, as in the Czech Republic. 
A further distinction in SHI can be made between countries that rely on third party payer 
competition (Czech Republic, Slovakia, and briefly Poland in 1999-2002) and those that 
maintained the monopolisdc position of a SHI agency. 
The above discussion reveals a wide variety of HCSs with respect to public financing. On one 
hand, in numerous countries the state participation remained strong. In 2010, in Estonia and 
Romania, public spending accounted for over 78% of TEH, and nearly 84% in the Czech 
Republic (WHO HFA-DB). At the other extreme there are the aforementioned collapsed HCSs 
of CIS and Central Asia, where the state participation may account for as little as 20%. 
Pool ing of public funds 
Changes in funding mechanisms also had implications for the pooling function of public health 
financing. The pooling function is essential for two aspects of health insurance: (1) risk 
management, by enabling the law of large numbers and narrowing the losses around their 
expectation, and (2) solidarity transfers from low to high risks and from more to less affluent 
individuals. Consequently, the pooling structure of a HCS is central to its economic efficiency, 
equity of financing and utilisation, financial protection, and administrative cost. In particular, 
pooling fragmentation can be efficiency enhancing, as it is the case in the systems of regulated 
insurer competition, or wasteful, when it sustains uncoordinated and unequitable allocation of 
resources between parallel systems. 
Preker et al. (2002) look into the problem of pooling across CEE/CIS over two decades. They 
find that pools of funds were fragmented between many actors and levels, including local 
government health agencies, health insurance funds and their local branches. At the same time, 
potential gains from multiple financing agents were absent, as the sector structure would not 
feature competitive pressures. Instead, each of the purchasers enjoyed a situation of monopoly. 
This problem extended to overlapping population coverage and exclusions from statutory 
coverage. CIS countries were generally disadvantaged in terms of risk protection, equity and 
allocative efficiency, compared to smaller and more reformed countries of CEE where the 
fragmentation of revenue channels had been reduced. Nonetheless, two issues persisted across 
the region: Firstly, recurrent expenditure was detached from capacity investments, and facility 
owners often chose to increase their capacity without considering the operating expenditures 
that fell on other agents. Secondly, a class of costly medical establishments, such as university 
hospitals and national centres, were financed from both SHI and by central budget grants. The 
latter source of financing protected them from making the necessary capacity adjustments. In 
Hungary, such university clinics were found to be the leading category in recurring sector debt. 
Broad reform strategies addressing the problem involved integration, centralisation and 
reduction in payer numbers. These strategies materialised in reducing the numbers of funds, 
creating a single territorial fund and transforming territorial funds into branches of a national 
fund. Coming from fragmented tax-based systems, one reform possibility was a shift to the SHI 
model, which proved successful in Kyrgyzstan and Moldova (Kutzin et al. 2010b). In 
competitive insurer systems such as in the Czech Republic, risk-adjusted contributions represent 
a key design feature of a pooling system, as risk equalisation inhibits risk selection and 
increases system efficiency and affordability. Kutzin et al. caveat that the transferability of 
reform experiences in this regard is limited. In particular, an introduction of SHI alone does not 
automatically solve the pooling problem, given the multiplicity of possible budget revenues 
present in the overall flow of funds. Moreover, pooling refomis are necessary but not sufficient 
for higher equity and economic efficiency; actual perfonnance critically hinges also on resource 
allocation mechanisms. A successful reform in Estonia simultaneously decreased pool 
fragmentation and furnished a complementary change in provider payment mechanisms. 
Consequences of SHI in t roduct ion 
It is a stylised fact about communist health care that its low priority is reflected in the shares of 
aggregate and public expenditures in GDP. Kornai & McHale (2000) challenge this idea and 
provide contrasting evidence of post-communist spending on health being higher than what 
could be expected based on their macroeconomic parameters. This evidence is derived from a 
model of economic development and age structure of population, based on a sample of CEE and 
OECD countries in the early 1990s. The relatively high levels of spending may reflect both 
difficulties in cost containment during transition and the popular expectation of universal health 
care. 
The adoption of social health insurance in CEE is argued to be an endogenous process (Rechel 
& McKee 2009). For example, it had no relation to EU accession. It was, however, inspired by 
Western European HCSs, particularly the German model, and Western experts exerted certain 
influence on decision-makers. Goals for SHI included improved efficiency of allocation and 
elevating the priority of the sector by allocating funds independently from the general 
government budget - a step up from the low priority under the Semashko system. Separation of 
financing and provision was also aimed at increasing transparency, mobilising additional funds, 
reducing fragmentat ion and duplication of functions, containing costs, limiting political 
interference, and introducing market forces that would lead to increased responsiveness through 
the elimination of incompetent public providers and a concurrent development of the private 
sector. The latter function has been limited, however, because outside the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia the SHI model involved single national funds which maintained strong state 
monopsony in purchasing of services (Szende & Mogyorosy 2004). Macroeconomic and 
institutional difficulties hampered a full development of the model, however, leading to 
incomplete coverage and a failure to raise revenue adequate to needs. This revenue inadequacy 
was a result of low wages, high unemployment , large informal sectors, corruption and tax 
evasion. Consequently, long-term sustainability of SHI has been questioned even in the most 
successful reformers. Population ageing is the main concern, but it has also been argued that 
increased health contributions lead to higher costs of labour, potentially hampering economic 
growth, while positive implications of SHI for quality and eff iciency have been limited by the 
continued presence of public monopolies. 
Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra (2009) explore consequences of SHI adoption in the CEE/CIS and 
Southern Europe, using non-adopter tax-based systems as a control group in a natural 
experiment. They find evidence of the SHI introduction leading to increased government 
spending as well as a higher share of government expenditures being allocated to salaries in the 
health sector. The latter evidence may support the hypothesis that SHI reforms are favoured and 
facilitated by health professionals. Other reported statistically significant implications include 
reduced average lengths of inpatient episodes as well as increased bed occupancy rates and 
numbers of hospital admissions. Despite these impacts, they find no evidence of improving 
health outcomes. 
In the literature of the subject, SHI adoption stands out as the region 's most prominent reform. 
No wonder then that the "tax or insurance" dilemma attracted considerable attention of policy-
makers, leading to a need for an unequivocal recommendation. The most recent voices tend to 
be ambivalent on the relative merits of the two scenarios, however. 
Although SHI seems to have the upper hand in the theoretical debate, evidence shows tax-based 
systems hold well in equity of access and financing, which are among central objectives of 
HCSs. Wagstaff (2010) overviews pros and cons of social health insurance vis-a-vis tax-based 
health care financing. He argues that, despite the theoretical prowess, experience indicates tax-
financed systems have the merits of universal coverage, less labour market distortions and more 
equitable revenue generation. These merits are particularly important for developing countries, 
but also developed countries are increasingly inclined to take them into consideration. 
Commonly recognised areas of SHI superiority include a more meaningful purchaser-provider 
split, provider autonomy, strategic purchasing, and furnishing a unified, one-flts-all model for 
the entire population. Wagstaff argues that shortfalls in these aspects are not insurmountable for 
tax-based systems, and many innovative purchasing and provision arrangements exist around 
the world. On the other hand, he shows the many practical disadvantages of SHI: smaller tax 
base potentially reducing health revenue, weak incentives to contribute leading to non-
enrolment and evasion, regressive nature that contributes to the informalisation of economic 
activity, a long period of adjustment until reaching high coverage with incomplete coverage 
persisting also among formal sector employees in well-established systems, the disadvantageous 
creation of separate risk pools, and the inevitable problem of risk selection in multiple insurer 
schemes. 
The above arguments are counterweighted with evidence from Euro Health Consumer Index 
(Eisen & Bjomberg 2010, Bjornberg 2012) that assumes the consumer perspective and 
measures HCS performance across patient rights and information, accessibility (wait times), 
outcomes, range of available services, and pharmaceuticals. The study, which provides an 
overall weighted score as well as partial performance scores, has been continuously expanded 
since its launch in 2005 and in the 2012 edition featured the total of 42 indicators across 34 
countries. One of the overarching findings is that consistently "Bismarck outperforms 
Beveridge", with the exception of small and well-managed National Health Service (NHS) type 
systems of the Nordic countries. Non-SHI countries generally fail to attain high levels of access 
and responsiveness, and rank at best in the middle of the European ladder in terms of consumer 
satisfaction. T w o possible explanations of this fact are hypothesised by the authors: first, an 
integrated national system typically falls under one management. In the case of England 's NHS, 
for example, this implies managing ca. 1.5 million staff within a single structure, posing natural 
chal lenges to eff iciency and responsiveness. Second, in centralised systems the primary 
accountabili ty is to politicians and decision-makers rather than to patients, increasing the 
chances of government failure. 
The experience from CEE/CIS transition shows that the dominant revenue collection 
mechanism is of secondary importance. On one hand, in countries with strong economy and 
high labour force participation, taxation performed satisfactorily. On the other, the introduction 
of SHI did not compensate for a lack of solid revenue base in some other countries. Sheiman et 
al. (2010) discuss the reform implications that go far beyond the preferred source of health 
revenue. For one, SHI may introduce implicit or explicit decentralisation, changing the central 
government ability to control the overall level of funding. Centralised systems enable better 
control of funds and facilitate effective reform. In terms of revenue collection by the tax 
authority or the SHI agency, the relative merits do not permit an unequivocal recommendation. 
The former functional specialisation allows administrative efficiency and reduces the scope of 
health f u n d s ' tasks to pooling and purchasing. The latter integrated collection, however, has 
been successful particularly in the multiple insurer systems in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
More importantly, SHI adoption Inas considerable secondary implications for the system 
performance, as it alters the stakeholder structure by introducing a major specialised agency. 
This may, in turn, catalyse other changes, inclusive of flexibility and eff iciency of resource 
allocation. This is because tax revenue is subject to the treasury rules with often tight control 
and rigid rules based on budgeting, while SHI brings about strategic purchasing and enables the 
formation of active purchasers in place of passive payers. Moreover, some experiences show 
that in lower-income countries SHI may contribute to higher predictability and stability of 
financing. 
2.5.4. Statutory coverage and benefit entitlement 
Reductions in breadth (coverage), scope (benefit categories) and depth (cost-sharing) in the 
public systems were largely forced by macroeconomic difficulties and the increasing gap 
between the nominal and actual services provided within public systems (Gotsadze and Gaal 
2010). The resulting restrictions differed between groups of countries, however, the regional 
patterns are largely consistent with previously discussed clusters by macroeconomic 
performance (Chapter 2.3.2) and by sources o f H C S revenue (Chapter 2.5.3). 
In higher income CIS countries, the limitations concerned both scope and depth. While the 
coverage remained universal, the scope of benefit categories narrowed and a substantial part of 
the cost were moved onto users of care. The latter took the form of formal and informal 
payments as well as rationing that induced market purchase of health services. In poorer CIS 
countries, in particular Central Asia, considerable reductions affected all three dimensions of 
public sector provision. Other than those mentioned above, the public system retrogression also 
encompassed an explicit termination of public entitlement for large groups of population. In the 
countries that experience the collapse of their HCSs, public financing took the complementary 
function and many benefits were shifted to market provision financed from OOP payments. For 
the benefits that remained in the public sphere, implicit forms of rationing became primary, 
including waiting times, informal payments, and deteriorating quality (Preker et al. (2002). 
In CEE, restrictions related primarily to depth and to some extent in scope (Preker et al. 2002). 
The basic benefit package remained wide, with certain countries taking the approach to enlist 
benefits excluded from public provision (a "negat ive" definition). The Czech Republic was the 
only country to produce a "posit ive" definition by enlisting all benefits explicitly covered. In 
either case, excluded were non-essential services such as cosmetic surgery, non-basic dental 
services, and non-curative treatments such as spa and sanatoriums. Attempts to exclude curative 
treatments faced strong opposition of patient groups, physicians, the parliamentary opposition as 
well as the public at large. 
Furthermore, the breath of coverage in CEE was adversely affected by tying the pubhc benefit 
entit lement to the payment of SHI contributions. This condition was rarely enforced initially, 
due to system fragmentat ion and the lack of overarching information systems that would enable 
identification of users. As measures for identification of the eligible improve, policy-makers 
have to face the problem of exclusion of certain groups from the statutory system, which 
amounts to a form of discrimination of non-contributors in the social policy. These 
developments have coincidcd with the growing prevalence of fiexible forms of employment 
(f ixed-term contracts crowding out full employment) that exist outside the social security 
system. The temporary contracts exclude increasingly large groups from the social safety net, 
public health care in particular, and are especially problematic in the context of opportunities 
offered to young people. The European Commission recognised this problem and has been 
searching for a labour market solution (dubbed "tlexicurity") that would offer "the best of both 
worlds", i.e. fiexible employment and social protection (Viebrock & Clasen 2009). 
Controversies around labour market practices have become more pressing in the recent years, 
resulting in intensified research activity (e.g. Cazes & Nesporova 2007 on consequences of 
fiexicurity in CEE) as well as heated policy debates, e.g. currently in Poland (Olczyk 2013). 
Some countries attempted to address the issue of demand-side moral hazard by reducing the 
depth of statutory system coverage. Minor user co-payments were introduced in the Czech 
Republic in 2008, Slovakia in 2003 and Hungary in 2007. Baji et al. (2011) find that a 
widespread lack of approval for the user fees s temmed from (1) discrepancies in understanding 
the purpose of the fee system: cost-consciousness according to policy makers and insurers and 
an additional source of revenue according to consumers and the medical profession, (2) a 
mistrust in the government management of public resources, reinforced by no perceptible 
improvements in HCS performance and lack of transparency in the funds" disposition, and (3) 
negative personal experiences with fees: bureaucracy, increased waiting times, additional paper 
work, handling cash during visits and less time or attention given by the doctor. Consequently, 
the feasibility of a co-payment policy hinges on careful planning, effective implementation and 
a good communicat ion strategy that makes its benefits visible to all HCS stakeholders. 
Sheiman et al. (2010) alert that any major reform of the revenue collection mechanism leads to a 
revision and rearrangement of existing social commitments . This in particular concerns the 
individuals who were eligible for benefits under tax-funded system but would be excluded 
should they fail to pay the SHI contribution. In CEE/CIS, the best reformers addressed the 
problem of reduced coverage by explicitly trading-off the benefits of maintaining the universal 
coverage and contribution-based entitlement, which requires an additional safety net for non-
contributors. Openly stating public priorities and strategies in this regard promotes transparency, 
stability of financing and financial protection of individuals. Neglecting the issue creates gaps in 
coverage, induces a growth in O O P payments, and erodes equity of financing. Additionally, the 
principle of universal coverage is often effective only nominally, while in reality insufficient 
f inancing leads to rationing through queues and informal payments. This, in turn, forces spot 
market purchase of services or result in forgoing care when it is not affordable . These issues, 
which threaten the objectives of equity and health protection, are explored in detail in Chapter 6 
with respect to seven CEE countries. 
Restriction in the entitlement faced serious opposition based primarily on equity concerns. 
Difficulties of reform encompassed the political process, the public debate, challenging change 
in constitutional courts (Ukraine, Hungary), and manipulat ions upon policy implementation by 
political and social interest groups. The lack of transparency, communicat ion or stability, hasty 
and frequent change regarding the basic benefit package, e.g. in Ukraine, Hungary and Armenia, 
resulted in lower public confidence and increased the infiuence of providers who used it to 
extract additional payments from patients, both informally and by providing the excluded 
benefits in private practice. The inadequacy of the basic package to available resources led to 
infomial rationing ("informal benefits package") that excluded the government from the 
process, shifted decision powers to providers, lessened equity, access, efficiency and trust in the 
public system. Experience shows that timing, sequence and a broader sector reform context 
were central to successful restructuring of public benefit entitlement. Strengthening the 
purchasing function, tackling the system inefficiencies with improved incentives and securing 
adequate financing for the reformed system set the right ground for further changes, including a 
re-definition of basic benefit entitlements. Conversely, targeting the scope of public entitlement 
alone will likely fail to increase system performance and be thwarted in the political process. 
The experience of CEE/CIS shows that rationalising the unrealistic promise of unlimited and 
universal care made by the communist regime can be successful if implemented as part of a 
comprehensive sector reform (Gotsadze & Gaal 2010). 
2.5.5. Provider payment mechanisms in the public system 
According to Fuenzalida-Puelma et al. (2010), payment mechanisms were an essential and often 
primary component of health care transition. They had the most direct impacts by promoting 
efficiency, changing the resource allocation, and reducing excess capacity. Payment 
mechanisms operationalised policy goals through new incentives and were the reform 
component most visible to provider organisations. The mechanisms introduced in CEE/CIS 
increased transparency and responsiveness by allocating a greater proportion of health 
expenditures to patient care as well as stimulated the quantity and to a lesser extent quality of 
services. Successful transition countries introduced changes in a stepwise manner, al lowing time 
for institutional adjustment, building capacity, formation of structures, developing ownership 
and trust both within the contracting parties and the general public. They recognised that 
providers require capacity and autonomy to respond to these new incentives. The provider 
paymenl reform has to be supported by political commitment to IICS development in other 
complementary areas of reform. Reforming provider payment mechanisms has been an ongoing 
process, especially for case-mix payments that require continuous elaboration. Moreover, 
parallel HCS changes generated synergies. For example, separate fund pools for primary, 
outpatient and inpatient care offer an opportunity to use customised provider payment 
mechanisms for best resource allocation in each area. Admittedly, separate pools may also 
disallow the shift ing of funds between pools towards more cost-effect ive interventions. 
In practice, creating a quasi-autonomous agency may facilitate the shift from historical budget 
allocation to more active mechanisms. Established treasury systems of budgeting and control 
are a barrier to reform, and a dedicated agency can be launched with new goals and funding 
rules without this inheritance. With the exception of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, countries that 
did not establish a dedicated purchasing agency failed to incept new payment mechanisms. 
Rationalising supert luous capacity appeared to be facilitated by organising the purchasing 
function under the MOH, which provided Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania and Hungary with leverage in 
their reforms. However, new purchasing agencies performed sub-optimally due to insufficient 
(Kazakhstan) or excess (Albania, Georgia, Hungary) accountability and control. These features 
are a consequence of lower transparency and institutional immaturity that distinguishes 
transition countries from their industrialised peers (Fuenzalida-Puelma et al. 2010). 
Szende and Mogyorosy (2004) identify waves of provider payment reforms looking at eight 
countries of CEE. Firstly, they note a switch from input to output-related financing in the early 
1990s. This was a result of the above-discussed departure of historical budgeting and adopting 
new contractual provider payment systems. Secondly, at the time of publication, they observe an 
emerging shift f rom output to outcome-related systems. They also argue that variations in 
payment mechanisms contributed to differences in health care accessibility across the region. 
In the primary care sector, the region relied inainly on capitation payments adjusted for the age 
structure of the population, with possible adjustment or equalisation payments and fee-for-
service (FFS) for preventive care (Szende & Mogyorosy 2004). Ensor (1993) notes that at early 
transition stages payments in primary care followed the British model of contracted GPs paid by 
the number of patients. Rechel and McKee (2009) argue that this shift to capitation payments 
failed to incentivise quality, and that most CEE countries (with a notable exception of Hungary) 
did not redirect funds in order to de-emphasise hospitals and strengthen primary care, as 
pictured in the reform rhetoric. Nonetheless, a case study from Poland shows that GP 
fundholding with prospective capitation payments for a wide scope of care created incentives 
for bot tom-up integration of primary and secondary providers (Kowalska 2007). This integrated 
care network relied both on formal (contracts) and informal (trust and reputation) arrangements. 
Evidence showed the network improved the quality of care for patients and promoted better 
worlcing conditions for medical staff. 
in outpatient care, fee-for-service has been the most commonly used basic mechanism, 
supplemented with capitation, per case payments , and caps at the provider or national levels 
(Szende & Mogyorosy 2004). 
In hospital care, payment schemes alternative to historical budgeting were most commonly 
case-mix for acute care and per diem in chronic care. Various case-mix systems were employed 
and sometimes coupled with FFS, per diem (Estonia, Latvia) or adjusted for ward types or 
lengths of stay (Poland). Hungary relied on a DRG system, while the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia used global budgets as the basis for hospital tmancing. Fee-for-service was 
experimented with in the hospital setting. Under this arrangement, hospitals would be 
reimbursed, according to an agreed price schedule, per every defined unit of service provided, 
e.g. medical procedure (test, consultation, surgery) or a day of hospitalisation. Each unit of 
service would be billed individually and independently of the context in which they were 
provided (e.g. patient characteristics, other procedures used in managing the case). The system 
was abandoned due to a rapid escalation in volumes of services (Szende & Mogyorosy 2004). 
More light is thrown on the development of financing mechanisms by Langenbrunner and 
Wiley (2002) who produce a complete list of hospital payment mechanisms that emerged in the 
region. The following units are identified as bases for the payments: (1) procedure or service, 
(2) bed-day, (3) discharge, (4) case-mix adjusted unit, (5) global budget, and (6) capitation. 
Considering the 22 countries in scope for this thesis, the authors find that in the early 2000s the 
most prevalent fornis included line-item budgets (11 countries), case-mix (9 and 4 in 
development) , per diem (6), global budget (2 and 2 in development) and capitation (1 in 
development) . Most countries would rely on mixes of the above mechanisms. Russia provided 
an extreme case of using, to some extent, each of them. This could be explained by the sheer 
size of the country and the fact that republics participating in the Federation operate largely 
independent HCSs. 
The evolution of dominant payment mechanisms in the hospital sector across CEE/CIS is 
presented in Appendix 1, Table A . l . The most recent arrangements are discussed in the next 
chapter and shown in Table 3.2: Extended typology of CEE/CIS hospital sector as of 2010, The 
tables illustrate the fact that FFS, which came into prominence in the 1990s as the primary 
mechanism for third-party payments to hospitals, has been phased out in favour of patient-based 
systems, currently operated in most countries of the region. 
Impacts of the above-described changes are explored by Moreno-Serra and Wagstaff (2010) 
who econometrically analyse a panel of 28 transition countries over the period 1990-2004. They 
establish that both FFS and case-mix payment schemes contributed to higher private OOP and 
aggregate national spending on health. They also produce evidence of FFS schcmes increasing 
the numbers of hospital admissions and case-mix reducing lengths of inpatient episodes. The 
latter is also found to have limited beneficial effects on avoidable mortality. The study in 
Chapter 5 of the current dissertation expands the Moreno-Serra and Wagstaff model in several 
dimensions, most importantly by accounting for reforms of hospital governance that took place 
in parallel to the said changes in provider payments. 
2.5.6. The role for private funds in health llnancing mix 
The unfolding HCS transformation assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that individual 
responsibility would be enhanced compared to the period of communism. This translated, 
among other things, to increased individual participation in costs of health care provision. 
Generally speaking, the explicit reforms aimed at the problem of moral hazard by introducing 
user co-payments , and at a rationalisation of the public benetn package. Implicit increases in 
private expenditures were typically unintentional products of restrictions in breadth, scope and 
depth dimensions of statutory coverage discussed in Chapter 2.5.4. Deficiencies of the statutory 
insurance public system were the primary cause of an increasing role for private financing. 
Growing reliance on OOP payments is one of the major trends that characterise post-communist 
health care transition (Preker et al. 2002). It materialised under the form of formal fees and 
growing informal payments across the region, and a nearly complete shift to OOP financing of 
health care in the case of collapsed HCSs. The growing OOP expenditures were a result of 
public financing being inadequate to the generous benefit entitlement and the excess capacity, in 
particular of hospitals. This shifted the provision of certain services outside the public system, to 
individually financed spot market purchase. This was particularly true in the case of primary 
and outpatient specialist care (Lewis 2007). The process was reinforced by the growing 
wil l ingness to pay for services of higher quality or perceived quality. Table 2.7; Basic 
infomiat ion on health expenditures in CEE/CIS illustrates the fact that in many countries the 
public share of TEH has decreased considerably. Given the negligible presence of private 
voluntary health insurance, this translates to a growing proportion of health care spending 
originating from patients" pockets. 
The shift towards markets for medical care had its parallel in an informal allocation of public 
resources. Here, similarly, individuals would be willing to pay for jumping the queue and 
securing extra quality or attention of medical s taf f This secondary circulation within the public 
system took the shape of a sophisticated shadow market, with informal prices refiecting the 
supply and demand of care, expected quality as well as qualifications and reputation of 
physicians. Given their informal and illegal status, these markets proved surprisingly persistent, 
and patients were well aware of the rules and prices (Shahriari et al. 2001). Infonnal allocation 
and corresponding envelope payments for statutory services remain a major force shaping the 
supply of goods and services as well as eff iciency, equity and health outcomes of transition and 
post-transition HCSs. The problem is explored in Chapter 2.7 in the broader context of 
corruption in health care. 
One of the potential directions for health care financing reform in Eastern Europe has been 
voluntary health insurance. Prepayment schemes offer a possibility for reducing the 
unrealistically generous scope of guaranteed services that the HCS are not effect ively able to 
afford. Rationalising the services provided under the statutory scheme would result in a range of 
services being subject to co-payments or altogether excluded. The coverage gaps in the statutory 
scheme could be filled in by commercial insurance markets with supplementary or 
complementary insurance products. 
So far, this has not been the case. For over two decades of transition, voluntary prepayment 
schemes failed to develop to any material levels in the funding mix. The still generous statutory 
insurance does not provide a complete explanation of this fact, as old EU member countries 
often offer equally comprehensive statutory benefit packages and this fact does not preclude 
voluntary insurance feasibility. Jowett (2004) argues that theoretical f rameworks for voluntary 
health insurance (VHI), which evolved in the context of industrialised countries, may be 
incompatible with developing countries of differently structured economy and society. In 
CEE/CIS, hypothesised barriers to VHI development include a limited ability to pay, the lack of 
consumer and employer confidence, the lack of private infrastructure and insurance know-how 
as well as a historical non-practice of this form of financing (Thomson & Mossialos 2009). 
Moreover, the presence of informal payments was also identified as an impediment to VHI. 
Lewis (2007) argues that informal payments are an implicit form of insurance for current and 
future health needs, especially with respect to surgery and inpatient care. The existence of 
informal risk-sharing arrangements, coupled with an approval for and availability of corruptive 
opportunities, form a barrier to uptake of formal health insurance (Jowett 2004). This is because 
individuals may fear of having to pay twice, as VHI does not fully protect against informal 
payments, uncertainty around the quality of VHI-funded services vis-a-vis those secured in 
informal ways, and the fact that making an envelope payment in the event of illness may be a 
more affordable way of achieving the same goal (Thomson 2010). 
On the policy side, VHI remains a viable component of the health care financing mix, however , 
evidence of its impacts on HCS objectives is mixed even in carefully regulated systems. Notable 
problems include segmentation and limited risk solidarity in systems that enable opting-out, 
resulting erosion of the public system and deteriorating conditions of access, as well as the use 
of public resources to subsidise privately insured patients that are predominantly well-to-do. 
Some the problems may be reinforced by policy tlaws, such as permitting higher fees on the 
privately insured and using tax incentives to subsidise tiie purcliase of VHI (Thomson & 
Mossialos 2009). Overall, voluntary health insurance does not guarantee to relieve financial 
pressures on the public system. 
Given the current immaterial role of VHI in CEE/CIS, reflecting the minuscule demand for non-
statutory prepaid options, fostering the market would require consistent, long-term support and 
significant expertise in policy design in order to avoid market failures. The Dutch experience is 
illustrative of the two-decade time span and strong political commitment required to develop a 
fully-tledged system of risk adjusted private health insurance (Enthoven & van de Ven 2007). 
Given the costs of this undertaking as well as likely issues in its promotion, implementation and 
operation, VHI cannot be recommended as a natural direction for health care financing reform 
in CEE/CIS (Thomson 2010). The case for this solution may be stronger in the collapsed post-
communist HCSs where OOP expenditures amotmt to more than 50 per cent of TEH. In 
countries such as Georgia, where the public system focuses on protecting the poor, VHI may be 
a viable option for ensuring access and financial protection for non-poor individuals. 
Looking broadly at the emerging role for private financing of health care, it has to be noted that 
reductions in public participation were seldom well-received by the CEE/CIS populations. 
Attitudes and expectations have been the main challenge in expanding the private share of 
health financing mix. The challenge encompasses distrust in private financing agents and strong 
expectations of free and public provision, characterised by Kornai and Eggleston (2001b) as a 
deeply embedded need for a paternalistic state. These sentiments do not seem to have lessened 
over the two decades of transition. A recent survey study from Poland showed that, in the view 
of a vast majority of population, the government ought to guarantee access to free of charge 
health services (supported by 85% of the surveyed individuals), guarantee employment (85%), 
directly supply jobs (93%), and provide day care (95%) (Zagorski 2013). The study also 
confirmed the perceptions of insufficient quality, low value, and the issue of pricing publicly 
provided services below an adequate cost of production. A related problem is the rejection of 
the inevitable tax revenue implications of a paternalistic state. Should the post-commimist 
countries pursue the Scandinavian model of welfare, they will have to accept the tax burden of 
40-50 per cent of their GDP (Andersen 2011). 
2.5.7. A new landscape of health care provision 
Organisational pluralism and elements of internal markets were at the centre of changes in 
primary and outpatient specialist care provision (Ensor 1993). Reforms aimed at reducing the 
reliance on hospitals by promoting outpatient and preventive care were seen as a convergence 
towards Western standards, in particular the British approach to primary care. The W H O and 
the WB advocated the family physician model centred on solo or group general practice. This 
model was incorporated in a number of countries, mainly in CEE, despite the lack of tradition, 
professional education, infrastructure and procedures. The GP model, as well as specialised 
outpatient clinics, were preferred by the W H O and the WB and assumed private sector 
provision. However, abandoning the concept of polyclinics, which underlay primary and 
outpatient specialist care for years, turned out to be premature. With the lack of polyclinics, the 
services became provided in numerous unlinked solo practices. This contrasts with the recent 
trend (e.g. in Germany) of creating conditions and incentives for integration and continuity in 
the areas of primary, specialist and long-term care (Rechel & McKee 2009). 
Privatisation was an extensive and important process in transforming primary and ambulatory 
health care, especially in the Czech Republic, Georgia, Estonia, Hungary and Poland (Atun 
2007). Oral health and phannaeeutical services were fully privatised in CEE and a similar trend 
has been advancing in CIS. As opposed to the hospital sector, this reform strategy has been 
widely accepted in CEE/CIS. Moreover, the establishments that remained under public 
ownership underwent devolution from a centralised, national structure to being owned and 
managed by their respective territorial governments (Nemec & Chubarova 2010). 
The environment in which hospitals operate has changed significantly. Most input markets have 
been deregulated and privatised. However, the scope of privatisation of actual hospitals was not 
nearly as large as in non-hospital sectors, and a great majority of hospitals across the region 
remained in the public sphere. Here, autonomisation and New Public Management (NPM) have 
proven an influential alternative reform strategy. Private hospitals, greentleld investments or 
privatised state property, on the other hand, account for a small proportion of the sector 's 
capacity. Governance and ownership transformation of the hospital sector are the focus of Part 
II of the present work. 
Debate over pr ivat isat ion 
Privatisation and marketisation were at the centre of the policy debate in the early 1990s, the 
goal of which was to establish a new balance between the public and private sectors. The idea of 
the private sector being the driving force of transformation, in health care and the economy at 
large, had both its ardent supporters and sturdy opponents. Among the former were Lipton et al. 
(1990), who advocated creating a market economy and headlong privatisation of public 
companies. According to them, the structural transformation through a rapid sale of state 
enterprises or transferring them free of charge to the private sector was the long-term priority, 
complementary to short-run policies aimed at consolidating stability. On the other hand, Banoob 
(1993) provided an early voice warning against rushed privatisation as a cure for the ailments of 
transition. He acknowledged the policy drive towards privatisation, but identified problems 
relating to private health care in Western countries. For example, in seven out of nine studies 
OECD countries he found hospitals were predominantly publicly owned, the two exceptions 
being Japan and the US. Instead of relying exclusively on market forces, he recommended 
investing in education, nurturing inanagerial capacity, holistic planning for sustainable sector 
development , decentralisation of f inancing from central to community-based and not-for-profit 
insurance schemes, quality standards and evaluation, and harmonious growth of the public-
private mixed system. 
More recent papers admitted that a larger degree of private sector participation could benefit 
post-communist populations by providing a synergy and alleviating the troubled public systems 
(Watson 2004). Albrecht (2009) discusses internal and external rationales for more extensive 
privatisation in CEE. The former encompass dissatisfaction with publicly provided services, 
privatisation being a critical component of the succcssful social t ransfomiation, and the need for 
re-introduction of private practice. Among the external reasons he points at patient rights, 
privatisation as a venue for choice and competit ion, as well as quality advantages and better 
overall performance. Nonetheless, both authors are aware of risks and obstacles: the challenges 
of equity and affordabil i ty, the possible creation of a two-tiered system, corruption and a lack of 
transparency, as well as an unstable and indolent political process unable to produce effective, 
non-cumbersome regulation that would steer the mixed sector towards desired policy goals. 
Consider ing these problems, Nemec and Kolisnichenko (2006) provide a criticism of market-
oriented reforms in selected CEE/CIS countries in the early 1990s. They indicate a number of 
political and institutional errors as well as severe regulatory capture that led to an overall failure 
of HCS marketisation. Firstly, reforms were influenced by foreign advisors (such as previously 
cited Lipton et al.) and organisations (the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund). The 
international experts tended to copy existing Western solutions (e.g. British fundholding, 
German SHI) and to privatise public property without ensuring the right institutional 
environment, which put at risk the stability of systems and health safety of citizens. Health care 
was often thrown in a bag of market reforms with other sectors of the economy; local conditions 
and HCS distinguishing features were overlooked or disregarded. For instance, marketization 
and privatisation in health care were launched before banking, insurance and capital markets 
gained stability in the region. Secondly, HCS stakeholders ' strategies and behaviours differed 
f rom the patterns of mature Western democracies. Political interference and uncoordinated 
government interventions took place where markets performed well and were lacking where 
markets failed. Reform concepts were manipulated by the political and bureaucratic classes to 
benefit f rom the t ransformation, for example, by stripping public property but limiting the scope 
of competi t ion in the newly established markets. This effectively converted state monopoly into 
another type of state-controlled or interest group monopoly. Until the present day, health care in 
the region remains dominated by public forms of financing and provision. 
in CEE/CIS, New Public Management has proven an influential concept. On one hand, it 
enables quasi-private practices and health care delivery improvements without forgoing public 
control of health establishments. On the other, in the context of asset stripping and government 
failure discussed above, it may be a pitch designed to justify the post-transition status quo. A 
number of adverse circumstances disallow full gains from this middle-ground arrangement, 
including low levels of financing, inadequate infrastructure, conflicting policies, ideological 
struggles over the change and poor leadership in implementation (Antoun et al. 2011). 
2.6. Consistency and quality of reform 
This section reviews the factors that shaped the directions and outcomes of HCS transition. 
Presented here are such reform aspects as vision and planning, clarity of goals, stability of the 
political process, disruptive events, timing and pacing, and various inhibitors. The discussion 
aims to complete the picture of reform circumstances on one hand, and provides a link between 
the emerging systems' characteristics and their deficiencies on the other. 
2.6.1. Capac i ty for r e fo rm 
The transformation of CEE/CIS health care systems was taking place during the turbulent time 
of rapid macroeconomic, institutional and social transition. Democracies in the region were new 
bom. The continuity of traditions and rules was broken after the Fall of Berlin Wall; their legal 
foundations were being established anew. Consequently, the process of HCS reform suffered 
from the immaturity of institutions. Governments and governing coalitions were unstable, 
formed ad-hoc and short lived. The chaotic political process would bring to power accidental 
leaders and individuals unprepared for performing prominent duties. There was a lack of 
previous experiences or expertise in policy formulation, particularly in the aspect of 
transforming centralised to market-based systems. Policy debates or independent reviews of 
reform proposals were non-existent and not welcome by the governments. There was no long-
term sector strategy. As a matter of principle, refomis were often revoked after a change of 
governing parties. Health system reforms were often led by medical professionals with no 
background in economics or social policy, instead, often determined to protect the interests of 
their own profession. It is also an interesting feature that CEE languages such as Czech, Polish 
and Slovak do not distinguish between "politics" and "policy". This linguistic nuance posits a 
significant cultural idiosyncrasy that has great consequences for the understanding of policy-
making in those countries (Nemec 2008). 
This extended to broader problems of low standards of governance and accountability, as 
professional and sustainable bureaucratic institutions were not well-established. In establishing 
quasi-autonomous, dedicated agencies such as SHI, the countries faced the challenge of 
providing accountability while fending off political interference. Given the low level of trust 
and the initial stages of civil society development, social mechanisms for accountability and 
supervision were not in place or were not reliable. Particular challenges in promoting 
transparency and openness include clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of levels of 
government, managing structures and the public, fostering the culture of open information, 
changing the priorities and norms of collective decision-making, and high political costs of 
facing numerous interest groups entrenched in the existing structures (Savedoff & Fuenzalida-
Puelma 2010). Davis (2010) identifies four early transition reform challenges: (1) unstable 
economic and legal environment and resource constraints; (2) reform leadership and 
coordination of economic and health reforms; (3) consistency and feasibility of intra-sectoral 
reform efforts, including insurance, health establishments, pharmacies; and (4) coordination of 
numerous government and non-government, national and international agencies that became 
involved in the reform process. 
Given the strong presence of the state in the HCS, CEE/CIS reforms can be interpreted as steps 
towards the paradigm of New Public Management (Antoun et al. 2011). This approach assumes 
the central position of the government in empowering consumers, creating a culture of 
accountability, and implementing incentives that promote efficiency, equity and quality of 
health care. Considering the cases of Albanian and Russian transition, Antoun et al. argue that a 
delay and gradation in the implementation of reforms were driven by ideology-based scepticism 
towards the utilitarian direction of market reforms, contrasting with egalitarian foundations of 
the socialist system. Al the implementation level, key problems involved limitations in human 
resources management, including a lack of previous exposure to market pressures and private 
sector practices, as well as deficiencies in health care infrastructure. Moreover, moral hazard 
and adverse selection undermined "well-intentioned but sub-optimally designed and managed" 
reforms of pharmaceuticals pricing, reimbursement and access. 
2.6.2. Definition of goals and strategies 
A consequence of low domestic capacity, as well as of shifting international influences, was a 
substantial reliance on external experts who offered leadership and advice in the refonn process. 
At the level of broad objectives, the recommendations were hardly contestable. For example, the 
World Health Report (WHO 2000) promoted good health, responsiveness to expectations, and 
fairness of financial contributions and protection. The goals were achieved in four vital HCS 
functions: service provision, resource generation, financing, stewardship. The proposal was 
supplemented with strategic directions of reducing excess mortality of the poor and the 
excluded, managing leading risk factors, and placing health at the centre of the development 
agenda. However, a number of researchers point at the problem of little practical relevance of 
such a high-level plan. In spite of the post-communist transition being an unprecedented event, 
and regardless of their little understanding of local conditions, the expertise and 
recommendations of foreign experts often came unquestioned (Shakarishvili & Davey 2005, 
Rechel & McKee 2009). 
Such recommendations provided an important platform for health policy-making in CEE/CIS. 
Delnoij et al. (2003) inspect the methods and influence of the W H O and the WB and confirm 
the anecdotal evidence of emphasising abstract ideas (accessibility, fairness, efficiency) without 
indicating mechanisms for the achievement of these goals. The two organisations would 
converge in a holistic approach to health, seeing it as a component of economic development, 
social participation and equity. Yet, they would shun any specific recipes for pressing regulatory 
questions regarding effective public-private mixes. Moreover, in the context of demographic 
and epidemiological change as well as macroeconomic instability, the international advisors are 
found exporting yesterday's solutions not tailored for the needs of tomorrow. Delnoij et al. 
conclude that CEE/CIS decision makers ought to give a lower priority to international expert 
advice, and instead focus on local conditions and future needs. 
2.6.3. Absence or d i s regard of evidence 
Personal ambitions of politicians and international experts often had considerable influence over 
reform directions (Nemec 2008). Major events, such as the adoption of SHI, are largely 
attributed to political aspirations of catching up with the West, rather than evidence-based 
strategy. This is also a consequence of the Soviet rejection of empiricism and the lack of 
understanding of empirical evidence in medicine. Rechel and McKee (2009) argue that this 
obstructed the progress of all CEE/CIS countries, and severely so among the Former Soviet 
Republics. The problem materialised in the lack of generation and sharing of evidence, no 
informed decision-making based on national statistics, the focus on ideas rather than local 
capacity building, and a negligence of changing population needs, from injury-caused and 
infectious to chronic diseases and managing comorbidities. 
2.6.4. Flaws in r e fo rm design 
The above-discussed lack of regulatory quality, stability, continuity experience and expertise led 
to policy design flaws and technical errors. Common were avoidable issues of technical and 
managerial nature, such as delayed SHI payments, the lack of data, inadequate patient 
information (McMenamin & Timonen 2002), paying providers on a fee-for-service basis 
without introducing cost-containment mechanisms (Ensor 1993), ignoring managerial capacity, 
decentralising assets without ensuring efficiency incentives, planning of long-term 
consequences and sustainability implications, introducing measures of accountability and 
equalisation of regional discrepancies (Shakarishvili & Davey 2005). The decentralisation 
process was often marked with ambiguity and duplication. New financing arrangements 
provided inadequate resources, leaving territorial governments with the burden of capital costs, 
facility investments and non-consumable medical equipment. Fragmentation of HCS networks 
was another issue, with overlapping areas of competence between local governments and 
insurance funds, owning bodies and chief physicians, primary and secondary care providers. 
2.6.5. T ime and pace of reform 
A number of researchers stress that poor regulatory quahty and outcomes were often caused by 
wrong t iming and pacing of reforms (Knight et al. 2003, Nemec 2008, Shakarishvih & Davey 
2005). A common idea propell ing r e fonns in HCS and the economy at large was to depart from 
communis t system as quickly as possible. This pressure for reform was a product of freedom 
aspirations, booming market activity and entrepreneurship, but also aimed at blocking the 
possibility of reinstating the communis t rule. Consequently, fundamental changes in the 1990s 
were rushed, underprepared, and introduced without adequate consideration of long-term 
implications. Coupled with poor capacity for policy-making, this yielded many new laws and 
institutions lacking in legal and economic quality. 
Poor reform quality led to the impossibility of new mechanisms to find a foothold in the system, 
as no interest group would support them. This was the case with the 1999 health care financing 
reform in Poland, which broke the national monopoly and replaced it with competing sickness 
funds (Roberts 2009). Its Hawed implementation found no traction and the milestone reform 
was eventually revoked with the National Health Fund reinstated in 2003. 
2.6.6. Stakeholder resistance 
This example illustrates that, other than the quality of law-making, a major system overhaul 
requires a strategic approach to communicat ion and building stakeholders" support. This 
prerequisite was the Achilles heel of transformative efforts and a common mistake made by 
reformers. Neglecting the importance of HCS stakeholders, alongside macroeconomic 
difficulties, can explain a share of unsuccessful reforms in the region. Reforms aimed at far-
reaching marketisation and dismantl ing the public monopoly were particularly opposed and 
often thwarted by stakeholder groups, most notably physicians who defended their influence 
and vested interests. Sometimes, the creation of new agencies, e.g. health insurance authority, 
was a gambit aimed at breaking the continuity of the MOH dominance and restricting the room 
for its inefficient bureaucratic practices (Ensor 1993). 
Decisions strategic for HCS transition can in fact be explicated with the presence of political 
veto players. Roberts (2009) argues that system deficiencies, macroeconomic factors, ideology 
and interest groups do not explain why the Czech Republic took the more liberal reform path 
than Hungary or Poland. He argues that the answer lies in political institutions; more 
specifically, in the presence of veto players in multi-party governments who are able to block 
reforms, and in the access of pro-change actors (e.g. physicians, insurers) to policy-making. 
Roberts further clarifies that a significant change can only take place in a small and rare window 
of opportunity. 
Nemec and Chubarova (2010) enumerate key stakeholder groups and their conflicting 
motivations: populist parliamentary politicians seeking short-term benefits from maintaining the 
illusion of "f ree" health care; territorial governments unwilling to undergo network 
rationalisation and decommission unprofitable facilities; bureaucrats exerting their power 
through monolithic public health care organisations; hospitals exceeding ineffective budget 
constraints; doctors using their influence to extract formal and informal payments as well as 
using unclear public sector boundaries for private gain; patients not willing to accept any form 
of rationalisation of unrealistically generous statutory benefits; and insurers in most countries 
being passive, politically dependent, monopolistic payers rather than active purchasers. 
Conflicting interests between central and sub-national governments are a particularly visible 
aspect of the stakeholder problem (Preker et al. 2002, McMenamin & Timonen 2002, Leven 
2005). The purpose of increasing decentralisation was to facilitate the process of restructuring 
provider capacity, through changing the profile of, closing down or privatising unprofitable 
units. Limited funds allocated to devolved facilities were supposed to stimulate the process. 
Instead, purchaser agencies became new players in the sector, pursuing their own agenda of 
influence. Territorial governments' reluctance towards reductions in their provider networks led 
to an accumulation of debt, and the indebted territorial and organisational units were on 
numerous occasions bailed out by the states. Considering this outcome, the strategy of 
pluralism, despite its advantages of promoting yardstick competition, innovation and 
productivity, inhibited some desired processes: the rationalisation of provider capacity, re-
balancing of primary and secondary care, development of integrated solutions, and holistic 
approaches to public health (Shakarishvili & Davey 2005). 
Health workforce has proven an influential group that hindered reductions in excess capacity by 
adjusting facilities and staff The resistance was primarily aimed at maintaining the benefits and 
informal privileges stemming from public sector employment. In the eyes of physicians, nurses, 
and other health professionals, defending the privileges was a means for compensating for 
inadequate remuneration and poor working conditions. This defensive attitude can be justified 
with the fact that economic growth and corresponding upward trends in health care expenditures 
did not translate into substantially increased salaries or greater employment satisfaction. 
Underpayment, deferred payment, job loss and limited opportunities for re-employment have 
been identified as major sources of health workforce dissatisfaction in the Czech Republic, 
Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine (International Labour Office 2002). The same factors 
contributed to low quality of care and fuelled workforce migration to Western Europe. 
2.6.7. Regula tory cap tu re and government effectiveness 
CEE/CIS is a region with relatively high prevalence of corruption, which is reflected in various 
indicators, including the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index and the 
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators. Selected values of these indicators are 
presented in Table 2.8. Corruption Perceptions Index is a proxy lor the perceived level of 
corruption based on expert assessments and opinion surveys. The index takes the values from 0 
(highly corrupt) to 10 (no corruption). Control of Corruption demonstrates the extent of public 
power use for private gain as well to the degree of state capture by private interests. 
Government Effect iveness is a World Bank indicator for the perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government to 
policy commitments . Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness estimates are 
obtained from an unobserved components model, based on expert assessments and opinion 
surveys. The values are reported as scores ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, where higher values 
correspond to less corruption or better quality of state governance (Kaufmann et al. 2010). 
Corruption has strong links to the effectiveness at which the government operates and the state 
capacity to successfully steer a reform process. In Table 2.8, the strength of this relationship is 
reflected by the correlation values between effect iveness of governance and two measures of 
corruption, for each of the given years, hi turn, government effectiveness can be strongly linked 
to the achieved level of economic output (in 2000, a correlation of 88%). 
The presence of corruption has many negative implications for the operation of a HCS, as it 
does for economic development and equity at large. Corruption weakens public services and 
functions, misdirects public resources, limits both economic growth and social development, 
often undermines or redirects reform efforts, and has the primary adverse impact on the poor. 
In the communis t systems, corruption was entrenched at all levels of managerial, political, 
social, economic and cultural life. A World Bank report (2000a) informs that the problem was 
often reinforced by new corruption opportunities inherent to transition. The proliferation of 
corruption was fuelled by a simultaneous re-design of economic, legal and political institutions 
and a large-scale redistribution of state assets. CIS is a region with the highest perceived level of 
corruption in the world, while CEE is on par with Middle East/North Africa and Latin America. 
The more benign situation of CEE relative to CIS has its source in a more conclusive departure 
f rom the previous system, greater state capacity, civil society able to promote transparency and 
accountability, the advantageous legacy of public institutions, and the presence of political 
competi t ion. 
The World Bank report recognises two dimensions of corruption. State capture concerns the 
influence over formation of laws to the advantage of an interest group. This form of corruption, 
also referred to as regulatory capture, is relevant for the consistency and quality of reforms and 
the ability of newly introduced mechanisms to support the goals of efficiency and equity. 
Secondly, administrative corruption is the intentional imposition or distortion of existing laws, 
Table 2.8: Selected measures of corruption and government effectiveness 
iviuiuuva 1,UJ/ -U.^J -U.UJ -u.uo -u. /t Z..U -u.u-t -U.U.? -U. / J -U.JU 
Annenia 2,295 -0.57 -0.76 -0.57 -0.59 2.5 2.9 2.7 -0.61 -0.65 -0.05 0.07 
Turkmenistan 2,322 -1.83 -1.12 -1.48 -1.43 1.8 1.8 -1.05 -1.31 -1.62 -1.34 
Azerbaijan 2,490 -1.06 -1.13 -1.03 -1.10 1.5 2.2 2.3 -0.88 -0.93 -0.68 -0.63 
Georgia 2,502 -1.11 -0.91 -0.33 -0.23 2.3 4.1 -0.42 -0.67 -0.37 0.22 
Ukraine 3,696 -1.03 -1.06 -0.65 -0.90 1.5 2.6 2.2 -0.88 -0.68 -0.46 -0.77 
Albania 4,800 0.05 -0.83 -0.72 -0.40 2.4 3.2 -0.54 -0.84 -0.65 -0.20 
Kazakhstan 5,406 -1.06 -1.00 -0.98 -0.91 3 2.6 2.7 -1.13 -0.67 -0.53 -0.19 
Belarus 5,810 -0.97 -0.56 -0.89 -0.78 4.1 2.6 2.4 -1.06 -0.83 -1.11 -1.10 
Romania 6,838 -0.23 -0.25 -0.16 -0.13 2.9 3 3.8 -0.82 -0.39 -0.08 -0.13 
Bulgaria 7,118 -1.02 -0.11 0.12 -0.12 3.5 4 3.8 -0.96 0.01 0.26 0.14 
Lat\'ia 8,529 -1.02 0.10 0.39 0.30 3.4 4.2 4.5 -0.48 0.48 0.63 0.64 
Russian Federation 8,613 -1.03 -1.06 -0.75 -1.12 2 2.1 2.4 2.2 -0.69 -0.68 -0.36 -0.28 
Lithuania 9,518 -0.24 0.43 0.31 0.25 4.1 4.8 4.9 -0.22 0.35 0.88 0.72 
Estonia 11,002 -0.21 0.76 1.00 1.00 5.7 6.4 6.6 0.54 0.88 1.04 1.18 
Poland 11,753 0.53 0.66 0.33 0.48 5 4.1 3.4 5 0.90 0.65 0.61 0.64 
Slovakia 12,726 0.55 0.36 0.59 0.32 3.5 4.3 4.5 0.62 0.44 0.99 0.92 
Hungary 13,674 0.56 0.74 0.69 0.46 4 5.2 5 5.1 0.72 0.93 0.87 0.73 
Czech Republic 16,887 0.58 0.33 0.60 0.46 5 4.3 4.3 4.9 0.65 0.66 1.01 0.98 
Correlation with 
0.86 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.94 0.82 0.89 0.92 
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in order to provide gains to an interest group. This form is further discussed in Chapter 2.7.4 in 
the context of informal payments and other uses of public office for private gain. 
Hoff and Stiglitz (2002) liken rule of law to a public good that may fail to emerge 
spontaneously as a result of privatisation. In Russia, the post-communist transformation was 
marked by stripping of public assets and establishing an oligarch class, rather than by creating a 
market economy, conditions for economic efficiency, wealth creation, and rule of law. A rule of 
law will eventually be constituted for the protection of the new status quo, cementing property 
rights distribution biased towards the privileged group. This is likely to damage long-tenn 
growth and further enhance social distrust in public institutions. The latter problem is 
commonplace in the region where the levels of trust and social capital are low. These obstacles 
hamper innovation, cooperation and organisational solutions to existing issues, constrain 
developments of human and intellectual capital, and consequently lead to underperformance in 
allocative efficiency (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998). 
2.6.8. Path-dependence 
The above circumstances add up to the argument of Rechel & McKee (2009) that feasible 
policy options in CEE/CIS have been constrained by the presence of system path-dependence. 
This theoretical framework is sometimes used to explain why, despite extensive reform efforts 
and a visible convergence towards Western standards, HCSs of Eastern Europe also display 
considerable continuity in certain aspects. According to the path-dependence approach, 
government interventions may result from prior events rather than an explicit welfare analysis. 
In particular, the presence of a third-degree path-dependence would imply that there exist 
feasible arrangements for recognising and achieving better outcomes, but these outcomes are 
not obtained (Liebovitz & Margolis 1995). Path-dependent outcomes arise from incapacity of a 
process to shake free of its history, or non-ergodicity (David 2001). Explaining social and 
macroeconoinic hardships of CEE/CIS transition with a historical lock-in is attempted by 
Roland (1990, 1992), Miurin and Sommariva (1993) and Liebovitz and Margolis (1995). These 
scholars demonstrate path-dependence with the continuity of nearly universal coverage, 
expectations of a paternalistic state, and maintaining extensive public prerogatives in health 
care. 
On the other hand, Maarse (2006) argues that a high degree of path-dependence characterises 
privatisation processes not only in CEE/CIS, but also in Western Europe. In terms of social 
policies and welfare state characteristics, the region followed different directions, with CEE 
influenced by access negotiations and membership of the EU, countries like Moldova and 
Ukraine staying under the influence of Russian Federation, and Belarus remaining a quasi-
military state (Fenger 2007). The case of Georgia, which introduced a liberalised health care 
market and reduced the public share of health spending to below the United States' level, 
provides another counterargument and an example of a radically disparate scenario. This variety 
of experiences seems natural, given a common background of a half-century-long episode of 
communism on one hand, and the cultural, political and economic diversity on the other. This 
outcome may or may not be path-dependent: Kay (2005) provides a deep critique of the 
applicability of path-dependence to policy studies, particularly with respect to the clarity of the 
concept and its heavy reliance on the contributions of New Institutional Economics. 
2.6.9. Idiosyncrat ic issues 
On top of the processes and challenges characteristic of the region at large, certain countries 
faced idiosyncratic external events that marked their individual transitions. For example. Knight 
et al. (2003) point at newly established nations, such as Estonia and Slovakia, which had to 
establish their HCSs from the ground up, independently from the structures existing previously 
in Czechoslovakia and the USSR. Conflict and war were another set of events distorting 
transition pathways in the region. Nuri (2001) discusses the case of Albania that had its health 
system heavily burdened as a result of the Kosovo crisis in 1999. Albania, which at that time 
was in the midst of a hospital reform, faced waves of refugees in the need of shelter and 
aliments as well as social and health care. 
2.6.10. Success stories 
This section discussed the most common obstacles that impeded or debilitated reform efforts in 
the region. Abstracting from a considerable variety of transition experiences, Kutzin et al. 
(2010a) find that successful reformers were: clear about the policy objectives and their relative 
weight; understood available financing arrangements and composed them to address locally 
identified problems rather than copying foreign models; took a stepwise approach to reform 
implementation, often making purchasing mechanisms a starting area; re-defined their benefit 
packages in accord with other health care policy developments; and relied on monitoring and 
evaluation for ongoing learning and improvement. Shakarishvili and Davey (2005) emphasise 
the successful systems were flexible in adjusting to their social, economic, demographic and 
political environments. 
Borisova and Gerry (2010) identify clusters of CEE/CIS countries by timing and consistency of 
reform. The cluster analysis is based on multiple variables of the HCS institutional setup in the 
areas of financing, organisation, primary care, incentives, patient orientation and the role of 
professional organisafions. The authors consider two stages of transition: early reforms (the first 
seven years) and further reforms (years 8-15). With respect to early reforms, they identify (1.1) 
fast reformers (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia), (1.2) inconsistent 
reformers (Albania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Russia), (1.3) slow reformers (Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Poland, Moldova, Romania), (1.4) non-reformers (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan), and (1.5) an outlier (Georgia). Considering the stage of 
further reforms, the systems are: (2.1) hberaiised (Czech Republic and Slovakia), (2.2) refonned 
(Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania), (2.3) diverse and inconsistent (Albania, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Russia), (2.4) non-reformers (Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan), and (2.5) outliers (Armenia, Georgia). 
2.7. Deficiencies of the emergent systems 
2.7.1. S h a r e d challenges of economic p e r f o r m a n c e 
Transfomiation o f C E E / C I S health care had positive impacts on quality of health care (Rechel 
& McKee 2009). Shakarishvili and Davey (2005) agree the quality improvements deserve 
recognition, but also note that reforms fell short in providing corresponding gains in HCS 
efficiency. In fact, a number of data envelopment and stochastic frontier analyses suggest that 
that overall economic efficiency of the CEE/CIS systems has been subpar considering their 
level of development (WHO 2000, Evans et al. 2001). Verhoeven et al. (2007) specify that, in 
comparison to OECD, GEE countries enjoy relatively high technical efficiency in converting 
expenditures into intermediate outputs such as the numbers of immunisations, consultations, and 
inpatient episodes. However, they display poor allocative efficiency in translating those into 
health outcomes reflected by measures of health-adjusted life expectancy, standardised death 
rates, and infant and maternal mortality rates. This structural system inefficiency will become 
more pressing as countries increase their health expenditures. Without major efficiency refomis, 
it may be impossible to maintain a trajectory of growth in health outcomes. 
Moreover, systemic underperfomiance is also apparent in the aspects of equity and 
responsiveness. So far, the outcome trends have been worrying. In the region at large, the level 
of equity and financial protection has lessened with growing OOP payments and payroll 
contributions, which are generally less progressive than taxation. Cost of illness has become a 
risk factor for poverty, as many families participate in no prepaid scheme and face catastrophic 
OOP expenditures in case of hospitalisation. Correspondingly, access barriers have increased, 
particularly for the poor (Preker et al. 2002). These trends are common to both unreformed and 
SHI countries. In the latter, adverse equity outcomes were usually a side-product of mishandling 
the composition of the health funding mix and reducing the scope of statutory entitlement. 
Sources of health care deficiencies are twofold. On one hand, the countries have struggled to 
neutralise the predominantly burdensome socialist inheritance. Some deficiencies had existed 
before 1989 and their persistence is a sign of the inability to shake off the historical residue. On 
the other hand, there are also new and upcoming problems that require anticipation and 
flexibility (thus corresponding to the concept of dynamic efficiency), among them new medical 
technologies, capital and infrastructure demands and •'brain drain" (Waters et al. 2008). The 
technological, fiscal and demographic pressures are likely to affect CEE/CIS no less than 
industrialised countries, effecting in the "welfare trilemma" of coverage, cost-containment and 
choice (The Economist 2011). The necessary trade-offs will require painful and, hopefully, 
explicit discussions over priorities and acceptable forms of rationing. Likely outcomes of 
shunning explicitness in managing the trilemma are observable in CEE/CIS, where rationing 
through waiting times and gatekeeping is subject to extensive informal reallocation, outside of 
government control. 
Regardless of its efficiency, a HCS will always be constrained by the revenue base. Social 
health insurance may be effective in generating HCS funds in affluent countries, but in poorer 
countries it does not guarantee higher and more stable revenues than taxation, because it suffers 
from the same limitations underlying the public sector. For example, shifting revenue collection 
from the tax authority to quasi-state agencies creates institutional issues, stakeholder tensions 
and creates opportunities for corruption and government failure (Preker et al. 2002). For the 
same reasons, SHI may incentivise but does not guarantee cost containment, economic 
efficiency or better health outcomes. 
Considering the above trends, pressures and liabilities with available financing sources, reform 
strategies ought to consider both additional sources of revenue and rationing mechanisms, as 
economic growth alone will be insufficient to cater for the increased health care demands. 
Solutions for consideration include stricter approaches to defining benefit packages, explicit 
priority setting, emphasising cost-effectiveness of interventions, and co-payments to curb moral 
hazard on the demand side. Expanding voluntary health insurance is another possibility. Its 
present immateriality is argued to hinder efficiency advancements and constrain financial 
resources available in the system. Moreover, the lack of prepaid alternatives may sustain 
resistance against rationalisation reforms of the statutory scheme, due to affordability concerns 
(Leven 2005). 
2.7.2. Health system performance in a sub-regional layout 
The challenges facing health systems are to a large extent universal across CEE/CIS. Most 
systems entered transition with similar inheritance of high levels of risk protection and equity, 
as well as the same mechanisms for maintaining thereof After a decade, considerable system 
heterogeneity emerged, resulting in dramatic differences in the severity of most pressing 
problems. For example, the levels of financial protection range from good in CEE to very weak 
in Central Asia. In terms of the HCS capacity to meet its objectives of access, protection and 
equity, three clusters of countries are distinguished in the region: Central and Eastern Europe, 
higher income CIS, and lower income CIS largely overlapping with Central Asia (Ensor 1993, 
Preker et al. 2002, Kutzin & Jakab 2010). The country groupings follow previously discussed 
characterisations of the extent of macroeconomic recession, absolute levels of per capita 
income, and the overall complexity and direction of health reform. In terms of health care 
llnancing, the three clusters loosely correspond to the predominance of long-term contracts 
(SHI), hierarchy (unreformed tax-based systems), and spot markets (OOP payments). 
Central and Eastern Europe 
The region 's upper income bracket. Central and Eastern Europe, experienced a mild economic 
decline followed by a period of fast growth. CEE systems evolved towards the Bismarck model 
of financing and only kept limited functions of tax funding. They also maintained high levels of 
financial protection, not necessarily reflected in general public satisfaction with the sector 
reform. Developments in countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia, have been driven by the closeness of Western Europe, democratic political processes, 
and the gravity of EU legislation over the matters of privacy policies and cross-border care 
(Mossialos et al. 2010). The influence of European policy triggered adjustments of national 
systems and altered the post-communist transition trajectory, through the early 1990s 
aspirations, late 1990s and early 2000s negotiations, as well as treaties, regulations and 
directives after 2004. 
The European context is also useful for assessing health system performance, as CEE countries 
have been closing the gap dividing them from Western Europe. Both the O E C D (2004) 
evaluation of high performing systems and subsequent editions of the Euro Health Consumer 
Index (Eisen & Bjiirnberg 2010, Bjornberg 2012) indicate the relative performance of Eastern 
European HCSs. In the latter ranking, focusing on responsiveness and accessibility, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Slovakia outperform such Southern European countries as Italy, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are praised for •'doing particularly wel l" 
considering their purchasing power-adjusted per capita health expenditures at around half the 
levels of Western Europe. Coincidentally, those two countries were the only ones to introduce 
SHI systems based on multiple competing insurers. In other CEE countries, transition 
experiences show that MOH-subordinate or semi-autonomous bureaucratic agencies led to 
considerable government failure, which seems to be reflected in their performance. CEE is also 
advancing to the stage of higher patient empowerment , which has been signalled by 
improvements in patient information, privacy protection, e-Health, etc. 
The variety of Former Soviet Republics (high income CIS) 
The second cluster of countries, of intermediate per capita income, differs from the previous 
group both in terms of the economic system (Kornai 2000c) as well as health care and outcomes 
(Kutzin 2010a). This bunch underwent a deeper recession and inconsistent political and 
economic transition. The aftermath of 1989 was more severe than in CEE, with growing poverty 
and inequalities, marginalised groups becoming more vulnerable, migration, erosion of social 
networks, and intensification in risk factors such as alcoholism, drug consumption, sex trade, 
violence and conflict. Consequently, health care systems of post-Soviet republics face 
challenges different from those of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The challenges were met by only limited and irresolute health care reforms. The health sector 
transformation typically featured an incomplete transition to SHI (which often remained 
secondary to tax), fragmented systems for health financing and fund pooling, deterioration in 
the levels of protection and equity despite sustained broad nominal entitlement, and increases in 
formal and informal payments. Social insurance schemes in the region failed to achieve 
universal coverage, excluding from the public safety net mainly the vulnerable groups. 
Formalising informal payments has achieved mixed effects, from unsuccessfijl to promising, 
with evidence from Russia showing that formal and informal payments may be substitutes. 
In terms of provision, many medical practices perpetuate from the previous system and 
managerial autonomy was scarcely extended, despite some decentralisation efforts. Shifting 
primary care from the polyclinic model towards general practice did not strengthen prevention 
or reduce the reliance on hospitalisations for treatment. HCSs capacity to respond to chronic 
diseases is constrained by the lack of investment in skills and facilities, overlooking care 
continuity and integrated approaches, shortages of drugs and equipment, and low commitment 
to quality. The situation is particularly difficult in rural areas. Public health systems failed to 
adapt to the new reality and continue with their narrowly-detmed task of controlling 
communicable diseases. Impacts of privatisation and liberalisation were uneven and did not rise 
to create an alternative to the public provision. In the pharmaceuticals sector, most drugs are 
now imported through private networks, at a substantial cost. The opportunity to use generic 
drugs is low due the absence of favourable regulation, limited local capacity to produce generic 
drugs and general negative attitudes towards substitution of brand-names with generics. 
Professional organisations gained more voice and relevance, however, health policy-making 
remained highly politicised (Balabanova & Coker 2008). The importance of parallel health 
systems, run independently by state companies or ministries and dedicated for workers of the 
military, transport and civil servants, has nonetheless been fading. 
Because of the size and diversity of the region, as well as the unevenness of the transition 
process, differences in access and utilisation within CIS are substantial. In this variety, countries 
of the second cluster, such as Albania, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, maintained 
fair accessibility of health care for the general public. This is notwithstanding the commonplace 
reliance on informal payments and personal connections, substantial within-country inequalities 
and the potential unsustainability of health care systems (Balabanova et al. 2004). A study of 
eight countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia by Balabanova et al. (2012) shows that 
improvements in health care accessibility have taken place in the recent years, lowering within-
country inequalities and strengthening financial protection. The scholars also observe 
institutional progress in the tbrm of developing insurance systems, growing public awareness of 
the HCS mechanisms, and some positive side-effects of economic growth. Moreover, 
geographical accessibility is not an issue. However, large scale OOP expenditures persist, and 
affordability of health services is sub-par. Once free at point of service, medical treatment has 
universally become subject to formal or informal fees, despite efforts to strengthen public 
systems and llnancial protection of the populations. This is not least because citizens pay for 
health care provided in public facilities as if it were provided in private practice, due to the 
capture of public property. Anticipating these obstacles, people commonly choose not to seek 
medical care, opting instead for alternative practices: self-treatment with herbs, alcohol or 
traditional medicine. In consequence of the above challenges, accessibility patterns have 
changed in the last decade. On one hand, there has been a decrease in variation between socio-
economic groups and an overall decline in the access problem. On the other, the improvements 
have been less significant for the lower social strata, therefore the groups of low income, poor 
health, or otherwise vulnerable, became relatively more disadvantaged. 
C a u c a s u s and Cen t r a l Asia 
The third cluster comprises low income countries, primarily but not exclusively of Caucasus and 
Central Asia, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia, and Uzbekistan. These countries, 
similarly to the previous group, suffered negative consequences of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union: increasing poverty, widening inequalities, erosion of social networks and values, social 
disruption, and intensification of adverse risk. However, the shocks were particularly 
pronounced: in Central Asian countries in the first half of 1990s GDP fell by 50 to 80% and 
poverty levels rose manifold, e.g. in Kazakhstan from 5% in 1988 to 50% in 1994 (Borowitz & 
Atun 2006). In some cases this was accompanied by civil or military conflict, e.g. dictatorship 
and international isolation of Turkmenistan and the 1992-94 civil war in Tajikistan. Balabanova 
and Coker (2008) explain that the extent of disruption varied between countries for complex 
reasons, including both extrinsic circumstances as well as culture, history, varying population 
homogeneity, national product, political processes, and availability of natural resources (mainly 
natural gas and petroleum). Consequently, the socio-economic situation of Caucasus and 
Central Asia differed dramatically not only from CEE, but also from Russian republics, to the 
extent that some countries qualified for international aid of up to \0% of TEH in 2007 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Rechel et al. 2011). 
The health sector was adversely affected by severe macroeconomic decline and social 
disruption, which widened the gap between the capacity and needs, as well as disallowing the 
necessary health care and public health reforms. These countries have introduced limited 
changes of governance, financing and health care delivery, and moved towards strengthening 
primary care (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan), but generally did not overcome fragmentat ion, 
overreliance on hospitals, inequalities in utilisation and health care system inefficiency (Rechel 
et al. 2011). This resulted is the group ' s distinguishing characteristic: OOP payments being the 
primary source of health care financing at the level of 50-80 per cent of TEH, which Borowitz 
and Atun (2006) interpret as a collapse of public HCSs and a de facto privatisation of health 
financing. 
Bonilla-Chacin at al. (2005) identify four cases within this cluster: (1) very low spending 
(TEH < 2 % GDP) and no reform, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, which rely too much on hospital 
care despite the resource constraints and need to shift the focus towards primary care; (2) very 
low spending and some reform, Armenia and Georgia, which suffer from low public revenue, 
high OOP payments and a weak primary health care system leading to problems in accessibility, 
eff iciency and equity; (3) higher spending (THE > 2% GDP) and no refonn, Uzbekistan, which 
has a good opportunity to catch up with the better-off countries if it proceeds with adequate 
reform; and (4) higher spending and some reform, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova, which are the 
group leaders and should continue to reform their systems with caution. This classification 
proves that there is heterogeneity even in the narrowly defined group of the seven poorest 
former Soviet republics. 
The scarcity of resources and inadequate policy responses correspond to increasing barriers to 
access, especially given immaterial levels of voluntary prepaid schemes, declining utilisation, 
and poor levels of equity and financial protection. Problems with infrastructure upkeep led to 
limitations in the supply of water and sanitation. Affordabili ty issues are most severe in Georgia 
that has the most limited public benefit entitlement, and in Azerbaijan, where the public share in 
total health expenditure is the lowest (Balabanova el al. 2012). The health care that remained is 
provided inefficiently and has poor quality. The palpable consequences have been rising poverty 
caused by cost of illness and declining health outcomes, the latter an effect of both increased 
incidence of communicable disease and growing burden of chronic disease (Bonilla-Chacin at 
al. 2005). 
Differences between reform paths in similar post-Soviet countries of Central Asia, e.g. 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, reveal essential ingredients of successful reform. Borowitz and 
Atun (2006) emphasise leadership, planning and a vision of implementation, coordination of 
reform areas, capacity-building, and allowing time for institutions to mature especially if they 
perform functions unseen in the previous regime (e.g. health insurance regulation done by 
people who only are familiar with a management system of top-down command and control). 
Rechel et al. (2011) highlight good governance and political continuity, coordination of donor 
activities, carefully contextualising new economic mechanisms, incentivising efficient modes of 
provision, lessening regional inequalities, using pilot projects for successful and step-wise 
implementation, as well as building support and understanding of the public and health 
professionals. Bonilla-Chacin at al. (2005) recommend to firstly enhance supply-side efficiency 
through outpatient and primary care focus, evidence-based care, empowerment and training of 
health workers, financing reforms and fostering managerial capacity; secondly, to strengthen 
budgeting and regulation through monitoring and evaluation as well as standards of quality, 
information and accounting; and thirdly, to tackle the problems of access and affordability by 
considering prepayment mechanisins outside the public sphere and creating protection programs 
for the poor. 
Although Caucasus and Central Asia have the lowest health outcomes among CEE/CIS 
countries, neighbouring Pakistan and Afghanistan perform poorer still. Keeping this in mind, 
the traditions of the Semashko system can be seen as an asset rather than a burden. A coherent 
system for delivering key basic health care and public health services is valuable fundament 
that, despite significant challenges, can be transformed by adding new solutions that will 
respond to modern needs. 
2.7.3. C o r r u p t i o n in health ca re 
T h e presence and f o r m s of co r rup t ion 
A particular challenge faced by CEE/CIS countries in reforming their health systems lies in 
entrenched corruption. This is one of the persistent forms of the socialist burden, underlying 
numerous other issues and undermining health care reform. Corruption is a broad term, applied 
to a wide variety of circuinstances, and therefore usually referred to in a specific context (cf 
Bardhan 1997). Even narrowed down to health care, corruption may assume a number of 
different areas and forms. Vian (2008) identifies the following: ( I ) construction of facilities -
bribes, kickbacks, insufficient accountability; (2) purchase of medical goods - bribes, 
kickbacks, collusion during procurement, a lack of incentives for optimal choice, unethical 
promotion, insufficient accountability; (3) use of medical goods - theft, resale, sale of goods 
that should be provided free of charge; (4) regulation - bribes to gain approval, certification or 
speed up inspection, bribes to influence decisions, biased application of rules and regulations; 
(5) education - bribes to secure a place in a medical school or training, to obtain passing grades, 
personal influence and nepotism; (6) research - pseudo-trials for marketing purposes, 
misinformation or inadequate standards; (7) provision of services - use of public facility to 
serve private patient, unnecessary referrals and induced demand, absenteeism, eliciting informal 
payments, theft of user fee or diversion of budget funds. Leven (2005) discusses three forms of 
corruptive action as particularly widespread in Eastern European HCSs; patient payments 
intended to secure, speed up or improve quality of medical treatment; payments from 
pharmaceutical and medical equipment industries aimed at obtaining a favourable consideration 
by physicians or regulators; and the use of public facilities for private practice. 
Informal coordination, bordering witli or explicitly involving corruption, is by no means 
exclusive to post-socialist countries. Illegal practices have been documented in the industrialised 
countr ies ' health care also, e.g. in the US, Pauly (1979) on fee splitting to offer incentives for 
patient referrals, and Hyman (2001) on social norms and perceptions of health care fraud. In the 
latter paper, the US illegal activity was estimated to account for 10 per cent of total spending on 
health care. Informal payments, usually taking less subtle forms, are common in the developing 
countries of Asia, South America, and have also been reported in some African countries (Lewis 
2006). These countries rely on public provision rather than regulation, where an ample space for 
corruption is created by the combination of the position of power, a lack of accountability, and 
persistent shortages. However, industrialised countries have the infrastructure and social 
protection schemes but considerably lower levels of corruption, while developing countries 
often lack the infrastructure or welfare benefits that could be captured for private gain. The 
presence of public infrastructure and generous welfare programmes on one hand, and high 
levels of corruption on the other, is the distinguishing feature of CEE/CIS and an explanation of 
the unique intensity of the problem in this region. 
A number of mechanisms can be conceived through which informal allocation can be argued to 
improve economic performance. These arguments have attracted the attention of 
macroeconomists concerned with economic growth and health economists looking primarily at 
eff iciency and equity outcomes. Admittedly, macroeconomic evidence exists to support the 
claim that the informal sector can boost growth by "oiling the mechanism" of rusty bureaucracy 
that distorts allocation by sub-optimal rules, regulations and administrative decisions. 
Corruptive action may at best improve economic outcomes in the short run, while in the long-
term it will lead to system underperformance both in terms of efficiency and equity (Akai et al. 
2005). The discussion of corruption and its effects is very similar in the case of health care. Liu 
and Sun (2009) present a formal analysis of patient welfare, taking into consideration the 
scenarios of banning and tolerating informal payments. The model shows that forbidding 
informal payments is not necessarily a welfare-enhancing step, nor is al lowing for their 
existence. The overall outcome hinges on patient heterogeneity, among other things. Tanzi 
(1998) considers a number of situations in which corruption can improve allocative eff iciency, 
however, each of his arguments can be countered as being non-optimal and having in the long 
run harmful effects on efficiency, equity, accessibility and responsiveness of health care 
Econometric studies of links between corruption and health outcomes (e.g. Gupta et al. 2000, 
Radin 2009) substantiate these claims, suggesting considerable costs of tolerating high levels of 
illegal or informal activity in the HCS for extended periods of time. 
Problems of state capture and regulatory failure were introduced in Chapter 2.6 in the context of 
reform quality. In the remaining part of this section, the focus is on the problem of informal 
payments . Nonetheless, the various manifestat ions of corruption remain interconnected parts of 
a broader problem, and in terms of effective policy cannot be addressed partially. 
I n f o r m a l p a y m e n t s 
Forms 
The practice of informally paying for public services is a residue of the shortage economy, 
where many goods were unavailable in the official circulation and often obtainable only through 
grey or black markets. Non-price rationing of goods and services granted substantial 
discretionary powers on the side of the officials, who often demanded a token of appreciation in 
exchange for favourable consideration. The system of non-price rationing functioned for over 
four decades, and finding ways around it became both a necessity and a habit. Despite 
subsequent reform efforts, the public sector remains largely affected by the presence of the 
phenomenon, both in terms of clerks ' expectations and petitioners' perception of duty. The 
problem is pronounced in health care, where underfunding, organisational deficiencies, as well 
as intentional impediments put in place by medical staff, result in low quality, poor 
responsiveness, and long waiting times. 
In health care, infonnal payments, also referred to as envelope or under-the-table payments, 
typically concern patients ' out-of-pocket expenditures on services provided under the statutory 
scheine, which are nominally free of charge. (Exceptionally, they may take the in-kind form 
rather than cash, and may also take place when a medical service is already subject to a formal 
fee.) Gaal et al. (2006a) differentiate between infonnal charges, advance payments (in private 
practice for provision by the same doctor in his employing public organisation), brick payments 
(an encouraged or compelled purchase of a token to support the provider organisation), tips, in-
kind contributions (e.g. in case of a shortage of medical provisions), and gratuities. These forms 
differ in the scope of illegality, informality, abuse of power, voluntariness, timing, and the 
extent of public-private sector crossover. For example, Ensor (2004) distinguishes between (1) 
informal payments that arise from need, such as an actual deficiency that requires the patient to 
contribute towards costs of care if the treatment is to be provided, (2) misuse of market power, 
in which a physic ian 's monopolist ic power enables him to successfully extract payments in 
exchange for granting access to medical care (3) additional services, initiated by patients hoping 
to " jump" the queue, increase the quality of care or gain other privileges. In the wider health 
sector, an informal payment could secure eligibility for state-funded spas and health resorts, for 
example. 
The extent to which under-the-table payments are expressions of genuine gratitude, as opposed 
to abuse of position or bribe, has been debated. Gaal and McKee (2005) closely examined 
contexts and motives, as well as theoretical arguments and empirical evidence regarding the 
nature of informal payments in Hungary. They found that the discussion is inconclusive and 
neither the donation nor fee-for-service hypotheses can be defended beyond doubt. Thompson 
and Witter (2000) argued tliat in fact, even for the parties involved in the transaction, it may be 
impossible to determine whether the payments are solicited, requested, hinted at, bribe attempts 
or tokens of appreciation. This ambiguous situation involves a mixture of various social norms 
as well as complex material and immaterial incentives. Consequently, an ethical qualification of 
such an act is often open to various interpretations. 
Public sector corruption is well-entrenched in Eastern Europe, which creates certain 
expectations and automatisms that inlluence individuals' actions and choices. However, 
Bardhan (1997) rejects the explanation of reasons for corruption based on social norms. His 
argument is that it nears a tautology to claim that "a country has more corruption because its 
norms are more favourable to corruption". This hypothesis is further dulled by the presence of 
tangible benefits that accrue to both voluntarily transacting sides. Ledeneva (2009) is cautious 
of the "system made me do it" attitude that justifies corruption and fosters moral indifference to 
its implications. Resulting "petty corruption", one that involves minor gains to a few involved 
individuals, is the most widespread, overlooked and damaging at the aggregate level. 
Implications 
Envelope payments form a part of the changing health care expenditure patterns and growing 
reliance on OOP spending, discussed in Chapter 2.5.6. Rechel and McKee (2009) argue that 
informal payments are highly regressive, damaging health care accessibility and equity of 
financing and provision, as well as they distort health care provision by inducing the provision 
of expensive, inadequate services. Informal payments also introduce distortions into the publicly 
funded system by undermining the achievement of social objectives which non-price rationing 
is designed to realise. Evidence shows that patient charges, both formal and informal, may lead 
to forgoing care or incurring debt in order to pay for hospitalisations and physician visits. The 
equity issue of inability to pay is pronounced in Romania and Ukraine, with 43 and 49 per cent 
of individuals in need reporting affordability issues. While the two countries feature the highest 
levels of patient payments, in other CEE/CIS countries the frequency of reported inability to pay 
is still high at around 30% (Pavlova et al. 2012). 
The inequality argument also concerns untaxed incomes of doctors, as some medical 
specialisations and positions give more opportunities to secure extra profits (Leven 2005). This 
leads to the sentiment of injustice and dissatisfaction of the health workforce. Moreover, a 
broader social security perspective reveals the magnitude of macroeconomic implications of 
corruption, related to but not limited to health care. Examples of this include false statements of 
sick leave eligibility, early retirement, paid disability and other social safety net benefits. These 
practices decrease the size of the economically active population and put a strain on the welfare 
system, yet in CEE/CSI arc a popular measure of securing against unemployment. According to 
Lewis (2000, 2002) Intbmial payments damage the iiealth sector, the government and the 
society by breaking trust and cohesion. They are highly inequitable in being random 
uncontrolled charges arbitrarily imposed by HCS medical workers on individuals, with the only 
selection criterion being a need of medical care. Envelope payments also obstruct and 
undermine the re fonn process through tying up potential leaders of change in informal networks 
and illegal private benefits . Finally, the problem of supplier-induced demand may analogously 
occur in the informal and formal settings. 
Szende and Culyer (2006) produce evidence of informal payments in Hungary being highly 
regressive. They calculate the Kakwani indices, as applied to equity of health financing by 
Wagstaf f and van Doorslaer (1992), and tmd their values at -0.38 for GP, -0.39 for outpatient, 
and -0.35 for hospital care. The regressive nature of informal payments stems from the amounts 
paid and their frequencies being similar across income groups and unrelated to the ability to 
pay. The payments in Hungary are found to be part of an informal code of practice between 
public system providers and patients, and rarely contested. Pavlova et al. (2012) apply system 
dynamic model l ing to project macro-level effects of patient charges on health care consumption. 
Their f indings are in line with other qualitative studies, with informal payments adding from 0.1 
to 0 .5% of G D P to effective health care spending, equivalent to 0.5-6.7% of TEH. Poland is 
positioned near the lower estimate; the upper boundary value illustrates Romania and Ukraine. 
Gaal et al. (2006b) estimate that, in 2001, Hungary informal payments amoimted 1.5-4.6% of 
TEH. 
While the above values represent fairly immaterial shares of the health system fmancial flows, 
informal payments have considerable and adverse individual-level implications. Their key 
influence is in crippling the equity of the system, both in being highly regressive on the patient 
side, and unequally distributed among doctors. Despite their relatively small value, informal 
payments persist by giving both health professionals and patients an expectation and hope of 
improving their situation. In terms of health policy, this proves a balance difficult to overthrow, 
because achieving an alternative, formal equilibrium would require resources far exceeding the 
value of informal payments (Gaal et al. 2006b). On the other hand, the "grassroots" form of 
corruption is often indicative of underlying system deficiencies, e.g. oppressive administrative 
or regulatory practices. It may thus be seen as a signal, or outcome, of deeper system corruption, 
rather than part of it. In this view, participating parties are trying to restore a balance with 
informal transactions, suggesting a sub-optimal allocation of public resources. Ledeneva (2009) 
calls for a more profound, contextualised understanding of this problem, and criticises the 
"corruption paradigm" that emerged in Eastern Europe and materialises in the form of grand but 
blunt anti-corruption campaigns. 
Reasons for existence 
There are numerous reasons why envelope payments have proven so d i f f icuh to uproot. Perhaps 
most importantly. Eastern European countries have not fared a long way from the communis t 
institutional environment conducive to government failure. The conditions of state monopoly, 
provider discretion, and inadequate accountability have persisted in the health sector. Moreover, 
there are resource shortages that translate into inadequate volumes of service providers relative 
to needs, low salaries and otherwise poor working conditions, all of which were also the feature 
of the Semashko system. These circumstances are coupled with the lack of market-based price-
quantity adjustment, which results in non-price rationing. Thus, in many of the today 's systems 
there is a shortage and maladjustment that fuels the existence of a secondary circulation of 
medical goods and services. 
Attempts to constrain or formalise infomial payments were met with strong resistance. Under-
the-table payments are an outcome of a sophisticated quasi-market process, with asking prices, 
bidding and haggling, price and quantity/quality equilibria, etc. (Leven 2005). This deeply-
rooted unofficial marketplace serves multiple stakeholders ' interests; in particular, extra profits 
compensate for low health workers ' salaries. In its less harmful forms, the situation could be 
argued to bear resemblance to rewarding good service with a "tip", a common practice among 
US consumers, for example. This interpretation is likely correct when the a priori envelope 
payment neither constitutes a "bid" leading to another pat ient 's relative disadvantage, nor it is a 
prerequisite for obtaining care of the customary quality. In the resource-constrained systems of 
CEE/CIS, however, these conditions are seldom met. Thompson (2000) as well as McMenamin 
and Timonen (2002) suggest that, despite its prominence, the problem has not been addressed 
explicitly by decisive government strategies. The hypothesised reasons include political costs 
involved and the possibility that politicians turn a blind eye to the presence of informal 
payments in an act of compensating for low salaries in the health sector. Anecdotal evidence has 
it that in some countries governments account for informal payments in physicians ' wage 
calculations (Lewis 2002). Related reasons for indolence in the elimination of informal 
payments are poor regulation, weak accountability, and little political commitment due to the 
health lobby pressures (Rechel & McK.ee 2009), 
In fact, some reforms are argued to have worsened the situation. In Poland, an attempt to 
reinforce the private sector growth by allowing the use of public facilities for private practice 
led to blurring the boundary between the public and private sectors. This intensified corruption 
through enhancing opportunities for doctors to shift costs as well as demand advance payments 
and impose informal charges. As a result, the proportion of patients making informal payments 
reached 80%. Another flawed reform introduced confiict of interests into the area of the 
procurement of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. Representatives of the industries were 
allowed to inlluence public decision-making regarding the purchase ol ' lheir own products and 
acceptance for publication of clinical trials in medical journals (Levcn 2005). 
Patients contribute towards the perpetuation of envelope payments also, with various 
motivations behind their actions. Most commonly, they want to by-pass system limitations such 
as sub-par quality or waiting times by offer ing a bribe. However, their reasons may also include 
confusion regarding fees and obligations, or fear of poor quality. The latter stems from the 
awareness of the possibility of provider-induced illnesses, such as hepatitis B or C. Iatrogenic 
conditions are a product of insufficient funding, but also of negligence, poor medical conduct, a 
lack of supervision, and other factors. Given the presence of information asymmetry in medical 
care, the patient may not be able to observe the extra quality he or she is paying for, however, 
may still decide to pay in the hope of reducing the health-related risks. 
Responses 
Komai (2000a) notes that the incidence and size of gratitude payments is a proxy for the 
successfulness of reforms and progress made in health care transition. In the light of his 
comment , the status of informal payments across the region is indicative of certain difficulties. 
There are a number of policy responses to corruption in health care, and informal payments in 
particular, that have been suggested for CEE/CIS governments consideration. The first group 
involves an increased reliance on markets. This may imply increasing the scope for private 
sector provision, following the argument that it would constrain public monopoly that enables 
the abuse of power. Alternatively, elements of markets in public health care may take the form 
of selling the right to choose doctors. This would provide a middle-ground solution, enabling 
and formalising the choice of doctor, however, without privatising the system. Both solutions 
allow for the first-best allocation, however, the choice within the public system avoids a number 
of problems of private markets, e.g. doctors ' strong bargaining power that reduces patients' 
welfare (Liu & Sun 2009). Strategies based on introducing the choice of doctor alone did not 
stand the test of preventing corruption, as in many areas there was no alternative, and waiting 
lists caused patients to opt for a less preferred doctor. Moreover, information asymmetries 
prevented patients from separating the wheat from the chaff (Leven 2005). 
A complementary set of solutions lies in strengthening the legislative framework and 
effect iveness of the justice systems, with the goals of shifting the informal cash flows into the 
legal, transparent and taxable sphere. Above-discussed market mechanisms could be employed 
in support of this goal. Gupta et al. (2000) add that empowering more people over public 
spending and procurement has accountabili ty-enhancing effects and also mitigates corruption 
opportunities. Resulting improvements in fairness, quality, outcomes, and stopping the leak of 
public resources, may dispose the citizens to pay more for public services, breaking the vicious 
circle of poor quality and underfunding. 
Even though informal payment are often forced, Mokhtari & Ashtari (2011) show that they are 
significantly affected by the extent of information asymmetry. Increasing patients ' awareness 
regarding the services they are entitled to receive free of charge and informing about prices of 
services that are subject to fee reduces the likelihood of leaving informal payments. Information 
strategies are inexpensive, non-intrusive and effective, and therefore are preferred policy 
solutions. This strategy extends to broader patient empowerment . Currently, physicians have 
little legal responsibility, patient protection is weak and the implementation of patient rights is 
f lawed. 
Penalisation strategies are likely to have some effect , but may cause a drive of workforce 
towards to the private sector. Introducing formal charges to "crowd out" informal payments has 
the downside of imposing a financial burden with equity consequences (Ensor 2004). Moreover, 
the CEE/CIS track record suggests this reform would face strong rejection by voters. 
Given the problem's strong cultural roots, the counteraction must be multi-directional, 
coordinated and persistent over a long time. Strategies likely to succeed involve a major health 
sector overhaul (Lewis 2002). There are a few necessary elements of a holistic strategy. Firstly, 
the government has to clarify its position and send out a signal for change by making a strong 
objective statement. Secondly, some underlying system deficiencies need to be addressed. This 
includes reducing the overcapacity and overemployment, limiting the input drive and laying out 
across-the-board efficiency incentives, rationalising the statutory scheme in terms of guaranteed 
services, cost-sharing and exclusions, in order to make the public promise feasible and reduce 
informal rationing vehicles. Official fees, even of token size, are likely to constrain informal 
payments to some extent. Since many patients are already accustomed to co-payments , the 
problem is deciding on whom and in what size would fall the burden of formal charges. Part of 
the challenge is in communicating such a reform as credible and beneficial to the majori ty of 
voters, to make it politically feasible. Higher salaries and more satisfactory working 
environments in the public sector are essential, but evidence shows they are not a s tandalone 
solution. Thirdly, regulation should enable and encourage competition as well as choice, 
information and patient rights. This involves the existence of private sector alternatives, 
benchmarking, monitoring and accountability of providers, and opening performance 
assessments to the public. Finally, effectively separating the public and private spheres would 
stop the use public facilities for private provision, an implicit government subsidy for the 
private sector. 
2.7.4. Other sclcctcd problem areas 
Workforce 
Generating additional tunds and reducing the public scheme's liabilities may not be sunicient to 
streamline further progress. One possible limiting factor is health manpower. Afford (2003) 
describes the post-communist transformation as a "corrosive reform", one that brought 
increasing job insecurity, persistently low salaries (compensated for by the government turning 
a blind eye to informal payments), salary and informal gains highly dependent on specialisation 
and position, long working hours and poor working environment, the need for increased 
mobility, the substitution of physicians with nurses, normalisation of CEE medical training 
curricula according to EU norms, evolving competencies demanding adaptation and continuing 
education without employer support. These deteriorating conditions affect males and females 
differently, creating or contributing to gender inequalities in the health workforce (Evidence 
Network 2005). Some of the problems are caused by low proportions of health spending on 
salaries, the rigid system for medical education contributing to job insecurity and forced 
emigration, and unsustainable health labour planning. The misadjustment is reflected in the 
simultaneous existence of unfilled vacancies and migration of new graduates to Western 
Europe. Oboma et al. (2010) say that in the Czech Republic health professionals' perceptions of 
health reforms contrast with the general view of their successfulness, leading to dissatisfaction 
and concern. Thus, there is a hidden cost to improvements in HCS performance, which lie in 
strain, instability and underpayment. 
Eastern European health systems are therefore pressurised by justified expectations of medical 
professionals on one hand, and a new level of mobility opportunities on the other. Opening of 
the economy generated additional input pressures by providing an opportunity for health 
workers to migrate to western countries. The scale of this problem is illustrated by current 
presence of Eastern European doctors in old EU member states, which in such countries as the 
UK and Gennany account for between 1 and 2 per cent of all active physicians (Garcia-Perez et 
al. 2007). This "brain drain", which also existed before 1989, intensified especially after the EU 
enlargement, and was further amplified by the EU-led harmonisation of education and 
qualifications (Waters et al. 2008). Yet, also outside of the EU, the opening of economies and 
relaxation of border restrictions in the region facilitated flows of health professionals from 
Former Soviet Republics. 
The flow of medical personnel is not exclusively towards Western Europe, however, and also 
involves transfers within Eastern Europe. For example, Czech doctors commonly migrate to 
Germany and Austria. Their chief motivation is salary levels, with up to fourfold differences 
between two regions adjacent to the border. This led to some hospitals calling their staffing 
situation a "crisis". However, the Czech Republic gains advantage from Slovak doctors sharing 
the same language and culture, thus being able to seamlessly fill in vacancies. Czech hospitals 
go to great lengths to encourage j o b applications, for instance, by offer ing perquisites such as 
accommodat ion. In Czech hospitals in 2004, up to 30% of personnel were Slovak (Mareckova 
2004). 
Overall , various configurat ions of "brain-drain" put additional constraints on the sys tems ' 
capacity to deliver quality medical care. Countries of Central Europe have to some extent been 
able to make up for the outf lows by offer ing competi t ive salaries and attracting medical doctors 
from other CEE/CIS countries. 
The pharmaceutical sector 
The pharmaceutical sector, previously of centralised manufactur ing, procurement and 
distribution, was one of the most extensively liberalised areas of CEE/CIS health systems. EU 
negotiations and accession were factors greatly shaping the sector operation in the member 
states, and these countries benefited from the quality of the standardised EU regulation. Yet, 
even non-EU countries saw their pharmaceutical sectors deeply affected by privatisation of 
manufactur ing and opening of economies; here, however , the quality of regulation varies and 
generally remains a problem. Compared to the starting point, much has been achieved in the 
course of pharmaceutical sector reforni. Perceptible effects of transition are improved health 
outcomes and a rapid increase in medicament prices and expenditures. The latter stems from 
insufficient eff iciency efforts: inconsequential application of health technology assessment 
(HTA) and little information and incentive for physicians and pharmacists to support cost-
effective, cost-conscious choices. Other problems include limited competi t ion of distributor 
chains that results in excessive mark-ups, a lack of clear rules for price-setting and 
reimbursement listing, non-transparency and corruption of markets and regulators, as well as 
taxes and duties imposed on imported drugs that contribute to high prices faced by payers 
(Mrazek et al. 2004). 
From the pharma perspective (John Wiley & Sons 2006), the post-communist transition 
presented growth opportunities based primarily on the region 's epidemiological profi le shif t ing 
to chronic conditions. Intellectual property protection has been increasingly stable and currently 
is not a matter of concern. However, regulatory gaps exist, for example, a lack of 
bioequivalence information in the generics market. Other shortcomings are low transparency in 
reimbursement listing, instances of preferential treatment of local manufacturers , bureaucratic 
procedures that fail to reward innovation, as well as increasingly aggressive government effor ts 
to contain the costs through reducing the number of drugs listed and their prices. 
Health technology assessment 
Health technology assessment is a newcomer in the region, adopted first in CEE as a supporting 
(non-binding) element for public policy implementation. Poland stands out as the regional 
leader, having established a MOH-dependent HTA agency that made its first recommendat ions 
in 2007. In Hungary, there has been frequent organisational change and shifting of 
competencies , but various HTA bodies have existed since 2004. In the Czech Republic, a 
dedicated agency is not yet established and guidelines are issued by an independent health 
economics society. Gulacsi et al. (2012) emphasise limited transferability of studies based in 
Western countries to Eastern European systems, which strengthens the case for local research in 
this area. However , the capacity to carry out HTA studies is limited in the region, mainly due to 
low numbers of trained specialists, insufficient know -how, and public budgets allocated for this 
purpose being considerably lower than in industrialised countries. Recognising the constraints 
of the Eastern European context, initiatives have been undertaken to establish guidelines and 
standards of economic evaluation tailored to the regional needs (Inotai et al. 2012). The 
awareness of the role of HTA in public policy-making is gaining momentum in the region, with 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia operating preliminary systems that are not yet comprehensive 
or transparent. Generally, there is little but increasing reliance on HTA in implementing new 
technologies, interventions, and pharmaceuticals, as well as setting broader priorities for the 
public system. 
Evidence-based pol icy-making 
Limited HTA applications are a part of broader problems in generation and utilisation of data 
and evidence. Given that evidence is an input to policy-making, the lack of research activity 
may constrain the benefi ts attainable through policies. The limited availability of data suitable to 
support pol icy-making has been indicated as an advantage of the US over the EU (Suhrcke et al. 
2005). The situation of Eastern Europe with respect to the EU is analogous. The case for 
evidence-based pol icy-making has become stronger with the shift towards non-communicable 
diseases that require holistic policy responses. Comprehensive policies ought to consider, other 
than narrowly def ined medical care, lifestyle and social determinants of chronic conditions as 
well as the role of education and information in empowering individuals towards managing their 
health capital. There are sound economic grounds for investing in health, however, research 
activity is needed to assess costs and benefits and enable the best allocation across the 
alternative uses of health care and public health budgets. 
Similarly, Smith (2002) explains that monitoring and performance measurement are necessary 
and powerful tools for the continuous improvement of health systems. Their uses include 
informing decis ion-making at the policy and point of service levels, support ing patient choice, 
and designing incentives to promote various policy goals. For example, Kutzin and Jakab 
(2010) suggest improved information systems could be used to strengthen the unders tanding of 
health financing functions, e.g. the consequences of dramatic increases in private O O P 
expenditures. However , effect ive use of the strategy of cont inuous improvement requires 
reliable data and systems, availability and compatibili ty, incentives and procedures for staff to 
scrutinise and apply the data, as well as a culture of peer comparison and quality improvement . 
Payers and providers in CEE/CIS are not yet at this stage of development , and in particular do 
not meet the prerequisites of infrastructure, data compatibil i ty and reliability as well as the 
culture of making effect ive use of evidence for the advancement of the system. 
Information deficiencies further translate into identification and prioritisation of problem areas. 
McKee et al. (2000) look into the lack of responsiveness of CEE/CIS governments to the 
problem of injury and injury-caused mortality. Compared to the EU, death rates were 6 0 % 
higher in C E E and three times higher in CIS countries. Investigating the causes, McKee et al. 
identify a number of issues rooted in health policy-making: (1) low problem visibility, (2) the 
lack of data and evidence that would direct government action, (3) inadequate capacity of 
organisations responsible for public health in identifying threats and responding with strategies, 
(4) uncertainty about the ownership of the problem, s temming from the system fragmentat ion 
and passive attitudes, (5) weak or non-existent non-governmental organisations that could 
escalate the problem, and (6) international actors focusing on milestone health care system 
reforms rather than practical solutions to specific problems. 
Publ ic hea l th 
Knight et al. (2003) as well as Duran and Kutzin (2010) shed more light on the situation of 
public health in CEE/CIS. Although the actual organisation varies considerably between 
countries, it is considered a national (federal) prerogative and structured in separation f rom the 
health care system. Nonetheless, financing, provision and stewardship of public health 
programmes is fragmented between ministries, agencies, departments, and institutes at national, 
sub-national and international levels. Roles and responsibilities are not clearly def ined and the 
organisations tend to compete rather than cooperate, trying to protect their areas of competency 
and secure funding. Deficiencies range from defining and understanding the problems, 
designing responses at the conceptual and implementation levels, engaging stakeholders, and 
the lack of monitoring and assessment. For example, the inclusion of environmental health and 
health promotion in public health agendas was highly discretionary. Moreover, until the early 
2000s, health inequalities were not generally considered a responsibility of the public health 
authority, which contrasted the EU practices. Public health off icers from C E E countries 
manifested the need for establishing a core set of disciplines at the EU level, which would help 
synchronise and organise public health according to universal priorities and best standards. 
Long-term carc 
Long-term care has also been largely neglected in policy-making and research. The discussion 
oFlong-term and aged care in the context of welfare and social policy is new to CEE/CIS, where 
the traditional model of home-based, informal care remains strong. Existing systems are 
(ragmented, underdeveloped and orientated at social assistance. These facts explain the scarcity 
of data and evidence. Private for-profit and not-for-profit sector initiatives have so far been rare 
and insufficient to make up for the public system deficiencies, partly because of affordability 
issues and little public sector commitment to fostering private sector initiatives. Meanwhile, 
cultural and socio-economic changes, increased labour mobility, population ageing, as well as 
the growing fiscal risks related to intergenerational dependency, put the existing systems to a 
test. Given the welfare privileges inherited from the previous systems their fiscal burden, 
governments of the region are unwilling to take on another commitment and play a game of 
deferment, for the time being relying on informal carers. Currently, the statutory responsibilities 
are fragmented and often unclear between the health and social sectors. The emerging reform 
agenda encompasses decentralisation and pluralisation, clarification of responsibilities in 
financing and provision, setting clear-cut boundaries between health and social care, 
strengthening community care, and providing alternative housing arrangements, with the overall 
goals of improved access and efficiency (Osterle 2010). 
Mental health care 
Mental health care reform in Eastern Europe faces significant challenges. According to Murray 
and Lopez (1996), the burden of neuropsychiatric disorders was 17.2 per cent of DALYs, 
compared to the global average of 10.5 per cent. The region-specific problems inherited from 
the previous system are similar as in health care and public health; weak community and social 
structures; limited non-governmental sector development; the long period of isolation of Soviet 
psychiatry from evidence-based western medicine; under-financing and under-staffing of mental 
health; weak primary care resulting in poor detection and late treatment; the professional culture 
and structure oriented towards institutional care and clinical regimes; a custodian rather than a 
therapeutic approach to care; and profession- rather than patient-led care (Jenkins et al. 2001). 
The main obstacles to reforms include low social and political awareness of mental health care, 
a lack of policy support for community care, insufficient funding for professional training and 
developing community structures. Deinstitutionalisation of mental health services tends to be 
seen as a cost-saving exercise rather than releasing funds for more cost-effective community 
alternatives. In poorer countries of the regions, the problems extend to inadequate availability of 
pharmaceuticals, a lack of standards for patient management, and obsolete standards of 
professional education that overlook the social dimension. Effectiveness of care suffers from 
gaps in coordination and continuity between social, mental and health care, as well as the non-
governmental sector. Processes for monitoring and assessment of needs and outcomes are 
largely missing. Distrust towards community and user involvement is a part of the broader 
problem of damaged civil society and deficient social capital. 
2.8. Problems of the hospital sector 
2.8.1. Global reasons for hospital r e fo rm 
Looking at Europe at large, the greatest reductions in numbers of hospital beds have taken place 
in the former Eastern Bloc, and in particular in Central Asia. However, reductions in hospital 
capacity in the last decade of the 20"' century were noticeable across most European countries 
(McKee 2004). Transforming the way hospitals provide medical care has been a common theme 
and a high priority on health policy agendas. New models of care, which affect all sorts of 
services provided in hospitals, include decentralised emergency care, day surgery, paediatric 
care and obstetrics, improvements in diagnosis, new care pathways, and forming networks for 
integration of hospital and primary care with the use of state-of-the-art information technology. 
Cost-savings can also be achieved through preventing unnecessary inpatient admissions and 
speeding up discharge. 
There are universal trends that drive the hospital sector transformation globally. McKee et al. 
(2002) identify three main groups of pressures for change. The first group, concerning demand 
for hospital care, comprises demographics (fertility, ageing, migration), patterns of disease 
(burden of disease, risk factors, iatrogenic infections) and public expectation (awareness of 
patient rights, lower information asymmetries). Second, supply-side factors include 
technological progress and clinical knowledge (patient management, increasing emphasis on 
outpatient care, for instance) as well as challenges of workforce. Third, political and societal, 
comprise fiscal pressures, intemationalisation of health care (patient mobility) and dynamics of 
the global market for R & D (including consequences of an increasingly competitive science 
sector for university hospitals). Moreover, there are a number of pressure sources for 
organisational change (Edwards et al. 2004): (1) Increase in specialisation, greater caseloads to 
follow, larger teams of trained specialists; (2) Changes in employment laws, working hours, rest 
times; (3) Increasing efficiency and reducing costs, by eliminating redundancies and 
duplications, reducing fixed costs and high-costs assets; (4) A shift from "volume determines 
outcomes" paradigm to multidisciplinarity and coordination of larger groups of specialists for 
improved outcomes; (5) Ever increasing emphasis on patient safety and quality of care; (6) 
Accelerating technological progress and the need for its absorption; and (7) Consumerism, 
patient voice and empowerment, expectations of higher responsiveness. 
In this uncertain environment, the concept of the hospital is changing. Hospital assets 
infrastructure, staff, equipment, pharmaceuticals, procedures, and the synergies they produce -
are subject to a paradigm shift From purely clinical understanding of care towards the point of 
tangency between health care and social care, with an increasingly strong case for integrated 
care (Glasby 2012). Healy and McKee (2002b) provide an overview of hospital functions that 
go far beyond providing inpatient care (Table 2.9). The turbulent environment also means that 
hospital reforms may be either intentional or forced. On one hand, they may arise from 
intentions of quality improvements (e.g. hardening accreditation to eliminate poorly equipped 
hospitals in Estonia) or introducing new model solutions and techniques to streamline or replace 
inpatient care with alternative modes. On the other, reforms can be a response to a change in 
health needs (e.g. converting beds or facilities from acute to long-term) or forced by economic 
downturn. 
Table 2.9: Functions of an acute care hospital 
Inpatient, outpatient 
and day patient 
Vocational Basic Source of referrals Health professionals State legitimacy 
Emergency 
and elective 
Undergraduate Clinical 
Professional 
leadership 
Other workers Political symbol 
Rehabilitation Postgraduate Health services 
Base for outreach 
activities 
Suppliers 
Provider of 
social care 
Continuing 
education 
Educational 
Management of 
primary ca re 
Transport services 
Base for 
medical power 
Civic pride 
Source: Healy & McKee , 2002b . 
2.8.2. Historical roots of CEE/CIS hospital issues 
The broad problems of the health sector are largely associated with the philosophy and 
organisation of the hospital sector. In the case of CEE/CIS, given its dominant status and the 
generation of majori ty of costs, this implies a number of difTiculties. 
Inpatient services in the Semashko model consumed 60-75 per cent of TEH. Until the 1960s, the 
trends in HCS and medicine were similar in the Eastern Bloc and western countries. However, 
while the western world gradually restrained the hospital sector growth in 1960-70s, the Soviet 
Bloc did not. Hospitals were rewarded for increasing their inputs, which led to the creation of 
establishments with thousands of beds as well as single-specialty hospitals. Some health 
establishments qual ifying as hospitals in the Soviet Union did not have electricity or running 
water; while these were extreme cases, rim-down facilities were common across the region due 
to towering costs of upkeep. S ta f fmg levels were very high, but the nurse-to-doctor ratio was 
low, and physicians over-specialised as medical education promoted narrow areas of expertise. 
Technology was poorly distributed, particularly in rural areas, and available equipment was 
often idle. Many hospitals were not equipped for performing diagnoses, which led to the 
establishment of centralised diagnostic facilities. With catchment areas often overlapping, the 
system was fragmented and uncoordinated. 
It was a common practice to refer patients to higher levels of care rather than to treat. Primary 
care was often skipped altogether, with patients self-referring to hospitals, through emergency 
care, personal networking, or under-the-table payments. An estimated 20-25 per cent of all 
patients were referred to inpatient care. The administration was fragmented with many owners 
and independent sub-networks of facilities, leading to duplication in city areas. The duplication 
stemmed from the fact that hospitals were supervised by different levels of self-government or 
operated as parallel systems independent from the MOH, e.g. owned by other ministries. The 
total value of medical assets scattered between those parallel systems would be comparable to 
that at the disposal of the MOH. Alternatives to inpatient care, such as day surgery, nursing 
homes, and rehabilitation facilities, were scarce or non-existent. This greatly contributed to 
excessive lengths of hospital episodes. Clinical practice was often out of date, and arbitrarily set 
by the MOH bureaucracy. Physicians routinely oversupplied care (inpatient days, test 
procedures) in facing administrative consequences for negligence but no incentives for efficient 
use of resources. Following the above patterns, information was also fragmented. There were 
few systems and little capacity to use the available information for the purposes of planning or 
policy-making. The uninformed, rigid system of planning and budgeting left no mechanism for 
correcting the growing system inefficiencies (Ho & Ali-Zade 2001). 
2.8.3. A sector unsusceptible to reform 
It is apparent from the above paragraphs that the inherited Semashko system faults alone 
provided enough reasons for a general reconstruction of the hospital sector. This was coupled 
with the changing role of the hospital, propelled by re-shaping global patterns of health needs, 
fiscal pressures, patient expectations, workforce mobility, and so forth. The overall direction has 
been towards greater hospital flexibility (Edwards et al. 2004). 
Yet, reforming the hospital sector proved a formidable task. McKee and Healy (2000) explain 
that hospitals represent large sunk costs, are immovable and of limited adaptability, built for 
many decades, often fit for medical practices, and disease patterns and population needs from 
past eras. Hospitals suffer from design limitations when confronted with changing technology, 
from major capacity misadjustments to such minor problems as insufficient sockets to power up 
the ubiquitous electronic devices. The sector inertia also stems from the power exercised by 
high profile members of the medical community, who protect their positions from reductions, 
restructuring and change in practices. Defensive strategies of the medical professions are 
facilitated by uncertainties surrounding health (care) production, information asymmetries, and 
technical and technological complexities of hospital care. These obstructions are as relevant to 
CEE/CIS as to any other country or region. 
Two added difficulties of llie post-communist region were tlie paradigm of providing most of 
health care in hospitals, which produced an ample class of bureaucrats and medical professions 
defending their embedded interests. Moreover, the transformation was taking place in adverse 
circumstances of economic downturn and decreasing health budgets, social disturbance, re-
structuring basic institutions, and in some even war or conflict (Healy & McKee 2002a). 
2.8.4. Key problems In hospital transition 
Nonetheless, reforms attempts have been made in CEE/CIS, varying in both scope and quality, 
yielding refinements but also revealing further problems. Ho and Ali-Zade (2001) conclude that 
transition paths were distinct, but certain patterns can be identified. Previously discussed health 
sector developments also have had significance in the context of hospital sector: emerging 
payroll-based SHI schemes, new provider payment mechanisms, spreading informal payments 
in response to inadequate public financing, state capture and conflict of interest in using public 
facilities for private practice. In many cases, reforms were forced by a deep macroeconomic 
hardship rather than effecting from purposefully devised sector strategies. 
Given the design of the Semashko system, reduction, rationalisation, modernisation, 
decentralisation and incentivisation were directions promising efficiency gains. These objectives 
were attempted, with mixed success. Cutting back excess capacity and overstaffing unfolded 
slowly. This was in part responsible for deteriorating infrastructure, and thus quality of care. 
Primary care has been emphasised through reductions in hospital referrals, re-introducing 
general practice and family medicine, elements of fundholding and payment incentives, as well 
as including the GP training in medical schools' curricula. Privatisation has been limited to an 
emergence o f a few private hospitals. More prominent was decentralisation of ownership to sub-
national governments coupled with granting different extents of unit autonomy. The benefits of 
this were curtailed by low managerial capacity of the empowered agents, which was gradually 
alleviated by training, development, quality assurance, best practices and benchmarking. In 
many countries, information systems became a choke point for other advancements, given their 
slow implementation and little emphasis on evaluation and perfomiance. Modem technologies 
were gradually acquired, with priority given to imaging instruments. However, a lack of 
coordination and planning led to situations where the saturation of a particular technology 
exceeded the levels o f industrialised countries, and to reported cases of the equipment being 
redundant or its operation and maintenance unaffordable. Application of present-day medical 
practices was constrained, especially in poorer countries of the region, by declining quality of 
health workers' education and increasingly obsolete clinical guidelines. The importance of this 
is in the traditionally narrow specialisation of Semashko physicians, whereas today's hospitals 
increasingly rely on generalists able to coordinate complementary modes of care and manage 
complex pathways. 
The simultaneous decommiss ioning of obsolete facilities and making across-the-board 
modernisation investments proved a formidable task. It was, however, an essential step in 
reducing the over-capacity and increasing the quality of the infrastructure, addressing low sector 
eff iciency and high fixed costs. Observations from CEE/CIS suggest that limited success 
depended on a presence of a downsizing master plan, merging and restructuring networks of 
health care facilities, as well as on simultaneous reforms of organisation (e.g. provider 
autonomy) and financing (economic incentives). Given the cost of such restructuring, estimated 
at between a third and a quarter per cent of G D P per year, a program would require strong 
political and budgetary commitment (Haazen & Hayer 2010). CEE countries have tapped into 
the EU structural funds to support this goal. Importantly, both decommissioning and new 
investment decisions have had implications for recurrent expenditures, both in terms of fixed 
(heating, electricity) and capital (upkeep) costs as well as the costs of old and new medical 
services provided. Countries rely on a variety of arrangements for meeting these costs, including 
local and regional revenue depending on the owning body, government grants, other taxation-
based resources or a proportion of SHI resources, public-private partnerships, capital charges, 
and direct financing. For most countries, using a mix of the above has been a viable option. 
Problematically, this range of financing sources was not sufficient to prevent debt from 
recurring in the hospital sector, among other things caused by the lack of financial discipline, or 
a "soft budget constraint" (Komai 1996). This problem is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, 
in the context of the changing hospital governance. 
Healy and McKee (2002a) as well as McKee (2004) point at a number of hospital policy-
making shortcomings apparent across the region. Changing the hospitals environment was based 
on weak or no evidence, both in the design and implementation of policy. This is partly because 
theories, data and evidence are concentrated around the US and Canadian HCSs, and their 
applicability outside these countries is limited. More often, however, reforms were ideological 
and imitative, rather than tailored and objective-oriented. Policies were sometimes drafted with 
no clear purpose, and no continuation or synchronisation with other sectors or broader system 
goals. Moreover, planning was emphasised, while implementation was often neglected and 
taken for granted to be successful. In consideration of transitioning from the bureaucratic to 
pluralist vision of the sector, Healy and McKee identify the following cardinal errors: ( I ) simply 
borrowing solutions from other countries without contextualising; (2) the belief that 
marketisation will solve issues of debt, poor quality, over-capacity, financial sustainability and 
meeting population needs without requiring further government effort ; (3) not engaging 
stakeholders in setting clear policy goals and acceptable, feasible implementations; (4) not 
aligning incentives coming from different financing and other sources; (5) not developing 
human resources and their capacity to support change at all levels. 
2.9. Concluding remarks 
Rowland and Tclyukov (1991) interpret post-communist healtli care transition as a paradoxical 
attempt to bring power closer to the people after abolishing the self-proclaimed people's regime. 
This chapter illustrated the conditions of CEE/CIS countries and their efforts towards the goals 
delined in the World Health Report ( W H O 2010): achieving universal coverage through fixes in 
a number of complementary areas: raising sufficient resources for health, removing financial 
risks and barriers to access, promoting efficiency and eliminating waste, reducing inequalities in 
coverage; also, setting an agenda for action and facilitating change. Some of the discussed 
circumstances included the socialist inheritance, the overall institutional transfonnation, 
common and distinguishing features of countries of the region, macroeconomic and socio-
demographic pressures influencing the health care transformation. In terms of the actual health 
sector, presented were fundamental mechanisms of the reformed health care systems, problems 
of the reform process, and resulting system deficiencies, with a particular focus on the hurdles 
o f the hospital sector. 
This overview of factors endogenous and exogenous to the health sector was aimed at providing 
a comprehensive background for the studies in Part II and III of the current thesis. Such a broad 
review of issues is necessary to explain the complexity and entanglement of the unfolding 
processes. The associated literature review also gives an opportunity to identify unexplored 
areas o f transition. The purpose of the subsequent chapters is to fill in some of the identified 
gaps in knowledge. 
One picture standing out of this overview is that CEE/CIS is a heterogeneous region, containing 
countries at different levels of socio-economic development, and HCSs facing various 
challenges. Understanding this variety of contexts is critical for discussing policy implications 
or making reform recommendations. On the other hand, for the purposes of analysis, it is 
important to remember what binds these counties together: a shared inheritance of the 
communist health care system that featured a nearly unifomi structure and a heavy reliance on 
hospital care. 
Another thought inspired by this overview is that economic studies of post-communist health 
care were primarily focused on health care financing, in particular on the role for social health 
insurance, voluntary insurance, informal payments, and economic incentives conveyed by 
contractual provider payment mechanisms. In terms of public health and health policy, research 
has centred on accessibility and equity o f financing, again especially in the context of informal 
payments. However, those studies have targeted mainly the populations of CIS. Consequently, 
Parts II and III of this manuscript are responses to these concentrations of research, targeting the 
less explored topics. More specifically. Chapters 3-5 look into the problems of hospital sector 
governance, counterbalancing the knowledge and evidence accumulated on the financing side of 
health care. U is an established fact that economic incentives and governance arrangements are 
complementary areas in determining performance of organisations (Harding & Preiser 2003). 
Chapter 6 corresponds to the wealth of evidence on accessibility, affordabili ty and utilisation of 
health care in former Soviet republics by Balabanova and others (2004, 2008, 2012). The 
original study presented here provides comparable information on countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
An overview of two decades of HCSs ' evolution also creates an opportunity to highlight 
successful transition paths. It can readily be seen that countries that achieved best performance 
of their HCSs benefited from opportune external circumstances. These circumstances are, 
namely, a higher overall level of economic and social development, a greater institutional 
stability and quality of governance both inside and outside the sector, stable internal and 
external environments including little macroeconomic disruption and a lack conflict . On the 
other hand, strategies for specifically transforming the system were essential for achieving 
satisfactory outcomes. Some key determinants in this regards are an early onset with clear, 
prioritised goals for the sector development, a careful choice of the preferred health care 
financing model and its continuous improvements, allowing for a considerable private sector 
participation, reforming consistently and smoothly without unnecessary back-and-forth moves, 
reforming in a comprehensive manner with synergies enabled by the t iming and scope of 
parallel changes, and controlling and containing informal payments and corruption. 
One purpose of a close examination of the post-communist region heterogeneity is that each 
individual country 's progress should be assessed relative to its situation. A broad overview of 
exogenous and endogenous factors establishes a level playing field for the comparat ive 
discussion of HCSs. Rechel and McKee (2009) argue that the reform context, socioeconomic, 
cultural and political, varies greatly and has affected governments" capacities for re fonn and 
HCSs ' trajectories. Kutzin and Jakab (2010) expound three pillars for evaluating transition 
paths: the fiscal context, the sector prioritisation, and the reform implementation. From the HCS 
perspective, the first one is largely exogenous. The second is determined by the political agenda. 
The third concerns actual reforms, capacity for which is constrained by the former two, 
however. Hence, it is evident that a fair and realistic international comparison has to mind 
complex underlying determinants, should it lead to valid recommendations. 
As this chapter has shown, clusters of countries based on per capita income are good predictors 
of the comprehensiveness of reforms, as well as of achieved equity, financial protection and 
health outcomes. Notwithstanding, some poorer CIS countries fared better than expected 
judging by their financial and institutional capacity, while some better-off countries of CEE fell 
behind their peers. For example, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova, despite being among the most 
affected countries in terms of the magnitude of the fiscal shock and susceptibility to social 
disruption, inlroduced ambitious and well-handled reforms followed by respectable 
advancements in system performance (Kutzin et al. 2010b, Balabanova et al. 2012). In CEE, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia fared better than their similarly positioned neighbours 
(Bjomberg 2012). Their status of regional best performers is corroborated in Part 111 of this 
dissertation, which provides comparative evidence on health care accessibility in seven new EU 
member states. 
Finally, f rom a broader international perspective, CEE/CIS transition tits into trends in the 
organisation of developed countries ' HCSs. There appears to be (1) a continued divergence in 
social embeddedness , including values, norms and social relations, (2) a mix of convergence 
and divergence in the political rhetoric and resulting health policies, in terms of solidarity, 
equity, eff iciency, priorities for public and private sectors, extents of government intervention, 
etc., and (3) a considerable convergence within technical aspects of HCS organisation, such as 
financing mechanisms, clinical procedures and the use of pharmaceuticals (Saltman 1997). Most 
countries of CIS and especially CEE seem to be in accord with these patterns. 

PART II: 
HOSPITAL GOVERNANCE IN POST-COIVIIVIUNIST COUNTRIES 

Chapter 3: 
Transformation of hospital governance in post-Semashko health systems 
3.1. In t roduct ion 
Transfonnat ion of health care systems in CEE/CIS has been a multi-faceted process. Chapter 2 
has overvievved the complexity of this process and presented the varying progress that countries 
have made in areas that make up post-communist transformation. In consideration of the 
dimensions along which the countries transitioned away from the original Semashko model, 
researchers have directed their attention primarily at the milestone reforms of revenue 
collection, pooling and allocation to health care providers. Those changing financing 
arrangements have consequently been credited for being a driving force behind sector 
performance. 
This chapter is an attempt to extend our understanding of health care transition in Eastern 
Europe by shedding light on the transformation of governance and ownership in the hospital 
sector. A number of processes have added up to this less explored, but potentially meaningful 
reform: taking steps from state-owned and centrally managed towards various decentralised 
forms can be viewed as parallel and complementing the changes on the financing side of the 
system. The purpose of this chapter is to explore, in a comparative way, this process of 
balancing authority and responsibility over hospital care between the central government and 
various sub-national levels of government as well as provider organisations. Country-specific 
information and its interpretations, produced by local and international experts, are reviewed 
and summarised in order to present of a compendious account of how the countries, and the 
region at large, evolved in respect to their hospital networks ' governance. 
The model of transition proposed here assumes that the ownership and governance 
t ransfonnat ion fol lows a pattern that goes beyond the simple public-private delineation. At the 
same time, each stage of the model can be argued to have the potential to significantly affect the 
sector operation and hospital performance. Given the hospital sector materiality, this has critical 
implications for the whole health care system. The relevance of this fact for the CEE/CIS region 
is t remendous, because a major and universal challenge faced by the post-Semashko health 
systems has been in de-emphasis ing the hospital sector and reinforcing primary care. The 
problem of over-reliance on hospital care goes hand in hand with the negligence of other modes 
of health care, including primary care, and is reflected in the shares of inpatient spending in 
overall health expenditures. In the Visegrad group and the Baltics, these values have been 
reduced and in the last decade typically ranged from 25% to 35%, comparably to most western 
European countries. However, former Soviet republics maintained considerably higher shares, 
for example in 2007, Moldova 53%, Belarus 57%, Ukraine 69%, and Azerbaijan 75% ( W H O 
HFA-DB). The Health For All database specifies the above values as current expenditures on 
acute, chronic and convalescent care provided in the inpatient mode in public and private 
hospitals, exclusive of investment and capital outlays. By definition, outpatient expenditures 
such as day care are not included, although the quality of data in this respect varies between 
countries and may constitute a source of error. 
A number of features add up to the novelty of this study. Observing the evolution and relevance 
of providers ' governance and ownership provides an opportunity to extend the existing 
typologies of the transition systems, making the picture of Eastern European health care more 
complete and clear. In reconstructing paths of the reforms in question, this chapter sets the stage 
for the subsequent discussion of economic implications of changing governance in Chapter 4, 
and a statistical inspection of its impacts on hospital performance, which is carried out in 
Chapter 5. Altogether, Part II of the thesis indicates a major underexplored aspect of post-
communist health care transition, provides a descriptive account of its building blocks, discusses 
the theoretical grounds on which these components can be interpreted, and statistically verifies 
their consequences for the functioning of the health sector. 
This chapter is organised as follows. First, literature positions that observe the relevance of 
governance to the overall post-communist transition process are reviewed. Second, a conceptual 
model is proposed to explain in a stepwise manner the t ransfonnat ion of CEE/CIS hospital 
governance. Third, each country 's profile is briefly presented in a section corresponding to that 
country 's current hospital governance status, following the previously established conceptual 
model of transformation. Each section is provided with a short generalisation of experiences 
based on the countries at a given reform stage. Complet ing the picture of the changing sector 
governance is an account of the evolving role of the Ministry of Health. The findings are 
summed up and are generalised, and region-wide conclusions are drawn in the closing sections. 
The knowledge generated in this chapter feeds theoretical considerations of economic 
ramifications (Chapter 4) and is subject to an econometric analysis of performance impacts 
(Chapter 5). 
3.2. Background 
The literature review performed in the previous chapter suggests that numerous aspects oF 
heahh care transition in Eastern Europe have been scrutinised and opinionated upon. Among 
these topics are: the introduction of social health insurance in a number of countries, a shift 
towards fee-tbr-service in the 1990s and case-mix payments later towards the 2000s, new 
elements of competition in the form of competit ive tendering, the persistence of corrupt and 
informal arrangements, trends in health status, as well as privatisation in primary and 
ambulatory care. 
This idea for this study stems from the observation that the subject of changing hospital sector 
governance has attracted somewhat less attention. This might have occurred for a number of 
reasons. For one, privatisation of hospitals has not been prominent, compared to primary and 
ambulatory care. In most countries, public ownership remained dominant in the hospital sector, 
and any adjustments within the public sphere have taken forms more subtle and gradual than 
outright privatisation. For research purposes, and especially considering econometric studies, a 
clear-cut transfer between the public and private spheres is more easily measured and 
interpreted. In this sense, evolutions of public systems pose a greater conceptual and empirical 
challenge. 
Nonetheless, a number of researchers have indicated the existence and relevance of the 
changing hospital governance setting. Herman (1998) observes that policy-makers in Poland 
devoted excessive attention to developing payment mechanisms and overlooked the broader 
institutional setup that would make the system perform. This can be argued to be the case in 
most if not all transition countries. The broader prerequisites for a successful transformation 
include effective bargaining, tendering and competition, aligning incentives of payers and 
providers (enforcing hard budget constraints, quality considerations), removing political 
interests from the picture, accounting for social functions reaching beyond health care (e.g. a 
hospital being the biggest employer in town), and so forth. Ho and Ali-Zade (2001) identify 
decentralisation of ownership as one of the characterising features of CEE/CIS health care 
transition. Langenbrunner and Wiley (2002) consider it one of three major areas of change, 
along with restructuring of financing and new purchasing arrangements. McMenamin and 
Timonen (2002) look in-depth into this and other aspects of transition, but simplify the problem 
of governance down to the privatization of outpatient facilities and hospitals, thus failing to 
report other structural changes. Jakab et al. (2003) emphasise the weight and complexity of the 
process. They identify two fundamental changes that took place in the hospital environment: an 
introduction of social health insurance and decentralisation of hospital ownership. Regarding the 
latter, they observe varying, in time and across countries, extents of hospital autonomy and 
accountabil i ty. These latter aspects are then linked to other reforms in an assessment of 
coherence and synergy. Fuenzalida-Puelma et al. (2010) explain that health care provider 
autonomy is necessary for purchasing reforms to succeed in driving system performance. That is 
because payment mechanisms, contracting and information systems will not advance health 
system development unless providers have the capacity to optimally respond to the new 
conditions. Autonomy of public providers and reliance on the private sector are two possible 
ways of building the capacity. However, in the case of the public sector, increased provider 
management autonomy requires time for adjustment before taking effect . 
A conceptual f ramework for understanding the organisation of health f inancing (Kutzin 2001) 
positions governance alongside regulation and provision of information that together constitute 
a health care system function of stewardship. Stewardship, in turn, is one of the HCS pillars, 
influencing other functions such as revenue collection, pooling of funds, purchasing and 
provision of services, and entitlement definition. Stewardship in general, and governance in 
particular, have attracted increasing attention in recent years, especially after the fonner 
function was accentuated in a world health report ( W H O 2000). 
Basse et al. (2002) compare Beveridge, Bismarck and post-Semashko systems in Europe, taking 
into account the relationship between purchaser and provider, latitude of independent decision-
making, financial autonomy and distance to regulator (regulator—hospital split). Looking at 
CEE/CIS countries after 10 years of transition, they find that the payer and hospitals were often 
based within the same hierarchy but progressively moving towards SHl-induced split and 
contractual relations, generally narrow scopes of managerial autonomy (with the exception of 
Estonia), early stages of financial autonomy and apparent institutional immaturity, as well as 
small but increasing distance to the regulator. 
In their study of the socialist legacy and early reform in CEE/CIS, Shakarishvili and Davey 
(2005) devote a section to facility ownership, at which they look primarily through the lens of 
decentralisation. They argue that the quality of governance in all its aspects as a necessary 
condition of reform sustainability, but in discussing the cases of nine countries find gaps in the 
structure of incentives, planning and accountability, as well as the space for excessive regional 
discrepancies. In a comment regarding scientific literature and Eastern Europe as a study area, 
Shakarishvili and Davey note that due to shared political, social and economic problems in the 
late 1980s, at the onset of transition CEE/CIS became a target of intense comparat ive research 
in various social sciences. Those efforts were directed at producing reform strategies and policy 
recommendations. However, Shakarishvili and Davey also point out that there has been little 
research activity concerning outcomes of the t ransfonnat ion, especially putting decentralisation 
in a comparative, regional context. Maarse (2006) stresses the evolutionary character of 
ownership transformations and the existence of an institutional continuum that goes beyond the 
oversimplification of a public-private dichotomy. However, the CEE/CIS transition literature 
has rarely proposed a stepwise understanding of ownership decentralisation. Considering the 
above criticisms of the subject ' s meta-iiterature, this present study can be seen as a response to 
the identified shortcomings. 
3.3. Methods and model 
3.3.1. Methods and data 
This study based on a compilation of information from secondary sources, available in the form 
of country-focused studies provided by local experts. The sources comprise various 
manuscripts, primarily publications in the areas of economics, public health, and health policy, 
which were identified in the way of an online database search. The search was performed with 
the use of the Australian National University library "supersearch" system that sends the search 
phrase to multiple major literature databases including Science Direct, Scopus, EconLit and 
ProQuest, with a notable exclusion of Google Scholar that was searched manually. Search terms 
included names of individual countries, groups of countries and the entire region, as described 
in the section "Terms and definitions" of this dissertation, taking into account variations in the 
spelling of proper names. The search further included the terms "health care", "health system", 
"reform", "policy" and "hospital", in various combinations and versions of spelling. 
The source materials were selected with the objective of providing full and exact information on 
the reforms in question. In some cases, the sources provided different interpretations of facts, or 
facts that would not reconcile. In those cases, preference was given to peer reviewed 
publications, high quality journals, and leading experts. Moreover, greater weight was attached 
to more specific information, e.g. a reform description that includes dates of events, references 
to legal acts and the names of stakeholders involved would be considered more reliable than a 
loose description or interpretation of facts. Some doubts remaining from the literature were 
clarified by way of personal communicat ion with experts at the European Centre on Health of 
Societies in Transition, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, during a visit by the 
author over the period September-November 201 1. Admittedly, the scarcity of information on 
certain countries rendered it impossible to reconstruct reform events in detail. By the same 
token, the availability of multiple sources allowed for more comprehensive accounts, often 
offer ing additional detailed relevant information. This variation did not undermine the 
feasibility of the study, however, given its high-level nature and the ability to construct a 
complete set of 22 basic profiles containing essential comparative information. 
The European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies proved to be a particularly helpful 
supplier of suitable country materials. Specifically, the Health Systems in Transition monograph 
series is an invaluable source of information for comparative studies, as it conveys expert 
reviews structured by a template document. The template covers every important function of the 
health care system; financing, provision, organisation and governance, physical and human 
resources, and so forth. Each template section contains instructions for authors, setting standards 
for clarity and comparabili ty of information. Since subsequent editions build upon previous 
ones, some information is not repeated. Therefore, not only the latest, but all available profi les 
are considered for each of the studied countries. Finally, the quality of the health system profi les 
has been improving markedly since the first publications in the late 1990s. Thus, when 
inconsistencies within a series arise, newer editions are generally given priority as revised and 
corrected. 
3.3.2. The model of hospital governance transition 
The conceptual model of governance transition, proposed by the candidate, is presented in 
Figure 3.1. The brief description below characterises each transition stage. Further information 
regarding each stage follows country descriptions (see summaries of Sections 3.4-3.8). 
Stage 1 countries only introduced minor changes in their system, without altering the basic 
mechanisms of the Semashko system operation. The initial operation of the Semashko system is 
the selecdon criterion, and therefore common to all the discussed countries. Stage 2 countries 
discontinued the integrated, centralised system by taking various decentralisation steps. These 
steps transferred selected decision-making powers to sub-national governments and territorial 
health authorities, thus shifting the allocation decisions away from the central government and 
closer to the point of provision. Importantly, the scope for delegation and de-concentration 
excluded the financial and legal responsibility for the effects of said decisions. At Stage 3, 
territorial governments maintained the decision-making authority, but also conferred 
responsibility in the form of facility ownership. The latter has considerable implications for the 
distribution of risk in the system, as the national pool of hospitals backed by the state budget is 
broken into territorial networks, with respective governments bearing financial and legal 
responsibility for their subordinate units. The practice shows that this process also involves 
increasing autonomisation of units. Stage 4 retains the previous balance between central and 
territorial governments, however, hospital units cease to operate as public enterprises. Their 
status of public establishments, being part of the all-embracing State Health Company, is 
replaced with that of an independent commercial company, or corporation, effectively imposing 
private sector legal regulations and standards of governance. Typically, in the course of 
t ransfonnat ion, the respective territorial government maintains the status of the sole or majori ty 
owner, with all the responsibilities of the founding body. Stage 5 accommodates for the 
presence of an outlier - Georgia - the only country that has privatised its hospital sector. Yet, 
the inclusion of this stage also serves as an indication of further possible developments in other 
CEE/CIS countries. Specifically, the growing presence of corporatised forms may facilitate 
public-private partnerships or intensify privatisation of selected hospitals that currently remain 
in the public sphere of ownership. 
The aim of the f ramework is to capture the essential steps that make up hospital governance 
transition in CEE/CIS, in order to better explain health system change and consequences 
thereof. The model is inductive - conceived by abstracting from individual countries' transition 
trajectories. While it features a high level of generality and thus leaves substantial system 
heterogeneity unaccounted for, the framework manages to capture the evolving nature of 
governance and indicates the existence of intermediate fonns between the extremes of 
centralised public and private ownership. The need to account for the intennediate stages 
follows the observation that outright privatisation, if advocated by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund as means for breaking national monopolies, has not been a 
common strategy for hospital reform. These intermediate forms may have different 
characteristics in terms of economic incentives, the possibility of which is examined in Chapter 
4. The f ramework concerns not only hospital units, but the hospital sector at large, in particular 
encompassing the role of territorial governments as founding bodies, influencing hospital 
operation and managing their networks. 
F i g u r e 3.1: T h e model of hospi ta l gove rnance t rans i t ion in C E E / C I S 
With these goals in mind, the model focuses on the dominant fonns and disregards some lesser 
forms of governance that may exist across the region. For example, nearly all CEE/CIS feature 
private hospitals, but contrary to privatisation of primary and ambulatory care, this form of 
ownership has played a minor role in shaping the sector. Similarly, notwithstanding 
transformations of secondary hospital ownership, in most countries tertiary and quaternary care 
typically continues to be organised under the MOH in the form of national centres or university 
hospitals. Likewise, these hospitals, despite their importance, contribute relatively little to 
overall population health outcomes. For this reason, and as a minor organisational form, they 
are excluded from the analysis. 
The transition steps are incremental in the sense that subsequent stages increase the extent of 
decentralised powers and local autonomy. Therefore, the relationship between decentralisation 
of management and devolution of ownership involves a one-way inclusiveness: an ownership 
transfer conveys the administrative and managerial tasks (Stage 2), on top of which it grants 
financial and legal responsibility. Similarly, the corporatised hospital sector implies the 
managerial tasks (Stage 2) and ownership (Stage 3) have been transferred to sub-national 
governments, in addition to which the legal status of hospitals has been changed. 
With respect to the above, countries are not expected to make the steps one at a time or in a 
sequential order. In fact, some of the reviewed countries introduced bundled reforms and 
proceeded directly to more advanced stages, nonetheless bringing more basic features of 
decentralisation into the system. For example, in Slovakia, a late decentralisation reform 
devolved facility ownership to sub-national governments (Szalay et al. 2011). Naturally, the 
reform also conveyed the authority to manage those decentralised facilities, represented by the 
preceding transition stage. By the same token, the Czech Republic carried out Stages 3 and 4 
simultaneously in a move that transferred the ownership of hospitals to sub-national authorities 
and initiated a conversion of their legal form from public units to joint-stock companies (Hava 
& Maskova 2011). In an extreme case where the Semashko hospital sector was outright 
privatised, the transition model would collapse to the usual binary public-private understanding 
of governance, with Stage 5 representing an accumulated effect of what otherwise is shown to 
be an Incremental change. 
For the purpose of presentation, the countries are grouped by their governance status at the time 
of writing. However, transition paths of more advanced countries typically include the 
preceding stages. This is reflected in those countries ' descriptive accounts. 
3.3.3. L imi ta t ions and cavea t s 
Many details that distinguish the hospital setting of each country, and influence its per fonnance , 
are beyond the scope of this model. The quality of doctors ' education and the quality of medical 
facilities are two examples. The complexity of health systems is such that no model is capable 
of accurately measuring their added value (Pedersen 2002, Richardson et al. 2003), let alone 
fully accounting for the individual significance of their components . The model proposed in this 
chapter is not meant to imply that those factors are irrelevant or immaterial, nor that they have 
not been subject to change in the course of transition. 
Decentralisation is sometimes interpreted in the context of financing powers transferred to 
regional branches, bodies, or governments. Consequently, it is a common practice in studies of 
fiscal federalism to measure the scope of decentralisation using as a proxy the local share of 
spending, or locally raised taxes, in the total expenditure on a given activity (Smith 1979). This 
study, instead, is concerned with how health care resources are allocated (centrally, territorially 
or at the provider level), irrespective of their origin. While the influence over resource allocation 
may be largely in line with the extent of fiscal decentralisation, this study intentionally avoids 
t he rep l i ca t ion o f d i s cus s ion o f heal th care f i n a n c i n g r e f o r m s . Instead, it focuses on the less 
e x p l o r e d top ics o f dec i s ion a u t o n o m y , o w n e r s h i p , and o the r a spec t s o f g o v e r n a n c e . 
T h e a im o f the de sc r ip t i ons b e l o w is to present each c o u n t r y ' s r e fo rm steps , but a lso to 
subs t an t i a t e the p r o p o s e d m o d e l of the sec tor t rans i t ion . W h e n the mode l is app l ied to individual 
cases , a r e a s a p p e a r w h e r e the ex i s t ing inst i tut ional e o n n g u r a t i o n is not ent i rely c lear . Th i s is 
b e c a u s e va r ious ins t i tu t ional a spec t s m a y c ros s the b o u n d a r i e s o f t rans i t ions s tages , d i sp l ay ing 
va r ious d e g r e e s o f con t inu i ty in s o m e aspec t s . T h i s p r o b l e m m a y result f rom organ isa t iona l 
iner t ia , b u r e a u c r a c y , d i spa r i ty b e t w e e n legal and factual condi t ions , res is tance to r e f o r m , e tc . 
D o u b t s a l so a r i se in the con tex t o f nomina l ve r sus real c h a n g e : s imi lar ly b randed r e f o r m s m a y 
p r o d u c e d i f f e r e n t o u t c o m e s d e p e n d i n g on the legal e n v i r o n m e n t and the b roader cul ture . In 
A z e r b a i j a n , for e x a m p l e , o w n e r s h i p o f district hosp i ta l s w a s decen t ra l i sed to local g o v e r n m e n t s , 
h o w e v e r , local hea l th au thor i t i es r e m a i n e d part o f the h ierarchica l sys tem led by the M O H . In 
th is case , t he imp l i ca t i ons o f c h a n g e w e r e not c lea r -cu t ; fur ther invest igat ion indicated that the 
pos i t ion o f the M O H r e m a i n e d s t rong, and the devo lu t i on p r o d u c e d no real change in the w a y 
hosp i t a l s w e r e m a n a g e d ( I b r a h i m o v et al. 2010) . In t e rms of t im ing of events , re forn i m a p p i n g 
ind ica tes the a r r a n g e m e n t that p reva i l ed dur ing any g iven year . At t imes , it p roved p rob lema t i c 
to d e t e n n i n e an exac t t i m e o f r e f o r m , or the t i m e w h e n it b e c a m e e f fec t ive . For ins tance, the 
p r o c e s s o f co rpora t i s a t ion o f C z e c h hospi ta l s w a s ini t ia ted in 2 0 0 3 and lasted until m i d - 2 0 0 7 
( H a v a & M a s k o v a 2011) . S o m e o f these p r o b l e m s h a v e their roots in a l imited prec is ion wi th 
w h i c h local e x p e r t s m e a s u r e d and desc r ibed the p rocesses . T h e a b o v e hurdles pose cer ta in 
d i f f i cu l t i e s in c o m p i l i n g de f in i t ive t ransi t ion p ro f i l e s for a n u m b e r of countr ies . Neve r the l e s s , 
they a re s p o r a d i c and d o not u n d e r m i n e the mode l at large, wh ich is s t rongly based on fac ts 
ra ther than thei r in te rpre ta t ions . 
It is a l so pos s ib l e that the t rans i t ion mode l is la rgely app l i cab le to o ther m o d e s of care. It cou ld 
be a r g u e d , fo r e x a m p l e , that va r ious hospital g o v e r n a n c e a r r a n g e m e n t s a f fec t outpat ient as well 
as inpa t ien t care . In add i t ion , in m a n y ins tances , c h a n g e s in admin i s t ra t ion and o w n e r s h i p o f 
mul t i - spec ia l i s t c l in ics and a m b u l a t o r y heal th cen t res w e r e car r ied out in paral lel to those o f 
hosp i ta l s . W h i l e the m o d e l cou ld be ex tended to inc lude all f o r m s o f special is t heal th care , the 
ve rac i ty o f i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d in this chap te r has on ly been c o n f i r m e d in the con tex t o f 
s e c o n d a r y and te r t ia ry inpat ient care . Th i s is p r imar i ly b e c a u s e o f the central i ty and mater ia l i ty 
o f t he hosp i ta l s ec to r in C E E / C I S . M o r e o v e r , the s tudy f o c u s fo l l ows the pract ical cons ide ra t ion 
that t he va r ie ty o f o rgan i sa t iona l f o r m s and the qua l i ty o f i n fo rma t ion ava i lab le on ou tpa t ien t 
and a m b u l a t o r y spec ia l i s t ca re w o u l d resul t in the mode l b e i n g less solid and s o m e of its 
i m p l i c a t i o n s m o r e con t e s t ab l e . Ins tead, this s tudy m a k e s the conse rva t ive a s s u m p t i o n that 
ou tpa t i en t as wel l as p r i m a r y ca re have been sub j ec t to dis t inct o w n e r s h i p and p a y m e n t 
a r r a n g e m e n t s , a s d i s c u s s e d e l s e w h e r e ( W a t s o n 2 0 0 4 , N e m e c & K o l i s n i c h e n k o 2006 , Reche l & 
M c K e e 2 0 0 9 ) . 
3.4. S tage 1: Integrated s tate f i n a n c i n g a n d provis ion 
3.4.1. Albania 
In Albania, the system has remained highly centralised and hierarchical, with the MOH focusing 
on administrative functions rather than policy and planning. Limited decentralisation brought 
about a delegation of selected administrative tasks to districts, which nonetheless remained 
accountable to the MOH (Nuri & Tragakes 2002). Particularly in secondary and tertiary care, 
the MOH retained full control over the system, leaving very narrow autonomy for the 
managerial staff (Nuri & Healy 1999). Virtually all spheres of decision-making remained with 
the central authorities; appointing directors, setting hospital bed capacities and physical assets, 
purchasing of medical inputs, staff composition and salaries, selection of provided services, 
targeting public health goals, implementing technologies, strategic development and setting user 
charges. The only area of responsibility for local staff is clinical management (Veillard 2003). 
Efforts in restructuring the inpatient capacity took the form of central government-orchestrated 
reductions and transformations (Nuri 2001). The lack of reform is emphasised by the fact that 
despite the nominal shift towards the Bismarck model in 1995, through the establishment of the 
Health Insurance Institute, until the end of 2012 hospitals continued to be financed according to 
historical budget (Marku 2010). The most recent reform steps indicate that Albania will proceed 
towards the principles of New Public Management, maintaining the central position of the state 
while introducing selected features of the private sector environment (Antoun et al. 2011). So 
far, there is no system for hospital accreditation, and the lack of medical standards and clinical 
protocols makes it impossible to monitor performance and quality (Marku 2010). 
3.4.2. Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan retained the centralised and integrated HCS, and the limited scope for sub-national 
governments' discretion reflects that of the Semashko system. The MOH appoints senior 
administrators at all system levels, who are allocated line-item budgets and follow a hierarchical 
structure of accountability. The state continues to own providers, granting them very little 
financial and managerial autonomy (Ibrahimov et al. 2010). The fact that hospital capacities 
continue to rely on historically established norms has hindered adjustments to decreasing bed 
occupancy rates, which are related to declining rates of infectious diseases and shifting some 
procedures to the outpatient setting. The centralised, hierarchical organisation does not prevent 
the system from fragmentation, however, and while the MOH holds the responsibility for all 
aspects of health care performance, its knowledge and influence over more remote parts of the 
system are limited. This deepens the problem of unresponsiveness already inherent to the 
Semashko model (Holley et al. 2004). In sum, the hospital sector continues to be subordinated 
to the MOH, even though it is territorial governments who formally own the majority of 
hospitals. 
3.4.3. Belarus 
Belarus has never attempted to de-politicise its health care system and operates a virtually 
unaltered Semashko model. Decentralisation has been constrained within the existing structures 
and takes the form of delegation of administrative tasks. While regional governments are 
formally owners of hospitals, and the day-to-day use of resources is done locally, the process is 
part of an integrated system and managerial decisions are made accordingly to norms and 
capacities set at the ministerial level, with a strong involvement of the central government. This 
is also true for all strategic decisions, concerning investment, decommissioning, physical and 
human resources, the scope of services offered, clinical practices, and so forth (Richardson et al. 
2008). 
3.4.4. Ta j ik i s tan 
Tajikistan's health system also represents an evolved version of the Soviet model. The role of 
sub-national levels of government is more emphasised than in the peer countries, because 
regional and local authorities are formally in charge of the provision of social services. 
However, resources are allocated according to close directives issued by the MOH, to which 
local health authorities are ultimately accountable (Rahminov et al. 2000). There have been few 
structural changes in the system, with the exception of two waves of reform (1991-94, 2004) 
that gave territorial governments a limited scope of autonomy in shaping their health networks. 
Considering the peer HCSs, this was an organisational innovation. Yet, in 2009, the role of the 
MOH in heading the system was strengthened with the power of appointing regional and district 
heads of administration without the need to consult the respective regional government, as was 
previously the case. The reporting structure has remained hierarchical, with hospital managers 
having little discretion over what and how medical services are provided. Provider organisations 
are owned by and financed from the state budget, and local authority is constrained by budget 
lines ascribed in detail by the Ministry of Finance with little involvement of the MOH. 
Consequently, the Ministry has no direct control over health expenditures other than at national 
centres (Khodjamurodov & Rechel 2010). 
3.4.5. T u r k m e n i s t a n 
In the 1990s, the Turkmen health care system retained all principles of the Soviet model: 
integration, centralisation, bureaucracy, hierarchy, and state ownership. Local allocation 
decisions continued to be led by centrally set norms, leaving no space for flexibility, innovation 
or community involvement. Allowing doctors to rent public facilities for private practice had 
little impact on the sector functioning, as did enabling hospital administrators to offer individual 
employment contracts and transfer funds between line-items, which was abandoned in 1997 
(Mamedkuliev et al. 2000). In the 2000s, the oppressive dictatorship of President Saparmurat 
Niyazov caused a rapid degeneration of the HCS. Doctors Without Borders (2010) report 
deterioration of the system due to politically-inspired misinformation and manipulation of data, 
creating false impressions of collaboration with international organisations, denial o f problems, 
and a culture of fear within public structures. Between 2003 and 2006, poor quality o f care was 
exacerbated by such practices as refusal of care and an unwritten ban on certain diagnoses 
(Lowrey 2009). These observations are supported by Rechel and McKee (2007) who document 
the practices of the dictatorship: neglecting health care system issues, denial and secrecy, 
falsification of data, and involvement in drug trafficking. They later report signs of 
improvement, albeit fragmented, uncoordinated and insufficient (Rechel et al. 2009). Moreover, 
the country does not cooperate with international institutions. In terms of organisation, the 
decaying system perpetuates the Semashko features, but many of its basic functions have been 
damaged. 
3.4.6. Ukraine 
Ukraine represents a more progressive approach to the Soviet model. In principle, the system 
continues to operate along the Soviet tradition, with an essentially unaltered organisational 
structure. On the other hand, since 1997 there has been a shift in decision-making towards sub-
national levels of government that spurted innovation in health care provision. This process, 
referred to as "functional decentralisation", involved passing down the budgeting and 
management powers while maintaining the empowered authorities formally subordinate to the 
MOH . Thus, the Ukrainian developments cannot be interpreted as an actual autonomisation o f 
territorial governments, because local health bodies' incentives for rationalisation of resource 
use remain limited, and tight control exercised by the MOH is said to be a factor inhibiting 
further system adaptation. In particular, the MOH continues to impose national input norms that 
prevent rationalisation through reductions in hospital networks and facilities. (Lekhan et al. 
2004, Lekhan et al. 2010). Tymkovych (2005) argues that despite some flexibility in health 
funds allocation, the system remains wasteful and insufficiently incentivised. Thirty per cent of 
inpatient episodes are considered unjustified and lengths of stay are excessive with the average 
o f 15 days. Considering the above, the HCS can be seen as a centralised and integrated model 
with a considerable amount of task delegation. An actual decentralisation is on the agenda. 
3.4.7. Uzbekistan 
In Uzbekistan, limited decentralisation reforms took place within the integrated system. Certain 
allocation tasks have been delegated to regions that nevertheless remained part of the 
hierarchical structure and follow strict norms and guidelines set at the ministerial level. Strong 
control on the part of the MOH constrained the anticipated adjustment of provision to match 
local health needs. Reductions in the numbers of public, state-owned hospitals led to 
privatisation of some units, but the materiality of private provision has been low, and inpatient 
care remains tinnly set in the public system. Granting managerial autonomy to facilities, which 
encompassed staffing, pricing, and organisation of service delivery, has been restricted to four 
pilot projects. Heads of the units selected for the programme were appointed by the central 
authorities. Budget allocation has been decentralised to quasi-independent MOH branches, 
however, this change is reported to be purely nominal and having no impact on the actual 
operations. Nonns and guidelines, which the system runs by, continue to be closely set at the 
national level (lllkhamov et al. 2001, Ahmedov et al. 2007). 
3.5. Stage 2: Decentralised facility management 
3.5.1. Kazakhstan 
Compared with other countries of the region, from the mid-1990s Kazakhstan! sub-national 
governments enjoyed a higher degree of autonomy. Although the extent of their powers has 
been fluctuating, most allocation decisions have been made at the regional level, including 
hospital management and financing. The latter relates to the fact that the system continues to be 
funded based on budgets, but their composition is a regional prerogative. While the health sector 
remains predominantly owned by the state, and the MOH has a say in making regional 
appointments, territorial health authorities are accountable to their respective regional 
governments. Regions also appoint heads of units and hold hospitals accountable. 
Since 1997, regional committees were given the opportunity to transfonn public health 
establishments into autonomous state-owned enterprises. The impact of this legal provision was 
initially limited to primary care and outpatient facilities such as polyclinics. Regarding inpatient 
care, the process was hindered by the lack of a clear strategy detennining the units that would 
remain under state control, and whether for-profit status should be pennitted. Consequently, 
nearly all hospitals remained in the state domain, and continued to rely on outdated 
infrastructure planning in the fonn of population-based input norms (Kulzhanov & Healy 1999). 
More recently, the autonomy of hospital units has been increasing due to new case-related 
payment mechanisms and the gradual transformation of their legal form to state enterprises. The 
transformation is a strategic decision for the territorial authorities, as these enterprises are able 
to manage their own assets, decide upon inpatient capacities, and set user charges. This has 
created more space for innovation and tailoring service provision to local needs, but has also led 
to varying levels of power and revenue (Katsaga et al. 2012). 
Even so, the position of the MOH remains strong, with the competencies of national policy 
setting, planning, service delivery approval and control. Between 1997 and 2002, the MOH 
underwent a number of uncoordinated transformations that interrupted its performance, and the 
demarcation between regulatory and service delivery authority continues to be unclear in certain 
aspects. However, in terms of setting the levels of financial resources, ministerial powers are 
limited. This is because the MOH budget, as well as territorial budgets, are allocated externally 
by the Ministry of Economy and Budget Planning (Kulzhanov & Rechel 2007, Katsaga et al. 
2012). 
Overall, the hospital sector structure in Kazakhstan has been dynamic. In the light of western 
European standards the system remains highly centralised, but compared to other countries of 
the region the sub-national governments enjoy considerable autonomy. In terms of ownership 
and governance, since 2007, the regions have accelerated the process of converting their 
hospitals into autonomous units. 
3.5.2. Kyrgyzstan 
Similar health care system evolution took place in Kyrgyzstan. The MOH has assumed the role 
of the system regulator and supervisor; it now exerts relatively little direct power over service 
provision in facilities other than national centres. Since 1994, regional governments have been 
empowered with the organisation of primary and secondary health services including hospitals. 
Local health authorities are appointed by the regional governor, subject to the MOH approval; 
in turn, local health authorities appoint chief physicians that head hospital provision of medical 
services (Sargaldakova et al. 2000). Since 2004, there has been a further push towards financial 
and managerial autonomy of providers, which involved a shift from line-item to consolidated 
budgets, thus increasing provider flexibility and responsibility. However, effects of this reform 
have been constrained by legal issues surrounding the project, the lack of provider financial 
management capacity, and financial unsustainability that could not have been aided by 
adjustments in structure and staffing alone (Ibraimova et al. 2011). Following a number of 
reforms in the early 2000s, local health administrations represent a mix of stakeholders, 
including local and central government representatives, and have a dual accountability to the 
regional government and the MOH (Meimanaliev et al. 2005). Therefore, Kyrgyzstan depicts 
another post-Semashko system that evolved towards considerable autonomy of stakeholders 
through the means of delegation and de-concentration. Still, this decentralised system is built 
around the original hierarchical structure, and the MOH has a voice over what and how 
resources are allocated. An important feature of the Kyrgyzstani hospital system is the intended 
autonomy of providers, which has not yet fully materialised due to legal, financial and capacity 
constraints. 
3.5.3. Moldova 
Throughout the 1990s, Moldova continued with the structure inherited from the previous 
system. The 1999 retbmi decentralised some tasks of health care administration to territorial 
health authorities, notably including governance of provider organisations. Restructuring of the 
hospital sector was carried out by empowering stakeholders at all levels of government, a 
negotiation process of new standards and norms led by the MOH and involving decision-makers 
at all political levels, and ensuring international donors' and the World Bank approval for the 
objectives and means of the reform. The autonomy and flexibility of sub-national governments 
facilitated change and was a key assumption behind the effective sector overhaul (Cercone & 
Godinho 2001, MacLehose & McKee 2002). The launch of the National Health Insurance 
Cornpany in 2001 put an end to line-item, inputs based budgeting, and caused health care 
providers to transform from budget-dependent agencies into more autonomous public 
enterprises. This potentially presented health care providers with greater flexibility in managing 
their resources. However, the adjustability was constrained at 25% of budget and subject to 
strict national norms, while modifying the inpatient capacity required MOH approval. At the 
same time, much power was concentrated in the hands of the regional chief doctor, whose 
authority ranged from budget planning and control to contracting, procurement, service design 
and employment. In practice, the chief doctor had the power to override providers' decisions 
over allocation of their resources. This concentrated influence over the system has been lessened 
after 2005. However, it was still substantial in 2008. 
The MOH involvement in the operation of system remained significant and, besides such 
stewardship functions as regulation and supervision, includes more direct tools such as price-
setting. The hospital sector continues to be emphasised, and its operation is subsidised at the 
expense of primary care (Atun et al. 2008). Despite the fact that the ownership of inpatient 
establishments was transferred to territorial levels in 1991, the MOH has retained almost all the 
instruments for managing hospitals. The MOH is positioned as a central actor even though 
hospitals are formally owned by sub-national governments and financed through National 
Health Insurance with the right of budget-holding. These inconsistencies have their source in the 
provisions of law, starting from the Constitution that explicitly makes the central government 
responsible for the health of the population, and HCS regulations that fail to specify how key 
health care competencies are distributed between the sector stakeholders (Turcanu et al. 2012). 
Therefore, the general picture of Moldovan HCS is a mixed one: many powers have been 
fonnally decentralised, but rigid structural features and unclear legal provisions constrain the 
autonomy of providers and their founding bodies. 
3.5.4. Russian Federation 
Due to the sheer size of its population and territory, the Russian Federation runs a federally 
decentralised system. Each state operates its own health care system, but this is more an effect 
of the weakness of the central governance rather than intentional decentralisation. In fact, the 
system is so fragmented that, at the national level, it is on the verge o f disintegration. This is a 
consequence of a number of factors. The early 1990s' reform efforts, aimed at the relaxation of 
input norms, centrally set salaries and staffing levels, as well as moving away from line-item 
budgets, were thwarted by the central government's weakness, managerial incapacity at all 
system levels, and notably corruption. Direct MOH supervision over regional financing and 
provision was nonetheless abolished in 1991-93, making health care a regional competency. 
Some recentralisation has been taking place since 2005 under the National Priority Project -
Health, and further recentralisation was envisaged as of 2011. 
At the regional level, the system is often structurally and functionally lacking, and driven by the 
Soviet tradition rather than current objectives. The fragmentation implies a lack o f certain high-
level functions such as strategic planning, information systems, nonns and standards, which 
result from both the Soviet inheritance and unsuccessful decentralisation that has decomposed 
the old system without establishing a complete new structure. This improvised system creates 
ample space for individual influence, but lacks in monitoring, coordination and control, thus 
nurturing the environment of corruption (Tragakes & Lessof 2003). 
At the provider level, however, no meaningful decentralisation took place until 2011, when 
legislation allowed providers to change their legal status, potentially increasing their operational 
autonomy. Uncertainties surrounding the legal provisions and outward hostile attitude of the 
political class towards non-state forms o f ownership hindered the transformation, however. As a 
result, providers continue to exist as budget-dependent public health establishments, which are 
politically driven, which do not require an appointment of professional executive bodies, and 
which provide little economic incentive for efficient operation. This implies the continuation of 
Soviet system management practices, such as line-item budgets, salaried workers, political 
interference, and wasteful performance (Popovitch et al. 2011). Antoun et al. (2011) 
characterise this as a hybrid between the Soviet-type administration and New Public 
Management. They also advocate a further shift towards autonomy of health enterprises, by 
strengthening the principles of accountability and performance and aligning them with HCS 
objectives. Similarly, Gordeev et al. (2011) argue that the reform emphasis should be shifted 
from the financing model to governance arrangements, with a particular focus on the 
implementation of mechanisms for efficiency and cost-control. 
3.6. Stage 3: Devolved hospital ownership 
3.6.1. Hungary 
In Hungary, after an early devolution of 1990, territorial governments have been at the centre of 
the hospital sector (Gaal et al. 1999). While national institutes and university clinical 
departments remained under direct control of the MOH and the Ministry of Education, 
ownership of a majority of hospitals (76% of hospital beds in 2002) was devolved from the state 
to sub-national governments, from 1997 making them responsible for debt and asset 
management (Gaal & Riesberg 2004). The Constitution gives regional governments the 
authority and responsibility to manage their regional health care provider networks. Yet, sector-
specific regulations fail to clearly refme the role for territorial governments' despite extensive 
decentralisation, what has been argued one of the key shortcomings of the Hungarian reform. 
Another one is the strongly politicised process of appointing hospital managers, who are 
selected according to party membership rather than objective competence criteria (Orosz & 
Hollo 2001). Being politically subordinate to a political party limits the managers' scope of 
autonomy, and prioritises political gains over health outcomes and economic perfomiance of the 
hospital unit. Moreover, passive attitudes of territorial governments, typical of the previous 
system, are reported to undermine the central government in reform attempts (Fuzesi et al. 
2005). 
The MOH stewards the system, among other things, by setting nation-wide health policies; 
currently it also monitors and influences the National Health Fund. The extent of 
decentralisation has been subject to lluctuations, with shifts of power between levels of sub-
national government in 2002-2010, and some back and forth movement between the central 
government and other stakeholders (recentralisation of health care financing in 1998, re-
assumption of control over medical profession regulation and licensing of pharmacies in 2007) 
(Gaal et al. 2011). 
Efforts have been made to encourage private capital involvement, by providing in 2008 legal 
grounds for the corporatisation of hospitals. Strong political resistance hindered this process, 
and hospitals perpetuate as predominantly publicly owned, budgetary entities. Between 2008 
and 2010, 36 out of 126 hospitals had been corporatised; this was expected to do away with 
political interference, bring forth higher information and accounting standards, as well as 
facilitate re-organisation of hospital networks through mergers, adjusting catchment areas, joint 
ownership by adjacent localities, flexible forms of employment, outsourcing and contracting out 
hospital management to the private sector (Orosz & Bums 2000). However, the legal possibility 
of corporatisation was rescinded, and the relevant changes reversed, in 2010 by the central 
government. This implies that hospital staff, specialists in particular, continued to enjoy the 
status of public servants, which gives them occupational protection through trade unions and 
restrains adjustments of staffing levels. Moreover, hospitals, as budgetary establishments, do not 
produce full accounting information, disallowing an analysis of cost and performance. 
A number of issues have been identified in the process of empowering health system 
stakeholders (Orosz & Bums 2000, FUzesi et al. 2005). Many of those issues concern the 
responsibilities of territorial authorities vis-a-vis financial and managerial powers at their 
disposal. In consequence of inadequate capacities, the empowered sub-national governments 
failed to effectively administer their hospital networks: they neither managed to avoid 
duplication of functions and excess capacity of the hospitals endowed with, nor they had the 
opportunity to plan, prioritise and develop their establishments with the long-term perspective, 
hnbalances in hospital catchment areas, unsolved because of the sector regulation encouraging 
regional competition rather than cooperation, resulted in concurrent insufficient and excessive 
demand, causing debt accumulation under the soft budget constraint. The incapacity to cover 
financial deficits, while at the same time refusing to allow hospital bankruptcy and liquidation, 
led to the central government bailing out insolvent hospitals, which in turn created a problem of 
moral hazard. 
Lastly, the Hungarian statutory health fund only covers current expenditures, explicitly 
excluding the costs of depreciation and capital investment. The latter remain the responsibility 
of the funding bodies, i.e. territorial governments. However, their financial capacity is limited, 
therefore for this purpose they rely on investment grants and subsidies, conditional and 
matching, allocated by the central government. This process disincentivises sound strategic 
purchasing and restricts the autonomy of hospital managers, who are unable to build up 
financial reserves for capital investments, cannot borrow from the capital market to fund vital 
facilities, but also cannot make disinvestments as these decisions rest with the local assembly. 
As a result, facility investments depend on the availability of subsidies and are subject to 
political and budgetary games rather than made on medical and economic grounds. 
3.6.2. Poland 
In Poland, decentralisation of the HCS started in 1991, when regions and districts became 
involved in the process of organisation (i.e. financing and planning) of hospital care provision. 
The next step, devolving hospital ownership to respective territorial units, coincided with a 
reform of territorial division and the introduction of Social Health Insurance. These reforms 
changed the structure of regional self-government, imposed new competencies on the newly 
formed authorities and terminated dependence of hospitals on the central budget (Karski et al. 
1999). The hospitals dropped their legal form of state budgetary entifies, making territorial 
governments the sole founders of independent health care institutions (90% in 2005). This form 
of public ownership separated the provider from the founding body. While the founding bodies 
bear the financial responsibility for their establishments, providers are primarily financed by 
competit ively tendered contracts with the National Health Fund. Central and regional budget 
tniancing o f health care is still in place, contributing to the hospital sector mainly through 
f inancing health services for the uninsured population and subsidising capital investments 
(Kuszewski et al. 2005). 
Kozierkiewicz and Karski (2001) argue that de-concentration and devolution o f the early 1990s 
was a nomina l change that had little implication for managerial decisions regarding hospital 
operation. Decentralisation created autonomous units that enjoyed the public backing whi le not 
being held accountable for their performance. Hospital directors would answer to supervisory 
boards representing the territorial government, staff and trade unions, but in many cases the 
poor overall governance would lead to persistent financial losses. In fact, the devolution o f 
hospital ownership was dubbed "tossing the hot potato" o f hospital debt from central to regional 
governments rather than an empowering step towards permanently solving the problem 
(Gol inowska 2008). In addition, public hospitals have enjoyed favourable treatment by the 
sector's regulation: disadvantaging non-public hospitals by obligating payers to contract all 
publ ic providers despite the nominal rule o f competitive tendering, requiring exclusivity under 
National Health Fund financing thus forbidding concurrent contracting with private health 
plans, as well as political interference in bidding for contracts (McMenamin & Timonen 2002). 
Another reform design feature is that three levels o f sub-national government exist in parallel 
without superiority relationships, and operate independently according to their statutory 
responsibilities and organisation. Consequently, replication o f their functions, as well as the lack 
o f formal relationships or coordination has been a matter o f concern. Top-level regional 
authorities, currently responsible for strategy and planning o f service provision and medical 
infrastructure according to health needs o f the population, have been suggested to be in position 
to take on the coordinator role (Panteli et al. 2011). 
A key function o f territorial governments is to act as quasi-owners o f hospitals, ensuring 
operation according to the legal purpose by supervision and control, which also involves 
monitor ing and evaluating health units and their managers. Territorial authorities can found, 
transform and close down facilities, as well as change their purpose and capacity through capital 
investments and disinvestments. However, they do not have influence over contracting with the 
National Health Fund, whi le most commonly hospital debts result from provision o f services 
beyond the volumes contracted with that Fund. This is problematic in the light o f the provision 
o f law stating that financial loss does not constitute a justif ication to close down a unit, i f its 
range o f services is deemed necessary from the perspective o f population needs. Thus, 
autonomous units operate under loose accountability arrangements, and the insolvent ones do 
not face the peril o f market exit. The founding body, on the other hand, is burdened with debt 
which is beyond its control. There are few formal measures in place to curb this moral hazard 
and impose financial discipline (Wtodarczyk & Karkowska 2005, Panteli et al. 2011). 
One response, albeit severe, stems from the right of founding bodies to liquidate the insolvent 
hospitals or transfomi them into joint-stock companies. The latter corporatisation, or 
commercialisation, is a process of transfonnation of a public health entity into a publicly-owned 
company regulated by the code of commercial companies. This introduces corporate 
management and reporting standards, forcing the founding body to carefully manage loss and 
debt by eliminating the possibility of claim against the founding body. This solution has been 
encouraged from 2009. As of April 2010, 16% of public hospitals had their legal status changed 
and achieved good financial and quality performance. However, this number is likely to include 
the hospitals that had already performed well and used the opportunity to heighten their 
standards and send a signal of good performance (Boulhol et al. 2012). From 2011, other than 
allowed for by the voluntary transformation, territorial governments are bound to cover a 
hospital debt within 3 months of its appearance on the financial statement. Failing to do so 
triggers a legal procedure that forces the transformation within the next 12 months. The process 
will lead to the closing down of some poorly performing hospitals. 
3.6.3. Romania 
Romania took first steps towards decentralisation of its system in 1992, through de-
concentration within the structures of the MOH and the central government, delegation of health 
insurance administration, and devolution of selected primary care and public health 
responsibilities. (Vladescu et al. 2005). Implications of this for the hospital sector were limited, 
and at that stage the centralised structure was maintained with vast decision powers remaining 
with the Ministry. Under this arrangement, until 2001, various changes affected the 
accreditation process, the classification of hospitals, as well as their organisation and 
management (Busse & Dolea 2001). A more meaningful decentralisation took place in 2002, 
when territorial authorities were put in charge of local health councils with the power to manage 
their provider networks, including managers' appointment, controlling and supervising, 
licensing, and planning, albeit with some direct control over these functions from the MOH. 
More importantly, ownership of hospitals has been devolved. The same reform enabled 
establishing private wards in public hospitals, but form has not proven impactful. Hospital 
managers are nominated by a health authority (previously by the district public health authority, 
more recently by the MOH) in a competitive process. More recently, the managers have been 
evaluated on both their achievements in the field of medicine and managerial skills, which are 
subject to performance assessment. Executive power in hospitals is held by a committee of 
directors, headed and appointed by the manager. Recurring hospital debt indicates a 
misalignment in the governance structure on one hand, and an underfinancing of the system on 
the other (Vladescu et al. 2000, Vladescu et al. 2008). In early 2012, the government efforts to 
alleviate the problems of corruption and underfinancing through privatisation, including the 
replacing the state-controlled health insurance company with private insurers, were thwarted by 
massive public protests (Holt 2012). 
3.6.4. S lovakia 
Slovakia sustained the integrated model for a decade after the fall of communism. Hospitals 
remained under direct control of the MOH and had little discretion over allocation of their 
resources. The old system persisted because of the central government ' s fear of reform steps 
that could have been associated with privatisation of the health sector, and because of sub-
national governments ' reluctance to take responsibility for hospitals they did not have the 
capacity to manage, finance, and upkeep. Autonomisation of public facilities (through 
conversion from budgetary units to non-profit making public establishments) in 1999-2002 led 
to loosening the control over their financial performance. At the same time, the introduction of 
SHI reform was not accompanied by adequate regulation of financial discipline. Altogether, this 
led to rapid debt accumulation. The situation was worsened by the negligence of financial 
audits, the lack of reliable debt data, and the presence of corruption, as preferential treatment of 
debtors could be obtained by bribes. Curbing this loop was one of the key objectives of further 
reforms. Transformation of health insurance funds into private (joint-stock) health insurance 
companies increased the prudency and effectiveness in managing their assets. To facilitate the 
clearing of backlog payments, a state consolidation agency was created. The reforms proved 
successful , and after the last bail-out in 2006 the agency was abolished (HIavacka & Skackova 
2000, HIavacka et al. 2004, Szalay et al. 2011). 
In 2004, legislation became effective devolving to territorial governments the control over their 
respective health care provider networks. This occurred in the context of a mixed distribution of 
competencies. Setting health outcome targets, bed capacities and physical assets as well as user 
charges remained with the MOH. Deciding upon the range of medical services provided within 
a hospital became a shared prerogative. Territorial governments became founding bodies 
owning and supervising public health care establishments, with the right to appoint directors, 
implement new technologies and contract facilities out to the private sector. Hospitals were put 
in charge of their own per fonnance goals, procurement, salaries, staff mix, strategic 
development as well as clinical management (Veillard 2003). Removing day-to-day hospital 
administration duties from the MOH shifted its role from direct provision towards regulation 
and strategy-setting. 
While transformation of public hospitals into non-profit joint-stock companies was initiated in 
2002, the process has faced considerable political resistance and so far has not been fully 
realised. A repeated attempt to transform all hospitals into joint-stock companies, which was 
meant to become effective at the end of 2011, was again nullified by a public and health 
professionals' backlash (Wyszehrad 2011). 
3.7. Stage 4: Corporatised hospitals 
3.7.1. Armenia 
Armenia departed from the integrated system in a series of refonns between 1996 and 1998. 
Firstly, managing the regional health budget, contracting with providers, and monitoring quality 
of care were delegated to local governments. At that stage, setting prices and levels of coverage 
remained a competency of the MOH. In 1998, a SHI fund was established to take over provider 
contracting and reimbursement. Secondly, in 1996, ownership of hospitals (excluding tertiary 
establishments) was transferred to territorial governments. Two years later, budgetary health 
units were converted into joint-stock companies, which made them considerably more 
autonomous, with respective governments as sole owners and supervisors. Hospitals were put in 
charge of their resources and conditions of provision, including the right to retain profits, using 
the budget surplus for investment purposes, contracting with insurance companies, and setting 
prices for services outside the statutory package. This setup has turned hospitals to effectively 
operate as profit-seeking companies, making a case for corporate taxation (Jowett & Danielyan 
2010). Still, prices and volumes of basic benefits remained to be regulated by central authorities. 
A few obstacles prevented this transformation from coming into full swing. For one, governance 
mechanisms at founding bodies' disposal were unclearly defined, so the extent of accountability 
and the distribution of decision-making powers are uncertain. Moreover, hospital administrators 
do not have the managerial experience to perform the array of functions they have been 
delegated. As a result, they resort to the Semashko ways of running their facilities. In addition, 
within hospitals, the administrative structure is hierarchical and all key decisions are often made 
personally by the director. It is not a common practice for hospitals to have a managerial board 
or another governing body. This results in a concentration of power, ad hoc management and a 
lack of strategic planning. Furthemiore, there remain a number of issues in the system of 
payment incentives that in some cases encourages unnecessary hospitalisations, inducing the 
numbers of admissions up to a contracted limit, while in some other cases it sets reimbursement 
levels below the cost of production. Some governance functions, such as prospective planning, 
contract negotiations, utilisation management and clinical guidelines, are also missing. Overall, 
the system is characterised as a segmented hierarchy, with few horizontal linkages and 
mechanisms for coordination at sub-national levels. Vertical links have also been loosened. 
Regions have to comply with top-down orders and policies, but do not have to report back and 
have little inputs into planning and regulation (Hovhannisyan et al. 2001, Hakobyan et al. 2006). 
3.7.2. Bulgaria 
T h e social ist model of heal th care opera ted in Bulgaria until 1992, when most health care 
faci l i t ies were devo lved to terri torially elected governments . The system structure was llattened 
as result of a 1995 re form, which sh i f ted adminis t ra t ive tasks f rom the M O H to regional health 
cent res (Hinkov et al. 1999). A two-s tep reform of 1997 and 1999 a imed at rat ionalising the 
hospital ne twork by rep lac ing central control with manager ia l au tonomy (Koulaksazov et al. 
2003) . S ince 2000, hospi ta ls e f fec t ive ly operate as for-profi t l imited liability compan ies owned 
by territorial gove rnmen t s or jo in t -s tock companies . In the latter, the major i ty s take is held by 
the regional or is shared be tween regional and central governments ; a mixed ownersh ip 
a r rangement of 5 1 % state and 4 9 % territorial government is not uncommon . The above re forms 
were dr iven by the pr inciples of quasi -market isa t ion, decentral isat ion and pluralism in 
ownersh ip . T h e process of involving territorial authorit ies led to them owning nearly 7 0 % of 
mul t i -prof i le hospi ta ls as well as to their part icipation in planning, organis ing and running the 
heal th care sys tem (Delcheva & Balabanova 2001, Georg ieva et al. 2007) . 
T h e r e has been m u c h regulatory progress in the hospital sector. For example , since 2002 the 
Nat ional Heal th Insurance Fund contracts hospitals irrespective of their ownersh ip status, and 
s ince 2 0 0 4 pat ients have a f ree cho ice of any hospital in the country, public or private. In 1998, 
there were 16 private hospitals in Bulgaria, and by 2009 their number increased to 93, 
represent ing 3 0 . 4 % of hospi tals and 14.3% of hospital admiss ions . Private hospitals are believed 
to focus on p rob lem-f ree , most prof i table clinical pa thways . One reason for this is the fact that 
pr ivate and publ ic hospi tals do not compe te on an equal footing. Partial cover ing of clinical 
p a t h w a y s ' costs by the Fimd promotes public hospitals that use their own budgets to make up 
for the shor tages of r e imbursement , whi le private hospitals need to seek other sources of 
r evenue (Ba labanova & M c K e e 2002 , Dimova et al. 2012) . All hospitals may impose charges 
on pr ivate patients , and it is a popular practice to book charges as donat ions so as to avoid taxes. 
I r respect ive of their ownersh ip status, hospitals m a k e prof i ts they are a l lowed to retain. 
H o w e v e r , publ ic hospi tals have failed to reach profi tabil i ty, partly due to poor management , and 
part ly in consequence of unreal is t ical ly low levels of re imbursement . In 2001, 24 out of 46 
publ ic hospi tals reported losses. Thus , the sector t ransfomia t ion did not lead to the expected 
reduct ion in the bloated hospital sector, as local authori t ies maintain hospitals that consistently 
report losses (Da tzova 2003) . 
T h e dis t r ibut ion of decis ion powers represents a mixed landscape. Hospi ta ls are managed by 
boards of directors , which m a k e execut ive decis ions regard ing s taff ing, procurement , and user 
fees . The found ing bodies dec ide upon hir ing managers , manag ing physical assets, set t ing bed 
capaci t ies and the scope of provided services . The M O H sets pe r fo rmance and quali ty targets as 
wel l as directs the s trategic deve lopment . Choos ing technologies for implementa t ion as well as 
salary negotiations are collective tasks. Incentives for careful strategic investments have been 
strengthening between all stakeholders: managers who administer facilities as well as central 
and territorial government who subsidise hospitals in upkeep and capital investment (Veillard 
2003) 
In the light of many favourable institutional arrangements, the lack of experience and know-how 
has been reported as an impediment of this new incentivised environment. Because of the 
inadequate managerial capacity, as well as due to the presence of corruption, developments at 
the territorial level are often informal, irregular, ad hoc and whimsical (Prohaska et al. 2005). 
3.7.3. Czech Republ ic 
Dissolution of the Semashko structures in 1990-1992 resulted in a broad programme of de-
concentration, both in terms of financing (the inception of SHI) as well as system governance. 
With respect to the latter, district authorities, structurally independent from the MOH, were put 
in charge of ensuring adequate health care, with the power of founding and licensing facilities, 
appointing directors, and allocating funds for investment. Their real executive powers were 
shaky and constrained by a substantial autonomy of insurers and providers. Hospitals operated 
as state-owned and territorially-administrated institutions (Busse 2000). 
The second wave started in 2003 and was triggered by a reform of public administration that 
abolished district health departments. The reform involved devolving hospital ownership to 
regions with their simultaneous transformation to joint-stock companies. The process has also 
been termed "regional centralisation" as it transferred considerable powers from the disbanded 
districts up to the newly fonned regions, limiting autonomy down the stream (communities and 
hospitals), but proving an effective tool in rationalising hospital networks (Jaros et al. 2005). In 
terms of governance, the hospitals remain dependent on, and accountable to, the sole owners of 
regional governments, but their recurrent costs of operation are covered by purchaser 
organisations and the owning bodies do not participate in the contract negotiations (Rokosova et 
al. 2005, Bryndova et al. 2009). 
In 2006, the Constitutional Court confirmed the non-governmental, non-protlt status of public 
hospitals, highlighting the independence of the supervisory board from the founding body. 
However, due to concerns over protection of public property, political influence continues to 
exist as far as hospital management is concerned, and the strategic self-dependence of hospitals 
is limited. Compared with a mature system of corporatist-style governance, hospital governance 
in the Czech Republic was found lacking in objective appointment procedures and definition of 
performance goals. Relatively small boards have the advantage of higher flexibility and 
responsiveness, but this comes at the cost of an inconsistent ad-hoc style of managing, the 
possibility of non-representativeness of stakeholders and a higher risk of self-interest and 
corruption. The latter is lil<ely reinforced by inadequate token payments that board members 
receive for their services (Ditzel et al. 2006). 
While the above is the dominant arrangement, other significant forms of ownership exist in the 
HCS. The Ministry remains in direct control of national and highly specialised health centres, 
university hospitals and research institutions. These account for ca. 13% of facilities and 31% of 
beds. As for the private sector, privatisation has been part of the transition since the 1990s, and 
in 2000 accounted for 32% (64 out o f 203) of hospitals, corresponding to 10% of beds. Their 
legal status comprises both not-for-profit charities and foundations and well as for-profit (Busse 
et al. 2001, Hava & Maskova 201 1). 
Early reforms came across obstacles typical for post-communist countries: a lack of actors' 
responsibility, insufficient know-how vis-a-vis comprehensive managerial tasks, shortfalls in 
the political mandate to carry out a complete system overhaul, and difficulties in achieving 
across the board quality of regulation. Still, assessed against the CEE/CIS background, 
decentralisation, pluralisation and autonomisation in the Czech system have been progressively 
high since the 1990s. Collective decision-making is reflected in the presence of various 
stakeholder groups on health plans' boards, participation in regulatory negotiations and public 
tenders for health provision, in different configurations. Overall HCS transition has proven 
politically stable and successful in improving health outcomes, meeting population needs 
through the development ofservices, and adaptation of new technologies (Jaros et al. 2005). 
3.7.4. Estonia 
Since 1994 hospitals, formally subordinate to the Ministry and void of individual governing 
boards, were increasingly exposed to market pressures, were required to face input markets, and 
enjoyed relatively extensive autonomy. This involved investment decisions, setting staff levels 
and salaries, renting facilities to the private sector, and borrowing from the capital markets with 
unclear legal responsibility in the eventuality of default (Palu & Kadakmaa 2001). 
It was not until 2002 that Estonia underwent a major health care system restructuring. At that 
time, ownership o f hospitals was transferred to territorial governments, and their status changed 
from public budgetary health establishments to non-profit organisations operating under the 
commercial code. The legal status takes the form of joint-stock (limited liability) company or 
foundation; in practice, there is little difference between the two alternatives. Founding bodies 
exercise control over hospitals by nominating governing boards. Joint ownership is permitted, 
leading to hospitals being founded by multiple adjacent governments as well as governments of 
different levels of the territorial division. This has allowed for a number of consolidations and 
mergers essential to the rationalisation of hospital networks. The potential benefit of having a 
broader founding base thanks to multiple owners is in practice overshadowed by the blurred 
responsibility for hospital performance and free riding that materialises in reluctance of owners 
to contribute toward capital investments. There is also a situation of hospitals' dual 
accountability; to the health fund with respect to provided health care services, and to the 
funding body for overall performance and financial status. The above developments altered the 
role performed by the MOH, from hands-on hospital administration towards licensing, 
supervision, and public financing (Jesse 2000, Jesse et al. 2004, Koppel et al. 2008, Jesse 2008). 
3.7.5. Latvia 
Latvia decentralised its health care system in 1993 by charging territorial governments with the 
task of managing provider networks in order to ensure accessible care according to local need. 
This entailed devolving the ownership of hospitals along with the usual funding body 
responsibilities. Correspondingly, hospital directors enjoyed increased autonomy, e.g. in 
negotiating salaries. The ownership transfer excluded tertiary hospitals - in 1999, 52 out of 151 
hospitals remained under direct control of the MOH. With effect from the year 2000 "Law of 
Commerce" legislation, public (state and territorial) health providers were transformed into 
capital entities assuming the form of limited liability state stock company. Under the new 
setting, hospital managers have been appointed by, and accountable to, the founding body, and 
enjoyed a considerable autonomy in managing their facilities. In fact, poor accountability, low 
standards of governance and blurred boundaries between public and private sectors have been 
identified as factors conveying corruptive opportunities in the health sector (Karaskevica & 
Tragakes 2001, Tragakes et al. 2008). 
3.7.6. Lithuania 
With effect from the 1991 decentralisation reform, territorial governments became owners of 
hospitals (except national centres). As well, they were put in charge of territorial health care 
budgets. This strengthened their role in the HCS and catalysed hospital autonomy. From 1997, 
public hospitals were successively transformed into non-profit organisations acting under the 
commercial code, managed by executive boards, and accountable to the MOH or respective 
territorial government. Setting the global limit on health spending and deciding upon capital 
investments remained competencies of the central government (Cerniauskas & Murauskiene 
2000). 
A number of issues marked Lithuanian governance transition. For one, increasing hospital 
autonomy led to coordination issues and reduced the control over their financial and clinical 
activities. As in other countries, accountability mechanisms were not adequate to maintain the 
coherence of the decentralising system (Logminiene 2001). Moreover, until 2010, a conflict of 
overlapping competencies existed between the district physician and territorial authorities. The 
former was appointed with the charge of organising district-wide secondary health care on 
behalf of and with the involvement of the MOH . The latter were made formal owners of health 
provider organisations. The eontlict originated from unclear laws that failed to align the formal 
public responsibility with real influence, in this case represented by decision powers over 
establishing, administrating as well as liquidating facilities. The flawed iinplementation had 
long-term repercussions for the sector, and even the elimination of the district authorities in 
2010 did not fully resolve the conflict of control over hospital networks (Kiskiene et al. 2010). 
In consequence, provider network restructuring tended to be small in scale and problematic to 
put into practice, especially in terms of merging well and poorly performing, solvent and 
insolvent establishments. Political rather than medical or economic reasons underlay many 
decisions regarding the existence of hospitals, at all government levels. The bureaucratic 
principle o f amassing power, by controlling the largest possible budget or in this case provider 
network, explains a fair share of Lithuanian HCS developments. Still, some shifting of emphasis 
from hospitals toward outpatient care has been achieved (Petkevicius et al. 2005). 
3.8. Stage 5: A privatised hospital sector 
3.8.1. Georgia 
In Georgia, the first wave of decentralisation commenced in 1995 involved establishing regional 
health authorities accountable to regional governments, with the goal of identification and 
planning for local needs. Two years later, ownership of health care facilities was transferred to 
territorial governments together with the powers of resource allocation, budgeting, priority 
setting, quality monitoring, and contract negotiation. The central government, on the other hand, 
steered the sector using a mix of direct (a national hospital restructuring programme) and 
indirect (financial incentives, licensing and accreditation, supervision of autonomous units) 
tools. Problematically, this change disregarded local capacities required for performing the 
tasks, weak governance structures and the abuse of power by hospital managers (Rose & 
Gotsadze 2001). 
Another step in the sector reorganisation, in 1999, transformed hospitals into either joint-stock 
or limited liability companies. Unconventionally, these newly autonomised units became 
subordinate to the Ministry of Economic Development, rather than to territorial or national 
health authorities. Still, there was an element of dual supervision, as infrastructural changes 
were subject to the M O H assessment and approval under the Hospital Master Plan 
(Gamkrelidze et al. 2002). Political discontinuity related to the Rose Revolution in 2003 caused 
the Plan to be abandoned before its full implementation, which resulted in unfinished mergers, 
and was replaced with sketchy reductions in staffing and health provider networks as well as a 
series o f sales of state property to the private sector, which altogether did not eliminate the 
excess capacity before the process was brought to a halt in 2004. 
Reforms initiated in 2006 were aimed at a complete transformation of the sector toward private 
provision and financing, and liberal market regulation. In result of the Hospital Development 
Master Plan carried out from 2007, a vast privatisation of the hospital sector took place, and ca. 
80% of hospitals were privatised between 2007 and 2008. Unrestricted types of private investors 
were allowed to bid in the process of competi t ive tendering for public hospital ownership, 
including the pharmaceutical industry and property investment funds. Defined in the Plan were 
criteria of geographic availability, integration of specialisations into one facility, and inputs 
(numbers of beds). Investors were obligated to maintain the privatised hospitals ' clinical 
specialisations for at least seven years. Quality and long-term sustainability of the arrangement 
were in no way safeguarded, however. 
Public spending accounting for less than 20% of total health expenditure makes it difficult for 
the MOH to fulfil its regulatory duties through planning or purchasing. Given little direct 
involvement, more effective regulatory tools are needed in order to steer the market-driven 
sector towards the social goals. For example, it is reported that privatised hospitals owned by 
the pharmaceutical companies operated according to their own clinical practice, disregarding the 
national guidelines. In the 2003 and 2006 waves of deregulation, the Minis try 's licensing, 
certification, and control powers were weakened, in line with the envisioned self-regulation of 
providers and insurers. Accreditation procedures were discontinued under the assumption of 
supply-side deregulation, and most of the remaining regulatory functions were transferred to 
independent organisations. Consequently, current leadership capacity of the MOH, in particular 
its ability to drive any change in the health sector, is very poor (Chanturidze et al. 2009). 
3.9. Summary of transition stages 
Section 3.4 presented the post-Semashko health systems that have seen no or only cosmetic 
changes applied in their structures. In countries that represent evolved versions of the Soviet 
model, such as Tajikistan and Ukraine, the innovation has been limited to delegation of 
administrative tasks and did not produce meaningful empowerment of sub-national governments 
or hospital boards. Moreover, the case of Turkmenistan shows that a disintegration of the 
system leads to worse still outcomes than simply maintaining the crude Semashko model . 
To be sure, the above HCSs underwent a degree of adaptation after the fall of communism, 
adjust ing their capacities to the changing patterns of health needs. These adaptation effor ts have 
been primarily driven by central governments that strategically curbed the reliance on inpatient 
care and cut hospital capacity. However, basic mechanisms guarding the sector operation, 
including allocation of resources, remained unchanged, which in the long run is going to limit 
innovation, flexibility, and the overall attainment of health sector objectives. For these structural 
reasons, it can be argued that this group continues to operate health systems that are based on or 
closely resemble the Soviet top-down model. Consequently, features of the Semashko systems 
discussed in Chapter 2.1, as well as relevant economic mechanisms to be presented in Chapter 
4.2, still apply in the above seven countries. 
This first step into governance transition involves a transfer of management decisions that take 
place in the sector. This may take the forni of de-concentration or delegation of various extents 
o f decision powers to sub-national levels. Stage 2 countries transfer, outside the MOH 
structures, comprehensive competencies relevant to managing hospital units and their networks. 
This is in contrast to some Stage 1 countries that may also employ an extent of delegation, but 
one that is contained within the national structure and restricted to administrative tasks within 
the boundaries set at higher levels of the hierarchy. 
The powers in question may include, in the area of financing: (1) allocation of budgets, (2) 
raising revenues through local taxes, and (3) administration of recurrent spending and capital 
investments. In the area of provision and contracting of care: (4) setting health care supply 
priorities and capacities, (5) planning volumes of services according to health needs of the 
population, (6) negotiating and signing contracts with third party payers, (7) shaping provider 
networks through hospital investment, closure, restructuring, licensing, (8) setting conditions for 
health care access, such as user charges, (9) organising service provision by adjusting structures, 
procedures, processes, and technology, (10) outsourcing of core and non-core services, and (11) 
staffing and employment strategies, e.g. salary levels. Other areas of discretion may include: 
(12) setting regional priorities, norms and standards, (13) human resources planning, (14) 
control and supervision after issuing a license for facility operation, and (15) renting out 
facilities to the private sector providers. 
The above competencies may take the form of a direct executive power over health care policy, 
financing and provision. Alternatively, an indirect influence is possible through appointing 
governing bodies or directors of local health authorities, such as Chief Doctor, who represent 
local interests and priorities. The governance structure may position either the MOH or regional 
aovemments as the top level, to which territorial health authorities are held accountable. In 
either case, meaningful decentralisation creates a situation in which some residual claims and 
political responsibility appears on the side of the newly empowered regional authorities. This 
common feature justifies decentralisation of management as an independent transition stage. 
Looking at reform experiences of countries that have gone through Stage 2, there emerges no 
single model of such a decentralisation. On the contran . there is a considerable heterogeneity of 
approaches. Kazakhstan, Kyrgvzstan, Moldova and Russia Federation feature HCSs that grant 
allocation powers to sub-national authorities, but subject to formal and informal structural 
constraints limiting the full benefits of decentralised decision-making. They are a varied group 
in terms of degrees o f regional bodies' involvement and more or less intentional transition paths 
that led to decentralisation. Kazakhstan, for instance, is a mixed and dynamic case, with 
scheduled transformations under way that will likely push it to Stages 3 and 4 of the transition 
model. In Russia, on the other hand, nearly all health care competencies are held at the regional 
level. Yet, this is a result of an uncontrolled fragmentation of the centralised system rather than 
a purposeful decentralisation, a process also fuelled by the size and the federal organisation of 
the country. 
The first countries to decentralise the ownership of hospitals were Hungary, Lithuania and 
Bulgaria, all before 1993. In certain cases, e.g. Armenia, Hungary and Latvia, this had not been 
preceded by a transfer of management powers, and thus constituted the first step into HCS 
decentralisation. As of 2011, half of the sampled countries have transformed their hospital 
sectors to Stage 3 or further. Discussed in this section were the four countries that currently 
remain at this stage of transition. 
Stage 3 depicts a meaningful decentralisation as defined by the presence o f devolved hospital 
ownership. While devolution is one of the possible forms of decentralisation, along with 
delegation and de-concentration, it has stronger implications for the distribution of power and 
responsibility across the health system. Already, at Stage 2, territorial governments were 
involved in the management of health care provision, but the establishments remained 
connected to the central budget. Devolution of ownership changes this by breaking the national 
pool of hospitals according to the administrative division, with hospital sub-networks ceded to 
respective territorial governments. 
The founding body (be it the State, region, district or municipality) bears the financial and legal 
costs of maintenance, capital investments, insolvency or incapacity to meet obligations. It is also 
responsible for ensuring adequate facility equipment, for staffing and procurement of drugs, and 
for medical errors and corresponding litigations. The owner is also financially responsible for 
implicit social functions performed by the hospital, i.e. any socially valued services that bring 
marginal revenue below their marginal cost of provision (Jakab et al. 2002b), such as basic 
health services for the uninsured population with the risk of being uncompensated. This applies 
both at the level of hospital unit and network, the latter also requiring strategic planning aimed 
at maintaining a network of hospitals adequate to the geographical distribution and needs of the 
population. 
Developing such a network takes into account the possibility of contracting out provision to the 
private sector, as in Hungary, often as a product of decentralisation-driven restructuring of 
provider capacity (Gaal et al. 2011). In Poland and Slovakia, sector regulations did not 
encourage privatisation of public hospitals, yet some facilities chose to outsource non-core 
activities such as cleaning and catering to the private sector (Tymowska 2001). The 
comprehensive task of hospital management was also sometimes outsourced (Hlavacka et al. 
2004). Despite the legal opportunities, these practices did not become commonplace and 
hospitals remained predominantly under public ownership and administration. 
Devolution o f facility ownership is therefore a shift of financial, legal and operational risks, as 
much as it is a shift of power to shape territorial health care provision. Moreover, it involves 
political responsibility for the system performance, notably health accessibility, responsiveness 
and outcomes. Rationales underlying a greater involvement of territorial authorities in allocation 
o f resources are their information advantages, the ability to carry out unpopular decisions of 
closing down superfluous hospitals, and possible benefits of yardstick competition of regions. 
In practice, devolution of ownership generally brought about increasing health service unit 
autonomy. As a consequence of breaking the nationally integrated structure, hospitals cease to 
be part of the MOH-led hierarchy. This means hospitals' boards of directors are nominated by, 
and accountable to, the new founding body, and the scope of their autonomy depends on the 
preferences of the regional government. Thus, the hospital managers' discretion in managing 
their unit would vary territorially, depending on the extent of the founding body involvement in 
setting goals and strategic planning. Empowering hospital managers would further support the 
cause of increasing system responsiveness by bringing allocation decisions closer to the point of 
provision. 
What proved problematic, however, was the founding bodies' inability to maintain financial 
discipline and the lack of legally prescribed mechanisms for effective accountability. This was a 
surprising outcome, given that one of the central reasons behind devolution was to stop hospital 
debt accumulation. Repeated debt clearance put a fiscal strain on the government and created a 
situation of moral hazard where extra funds would tlow to poorly performing hospitals, while 
good performance would be considered a job well done, granting no reward. Moreover, the 
government bail-outs led to the anticipation that debt was a legal obligation of the state and thus 
would always be cleared. The soft budget constraint and its implications are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4.5. It was believed that territorial governments would be able to enforce 
budgetary discipline. This turned out not to be the case, however, and in fact enhanced hospital 
autonomy exacerbated the problem. The pattern is universal across the analysed countries, and 
can also be linked to the governance environment conducive to corruption. It was only further 
developments that proved effective in ending hospital indebtedness (corporatisation, prudential 
regulation, and supporting mechanisms such as the clearing agency in Slovakia). 
Considering the above findings as well as recent developments, devolved ownership of public 
health enterprises appears to be an interim stage in the process of corporatisation. In all Stage 3 
countries the process is under way but, due to resistance of various stakeholder groups, the 
joint-stock company has not yet become a dominant legal form for public providers. 
The first countries to introduce corporatisation at a sector-wide scale were Lithuania, Armenia 
and Bulgaria in the late 1990s. By 2011, the other three countries described in this section also 
assumed this legal form for the majori ty of their hospitals. 
Compared to Stage 3, where elements of autonomisation were introduced at territorial 
authorit ies ' discretion and inpatient establishments remained subsidiaries of their founding 
bodies, the transformation into commercial law companies takes the transition process one step 
further. The key features are full organisational autonomy and legal grounds of funct ioning 
equivalent to those of commercial companies of the private sector. The latter involve, among 
other things, legal personality, a defined minimum statutory capital, a control structure (board of 
directors or an executive committee), information and reporting requirements, as well as the 
application of uniform corporate tax rules. 
Using the merits of this configuration for achieving health care sector goals is the main driving 
force behind the corporatisation attempts. Performance of hospitals operating under the 
commercial code may benefit f rom stricter accounting standards, the real risk of market exit, 
and breaking the link to a territorial unit 's budget. Experience shows that these three measures 
prove effective at deterring hospital indebtedness and isolating it from sel f -governments ' 
budgets. At the same time, the case of Lithuania is a warning that this cannot be taken for 
granted, as a sloppy implementation of accountability mechanisms will reverberate in 
unchecked financial and clinical performance issues. In terms of corruption and political 
interference, the clearer organisational boundaries of sector participants limit the opportunities 
for the preferential treatment of the public property and elucidate stakeholders ' actions, without 
tenninat ing the public engagement in the hospital sector. Thus, it presents an attractive venue 
for improving the transparency of HCSs in countries where the alternative of privatisation faces 
strong political resistance. 
While the devolution stage emphasised the role of territorial governments, corporatisation 
highlights the autonomy, responsibility and capacity of individual inpatient establishments, 
represented by a manager or a board of directors who hold the executive powers. In the 
institutional environment of heightened internal and external pressures, the managerial capacity 
is essential for reaping the fruits of increased efficiency and responsiveness, reflected in both 
health and financial outcomes. Evidently, in countries coming from the communist background, 
this capacity has been subject to a learning process, and after over a decade of operation the 
quality of governance is showing signs of improvement. 
In the analysed countries, regional governments typically continued to be the sole owners of 
corporatised hospitals. However, this legal form permits some opportune extensions, including 
joint public ownership (central and territorial governments, as in Bulgaria) or even public-
private partnerships. In the latter case, the hospital is considered public as long a government 
holds a majority stake, leaving ample space for the participation of a private investor. Despite 
the risk of cherry-picking well-performing, profitable public hospitals by private investors, if 
correctly applied, this may provide an opportunity to modernise or adjust to today's needs the 
obsolete and overweight networks of public facilities inherited from the previous system. 
Finally, two of the reviewed countries deserve to be spotlighted for their reform progress. 
Amienia, a country in a "medical poverty trap" (von Schoen-Angerer 2004), proves that 
ownership transformations are not an exclusive domain of industrialised countries. The virtually 
collapsed Armenian HCS puts corporatisation of hospitals in a different context, with efficiency, 
quality and cost-containment giving way to the primary goals of basic health protection and 
improved access to medical services. The Czech Republic, on the other hand, is a success story 
of pluralism. The transformation of HCS governance has mobilised various stakeholders with 
decentralised powers and means of participation; the provision of hospital care is balanced 
between the state, regions and the private sector financed through public and private health 
insurers competing on a level playing field. 
As seen previously in this chapter, privatisation has taken place in numerous countries" hospital 
sectors, most prominently in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic whose private shares of all 
inpatient beds are, respectively, 11.4% and 14.2% ( W H O HFA-DB). Maarse (2006) notes that 
while decentralisation itself does not necessarily cross the public-private boundary, it may be a 
precursor for privatisation. This appears to be the case in CEE/CIS, where privatisation was 
often a result of hospital network rationalisations that took place in connection to 
decentralisation processes. In addition, permitting the operation of privately owned inpatient 
facilities, in most countries from the early 1990s, led to greenfield hospital investments, an 
alternative way of fostering private ownership. Tyszko et al. (2007) observe that privatisation, 
by any means, was primarily contmed to outpatient providers and remained much more limited 
in the inpatient sector. Privatisation of outpatient care providers typically precedes that of 
hospitals, because the latter requires a greater capital base for establishing investors' 
participation. Moreover, due to inherent complexities, the hospital sector transformation is a 
sensitive social issue and involves considerable legal risks. For the above as well as for country-
specific reasons, in none of the previously discussed cases has private property become the 
dominant constituent of hospital governance. 
Georgia is an outlier in this respect: it is the only country that proceeded with a radical market 
reform, including a large-scale privatisation of inpatient facilities and the intentional stripping 
the M O H of its regulatory instruments. These governance-related changes have to be put in the 
context of financing-side developments. From 1995 to 2004 a quasi-independent public SHI 
system was in operation. However, due to a macroeconomic downturn, organisational 
deficiencies and political interference, SHI failed to ensure the availability of the basic benefits 
package to the insured. Its problems in generating revenue were so severe that in 2003 
mandatory payroll SHI contributions amounted to 5% of TEH. Coupled with poor transparency, 
negligence of patient rights and information, as well as widespread corruption, the system 
underperformance led to its dismissal in 2004. Because no alternative prepayment option came 
to prominence, in 2007 72.4% of TEH was private, 97.9% out of which was out-of-pocket 
(Chanturidze et al. 2009). 
The transition model might suggest that privatisation can be expected to take place in most 
countries as a natural continuation of hospital governance transition. This is unlikely to be the 
case in the foreseeable future. Public ownership remains strongly supported across the region 
and will be maintained, perhaps with some further steps toward N e w Public Management . 
However, it has to be noted that corporatisation enables intennediate forms of ownership, 
including mixed state-territorial and public-private arrangements. It also allows for streamlined 
or gradual privatisation of individual public establishments, giving more flexibility in asset 
management and contrasting with sector-wide privatisation programmes that prove politically 
unpopular. The inclusion of Stage 5 in the model thus serves two purposes: it accommodates the 
sole case of large-scale privatisation, and signals the consideration of future transformation 
scenarios, major or minor in scale, that may unfold as an after-effect of corporatisation. 
3.10. Lessons learned about governance 
The overview of countries ' efforts in reforming their health care systems provides a good 
opportunity to review lessons learned in the process. Given that 22 countries are studied over 
two decades, this baggage of experience is sizeable. The overall picture of governance has been 
a mixed one, featuring ambitious changes and success stories as well as overlooked details that 
hindered the reform potential. In many instances, deficiencies in the basic structure of 
institutional design had great adverse consequences for the post-reform sector operation. These 
problems may be country-specific, or they may appear in a number of countries suggesting a 
more common nature. Either way, they offer a moral for the consideration of future reformers. 
3.10.1. Governance matters 
The governance landscape of CEE/CIS and the processes of its formation confirm that the 
distribution of powers and responsibilities among the sector stakeholders, as well as their 
integrity, are essential components of system performance. In the analysed countries, good 
governance facilitated the adjustment of hospital capacity and contributed toward financial 
sustainability and the achievement of health system goals. Poor governance, on the other hand 
has a track record of inducing confiicts, stalemates and various forms of moral hazard, in the 
extreme case leading to a disintegration of the HCS. 
3.10.2. A variety of approaches 
There were a variety of approaches to decentralisation. The roles of territorial authorities have 
been quite diverse and include engagement in provider-purchaser contracting (Czech Republic), 
planning of health services ' volumes (Poland, Hungary), issuing licences and monitoring 
facilities (Czech Republic, Slovakia), maintaining adequate provider networks of primary, 
ambulatory outpatient, and hospital inpatient care (most countries), the authority to contract out 
provision to private providers (Hungary, Slovakia), and facility investment decision-making 
(independent or in the form of central grants as in Hungary). Furthermore, seven countries chose 
to maintain the model of highly centralised powers. 
3.10.3. Aspects of reform quality 
Early reforms were generally poorly prepared, and instances of hasty decentralisation led to 
political resistance. This resistance created a number of problems: delayed progress on reforms, 
duplication of facilities, and unclear distribution of authority (no explicitly defined functions, 
overlapping responsibilities, and lack of legal and organisational f rameworks for the operation 
of the sector). The above deficiencies, coupled with the turbulently transforming economy, 
promoted the conditions of low transparency, irresponsible property management and 
corruption. The problems were identified in Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, and others. In Lithuania, 
resulting confiicts of interest between sub-national levels of government persist up to the 
present day. These countries experienced a wave of re-centralisation in the late 1990s, after the 
hurried decentralisation was found to be flawed. The recentralisation steps took different forms, 
e.g. imposing capacity norms in Hungary, and recalling responsibility back to the central 
government in Latvia. 
In Latvia, between 1993 and 1997, territorial governments were put in control of both health 
funds and providers. This established a conflict of interest and undermines the idea of provider-
insurer separation as a means for ensuring more efficient resource allocation. The authorities 
would endeavour to ensure that health spending was committed to goods and services sourced 
within their administrative boundaries, through limiting references to external providers, in 
order to strengthen and expand their own networks of providers. This created issues in quality, 
choice and accessibility, especially in the light of an uneven availability of diagnostic and 
treatment facilities across districts. This was a problem on its own, as in the early 1990s 
mechanisms for equalisation were largely missing, resulting in widened regional gaps in ternis 
of health care capacity relative to need. In the case of Ukraine, this led to deteriorating health 
outcomes in poorer areas of the country (Lekhan et al. 2004). 
These observations are in line with the findings of Shakarishvili and Davey (2005) who write 
"The relationship between legal status, ownership, management , control, and planning is basic 
to the sustainability of the reforms. Those countries that did not ensure the transfer of all rights 
and responsibilities to one level have left space for unaccountability, lack of incentives and 
long-term planning. At the same t ime the process of shift ing these rights entirely to regional and 
private levels has built potential for regional discrepancies" 
3.10.4. Synergy with f inancing reform 
The first wave of devolution took place in the early 90s. At that stage most systems were still 
funded from local and national taxes. Later reforms fundamental ly changed the health care 
financing model by introducing social health insurance and contract tendering. Under the new 
rules for financing, some regions were left without the capacity for fimding the funct ions they 
had previously been endowed with, such as investment and maintenance of health care facilities, 
and certain public health functions (e.g. Hungary, Lithuania). Furthermore, the purchasing 
function generally remained weak and provider-driven - instead of selective purchasing, health 
funds would act as passive payers. Thus, for the most part, the transition to competi t ive 
pressures in the provider market did not come to be. 
3.10.5. Managerial capacity 
Most countries found territorial bodies unprepared for per fonning devolved functions; 
inadequate know-how and managerial skills hindered early reform outcomes. This has been a 
universal problem in the sampled countries coming from a communist background characterised 
by the internalisation of functions within monumental state structures, virtual non-existence of 
spot or long-temi contract markets for inputs and outputs, a predominance of planning, 
guaranteed life-time employment, and a narrowly trained workforce. It seems that the learning 
process lasting two decades brought considerable improvements in sector operation, however, 
the problem persists to various extents. In Armenia, for instance, health care institutions enjoy a 
greater extent of autonomy and responsibility, but administrators have not yet gotten 
accustomed to the new, more complex institutional environment. Consequently, they manage 
the institutions in the "old" ways typical of hierarchical structures (Hakobyan et al. 2006, Jowett 
& Danielyan 2010), which undermines the efficiency potential of a decentralised system. 
Similar capacity problems are reported in other countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Poland, 
Russian Federation) at the level of local government. 
3.10.6. A change that is not meaningful 
Certain decentralisation efforts were depressed by existing or newly established top-down 
restrictions. This may have been both a result of an intentional design and a non-intentional 
outcome of poor law-making quality. Despite the fact that ownership conveys full rights of 
disposition, in certain cases limitations to these rights would be imposed by the M O H . For 
instance, under historical budgeting, there would be little leeway for changing the objectives 
and methods of facility operation. Other constraints include the lack of know-how and the lack 
o f approval for budget reconstruction or new approaches to financing. Such conditions 
temporarily existed in Arrnenia, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania. Moreover, in Hungary, unit 
autonomisation was subject to a number of restrictions, one of which disallowed the 
contracting-out specialist health services provision to for-profit providers (Gaal 2004). 
The problem of decentralisation not being meaningful is particularly exposed at Stage 2 of 
transition, where countries represented various widths and depths, often incomplete, of 
administrative functions' delegation. An important feature distinguishing this stage is that health 
providers and their networks remain a property of the central government, thus limiting the risk, 
reward and responsibility of the empowered agents. 
More generally, in CEE/CIS, with the debatable exception of Russia, there has been no 
decentralisation in the federalist sense. Health care sector stewardship and policy-making was 
left a prerogative of the central government represented by the MOH. Although regions may 
enjoy degrees o f independence in assessing needs and developing their provider networks, they 
have generally not been permitted to create their own diversified regulatory environments. 
3.10.7. A politically sensitive matter 
Decentralisation within the hospital sector rightly aimed at enhancing responsiveness to local 
needs and increased accountability. Further changes in legal status were aimed at providing 
facilities with greater autonomy and individual responsibility in the hope that this would lead to 
improved performance. On the other hand, the process was also motivated by the political 
reasoning of delegating the unpopular task of downsizing the overgrown sector inherited from 
the previous system. For this reason, like many other health care reforms, devolution of 
hospitals has been branded a game of "hot potato", the stake being the political responsibility 
for indebted and underperforming hospital establishments. Predictably, this led to political 
tensions between the centre and the regions. 
Hospitals, as large employers and service suppliers, are weighty political assets. Bigger 
hospitals translate into bigger budgets and staffing capacity, and therefore greater political 
power. Thus, in many post-communist countries, problems of political influence extend to the 
interventionism in the public sphere, interference in day-to-day or strategic decisions, the lack 
o f a level playing field for public and private providers, and various entrenched interest groups 
defending the status quo. For these reasons, closing down hospitals has repeatedly proven a 
difficult task. 
Furthermore, governance transformation is difficult legally and organisationally, demanding 
expertise and sophistication. As discussed previously, in CEE/CIS, design and implementation 
of governance reforms often failed due to a lack of professionalism. Recurring failures have 
resulted in growing scepticism regarding the chances of success and reluctance towards new 
reform efforts. The popular feelings have been reflected by the increasingly deadlocked political 
process. 
3.10.8. A measure for tinancial responsibility 
Devolution generally failed as a mechanism for imposing financial discipline over hospitals 
spending in excess of their revenue and stopping debt f rom reoccurring. This is because it did 
not involve hardening of the budget constraint. Devolved hospitals were cut off the state budget, 
but still able to tap into their founding bodies ' budgetary resources. In addition, in Hungary and 
Poland the central governments stepped in to bail out indebted hospitals owned by territorial 
governments, which set a precedent (Karski et al. 1999, Orosz & Burns 2000). Corporatisation, 
on the other hand, appears to serve the purpose of fmancial responsibility rather well. In the 
source materials regarding Stage 4 countries, hospital debt has not been reported as a major 
sector issue. This may have been due to the inherent properties of corporatised legal forms: 
accountability requirements, the risk of market exit, and eschewing the pooling of debts with the 
founding body. 
In principle, the legal owner is responsible for the upkeep and capital investments, financed 
primarily through its budget catered by general and local taxation (Bryndova et al. 2009). Still, 
in most countries this responsibility has been thinned down by central governments ' targeted 
facility investment grants. In the European Union member countries, the investment function 
has been supported by EU cohesion and structural funds (Gaal et al. 2011, Koppel et al. 2008). 
3.10.9. Flexibility of corporatised forms 
The implementation of corporatisation in the hospital sector displays some heterogeneity. For 
one, the extent of supervision over commercialised units varies considerably, from factual 
autonomy in Latvia to increasing but not yet full administrative independence in Armenia. 
Moreover, compared to public health enterprises, joint-stock companies are more fiexibie and 
easily transformed. This enables various mixed forms of ownership, both public (property rights 
exercised by the MOH and a territorial government, or by various territorial governments) and 
public-private partnerships. The former was employed in Bulgaria where, as of 2003, regional 
hospitals were transformed into shareholder companies, with 51% shares belonging to the state 
and 49% to territorial governments (Georgieva et al. 2007). The latter is a newcomer in the C E E 
hospital sector and so far has been negligible when compared to Western Europe. However, 
t ransforming sector governance can be expected to facilitate further instances of public-private 
partnership. Indeed, sincc 2007, projects o f (re)construction, maintenance and operation of 
hospitals have been under development in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia; health care 
projects are also in progress or under consideration in Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Romania (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008, C M S Legal Services EEIG 2010). 
In tact, corporatisation creates an opportunity for the governments to steer their health sectors 
through non-legislative means. This does introduce a greater flexibility in HCS stewardship, as 
parliamentary pro-market reforms in the region have a track record o f facing strong rejection 
that materialises in a lack o f majority support or a veto action (Hall 2009). This obstruction may 
be detrimental to the sector advancement. Fidler (2009) shows examples o f successful public-
private partnerships in non-health public services (e.g. utilities) on one hand, and non-core 
health care services (ancillary services, outpatient care, commoditised carc such as alternative 
medicine, wellness, cosmetic surgeries, elective and high-tech interventions) on the other. As 
Preker et al. (2000) show, greater regulatory expertise makes it possible to push the boundaries 
towards the private sector in areas that have traditionally been the domain o f public provision 
(the so-called "make or buy" decision). 
3.10.10. An evolving role o f the Ministry of Health 
The tlip side of growing executive empowerment o f decentralised agents is a changing role o f 
the Ministry o f Health. Historically in CEE/CIS, governments' inlluence over the health sector 
had been heavy-handed and used the bluntest available tool - direct in-house provision. This 
reflected not only ideological choices but also suggested the incapacity to handle intricacies o f 
health care markets (Preker & Harding 2001). Health care transition has provided an 
opportunity to depart from these practices and move toward less intrusive public intervention. In 
the course of transition, the M O H functions have been converging to what W H O promoted as 
stewardship ( W H O 2000), and more recently as leadership and governance ( W H O 2010). Travis 
et al. (2002) identify specific areas of steward activity: (1) generation of intelligence; (2) 
formulating strategic policy direction; (3) ensuring tools for implementation: powers, incentives 
and sanctions; (4) building coalitions and partnerships; (5) ensuring a fit between policy 
objectives and organizational structure and culture; and (6) ensuring accountability. 
It is beyond the scope o f this study to inspect in depth the evolution o f the M O H prerogatives, 
as they vary considerably between countries and transition stages. Generally speaking, at early 
transition stages, direct involvement in day-to-day operation may remain substantial. At more 
advanced stages, the tools for influence become softer (regulating and enforcing regulation, 
licensing, policy-making, supporting research and development, providing infomiation, setting 
norms, reimbursement levels, etc.), dispersed between specialised agencies, and include new 
tasks (e.g. risk equalisation between health plans, health technology assessment). It has to be 
noted, however, that the M O H imiversally retained control over tertiary care establishments for 
highly specialised care, such as national centres and university hospitals. The MOH also 
supervises numerous quasi-independent agencies and inspectorates. 
Importantly, the changing nature of the MOH and its decreasing involvement in facility 
administration does not automatically translate into diminishing state participation in the health 
sector. Through the central and territorial governments, as well as their agencies, the state 
continues to dominate the sector by means of purchasing and production of services as well as 
provision of subsidies. This is true for most of medical care in CEE/CIS, with the possible 
exceptions of general practice and outpatient care. 
3.10.11. Overall strength of governance 
The above considerations add up to the overall strength of health care sector governance. All the 
institutions involved, and their interactions, contribute to the quality of governance and thus to 
HCS outcomes. The case of Georgia 's collapsed health system exposes dramatic consequences 
of across-the-board deregulation, dissolving public governance structures and surrendering 
sector leadership. The utter confidence in private markets and a lack of basic precautionary 
measures against market failures underlie the minimal levels of protection offered to the 
population. At the other extreme, the Czech Republic illustrates the stability and performance 
benefits of consistent policy development involving many stakeholder groups in exercising 
authority over the sector. 
3.11. M a p p i n g of g o v e r n a n c e transi t ion 
Table 3.1 represents the summary of transition in a layout corresponding to previous studies on 
the region-wide shift towards SHI (Wagstaff & Moreno-Serra 2009) and dominant provider 
payment mechanisms (Moreno-Serra & Wagstaff 2010). Using one year "blocks" is in some 
cases an approximation, but the above papers have proven its illustrative merits. Furthermore, 
the mapping serves as a basis for the coding of policy dummy variables for the purpose of an 
econometric study in Chapter 5. 
The transition mapping shows the range of progress made by individual by countries and by the 
region at large, as well as the prevalence of various stages of governance transition. Comparing 
the years 1989 and 2011, much has changed in terms of how the hospital sector is governed in 
Eastern Europe. The table also depicts the gradualness of change, highlighting one of the key 
arguments of this study - the presence of intermediate forms between centralised state and 
privatised extremes. One resulting observation is that CEE/CIS is converging to the trend of 
growing complexity of arrangements in the HCS (Saltman 2003). The traditional public-private 
delineation is becoming less relevant and less capable of describing the actual diversity of 
ownership, legal forms and objectives of the sector participants. New public forms go beyond 
T a b l e 3 . 1 : M a p p i n g o f h o s p i t a l g o v e r n a n c e t r a n s i t i o n 
C o u n t i ' y 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1991 1992 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1996 1997 1998 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 
Albania n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n 
Armenia n n n n n n n 0 0 c c c c c c c c c c c c c c 
Azerbai jan n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n 
Bulgaria n n m 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c c c c c c c c c c c c c 
Belarus n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n 
C z e c h Republic n n n m m m m m m m m m m m c c c c c c c c c 
Estonia n n n n n 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 c c c c c c c c c c 
Georgia n n n n n n m m 0 0 c c c c c c c c c P P P P 
Hungary n 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 
Kazakhs tan n n n n n n m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m 
Kyrgyzstan n n n n n m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m 
Latvia n n n n o o 0 0 0 0 o c c c c c e c c c c c c 
Lithuania n n 0 0 0 0 0 0 c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c 
Moldova n n n n n n n n n n n n n n m m m m m m m m m 
Poland n n m m m m m m in m 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 o 0 
Romania n n n n n n n n n n n n n o 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russian Federation n n n n m m iti m m m tn m m m m m m ni m m m m m 
Slovakia n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tajikistan n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n 
Turkmenis tan n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n 
Ukraine n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n 
Uzbekistan n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n 
Legend: 
[n)on-reromi, facilities owned by the state and managed centrally 
facility |o]wnership devolved to sub-national level 
facility [m|anagement devolved to sub-national level 
[c|orporalised facilities p most hospitals [p]rivatised 
decentralisation and allow the existence of state enterprises, regional governments' 
organisations as well as publicly owned but non-state corporations. Private forms differ 
significantly between for-profit and not-for-profit, with further distinctions possible based on 
size and statutory objectives. Hybrid forms similar to the British Primary Health Trusts create a 
merger of private for-profit motives and public interests. Saltman reports cases of melting public 
and private boundaries also in hospital care, e.g. in Spain and Sweden. This chapter has shown 
that CEE/CIS is no stranger to these processes. 
3.12. An extended typology of post-communist health care systems 
in CEE/CIS, changes in hospital governance have been taking place alongside the introduction 
of social health insurance and a shift from budget-based to activity-based contractual financing. 
Considering the existing literature, this study proposes to extend the conventional financing-side 
characterisation of HCSs with their governance features, which would broaden our 
understanding of post-socialist health care transition and further systematise trends in the 
region. An updated typology that accounts for this chapter's findings and previously published 
analyses is presented in Table 3.2. 
Cross-referencing the transition mapping with per capita GDP makes it apparent that richer 
countries tend to operate more evolved systems, both in terms of governance arrangements and 
provider payment mechanisms. However, this does not offer a full explanation of the existing 
diversity. Firstly, all the sampled countries, irrespective of income, set out from the common 
Semashko background, which gave them equal innings. Secondly, the income level, i f used as a 
proxy for the propensity to reform, may to some extent predict a country belonging to the upper 
(Stages 1 and 2) or the lower (Stages 3 and 4) half of the table, but would not help determine the 
allocation within the halves. Thirdly, poorer countries such as Armenia and Georgia introduced 
some of the most forward reforms, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are set to proceed to more 
advanced stages. 
Further still, the timing and extent of governance transformation seem unrelated to population 
sizes and densities. This is in spite of the conceivable hypothesis that larger countries could 
benefit more from decentralising their structures. For example, Latvia and Lithuania were 
among the first reformers, and Estonia operates one of the most highly autonomised hospital 
sectors despite being the smallest country in the region. 
3.13. Conclusions 
Discussed in this chapter were changes in the hospital sector governance that have taken place 
after the fall of communism in the countries of interest. The changes encompassed a 
redistribution of authority and responsibility through delegation, de-concentration, devolution as 
Table 3.2: Extended typology of CEE/CIS hospital sector as of 2010 
Country C D P * 
Tajikistan 
Uzbekistan 
Turkmenistan 
Azerbaijan 
Ukraine 
Albania 
Belarus 
% 9 
1,632 
2,322 
2,490 
3.6% 
4.800 
5.810 
Social Health Insurance 
status as pr iman linancinu agent 
Dominant hospital 
payment mechanism 
Hospital 
g o y e m a n c e 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
no 
(est. 1995, primary care and drugs only) 
budget 
budget 
budget 
budget 
budget 
budget 
non-reform 
non-re tbrni 
non-reform 
non-reform 
non-reform 
non-reform 
non-reform 
Kyrgyzstan 1,507 yes 
(since 2009 independent from MOH) casemix 
de-concentrated 
administration 
Moldoya 1,657 yes 
(est. 2004) 
casemix 
de-concentrated 
administration 
Kazakhstan 5,406 no casemix 
de-concentrated 
administration 
Russian Federation 8,613 
no 
(est. 1993 but only 25% TEH) 
budget 
(casemix) 
de-concentrated 
administration 
Romania 6,838 
yes 
(since 1999) 
casemix 
devolved 
ownership 
Poland 11,753 
yes 
(est. 1999 as 17 sickness funds, 
since 2003 single fund) 
casemix 
devolved 
ownership 
Slovakia 12,726 
yes 
(est. 1995, multiple insurers) 
casemix 
devolved 
ownership 
Hungary 13,674 
yes 
(in various forms since 1988) 
casemix 
devolved 
ownership 
Armenia 2,295 no casemix corporatised 
Bulgaria 7,118 
yes 
(est. 1999) 
no 
casemix corporatised 
Latvia 8,529 (est. 1994 health fund is 
tax-financed MOH agency) 
casemix corporatised 
Lithuania 9,518 
yes 
(est. 1997) 
yes 
casemix corporatised 
Estonia 11,002 (sickness funds in 1992, 
from 1995 single fund) 
casemix corporatised 
Czech Republic 16,887 
yes 
(est. 1993. multiple insurers) 
casemix corporatised 
Georgia 2.502 
no 
(present 1995-2004, then abandoned) 
private, 
mainly out-of-p<x:ket 
privatised 
* GDP p.c. PPPS, 2000 
Countries sorted by stage of governance, and then by GDP. Est. is short for established. 
well as a transformation of ownership structures and legal forms. This has brought about an 
empowerment and growing autonomy o f sub-national governments, hospitals and their 
managing bodies. Looking more broadly, it led to the adoption of new regulations, reporting and 
controlling standards, information systems, diversification and pluralism in managerial 
practices, and strategic development rather than top-down planning, which in turn added up to a 
trend of increasing rule of law, transparency and accountability. Consequently, one o f the key 
messages is that the evolution of Eastern European HCSs has been a multi-level holistic 
process, contrary to popular simplifications that conceptualise it as a number of decentralisation 
instances. Fragments of this changing institutional landscape have been acknowledge by various 
researchers but, to the author's best knowledge, this is the first attempt to build a complete 
profile, supplemented with a high resolution mapping, of this facet o f CEE/CIS health care 
transition. 
The study proposed a conceptual model of step-wise transition that extends the binary public-
private delineation often applied in the context of emerging economies. Indeed, the shedding of 
a centralised, inefficient, under-incentivised system is not a one-off reform event. The model 
improves our understanding of the health systems by indicating the presence o f intermediate 
governance stages. These stages have their idiosyncratic economic implications in terms of 
information assets, risks and profits attributable to various actors. These economic aspects are 
explored in detail in the subsequent chapter, under the working hypothesis that they have the 
potential to affect the economic performance of the system. 
The evolution of hospital governance has been unfolding in parallel to other milestone reforms, 
most notably the introduction of social health insurance, new provider payment mechanisms, as 
well as privatisation in primary and outpatient sectors. Therefore, this present study can be seen 
as complementary to studies that overview those aspects of CEE/CIS health care system 
transition (e.g. Atun 2007, Rechel & McK.ee 2009, Wagstaff & Moreno-Serra 2009, Kutzin et 
al. 2010a, Leive 2010, Moreno-Serra & Wagstaff 2010, Borisova & Gerry 2010, Borisova 
2011). 
The study also subscribes to a growing body of literature that reflects an economist's 
recognition of governance and a broader institutional environment, both through theory and 
evidence (e.g. Tiemann et al. 2012, Smith et al. 2012, Bayindir 2012). Looking beyond Eastern 
Europe, the model of governance transition has the potential to extend our knowledge of 
organisational determinants of HCS performance, in industrialised, emerging and developing 
countries. Its applicability and generalisability is illustrated by the fact that the inductive model 
o f CEE/CIS transition closely resembles a conceptual decentralisation gradient of service 
delivery discussed in a theoretical manuscript by Vrangba^k (2007). 
This chapter ' s overview of reform experiences gives the countries less advanced in transition an 
opportunity to learn from tiieir peers ' mistakes. For the more advanced, it is an assessment of 
their progress and an invitation to think about options for the future. The question of if and how 
to t ransfomi pubMc hospital networks is high on the political agenda in the region, aiming at the 
policy goals of cost-efficiency, quality and responsiveness of care as well as pennanently 
solving the problem of debt accumulation. 
It is apparent that the region as a whole is moving forward. Countries at Stage 1 have introduced 
traces of decentralisation. At Stage 2 reforms are in motion that may soon give rise to more 
advanced forms of governance. In all Stage 3 countries there are corporatisation processes 
taking place, although currently facing considerable opposition. In some Stage 4 countries 
private hospitals accoimt for more than 30 per cent of all hospitals. The transition model cannot 
be claimed to have predictive properties, especially as it allows for a substantial organisational 
and legal variety within each stage, but it does provide a simple framework for explaining the 
above processes. This capacity stems from the shared point of entry and a reform trajectory 
emerging from the last two decades. Thus, while the countries are by no means bound to follow 
the proposed path, the subsequent stages represent a logical continuation. 
The uncertainty of future steps is particularly strong regarding sector-wide privatisation, so far 
represented by a single case. In CEE/CIS, the topic of private hospital ownership is highly 
controversial, and inpatient care provision is likely to remain predominantly based in the public 
domain. Hence, in the light of the increasing awareness of economic principles applying in 
health care, the need for greater fiscal and operational discipline, and the pervasiveness of 
corruption, corporatisation offers the merits of flexibility, transparency and accountability. 
On the f inancing side, fiscal planning has been increasingly confronted with demographic and 
social pressures. Private financing is likely to become more prominent, enabling voluntary 
private health insurance markets to take o f f bringing along with them the benefits of health plan 
market competit ion. So far, the development of VHI markets has been hindered by the supply-
side incapacity to provide care to privately insured patients. Provider autonomy is a step toward 
relaxing this constraint. On the supply side, organising health providers as limited liability 
companies owned by sub-national governments will allow them to gradually introduce private 
capital in exchange for equity. In principle, such progressive privatisation could aid many 
systems struggling with hospital debt and inadequate capacity, while avoiding public backlash 
and without forgoing public control. The successfulness of this scenario will critically depend 
on the soundness of regulation, including clear-cut sector boundaries that will prevent cost-
shifting, and strong sector governance that will preclude cherry-picking of profitable 
establishments or treatment categories by private investors. 
The above tensions and directions are consistent with the diverse picture of European health 
care. Regarding the public and private spheres' coexistence, Europe is becoming more private in 
terms of financing (Belgium), provision of hospital care (Germany), long-term and community 
care (UK) and ambulatory care (Poland), as well as in health care management, operations and 
investment (Germany, UK). In Europe, while universal access and the welfare status of health 
care are likely to remain in place, a redefinition of solidarity is putting a greater emphasis on 
individual responsibility. The inevitable limiting of the public benefit package will create space 
for non-statutory insurance and market-based provision. Concurrently, the processes of 
management and operation are being increasingly outsourced, and long-term public-private 
partnerships are likely to expand into prominence (Maarse 2006). Publicly-owned but 
commercialised forms of provider ownership respond to the needs of the evolving health sector, 
in Eastern Europe and beyond. 
Chapter 4: 
Economic implications oj transforming hospital governance 
4.1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 
The evolution of hospital governance presented in the previous chapter concerned the 
distribution of powers and responsibilities between the MOH (representing the central 
government) , territorial governments and hospital directors. The aim of this chapter is to present 
theoretical arguments behind this process and discuss its implications from the perspective of 
economic incentives. The theoretical arguments compose a framework for explaining how 
changes in hospital governance affect economic and medical performance of the hospital sector. 
The f ramework thus compiles several perspectives that in economic studies are typically 
considered independently. 
The need to unify various aspects of governance relates to the fact that the health care transition 
in CEE/CIS countries has been sector-wide and comprehensive. Consequently, in a discussion 
of economic incentives, various levels of decision-makers have to be recognised in order to 
ascertain the direct and indirect consequences for resource allocation and for their aggregate 
impacts on system outcomes. Direct implications concern a transfer of decision powers, through 
decentralisation and empowerment , which can shift weights attached to various priorities, e.g. 
quality and quantity of care. Creating room for providers to act according to their judgement and 
independently organise the process of health care production is a critical aspect of transition 
f rom a centralised and integrated system towards one based on pluralism. New techniques and 
priorities may emerge at the provider or network level, depending on the scope of 
empowerment . Indirect effects of change in governance refer to the fact that institutional design 
may determine sensitivity to high-powered financial incentives conveyed by provider payment 
mechanisms . 
In terms of the thesis composition, this chapter bridges the narrative account of governance in 
Chapter 3 and the statistical analysis of its impacts in Chapter 5, by providing a framework for 
economic reasoning. It contains a compilation and synthesis of economic theories relevant to 
explaining the meaning of CEE/CIS hospital governance transformation. 
Yet, the framework applicability is not limited to post-communist countries. Looking more 
broadly at the literature of health economics, this present work fits in the trend o f increasing 
attention paid to the problems of governance in health care. Exploration of this area is indicative 
of the expanding areas of interest for health economists which go beyond financial incentives 
that have so far dominated the discussion of the institutional design of the medical sector. This 
trend is induced by the realisation that financial incentives alone have failed to steer the sector 
towards socially desired goals, vide a discussion of GP fundholding by Hausman and Le Grand 
(1999), Hence the need to also take into account the structure o f internal incentives as well as 
physicians' motivation and to explain the circumstances under which financial incentives may 
fail to be effective. These aspects were hinted at in Arrow's (1963) seminal paper, which 
contains insights regarding agency, delegation, regulation, as well as the possibility o f trust 
under the presence of profit motive. In particular, this branch of economic research has targeted 
the issues of governance and accountability and drawn upon institutional approaches. For the 
above reason, the theoretical framework and findings may be of interest to anyone involved in 
health care system design. 
The discussion commences with an overview of incentives in the Semashko systems, which 
determined performance of the Semashko system and set the ground for reforms of the 1990s 
(section 4.2). After the change of political regime, democratic governments faced the challenge 
of re-defining public and private roles in the health sector, considering various justifications and 
extents of participation (section 4.3). This choice was often made in a difficult political 
environment and under strong resistance from interest groups. This partly explains why 
decisions in CEE/CIS were largely biased towards retaining the dominant position of the state, 
especially in the hospital sector. Consequently, rather than between the public and private 
sectors, key reforms took place within the public sphere, including decentralisation which re-
balanced the distribution of decision powers and responsibilities (section 4.4). Parallel in time 
was autonomisation of hospitals, one of the means for decentralisation of the HCS. The process 
encompassed breaking the national hierarchical structure of the hospital sector, empowering 
managers from passive administrators to executives as well as new legal and ownership and 
forms, which resulted in a growing independence of allocation decisions made in public health 
establishments (section 4.5). Empowering territorial governments with the prerogatives of 
owning bodies, as well as allowing hospital managers to shape their processes of health care 
delivery, created space for the distributed immediate decision-makers' to reveal their relative 
preferences for quantity, quality, responsiveness and prestige. While this does not explain 
reform etTects at the aggregate system level, it could help understand outcomes and outcome 
variation at the individual hospital level. Thus, for completeness of exposition, a short overview 
of behavioural models of hospitals is provided (section 4.6). The above arguments are then 
compiled into a framework of governance-related economic incentives (section 4.7), followed 
by a discussion of the implications for health care reform (section 4.8) and concluding remarks 
(section 4.9). The theoretical f ramework sets a fundament for the econometric study in 
Chapter 5. 
4.2. Economic features and performance of the Semashko model 
Some defming characteristics of the communist health sector were discussed in the context of 
the transition entry point in Chapter 2.1. This section, instead, focuses on economic features of 
the Semashko model that shed light on the structure of incentives and explain the mechanisms 
for allocating scarce resources. The central command system notoriously led to the persistence 
of shortages, non-price rationing and corruption with negative consequences for efficiency, 
equity, quality and responsiveness. 
Under the rule of socialism, the preference for public sector financing and provision was based 
on ideological grounds. In fact, all sectors of the economy were state-owned, and the sporadic 
existence of private entrepreneurship and market exchange was no more than an exception to 
this rule. Albania, Bulgaria and Romania disallowed private practice altogether. On the other 
hand, markets for primary care were to various extents tolerated in countries such as 
Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Hungary and Poland. In the all-embracing public domain, health 
care was seen as a non-productive and low priority sector of the economy, particularly when 
compared to the privileged military, construction and heavy industries. A direct consequence of 
this was its budget allocation was often below 4% of GDP ( W H O HFA-DB), which magnified 
the problem of shortages. The limited size of health care expenditures can be also explained 
with the presence of hidden subsidies across the economy, aimed at supporting the national 
"champion" industries. 
The state-owned health system was paradoxical: on one hand centralised and integrated, on the 
other f ragmented and suffering from information and coordination deficiencies. The system 
headed by the MOH was paralleled by medical establishments run independently by other 
ministries, leading to duplication of functions and fragmentation of the pooling structure. The 
HCS itself comprised multiple tiers that separated services at the levels of elite, urban, 
enterprise, town and rural, with varying quality and accessibility of care (Ho & Ali-Zade 2001). 
Advanced, state-of-the-art medicine was available only to the elite patients coming from the 
privileged political group, the nomenklatura, and their social networks (Balabanova & Coker 
2008). 
The existence o f multi-tiered systems was a form of rationing; queuing was anotiier one. Some 
market forms of allocation existed, however, the "markets" were dominated by sellers, had 
constant shortages due to prices inadequately imposed by the government or no prices at all, 
which disallowed reaching market equilibrium. In the health system, persistent shortages 
materialised as crowding in health facilities, long queues and waiting lists, postponed treatment 
and surgeries, as well as forced substitution of specialists and medicaments (Kornai & 
Eggleston 2001b). Outside the HCS, other rationing vehicles were often used at the individual 
level, e.g. ration stamps or tickets that were subject to exchange in yet another unofficial 
market. On top of these forms of rationing there existed a fully-fledged system of informal 
allocation based on an exchange of goods and favours. 
The commonplace capture of public property and its use for personal gain were facilitated by 
low transparency as well as inferior governance and accountability standards. Every medical 
establishment was a part of the public health company, which in turn was a fragment o f a single-
party, state-owned economy. Consequently, rather than regulation and meaningful legal system 
supervision, the system integrated rules for its operation within administrative norms and 
procedures. Wrongdoings were generally dealt with "in-house" rather than relying on the justice 
system, which put health professionals in the position of power and minimised patient 
empowerment. While in today's HCSs the primary concern around corruption is that it creates 
inequalities (Vian 2008), the extent of discretionary power abuse in the communist systems, 
making it a de facto norm of behaviour, had devastating implications for their overall economic 
efficiency. 
Allocation of resources in the Semashko system followed the same rules as the overall economy 
(Komai & Eggleston 2001b, Ho & Ali-Zade 2001, Davis 2010). Provision of medical care was 
based on service quantities, according to detailed plans prepared by planning units placed lower 
in the hierarchy, and consolidated through districts and regions up to the ministerial level. 
Moreover, the plans determined inputs in quantity terms, including labour, capital, medical 
supplies and services. Other than input volumes, the plans specified utilisation norms, for 
instance bed occupancy rates. Imported medical goods were subject to sudden unavailability, 
depending on the macroeconomic situation, strength of currency and foreign debt. Wholesale 
and labour markets did not exist, so prices were outside the scope of the plans. Consequently, 
there was no purchasing sensu stricto; rather, there was a process of ordering, based on needs, 
plans and input constraints. Financial planning described rather than determined the plan 
execution. Thus, the allocation could be expressed in terms of budgets and special grants, 
however, actual allocations were often in-kind resources as financial flows did not take place. 
As for the plans, line-item budgets were rigid, centrally disposed and set in line of historical 
records. 
The vertical integration, imposition of pre-dctennined plans and nonns, as well as the passive 
role of finance and accounting meant that health departments did not face any quality or 
efficiency criteria; moreover, the system neither motivated nor permitted improved resource 
allocation. Growth in such a system could only be achieved in the extensive sense, which 
implied ever increasing volumes of inputs aimed at achieving higher outputs (Popovitch et al. 
2011), though not necessarily better outcomes, as opposed to an intensive growth aimed at 
enhancing technical efficiency of health care production. Moreover, health care was biased 
towards inpatient provision, which was an encouraged and liberally utilised fonn of health care. 
Other than hospitals the system relied on polyclinics (which typically served as patients" first 
point of contact with the HCS). dispensaries and public health centres. Health professionals 
were engaged as staff by the state health company and paid by salary. Good quality was not 
rew arded and poor quality was not penalised. Directors of health establishments similarly faced 
no tangible rewards or penalties for economic performance. Strict line-item budget allocation 
with no possibility of funds reallocation and no availability of spot market purchase limited 
venues for process improvement, and left them with the role of passive administrators. 
Distinctions and honours for exceeding the norm, as well as the pride of controlling greater 
inputs, were the only instruments of motivation. 
The system relied extensively on bureaucratic coordination complemented, to a small extent, 
with market mechanisms, as in the case of labour allocation and in the areas where formal and 
informal private sector existed (Komai 1992). The for and against arguments of the communist 
system were not unlike the discussion of the British National Health Service, where some voices 
attributed problems in resource allocation to infonnation limitations, while others claimed 
inefficiencies were inherent to public provision and could not be averted (Spicer 1982). The 
Semashko system featured all defining bureaucratic characteristics: the presence of a sponsor 
and the consumer not confronted with the full price of provision, the organisation divorced from 
its output market, cost savings not readily appropriated to responsible employees, costs and 
rewards to the bureaucrats unrelated or indirectly related to efficiency efforts, and the 
monopolistic position with weak or inexistent competition. These characteristics had adverse 
consequences for efficiency and access, detailed in a rich branch of economic literature (e.g. 
Niskanen 1968, Moe 1984, Morone 1993, Camis 2009, Camis 2010). 
The model of communist economy had a number of negative implications for economic 
efficiency. Budget allocations between sectors of economy were arbitrary, ideology-driven, and 
disregarded the marginal analysis of benefits that could be achieved by reallocating resources. A 
lack o f price signals disallowed marked coordination of supply and demand. Instead, the 
command economy used quantity signals (shortage, non-price rationing) and bureaucratic 
coordination based on centralised decision making. The latter suffered from severe government 
failures, including information-related issues, inefficiencies of monopoly, self-interest o f 
bureaucrats, state capture, no threat of bankruptcy or takeover, etc. Bureaucrats' efforts were 
directed at maximising budgets, as budget size was a symbol of power and prestige and, once 
seized, it would perpetuate, thanks to historical budgeting. Passive budgets implied that no 
payment component would be activity-based; in addition, hospitals could not claim any residual, 
which altogether left any innovation and cost-saving efforts unrewarded (Jakab et al. 2003). 
These adverse incentives affected economic efficiency as much as other objectives, such as 
cost-containment, responsiveness and health outcomes. In fact, it would be fair to say that while 
the above are universal goals of modern HCSs, they were not per se the goals o f health care 
under communism. Instead, the explicit goals were those of universal access and free-of-charge 
provision (Popovitch et al. 2011). 
On the demand side of medical care, poor cost control was a result o f weak or no gatekeeping 
and an ineffectual system of referrals (Ho & Ali-Zade 2001). The latter not only generated 
oversupply of referrals (leading to further referrals, rather than treatment), but also enabled 
patients to bypass polyclinics and self-refer to hospitals (Ensor 1993). Moreover, provision was 
generally free of charge at point of service, with the exception of formal fees introduced 
sporadically by health facilities for non-essential services. More importantly, patients faced 
under-the-table payments imposed by doctors who owed the position of power to permanent 
shortages. Medical staff at public facilities operated a second, unofficial circulation of medical 
goods and services that relied on personal connections and informal payments. 
The wasteful practices of the socialist system caused it to lag behind the capitalist model in 
terms of technical and allocative efficiency. While precise comparative figures are difficult to 
obtain for the HCS, because of its inherent complexities ( W H O 2001) as well as the scarcity of 
data prior to 1989, it is informative to see GDP-based efficiency estimates representative of the 
overall economy. Bergson (1987, 1992) provides estimates of comparative productivity and 
efficiency for the USSR, three satellite countries (Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia) and seven 
then-OECD member states. He finds, at the 1% level of significance, that the shortfall of 
socialist output per worker ranged from 25 to 34 per cent, depending on model specification. 
In a more conceptual discussion, Kornai (1980) explains some preconditions for efficiency and 
juxtaposes them with the principles of socialist ethics. Among the efficiency prerequisites, he 
finds (a) material and moral incentive, (b) calculation of cost and benefit as well as termination 
o f non-efficient production activities, (c) fast and flexible adjustment of production to external 
conditions, (d) entrepreneurship, initiative, innovation and risk-taking, and (e) personal 
responsibility of decision-makers. In contrast, the socialist ethics assumed (1) wage-setting 
accordingly to the rule "equal pay for equal work", (2) the principle of solidarity through the 
elimination of "cruel" capitalist competition, (3) the principle of security, which includes 
protection of those in need, full employment as well as any other social achievement guaranteed 
for all, and (4) priority ot"general interest over individual interest. By reconciling the two sets of 
principles, Kornai reveals deep-down constraints in the ability of the socialist system to operate 
efficiently, and concludes that the founding ideas of communism are inherently inconsistent 
with efficiency prerequisites. 
Finally, the communist HCS exemplifies an antithesis of a fully entrepreneurial (competitive) 
hospital sector as discussed by Busse et al. (2002). It brought into existence an anti-
entrepreneurial model representing, in its extreme fomi, in an end of the market—central 
spectrum, where the government decides about the placing and size of hospitals, the range of 
services offered and modes of production, leaving the providers no discretionary power. 
4.3. Implications of the departure from the Semashko model 
4.3.1. An institutional milestone 
As already discussed in Chapter 2.2.2. the fall of Communism was a milestone occurrence that 
gave rise to transfoniiative reforms in the HCS as well as in the economy at large. The 
magnitude of this event has been thoroughly explained within the institutional framework (e.g. 
Crawford & Lijphart 1995. Smyth 1998, Hoskisson et al. 2000). In fact, the fall of Communism 
is a prominent example and a proof-of-concept realisation of a rapid redefinition of level one 
through three institutions of New Institutional Economics (Williamson 2000). This is because it 
brought about a complete redesign of the legal system (including political processes, property 
rights, etc.) and of organisational structures (e.g. markets, contracts and private enterprises in 
place of hierarchical state companies). 
The reality check of the early 1990s was painful for the post-Semashko HCSs. The populations 
of the former Eastern Bloc had to face the fact that the promise of unrestricted and free-of-
charge health care was unrealistic, and generous statutory benefits had to be scaled down to 
meet the existing production constraints. Due to political reasons and strong backlash against 
attempts to limit the public health care entitlement, the governments were reluctant to openly 
restrict the basic benefits basket or introduce co-payments. Hence, the adjustment was for the 
most part carried out indirectly and implicitly, via excessively long waiting times and the 
resulting growth in out-of-pocket expenditures on medical services purchased in the private 
market. 
However, the fall of Communism also opened up vast opportunities for improvement. Most 
notably it brought about a shift from a command economy based on non-price signals towards a 
market economy, where the profit motive is the primary force driving resource allocation 
towards efficiency. It thus created space for pluralism and innovation. With respect to the latter. 
K-omai (2010) argues that the capacity of the capitahst system to innovate and change everyday 
life of consumers is under-appreciated in the layman's l<nowledge as well as insufficiently 
accounted for in economic textbooks. He supports this argument by contrasting the capitalist 
potential for holistic innovation with the communist system only being able to innovate in the 
military sphere. Kornai thus draws a causal link between capitalism, technological progress and 
improving peoples' lives. However, in contrast to the economy at large, the impact of 
innovation in the HCS has been downplayed by a limited room for competitive market financing 
and provision, both functions overshadowed by the continuing presence of the state. 
4.3.2. Redefining roles for the government and the private sector 
A need for new sector principles 
At its core, the health sector is shaped by implicit or explicit principles, dictated by various 
moral, ideological or conceptual considerations. These considerations may be regarding 
personal freedoms and sovereignty, acceptable extents of state paternalism and its desired 
forms, altruistic attitudes and social solidarity, understanding of market failures and the 
resulting need for regulation or direct government participation. Such principles provide a 
foundation for designing the essential components of the HCS: the choice between direct 
government participation and delegation to markets, the degree o f cost-sharing, ensuring 
competition, tackling the problem of selection, and providing a solidarity mechanism for 
achieving the socially desired level of health equality (Cutler 2002). Transitioning away from 
the centrally managed Soviet model towards markets, pluralism and growing private sector 
participation demanded revisiting the fundamental questions of rules and priorities for the sector 
operation. In their book "Choice and solidarity; the health sector in Eastern Europe and 
proposals for reform", Komai and Eggleston (2001b) advocate an open discussion of such moral 
and conceptual foundations, and propose the ethical postulates of (1) sovereignty of the 
individual (choice), (2) solidarity, (3) competition; desired attributes and coordination 
mechanisms in the form of (4) incentives, (5) a new government role, (6) transparency, (7) time 
requirement; and desired proportions of allocation according to (8) harmonious growth, (9) 
sustainable financing. Komai and Eggleston then judge HCS building blocks against these 
overarching suppositions. In practice, post-communist countries ended up with different sets of 
principles, corresponding to clusters of political systems discussed in Chapter 2.3.2, and 
manifested by various configurations of the health sector. It is beyond the scope of this study to 
detail these new rules and priorities, however, the levels of state participation remained 
universally high. 
Rationale and forms of government participation 
From an economic standpoint, iiealth and liealth care are particular intangible commodities. 
Following Arrow (1963), this branch of economics has considered the nature of the health 
industry and reasons why health cannot be left to laissez-faire markets. Among the chief 
characteristics are the presence of supply and demand uncertainty, problems of product and 
process information leading to the prominence of the agency arrangement and restrictions on 
competition, the dominant role of insurance in health care financing with its consequences, and 
ethical aspects of the value of life and health. 
A number of issues relating to their nature contribute to the difficulty in deciding about health 
care production and allocation (Culyer 1971). Firstly, consumer rationality can be argued to be 
limited as a result of infomiation asymmetries, short-sightedness or outright exclusion from 
decision-making as is often the case with emergency care. Secondly, there are multiple facets of 
uncertainty that relate to the measurement of health benefits vis-a-vis costs, quality of solicited 
care, and the availability of insurance and its value. Insurance cover leads to problems of its 
own. namely moral hazard in utilisation of the subsidised services. Thirdly, a layer of 
complexity is added by the presence of positive and negative, tangible and intangible 
externalities. While economists are primarily concerned with tangible external effects, it is the 
latter positive psychic externalities (altruistic feelings towards other individuals) that underlie 
social solidarity mechanisms. 
The question is, therefore, whether health and health care should be considered a part of the 
conventional welfare analysis. On one hand, Wagstaff (1991) demonstrates that a social welfare 
function can allow for maximising health gains while ensuring a fair distribution thereof This 
approach integrates efficiency and equity in overall welfare, as opposed to the usual goal of 
economic efficiency. The trade-off between the two goals of social policy is left to decision-
makers, and thus to the population. On the other hand, a number of arguments have been 
presented for health and health care to be "meritorious" goods and services, relating to the moral 
imperative o f protecting life and health, which requires special priority and escapes the general 
welfare analysis. This may lead to using outcome measures other than individual utility, sources 
of valuation other than the affected individual, weighing of outcomes based on ethical 
considerations, and allowing for interpersonal comparability of outcomes. These extensions 
characterise the extra-welfarist framework to which health care is sometimes subscribed 
(Brouweretal . 2008). 
The above characteristics contribute to the difficulty in determining optimality of allocation and 
its improvement using the Pareto criterion. Considering also various combinations of market 
failures, voter preferences as well as provisions of the General Theorem of the Second Best 
(Lipsey & Lancaster 1956), optimality ranks of various market and non-market allocation 
mechanisms cannot be determined a priori by theoretical considerations. The applicability of 
empirical studies is limited, on the other hand, because of their inherent lack of universality. 
Deficiencies of theory and evidence altogether make health care reforms a hit or miss effort. 
While health care does not have the non-exclusivity and non-rivalry features of a public good, it 
may be true that markets alone cannot provide it in efficient quantities. Evidence of market 
failure, as well as tangible contributions of the health sector to the overall economy and 
economic growth (Suhrcke et al. 2012), are often invoked as justifications for government 
intervention. However, despite the prominence of market failure in the economic debate of 
HCSs, it is a relatively minor problem in CEE/CIS, where there are few competitive market 
arrangements and no instances of unregulated market. In particular, other than the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, there are no competing insurer systems that would face the problems of 
cherry-picking and adverse selection. There are admittedly issues on the side of provision 
(information asymmetries) as well as moral hazard on the user side, but these issues are 
restrained by supervision, regulation, and non-pecuniary costs of care to the patient. Instead, 
given the extent of public participation in the HCS, there are many problems that commonly can 
be referred to as government failure. 
G o v e r n m e n t fa i lure 
Government action is not without problems of its own. Wolf (1979), Le Grand (1991) and 
others put forward a concept of government failure, paralleling the reasoning of free market 
deficiencies. The theory explains reasons why and how the government may fail at performing 
its responsibilities in the areas of provision, subsidy or regulation. Major identified issues 
include monopolistic position and a lack of competitive pressures, no price signals present in the 
system, self-interest and other issues of bureaucracy, political competition for government 
spending, regulatory capture, stified innovation and competition within regulated sectors, and 
perverse consequences of redistribution for individual effort. Preker and Harding (2001) further 
specify that government failure arises in publicly financed or provided health care because of (a) 
limitations of public accountability, including imperfections of the democratic process, (b) 
public sector information asymmetries that increase transaction costs and create opportunity for 
corruption, (c) public monopoly power, manifested in formal and informal forms of abuse, as 
well as lowering the quantity and quality of output to create a budget residual that can be 
distributed within the organisation, and (d) failure in policy formulation by inadequate 
regulatory competency, information and understanding of market failures relating to public 
goods, externalities and market information asymmetries. 
Given the extensive lists of issues in both market and government-led systems, one way of 
looking at health care sector organisation is finding a balance between market failures and 
government failures that would minimise the overall level of underperformance. This leads to 
delineating public and private domains in health care and facing the "make or buy" decision. 
The " m a k c - o r - b u y " d i lemma 
Deciding upon the state market participation can be based on two characteristics of goods and 
services in question: contestability and measurability (Preker & Harding 2001, Preker et al. 
2000). The former refers to constraints in market entry and exit. Highly contestable markets 
encompass competition both within and for the market, which in turn are detemiined by the 
level of asset specificity, sunk costs, technological advantage and geographic features. The latter 
characteristic relates to the precision with which inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes can be 
measured. The presence of information asymmetry may significantly lower measurability. 
Preker et al. argue for the government strategy of information disclosure when levels of both 
dimensions are high. A desired response to the other set of extreme conditions (low 
contestability, low measurability) is public financing and/or production. Middle or mixed levels 
of both parameters are areas subject to regulation and contracting. The authors argue that both 
contestability and measurability can be enhanced through policy strategies, enabling the 
government to expand the areas of "light" intervention while reducing the scope for intrusive 
direct participation. The process diminishes the public sphere, enlarges the room for efficient 
market production, and creates welfare benefits. Further benefits can be attained by using the 
freed-up public resources to improve the quality and precision of the remaining government 
actions. 
"Make or buy" was not much of a dilemma in the Eastern bloc prior to 1989, given that capital 
as a factor of production was state-owned across the entire economy. Unifonnly with the other 
sectors of the economy, health care was based wholly in the public domain. However, the 
question of preferred government interventions became a valid one after the change of the 
political and economic doctrine. To some extent, health care reforms shifted CEE/CIS health 
sectors towards industrialised market economies, which employ mixes of public and private 
arrangements. Nevertheless, a posteriori it is clear that the "make or buy" choices in Eastern 
Europe left the governments strongly rooted in the sector, which is partly a reflection of the 
citizens' expectations. Their involvement takes the forms of direct participation in financing and 
provision as well as supervision and regulation of markets that have emerged. More 
sophisticated market structures such as private health insurance, regulated competition and 
managed care have generally not risen to prominence. Yet, as documented in Chapter 3, the 
legal and organisational forms of central and territorial governments' presence have been 
evolving, reflecting the growing infiuence of the New Public Sector Management paradigm and 
the concepts of the "third way". In Eastern Europe, variations of the mixed economy emerge in 
result of introducing individual freedom, markets and private property, while retaining extensive 
redistribution, regulation and direct state provision (Kornai 2000c). New legal forms and 
incentive mechanisms make CEE/CIS consistent with a wider convergence of health care 
systems that come from the state-owned and market-based backgrounds (Saltman 1997). On one 
hand, the NHS-type systems introduce market or quasi-market environments (e.g. internal 
markets, fund-holding) in order to incentivise their structure towards greater efficiency. Market-
based systems, on the other hand, rely increasingly on regulation and supervision as well as on 
solidarity mechanisms designed for the purpose of providing a social safety net. The hybrid 
models emerging from this convergence employ both competitive market mechanisms and 
strong presence of the government. 
4.3.3. Inevitability of decentralisation 
The practical outcome of the above considerations has been that the private sector was only 
granted a minor role in the CEE/CIS health sector. Because markets did not come to 
prominence, the sector evolution gained limited exposure to economic theory. Less appealingly 
for economists, in the predominantly public hospital sector, change has occurred as either shifts 
o f power and or transformations of public forms of ownership. 
Figure 4.1: Centralisation and decentralisation - a simple economic model 
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The point of equilibrium E* corresponds to the desired extent of decentralisation. 
Given the starting point of an integrated, centralised, and hierarchical model of "public health 
care company", the system evolution necessarily involved an extent of decentralisation. This is 
because, on a centralisation-decentralisation scale, the Semashko model represents an extreme 
case o f near perfect centralisation. For such a system, the only way to transform and improve is 
to take steps toward the other end of the spectrum. A departure from nearly complete 
centralisation also implies that substantial efficiencies of decentralisation were to be reaped at 
the expense o f considerably smaller forgone benefits of centralisation, assuming that both 
centralisation and decentralisation are subject to decreasing marginal net benefits. For the sake 
ol' the arguineni (actual decenlralisation processes Feature higher complexity and encompass 
mult ip le dimensions o f governance), a siiTiple model o f centralisation-decentralisation benefits 
is presented in Figure 4.1. Al though the desired extent o f decentralisation (i.e. the point at which 
marginal benefits o f decentralisation and centralisation equalise) remains debatable, the 
proposition o f involving decentralised health system stakeholders as part o f post-communist 
transition is well-supported by economic theory. 
Thus, decentralisation provides a natural way o f thinking about systems that were previously 
fully centralised. De-integration o f Imancing, provision and regulation, the introduction o f SHI , 
changes o f legal status and ownership, as well as other changes to the health sector model, can 
be interpreted along the lines o f de-concentration, delegation and devolution o f functions that 
were formerly performed by the M O H on behalf o f the state. Departing from the centralised 
model impl ied pluralism in organisational and ownership arrangements as well as a lack o f 
direct control. In the political rhetoric o f health care reform, this has repeatedly been associated 
with liberalisation and denominated as deregulation. As Busse et al. (2002) aptly point out, the 
reality has been to the contrary o f the above claims - regulation has increased in scope and 
specificity. 
The initial situation o f post-communist countries was different from the Western European 
context, where systems have evolved from decentralisation and recentralisation along various 
dimensions o f governance, creating a less clear-cut and more complex set o f relations between 
the central government and other sector participants. There, applying the above reasoning 
(Figure 4.1) wou ld require disentangling the forms and extents o f stakeholders" involvement. 
Notwithstanding the added complexities, decentralisation has been a central concept in many 
health reforms o f industrialised countries, such as the UK , Sweden and Italy, which sought for 
remedies to various kinds o f pressures (Magnussen et al. 2007). After two decades o f transition, 
however, decentralisation di lemmas in many regards have converged to those in Western 
Europe. Regional idiosyncrasies that remain include a lack o f experience and expertise in 
designing health care systems, resource constraints including capital, facilities and workforce, 
high publ ic expectations o f central government involvement, corruption in the public sphere, 
and reluctance toward introducing "mean ing fur ' decentralisation (Saltman & Vrangba;k 2007). 
4.4. Decentralisation and fiscal federalism 
Designat ing selected aspects o f health care purchasing or production to the publ ic sector 
inescapably leads to the question o f what structures should be charged with the responsibility. 
The relevance o f the question stems from the fact that some public authorities may be better 
posit ioned than others to carry out the tasks. Because objectives, capacities and information 
assets differ between levels o f government and across agencies, sub-national governments. 
quasi-government establishments, or provider organisations themselves may be better 
positioned and incentivised to perform some of the public sector functions. 
The literature typically recognises three forms of decentralisation (Vrangbsek 2007). Delegation 
transfers responsibilities within the organisational structure; de-concentration involves a transfer 
of tasks to another level of administration; fmally, devolution relates to shifting responsibilities 
from central to territorial levels of government, which are subject to independent political 
processes. Additionally, a fourth mode Is added to this classification: privatisation, which 
concerns a transfer of competencies between the public and private sectors. The latter is 
qualitatively distinct in that the first three forms are contained within the public sphere, while 
privatisation, by definition, goes beyond that. 
While the transformation of the hospital sector in CEE/CIS has involved all four means for 
decentralisation, the nature of processes described in Chapter 3 shows the significance of 
changes taking place within the public system, and the relatively negligible reliance on 
privatisation. A number of difficulties surrounding decentralisation have obscured the change 
that has taken place in the hospital environment. The main difficulties concern distinguishing a 
meaningful from a nominal change, describing its actual scope, distinguishing between the 
forms of decentralisation as well as predicting and measuring its consequences. Still, there are 
reasons to think that decentralisation, and devolution in particular, may considerably alter the 
ways decisions are made within the health sector. This is not least because of the public health 
sector materiality: even allowing for small effects on resource allocation, the sheer extent o f 
state intervention would magnify its overall impacts into prominence. 
The decentralisation context has strong implications for HCS governance. Smith et al. (2012) 
review HCS leadership in six high income European countries and Australia, looking at three 
defining aspects of governance: priority setting, performance monitoring and accountability. In 
all three dimensions they report a substantial variation in the governance arrangements, despite 
a shared understanding of broad health system goals and some commonly accepted 
mechanisms, such as case-mix payments conveying economic incentives, performance 
monitoring driven by information technology, and cost-effectiveness analysis being a widely 
regarded operational criterion for priority setting (although rarely given the highest priority). 
The overview of governing bodies shows how differently governance competencies can be 
distributed between central health departments, councils and committees, quasi-independent 
agencies, regional, county and local health authorities, as well as medical associations. The 
greatest decentralisation-related diversity appears in the function of accountability, and is 
somewhat lower in the area of priority setfing that for the most part is a central prerogative. In a 
similar manner, decentralisation in CEE/CIS has been affecting HCS governance, and likewise 
priority setting remained largely with the central authorities, while performance monitoring and 
accountability has in many countries been de-concentrated or devolved. 
4.4.1. A r g u m e n t s in f a v o u r of decen t ra l i sa t ion 
Other than moral presumptions granting communities the right to govern their interests, there 
are a number of technical arguments in support of the local decision-maker being better suited 
towards economic efficiency. These arguments revolve around "the benefit rule", which sees the 
proximity to point of service of resource allocation as advantageous for technical and allocative 
eff iciency. More specillcally, there are four groups of reasons in support of economic systems' 
decentralisation (Levaggi & Smith 2005). 
For one, territorial governments arc better suited for provision of local public goods because 
they are in the position of informational advantage. This primarily refers to the knowledge of 
costs corresponding to possible actions, including the awareness of prohibitive costs that would 
render certain projects unfeasible. They can be expected to have a better understanding of local 
assets, and are in place to use both formal and informal networks for communication, 
inlluencing and coordination of these assets. Moreover, local authorities are arguably better 
informed about local preferences and needs, which stems not only from a closer organisational 
distance from the affairs, but also from the fact that they are typically elected by the community 
and thus act in accord with their supporters" preferences. This relates to the second area of 
argumentation - political representation. In a situation where national and local preferences do 
not align, decentralised governance allows the elicitation of the two sets of expectations 
separately. The local democratic process also allows citizens to hold public officials accountable 
for particular decisions affecting the community, potentially increasing their responsiveness. 
Thirdly, decentralised decision-making is supposed to provide better internal incentives, 
because public officials decide upon affairs that may affect them personally. Further, they may 
be more aware and sensitive to local issues of equity. Additionally, in decentrahsed systems 
costs and benefits of public good provision tend to be more closely tied, that is, a higher portion 
of costs accrues to the beneficiaries. This should result in greater cost awareness, leading to 
greater economic efficiency of provision. Fourthly, decentralisation creates space for innovation 
through experimentation and spillover of best practices. This typically happens under yardstick 
competit ion, which involves benchmarking over centrally set indicators. 
Thus, apart from improving technical and allocative efficiency, decentralisation may serve a 
number of other purposes (Bankauskaite & Saltman 2007). These may include empowering 
local governments (active local participation, heightened skills), increasing the innovation of 
service delivery (experimentation, adaptation to local conditions), increasing accountability 
(public participation, t ransforming the role central government), increasing quality of health 
services (integration of services, improved information systems, better access for vulnerable 
groups), and increasing equity (recognising local needs, enabling local organizations, 
redirecting resources towards marginalized regions and groups through cross-subsidies). 
4.4.2. Arguments in favour of centralisation 
Yet, a number of reasons can be devised against decentralisation, or in support of 
(re)centralisation within economic systems. Some of the reasons are "the other side of the coin" 
of the abovementioned arguments supporting decentralisation. The informational advantage of 
lower-level governments may lead to moral hazard in the principal-agent relationships between 
layers of government, leading to strategic behaviour in obtaining central government grants 
which are intended to compensate for external effects or provide resource equalisation between 
areas. The motivation coming from a personal stake in local provision, if taken to the extreme, 
may turn into protecting personal interests and seeking prestige rather than public benefit. 
Another argument arises out of adverse effects that may arise as a result of local governments' 
competition. For example, tax competition may lead to underprovision of public goods. 
Moreover, tax exporting (to non-residents and businesses) can distort the equilibrium quantity 
of a public good, by lowering the marginal cost of provision falling on the residents. 
Decentralisation may also give rise to financial pressures that result in risk selection, e.g. 
discouraging "costly" individuals from immigration. A number of indirect cream-skimming 
methods have also been identified at the local level: setting low priority for certain medical 
specialisations, creating access barriers, reporting poor outcomes and underreporting 
achievements. Furthermore, it can be argued that reaping the benefits of yardstick competition 
and innovation does not require devolution of powers. Instead, it can be achieved through 
delegation/de-concentration within national structures. This approach has been employed in the 
British National Health Service, for instance. 
Other economic counterarguments to decentralisation include forgone economies of scale, 
transaction costs of decentralised systems' operation and coordination, as well as the presence 
of externalities that need to be internalised at higher levels of government to ensure that the 
optimal quantity and quality of public goods are provided. Moreover, because of the regional 
variation in resources and capacity, national equity goals may be compromised in decentralised 
systems unless an equalisation mechanism is in place that does not blunt incentives for 
innovation. This problem is more likely to appear when local areas are small, mandatory 
provision is extensive, or the budgetary mechanism is faulty. Moreover, it is debatable how 
much diversity is desired in insurance coverage and provision of health care, as diversity tends 
to benefit mobile patients. Finally, coordination at the national level may be necessary to 
neutralise the adverse effects of macroeconomic shocks, the cyclical nature of economic 
activity, and local government debt accumulation. 
4.4.3. T h e need for a balance 
As illustrated by both the above discussion and the previously presented s imple model of 
d imin ish ing marginal net benet l ts (F igure 4.1), a successful public health sector strategy should 
aim at s t r iking a ba lance be tween the central government and sub-national governments ' 
par t ic ipat ion. T h e need for ba lanc ing out var ious inf luences over the system may explain waves 
of decentral isat ion and re-central isat ion observable in some industrial ised countries (Magnussen 
et al. 2007) . Similarly, despi te an overall outward tendency in C E E HCSs, by the early 2000s 
some recentral isat ion ad jus tments took place in most countr ies ( instances of Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia) . Reasons for this, laid out in Chapter 3.9 (misal ignment of 
authori ty and responsibi l i ty , inadequate managerial capaci ty , widening regional inequalit ies) 
necess i ta ted a greater coordinat ive presence of the central government . 
In pr inciple , the role for the central government relates to four areas that have the potential to 
inf luence the e f f ic iency ou t come (Jha 1998). Firstly, there are issues of internal common 
marke ts relat ing to l imitat ions to the flow of goods, services, or labour. Certain naturally 
exis t ing (e.g. language) or imposed (e.g. trade barriers) may inhibit allocative eff ic iency of the 
system. Secondly , many publ ic goods and externali t ies are of local nature and are best provided 
by an authori ty at the appropr ia te level. The nature of health care as a local public good is 
implied by varying intensity of altruistic preferences leading to uneven desired levels of cross-
subsidy. Thirdly, inter-regional spi l lovers may lead to under- or overprovis ion of a global public 
good. In the case of health care, this links to public health, research and training. In principle, 
the greater the proport ion of benet l ts or costs accrued by non-residents , the stronger the case for 
an internal is ing intervention at a higher level of government . Fourthly, there is a need for tax 
harmonisa t ion across regions, as uncoordinated taxation may lead to allocation decisions of 
decreased ef f ic iency . 
4.4.4. Fiscal and "non-f iscal" federal ism in health care 
Admit ted ly , the discussion of decentral isat ion has for the most part been focused on fiscal 
powers , in the context of mul t ip le layers of government in the Paretian economic ef f ic iency 
f r amework , a imed at achieving locally optimal provision of public goods through taxation and 
gove rnmen t grants (Dates 1972, Gates 1999, Gates 2005). The problems of fiscal federalism 
have marked the health policy debate, both in normat ive (e.g. Warner 1975, Mashaw 1995) and 
posi t ive (e.g. Robal ino et al. 2001, Crivelli et al. 2006) terms. Moreover , decentralisation of 
expendi tu re or tax revenue is somet imes assumed a proxy for local au tonomy (e.g. Barankay & 
L o c k w o o d 2007) . This approach has several l imitations, however , as decisions about local 
budgets m a y as well be m a d e at a central level; in the UK and Spain half of local health care 
expendi tu re is based on a central government manda te and should not count as decentral ised 
(Costa- i -Font 2012) . 
More importantly for this study, the influence over the HCS operation goes beyond allocation of 
budgets. The governance arrangement may be a key factor determining managerial practices, 
diligence in budget spending, priorities, the room for innovation, the response to the national 
policy goals, and so forth. These non-fiscal functions are central to the analysis of leadership 
and governance in the above-mentioned paper by Smith et al. (2012). Furthermore, Wismar & 
Busse (2002) show the significance of non-fiscal forms o f impact on the HCS, ranging from 
priority setting, responsibility for implementation, and various forms of compliance and 
accountability mechanisms. They consider two dimensions (technocratic—participative, top-
up—bottom-down) to illustrate how various stakeholders (government, quasi-independent, and 
non-government) contribute to the shaping of national health programmes in 15 countries, 
autonomies and organisations. In a broader context, O E C D (2002) presents a landscape of 
agencies, authorities and other government bodies in nine industrialised countries. A variety of 
non-central bodies is a response to an increasingly complex decision environment, with the aim 
of achieving higher effectiveness, efficiency, legitimacy and expertise of public decision-
making. Agents perform a wide variety of functions on behalf of the government, which include 
but are not limited to financial allocation. In particular, they may supply, regulate, own, direct or 
supervise, thus participating in the market or moulding behaviours of other sector participants. 
The concept underlying the delegation from the central government to its agents is that the latter 
will perform the functions differently than the government would have, presumably enabling 
higher performance. Therefore, the reasoning behind fiscal federalism, that is, the efficiency 
merits of decentralisation, the need to balance central and non-central prerogatives, and the 
necessity for coordination, applies to non-fiscal functions pari passu. 
4.4.5. Ambiguities surrounding decentralisation processes 
Despite the clarity of the basic theoretical arguments and definitions, decentralisation is difficult 
to describe and measure in practical terms. The difficulty is strongly marked in health care, 
given its high complexity of interactions between political, public authority, commercial, 
professional and private actors, who represent regulatory and stewardship institutions, medical 
care providers and their owners, third party financing institutions including sponsors and 
insurers, and interest groups such as the health workforce, patients and others. Decisions made 
within the HCS, from clinical management and quality of services to financing, regulation and 
setting sector priorities, are outcomes of these complex dynamics. It is the system complexity 
that makes analyses of decentralisation knotty, both in a positive and a normative sense. This is 
further complicated by internal structures and processes that determine stakeholders' 
behaviours, a possibility of divergence between nominal and actual scope and strength of 
authority, as well as the fact that the alignment of power and responsibility is often problematic. 
Levaggi and Smith (2005) present a number of other considerations. For one, there are issues on 
moral hazard, both on the side of central (favourable bias towards pivotal electoral areas) and 
sub-national (extracting grants, free-riding) government. The latter also relates to the possibility 
of local collusion between powerful monopolistic providers and captured purchasers. Secondly, 
an essential question is whether intemalisation should be achieved through centralised 
coordination or norms and standards. Thirdly, excessive costs of provision may result from both 
inefficiency and high external demand, and it is not always possible to distinguish between the 
two causes. Fourthly, i f priorities for health care were to be determined locally and placed 
outside of the government control, they could be captured by interest groups and thus 
undermine the benefits to the community. Fifthly, there is ambiguity in economic evidence 
regarding the relevance of economies of scale in health care provision as well as about the 
extent of innovation as an outcome of decentralisation. 
Yet, also at the conceptual level there are ambiguities. Some scholars argue that in principle 
there is no reason why national government could not differentiate the supply of a public good 
to achieve optimality at the local level. A number of devices could be used to ensure local 
satisfaction, for example, extracting local preferences though opinion polling, delegating the 
responsibility to local branches of centralised institution, or outsourcing the task of provision. 
Therefore, the claims of superiority of territorial governments in managing local affairs are 
arbitrary judgements rather than established facts and often expressed by economists who 
dislike government interference (Jha 1998). In addition, limitations of centralised systems may 
diminish with economic development, weakening the ease for decentralisation in industrialised 
countries with sound governance (Robalino et al. 2001). The latter argument may also be 
substantiated by technological progress that facilitates public participation in centrally initiated 
programmes. De Vries (2000) rebuts theoretical deliberations for both de- and re-centralisation 
as unconvincing: Any political setting has the potential for equity, efficiency, and effectiveness, 
and whether the potential will be realised cannot be settled on theoretical grounds. Moreover, he 
revisits the pro and contra views of decentralisation and verifies them against reform experience 
in four industrialised countries. The picture emerging from the policy debate is that the same 
arguments of economic efficiency, equity and democratic control are raised in support of 
decentralisation and re-centralisation, opportunistically used for the purpose of power 
bargaining. 
A final point coming forth from theoretical works is that decentralisation is a highly context-
specific process (Magnussen et al. 2007, Bremner 2011). There are a vast number of parameters 
that influence its outcomes, some of which are the number and type of agents, the extent of 
discretion, accountability mechanisms, relationships between parallel authorities, their 
geographic distribution, decisions that are and are not subject to transfer, industrial organisation, 
and contract flexibility. In particular, the presence of technical efficiency and information 
advantages, being potential sources of improved allocative efficiency, may be countered by the 
lactc of t;now-how and the limited capacity of human resources, task complexity, or plain 
negligence. Considering the above, rather than having inherent merits, decentralisation and its 
outcomes hinge on the setting, which makes it difficult to reach prescriptive conclusions. 
Especially in health care, as the nature of tasks and technologies varies across projects and 
interventions, optimal structures may differ from case to case. Thus, the optimal extent of 
decentralisation cannot be determined on purely theoretical grounds, and instead requires 
empirical support contextualised for project parameters, the institutional setting and 
comparative developments. 
4.4.6. Post-communist experiences with decentralisation in health carc 
Health care transition in CEE/CIS has attracted the attention of decentralisation scholars, 
because of its unique starting point characterised by the highest degree o f centralisation as well 
as a number of system redesign experiments that have taken place in this context. Among the 
aspects of decentralisation documented in the literature are financing-side elements of HCSs, 
spanning across revenue collection, pooling and purchasing (Kutzin et al. 2010a) as well as 
privatisation in primary and outpatient care (Rechel & McKee 2009). 
A number of theoretical predictions discussed in this chapter apply directly to Eastern European 
HCSs. Jakab et al (2003) reflect that increasing autonomy best serves the countries that are 
advanced in reforming their economies. Legal certainty, managerial capacity and the 
containment of corruption synergise with greater autonomy of health care facilities and allow 
reaping the benefits of efficiency and responsiveness. Conversely, low and middle income 
countries, i.e. those at the stage of mobilising resources and building capacity, are likely better 
off in relying on a centralised management. This argument is also supported by McKee (2004), 
who observes that major capacity restructuring is facilitated by centralised ownership and 
management, while being a more complex task in diverse and mixed systems. 
Many of the risks and limitations of decentralisation pointed out by Bankauskaite and Saltman 
(2007) have materialised in reform experiments that took place over the last two decades in 
Eastern Europe. Some of the challenges were the need to customise strategies towards local 
conditions and objectives, tensions between government levels, unclear concepts and goals of 
local participation, unclearly defined accountability, improving within-unit equity at the expense 
of equity between administrative units, and dependence of outcomes on incentives faced by 
managers. Poor planning often implied not taking the above into consideration, and led to 
negative outcomes. Additionally, decentralisation reforms did not improve health outcomes 
because they failed to address the root of the problem - persistent shortages that were the cause 
of long wait times and inadequate medical inputs (Leven 2005). Importantly, repeated re-
balancing moves and related back-and-forth shifts of power do not exclusively reflect the lack 
of experience or mistakes in structural HCS design in Eastern Europe. For example, mature 
Nordic democracies adjusted the organisation of their systems in parallel to CEE/CIS, pointing 
to the recurring nature of the process (Saltman & Vrangbsk 2007). 
Institutional capacity at the territorial level is an essential precondition for the success of 
decentralisation that played a major role in CEE/CIS success and failure. Inadequate 
competency of local decision-makers has been used as an explanation of failed reforms in 
Former Soviet Republics (0s tergren et al. 2007). Another crucial element is the need for the 
central government leadership, oversight and coordination of local developments, which should 
nonetheless be carried out without interfering with decision-making processes or restricting the 
autonomy. This prerequisite, emphasised by Robalino et al. (2001), has been rarely sufficiently 
met in post-communist countries. Finally, Smith & Hakkinen (2007) indicate that one salient 
challenge of decentralisation efforts in CEE/CIS has been the lack of information infrastructure. 
Following decentralisation, the cost of data collection and its quality would often be 
disadvantageous compared to the top-down system. Resulting fragmentation and 
incompleteness of information assets would hinder independent decision-making on one hand 
and disallow system-level adjustments on the other. 
4.5 . O w n e r s h i p a n d legal f o r m s of" publ i c hosp i ta l s 
4.5.1. Matters of hospital ownership 
This section connects to the previous one by observing that system-wide de-concentration and 
devolution have had implications for distributed system stakeholders, in particular affecting 
hospital autonomy and governance. In fact, autonomisation was one of the mechanisms through 
which decentralisation has been carried out. This process has the potential to change a range of 
hospital behaviours, including explicit and implicit objectives, policies and practices, the scope 
for risk taking and willingness to provide uncompensated services, the response to external 
economic incentives, and so forth. Thus, subsequent pages summarise theoretical frameworks 
relevant for transition at the level of a hospital unit, reviewing potential sources, means and 
consequences of this change. 
One way of understanding the evolution of hospitals in Eastern Europe is through envisaging 
their internal environment and the incentives it conveys. This is in contrast to the external 
environment and incentives, which include health needs of the population, market conditions, 
provider payment mechanisms, and sector regulation. The latter two have dominated the debate 
of the CEE/CIS hospital sector and underwent some radical reform, including but not limited to 
the introduction of contract-based relations with payers subject to rules set by the government. 
Importantly, internal incentives complement external incentives (financial or otherwise) in 
providing a whole picture of economic driving forces. The complete set of determinants of 
hospital behaviour thus encompasses provider payments and market pressures, both traditionally 
in the focus of economists' attention, as well as governance. In CEE/CIS, the three areas came 
to relevance at the point of decomposing the integrated, hierarchical model of health care 
financing and provision. 
Ownership, which is one of the defining elements of governance, has been showing a growing 
complexity of classifications, as far as European hospitals are concerned. The hospital landscape 
in Europe, traditionally following a public-private divide, recently has been bearing more 
resemblance to the diversified US market. Saltman (2003) discusses this as a process of blurring 
public-private boundaries and puts forward a taxonomy comprising (1) public and state (MoH, 
National Boards), (2) public and non-state (territorial government, public corporations), (3) 
private and not-for-profit (community, charitable, religious, non-governmental organisations), 
(4) private and for-profit (local business, corporation). In a similar vein, Atun (2007) 
enumerates alternatives to the strategy of transformation by privatisation: contracting out or 
outsourcing, "hybrid organisations" that remain in the public sector but have many private 
sector characteristics, as well as public-private partnerships - strategic alliances for designing, 
building, financing and operating assets formerly belonging to the public sector. 
The usual assumptions of economic analysis posit that providers respond to financial incentives 
in a way that enables them to maximise their objectives given the constraints under which they 
operate. Can the conventional neoclassical model accommodate a role for provider ownership? 
One parameter that likely depends on ownership is the specification of the maximand. Public, 
private and mixed ownership providers operate towards different sets of objectives, the crudest 
distinction being for-profit and not-for-profit, the latter allowing for a number of further goals 
such as quality or equity. Secondly, even supposing that providers are equally responsive to 
economic incentives, the ways that providers go about achieving their objectives may vary 
between provider types. This basically takes the form of additional resources or constraints 
imposed on their operation. Public owning bodies may introduce stricter than market regulation 
rules regarding quality, medical practices, available or preferred procedures, and risk taking. 
Such restrictions may lead to lower flexibility and less innovation. Employee privileges and 
unionisation can also contribute to the differences in organisational behaviour and outcomes. 
Furthermore, not-for-profit and government organisations may benefit from special treatment, 
such as tax advantages and eligibility for donations, or a preferential consideration leading to an 
uneven playing ground between various types of ownership. The latter is an issue particularly 
relevant in CEE/CIS, where public hospitals are usually prioritised in contracting with public 
payers as well as enjoying other forms of legal and economic protection. 
There is a wealth of evidence in the heslth economics litersture thsl supports the existence of 
intrinsic differentiating characteristics of ownership types. Comprehensive reviews are 
frequently published in dedicated studies, and attempting to produce another compilation would 
be outside the scope of this thesis. For the sake of the illustration of the volume and variety, it is 
worth saying that the comparative evidence encompasses cost per outcome (e.g. Sloan et al. 
2001), quality (Pham et al. (2011), the risk of market exit given inefficient operation (Deily et 
al. 2000), implications of for-profit hospitals for medical productivity (Kessler & McClellan 
2001), determinants of profitability (Gapenski et al. 1993), treatment choices (Bayindir 2012), 
and effects of privatisation (Tiemann & Schreyogg 2012). In Eastern Europe, Prochazkova & 
Stastna (2011) estimate the cost efllciency of 99 teaching, not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals 
in the Czech Republic. Moreover, there are meta-studies that collect and often statistically 
analyse outcomes of individual studies, e.g., Tiemann et al. (2012) compile 20 papers on 
hospital efficiency, Eggleston et al. (2008) identify 31 studies of the relationship between 
ownership and quality between 1990 and 2007 in the US alone. The latter study finds that 
outcomes of individual studies are sensitive to the institutional context and may not be 
generalisable. Similar conclusions are reached by Busse et al. (2002) regarding the implications 
of enhanced autonomy and entrepreneurship for efficiency, equity, quality and responsiveness. 
The mixed evidence suggests that various ownership forms have their context-dependent pros 
and cons, which justifies their coexistence. Indeed, an option overarchingly inferior would be 
dominated by other choices and eventually eliminated from the market. Neither does the mixed 
evidence preclude the possibility of improving perfomiance within a given type or by changing 
to another. 
Privatisation provides a conceptually convenient, clear-cut case of autonomisation. 
Exemplifying an extreme of the decentralisation spectrum, privatisation altogether removes the 
hospital from the public sphere. It furnishes a good starting point for the consideration of the 
case for and nature of intermediate, mixed forms of ownership. Since basic economic models 
are based on the assumption of profit-seeking, one way to look at not-for-profit and public 
hospitals is through the lens of differences from the for-profit model. The relevance of private 
hospitals also stems from the fact that they come in a for-profit and not-for-profit variety that 
has been argued to have distinct properties in terms of performance and priorities. This 
potentially positions the not-for-profit profile closer to behaviour that is expected from public 
hospitals, as far as social goals are concerned. Moreover, not-for-profits by definition pursue 
goals other than profit and allow no private residual claims (Sloan 2000). 
Problematically, in a private for-profit hospital sector, innovation may involve strategic 
behaviours such as focusing on profitable pathways, selection of patients, and shifting complex 
clinical cases to the public system. This short-temi profit orientation, among other reasons, has 
led to greater trust in, and market dominance by, not-for-profit forms. Nonetheless, the private 
for-profit sector offers many insights for all forms of hospital ownership. It has been credited 
with some good practices in corporate governance that have inspired public sector management 
reform. It also puts to a test the quality and integrity of the legal framework and health sector 
regulation, by removing the hospital from public control or supervision that could intluence the 
hospital behaviour towards being more benevolent than explicitly permitted. Moreover, it has 
been argued and shown that not-for-profit hospitals may mimic the more aggressive behaviour 
of their for-profit counterparts (Duggan 2002). 
The concepts of privatisation and private hospital apply in Eastern Europe directly and 
indirectly. Speaking of private hospitals per se, this form of ownership has not become 
prominent in CEE/CIS and only minimally contributes to hospital care provision in the region 
(Busse et al. 2002). The share of private beds in all hospital beds in 2009 was 5.9% in CEE and 
3% in CIS, compared to the EU average of 36.2% (WHO HFA-DB). That being said, there are 
exceptions: Georgia, where private ownership is dominant, as well as the Czech Republic 
(14.2%), Bulgaria (11.4%) and Estonia (9.7%). Moreover, increasing private ownership 
represents a feasible and likely alternative to maintaining the status quo in the sector as well as a 
logical continuation of governance trends observable throughout health care transition. In the 
process of shifting hospital ownership, private, for-profit and not-for-profit options will compete 
against hybrid public models. Furthermore, considering broader influences, when faced with a 
more dynamic environment in the 1990s, Eastern European physicians and health care managers 
became more aware of budgets, costs, and technical efficiency. These attitudes and skills, not 
without resemblance to the private sector practices, are essential for the adaptation of the 
predominantly public hospital sector (Rethelyi et al. 2001). This is true in the light of the health 
care transformation depicted in Chapter 3: growing reliance on market forces and the private 
sector, and governance change that enables a more explicit influence of physicians and directors 
over objectives pursued by individual hospitals. 
4.5.2. Autonomy and governance of public hospitals 
In post-Semashko health systems, various extents of public hospital autonomy were aimed at 
replicating some private sector conditions without forgoing public control over health 
establishments. The autonomisation process encompassed growing roles of territorial 
governments (as managing or founding bodies) as well as hospital-based decision-makers (chief 
physicians, directors). This was accompanied by shifting some of regulatory and supervisory 
prerogatives to independent agencies, professional associations, and other stakeholders. The 
trend has been in line with a recommendation by Kornai and Eggleston (2001b) that ownership 
rights and responsibilities of organisations that remain in the public sphere after a desired extent 
of privatisation ought to be divided between central government, regional governments, 
hospitals, and other health sector organisations. This is equivalent to decentralisation, inclusion 
and pluralisation, as discussed in the previous section. 
T h e s t a r t ing po in t fo r hosp i ta l s in the reg ion w a s the s ta tus of budge ta ry o rgan i sa t ions 
pa r t i c ipa t ing in a t o p - d o w n bureauc ra t i c admin i s t r a t ion . A u t o n o m i s a t i o n is a concep t o f 
d e p a r t i n g f r o m the h ie rarch ica l s t ruc ture by b r o a d e n i n g the s c o p e of m a n a g e r s ' a reas o f 
r e spons ib i l i t y and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , wi th the p u r p o s e o f i m p r o v i n g their p e r f o r m a n c e . A n 
a u t o n o m o u s hospi ta l is at least par t ia l ly s e l f -gove rn ing , se l f -d i rcc t ing , or se l f - f inanc ing , wh ich 
ind ica tes a m u l t i - d i m e n s i o n a l and gradua l na ture o f a u t o n o m y . C h a w l a et al. ( 1996) p ropose a 
f r a m e w o r k fo r a s s e s s i n g hospi ta l i n d e p e n d e n c e that c o m p r i s e s a heal th d imens ion (overal l and 
spec i f i c goa l s ) a n d a m a n a g e r i a l d i m e n s i o n (s t ra tegic m a n a g e m e n t , day - to -day admin is t ra t ion , 
p r o c u r e m e n t , f inanc ia l m a n a g e m e n t , h u m a n resources ) . In pract ice , au tonomisa t ion is carr ied 
out in a w i d e var ie ty o f ways , usua l ly wi th in an ex i s t ing s t ruc ture o f owner sh ip , albeit wi th a 
pos s ib l e c h a n g e o f legal f o rm (e.g. f r o m a publ ic e s t ab l i shmen t to a g o v e r n m e n t agency) . N e w 
p r e r o g a t i v e s m a y inc lude a p e r f o r m a n c e - b a s e d as sessmen t , capac i ty to shi f t f unds be tween 
b u d g e t i t ems , d e c i d i n g abou t hospi ta l inputs and re ta in ing budge ta ry su rp luses (Busse et al. 
2 0 0 2 ) . Inc reases in a u t o n o m y co inc ide wi th a grea ter recogni t ion o f the fact that hospi ta l s n e e d 
to fo rm n e t w o r k s wi th p r iva te heal th ca re p rov iders , o ther hospi ta ls , and seek cont inui ty of care 
in the c o m m u n i t y ( E d w a r d s et al. 2004) . 
C o r p o r a t i s a t i o n takes these c h a n g e s fur ther and fo l l ows a m o r e spec i f ica l ly de f ined concep t . In 
par t i cu la r , this f o r m is less var iab le with respect to the cri teria o f se l f -govern ing , se l f -d i rec t ing 
and s e l f - f i n a n c i n g . A corpora t i sed hospi ta l is a c c o u n t a b l e to its publ ic owner , but the g o v e r n i n g 
b o d y has full cont ro l ove r inputs and p roduc t ion processes , full responsibi l i ty for p e r f o r m a n c e , 
usua l ly re ta ins extra r evenue , is less l ikely to be f u n d e d by budge t and more l ikely by cont rac t , 
and f aces the r isk o f inso lvency and marke t exit . Corpora t i sa t ion r emoves the unit f rom the 
h ie ra rch ica l s t ruc ture , and is consequen t ly less eas i ly r eversed than au tonomisa t ion (Busse et al. 
2 0 0 2 ) . In C E E / C I S , co rpora t i sa t ion typical ly co inc ides with or is a c o n s e q u e n c e o f devo lu t ion 
o f o w n e r s h i p to terr i torial g o v e r n m e n t s . T h i s concur ren t c h a n g e in o w n e r s h i p and accountab i l i ty 
c a n b e e x p e c t e d to h a v e impl ica t ions for ob jec t ives and the m e a n s for their a c h i e v e m e n t . 
C o r p o r a t i s e d hosp i ta l s , d e p e n d i n g on the p r e f e r ences o f their o w n i n g bod ies and internal 
dec i s i on fac to rs , m a y put e m p h a s i s on access ibi l i ty , equi ty , qual i ty , or heal th o u t c o m e s , 
i nc lud ing subs id i sa t ion o f se rv ices unpro f i t ab l e but requi red for social ly impor tan t reasons . At 
the s a m e t ime , s t r ic ter accoun tab i l i ty will shif t the focus to financial susta inabi l i ty (if not 
p rof i t ab i l i ty ) , in r e s p o n s e to o w n e r s ' expec t a t i ons c o n v e y e d to hospi ta l s ta f f th rough r isks and 
r e w a r d s . In p rac t i ce , o u t c o m e s m a y vary d u e to ba rga in ing p o w e r s and skil ls of va r ious 
s t akeho lde r s . M o r e o v e r , co rpora t i sa t ion impl ies a shi f t in the respons ib i l i ty for capi tal 
i n v e s t m e n t s and dep rec i a t ion cos ts , as well as l iabil i ty for medica l errors , a l though this latter 
a spec t r e m a i n s u n d e r d e v e l o p e d in all p o s t - c o m m u n i s t count r ies . It a lso has c o n s e q u e n c e s for the 
o p p o r t u n i t y for pub l i c p roper ty p ro t ec t ion i sm, w h i c h is ma rked ly rest r ic ted in the case o f 
c o m m e r c i a l l aw c o m p a n i e s . Final ly , a b y - p r o d u c t of t r a n s f o r m i n g hospi ta l s into j o in t - s t ock 
c o m p a n i e s is a t t a in ing legal ly requ i red a c c o u n t i n g s t andards and thus i m p r o v i n g i n fo rma t ion 
systems, which are both needed for the purposes of performance monitoring and are helpful in 
mal<ing allocation decisions. 
The experiences of CEE/CIS transition identified in Chapter 3 are in line with four broad classes 
of governance: budgetary, autonomised, corporatised, and privatised (Harding & Preker 2003). 
In the model of governance transition (Figure 3.1), the budgetary status fits in Stage 1 (and 
possibly 2), the autonomised status in Stage 3 (with possible preliminary developments in Stage 
2). Corporatised and privatised hospitals correspond to the two last stages, which were named 
accordingly. 
Autonomisation has inevitable implications for hospital governance, which changes from direct 
management to leadership, supervision and other "soft" influences. Harding and Preker (2003) 
define three areas of good governance; (1) Objectives - clearly defined, mutually aligned, 
narrow in scope and achievable; (2) Supervisory structure - independent, professional, 
transparent, and focused on perfomiance rather than inputs; and (3) Exposure to markets for 
hospital services as well as to markets for capital, supplies, labour and products. Ditzel et al. 
(2006) in a comparative assessment of hospital governance in the Czech Republic identify the 
following key features: governing bodies, membership and appointment of governing bodies, 
board member remuneration, setting service delivery and financial targets, accountability of 
governing body, competencies and accountability of hospital director, and controlling body. 
Smith et al. (2012), in discussing hospital governance, recognise the functions of priority 
setting, performance monitoring and accountability, as well as various public agencies 
responsible for performing these functions. 
The main practical obstacles in setting up good governance are continued politicisation of 
decision-making, the lack of transparency in government interventions as well as the failure to 
make social functions explicit. Reasons behind these failures include conflicting stakeholders' 
interests and painful trade-offs that are revealed but not confronted in the process of specifying 
and prioritising objectives. Further impediments are generated by the preference of bureaucratic 
structures for direct control, and their inertia and unwillingness to adopt more efficient practices 
(Harding & Preker 2003). This may be accentuated when the practices are more complex and 
demand the acquisition of new skills or create additional tasks, e.g. contracting, monitoring, 
reporting. Finally, change is strongly resisted when it monitors performance rather than inputs 
or attempts to make services more systematic by reducing variations in practice (Edwards et al. 
2004). 
One of the prominent problems of hospital governance in CEE/CIS has been the "soft budget 
constraint". The concept originated from the lack of financial discipline in the socialist 
economy, but in a number of forms it can also be found in regulated market economies (Komai 
1998). A soft budget constraint materialises when adequate rewards and penalties are absent, in 
an organisational culture that does not proinotc prudcntiality and thrittiness, and under an 
expectation of government support. The latter may take the fomis ot'C I) fiscal means (subsidies, 
tax concessions), (2) crediting (preferential bank credit, trade credit, wage arrears), and (3) 
indirect support (protection from competition through tariff barriers, restriction on imports, 
preferential administrative or legal treatment) (Kornai 2001, Komai et al. 2003). The 
government assistance virtually eliminates the risk of market exit, posing significant challenges 
for effective governance. Repeated instances of government support lead to an expectation of 
further help. For example, in Hungary and Poland the central governments bailed out indebted 
hospitals owned by sub-national governments. This, however, did not prevent debt from 
reoccurring. In fact, improving financial discipline by eradicating an ingrained anticipation of a 
government intervention is a lengthy process. It requires building a track record of strict 
adherence to rules and preparing alternative legal and economic mechanisms to prevent adverse 
consequences of hardened accountability, such as bankruptcies caused by external conditions 
(Kornai 1996). 
As the above example illustrates, a budget constraint cannot be hardened by shifting ownership 
from central to territorial governments alone. Looking beyond Eastern Europe, in Italy and 
Norway instances of both centralisation and decentralisation led to overspending (Komai 2009). 
This is because the problem is deeply embedded in the nature of public ownership. The 
behaviour of non-governmental establishments considerably differs in this respect, with private 
for-profit organisations showing the highest level of budget discipline. Yet, even a for-profit 
structure of the hospital sector does not preclude the possibility of a public bailout, for example 
when a private hospital enjoys a monopolistic position or its managers can anticipate or 
encourage government help through informal connections. 
While Komai does not support an "unlimited free market privatisation", he argues that the 
advantages of financial discipline are an argument in favour of a greater presence of private 
capital or management in the hospital sector. For the same reason, he opines that irrespective of 
their ownership type hospitals should compete for patients, monopolistic power should be 
diminished and the threat of exit should be real. With respect to the legal and ownership forms 
discussed previously in this section, and in particular considering the inconclusiveness and 
reversibility of approaches to autonomisation, corporatisation offers a feasible public alternative 
that meets Komai's postulates, breaks the pooling of hospitals, and has the potential to 
effecdvely harden the budget constraint. 
4.5.3. Corporatisation and New Public Management 
In the case of the hospital sector, common performance issues concern technical and al locative 
efficiency, poor responsiveness and the failure to reach poverty groups. Thus, re-organisation of 
public hospitals should aim at improving efficiency and outcomes through a better utilisation of 
resources and new care pathways, as well as at improving patient satisfaction and reduce staff 
turnover (Edwards et al. 2004). 
New Public Management is a term coined by Hood (1991) for a public sector strategy that 
modifies the internal and external environment of an organisation in order to create more space 
for innovation and promote higher performance through economic incentives and market 
pressures. Pioneered in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, it was conceived as a response 
to the rigidity of hierarchical bureaucracies, the lack of close management involvement in the 
core operations, and absence of incentives (Harding & Preker 2003) that suffocated public 
sector performance. Corporatisation is one organisational pillars of NPM, alongside increased 
accountability in personnel performance management, performance-related budgeting, 
autonomous agencies, managed competition and contracting (Shaw 2004). 
The strategy of New Public Management gives rise to entrepreneurial hospitals. Busse et al. 
(2002) argue for a distinctive European model of social entrepreneurship which governments 
across Europe are trying to promote. Departing from public good provision based on 
bureaucratic structures or professional groups, this model introduces private-sector principles of 
innovation, opportunity-seeking, client orientation and taking commercial risks. Four pillars this 
model is based on are trust, transparency and public accountability, supervision and 
entrepreneurial skills. Regulating entrepreneurial behaviour in hospitals involves ex ante 
(planning) or ex post (review) approaches to setting hospital capacity and imposing restrictions 
on retaining budget surpluses, borrowing capital from the financial sector, selling assets, 
engaging non-core activities, acquisitioning or merging with other hospitals and health care 
establishments (nursing homes, ambulance services), as well as outsourcing (Busse et al. 2002). 
Altering the hospital sector according to the NPM principles is subject to a number of 
preconditions and caveats enumerated by Jakab et al. (2002b). Firstly, marketisation reforms 
may achieve certain objectives at the expense of others. A common trade-off involves improved 
efficiency and responsiveness going hand in hand with higher access inequalities and a lower 
level of financial protection. To avoid unwanted sacrifices, competing goals have to be made 
explicit and subsequently monitored. Moreover, governments in developing countries have a 
track record of taking for granted various positive by-products of market reforms, e.g. reduction 
of fiscal costs, emphasising primary care or rationalising hospital capacity. Experience shows 
that such secondary positive effects are unlikely to occur unless specifically targeted. Secondly, 
introducing market discipline implies that the market will provide incentives both in the form of 
rewards and penalties. The latter may not be politically acceptable, which leads to political 
interference and undermines market operation. Thirdly, capacity building is essential in 
countries where institutions and resources are insufficient to meet the transition costs and 
expertise requirements of autonomisation and marketisation. The presence o f corruption in the 
publ ic sphere especially requires additional safeguarding mechanisms. Fourthly, intentions 
underlying autnomisation may include lessening the fiscal burden or political pressures. 
Decentralising a financially constrained hospital sector without providing alternative financial 
mechanisms and ensuring accountability is likely to weaken the functions o f social, financial 
and health protection. By the same token, formalising informal payments and enabling hospitals 
to raise additional revenues may lead to better transparency, quality and staff retention. Fifth, a 
typical autonomisation scenario al lows hospitals to retain extra revenue and control o f medical 
supplies, maintains central control o f staffing and investment, and establishes supervision that is 
weak or l imited to controll ing board members. This limits the opportunities to rationalise 
hospital capacity and leads to recurring debt and neglecting social functions in result o f poor 
accountability. Finally, as Jakab et al. conclude based on a number o f reviewed cases, in 
countries with poorly performing centralised public hospital sector, substantial performance 
improvements o f efficiency and quality can be achieved by relatively simple reforms o f 
incentive environment o f hospital management. However, due to diminishing returns, such 
efficiency-oriented reforms have little or no incremental effect in the systems that are stable, 
well-resourced and well-managed. 
Despite its potential for enhancing efficiency, introducing N P M practices encounters substantial 
barriers to effective implementation. Barriers such as accountability deficiencies, corruption and 
rent-seeking as well as ineffective public sector practices are pronounced in Eastern Europe, 
although the situation has been gradually improving in the course o f transition (Nemec et al. 
2008). Political interference is a deeply rooted problem across the region, in unreformed and 
reformed systems alike. Jakab et al. (2002a) review hospital director appointment procedures in 
nine post-communist countries. Predominantly, directors are appointed based on political 
criteria o f party affiliations, local interests and personal networks: by the Minister (Albania, 
Georgia) , local government represented by assembly or mayor (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland). On ly in the cases where hospitals take the legal form o f 
joint-stock companies (Estonia, Latvia) directors are employed by respective boards of 
directors. Wh i le this form is by no means free from cronyism, it is more than others likely to 
rely on meritocratic criteria. Wi th corporatised hospitals increasingly present in the region, 
seeking for managerial qualities becomes more commonplace, to the benefit o f the quality o f 
publ ic sector performance. 
4.6. Economic models of hospital behaviour 
4.6.1. Overview 
From the profit-seeking, private sector organisation originated numerous economic models o f 
hospital behaviour. These frameworks extend the neoclassical model o f a firm, in some cases 
explain ing the nature o f not-for-profits and also offering lessons for public hospitals. This is 
because it is conceivable that public hospital managers, as in not-for-profits, prioritise over a 
combination of quality, quantity, solvency, and prestige. These preferences, stifled in the 
hierarchy, may be revealed after hospitals are granted autonomy and their directors are given the 
control over inputs, processes and strategic planning. The preferences may also have been 
subject to change given "managerial capacity-building", often emphasised in the literature of 
transition, and an increasing awareness of health care economics. Moreover, in consideration of 
CEE/CIS developments, in public hospitals there has been growing room for influences o f 
various lines of authority, including physicians, administrative staff and new founding bodies 
(owners). The three lines of authority are likely to have diverging priorities regarding such 
matters as objectives, risk profile, inclination towards moral hazard, and so forth. Their 
bargaining is likely to be central to understanding the hospital behaviour. 
Economic models of hospital behaviour address many of the above problems, and while most of 
them were originally developed in the US context, they could be adapted to the mixed market-
government environment of CEE/CIS. The models fit in the neoclassical framework and deviate 
from the standard profit-maximising firm by the parameters of decision-making actors and their 
objectives as regards resource allocation. Sloan (2000) discusses major behaviour patterns of 
not-for-profit hospitals by reviewing (1) a model of four internal groups of stakeholders 
(physicians, employees, owners, managers) bargaining over four objectives (quality, profit, 
labour slack, capital slack) (Zweifel & Breyer 1997); (2) a model of a mixed quality-quantity 
objective (Newhouse 1970); and (3) a model of a physicians' cooperative who maximise their 
net income (Pauly & Redisch 1973). 
In addition to the above, hospitals can be seen as quantity maximising (Rice 1966) or pursuing 
the objective of prestige expressed by the quality of inputs (Lee 1971). Feldstein (1971) 
submitted a compound objective of maximising quality at any given quantity. His dynamic 
framework enables adjustments in quantity, quality and prices, helping to explain the hospital 
cost inflation. The Feldstein model could also be adapted to shed light on the problem of 
hospital debt accumulation in Eastern Europe. Given fixed prices or budgets, rather than cost 
inflation, the model could predict how physicians' philanthropic preferences, devotion to social 
functions and attempts to meet demand for hospital care in a resource-constrained system lead 
to exceeding the budget under a soft budget constraint. 
Moreover, a number of researchers factor in the internal hospital structure. Buchanan and 
Lindsay (1970) suggest two lines of authority, physicians and managers, whose diverse 
preferences result in tensions or conflict, in which medical staff are likely to gain the upper 
hand. Clarkson (1972) focuses on differences between for-profits and not-for-profits by 
discussing choice constraints and internal bargaining between principals (owners) and agents 
(administrators). Along the line of internal bargaining, Harris (1977) develops a formal model at 
Ihe core o f which is an internal marlcet o f input demands (from clinical outcomes-driven 
doctors) and supply (by economic outcomes-driven administrators). The hospital behaviour is 
thus a product o f the interplay o f the two forces and competing objectives. A survey o f hospital 
models by McGu i re (1985) led to the conclusion that the internal hospital structure 
complements the external market structure in determining actions taken by the hospital. 
The above "organ ism" and "institut ional" models o f organisation (Jacobs 1974) set a basis for a 
discussion o f leadership, motivation, j o b satisfaction and culture as aspects that could further 
our understanding o f hospital behaviour. A long these lines, McKee and Healy (2000) assume a 
holistic standpoint and look into the evidence o f changing hospital behaviour by targeting three 
areas; (a) incentives for clinical performance, i.e. inducing continuous learning and quality care 
by quality assurance models, clinical audit and clinical governance; (b) organisational culture 
and its relation with quality o f care, involving various aspects such as nursing autonomy and 
relationships between doctors and nurses; and (c) payment mechanisms that ideally offer 
incentives towards desired efficiency, effectiveness, equity and quality, and avoid introducing 
adverse incentives in non-target areas or substantial transaction costs. McKee and Healy find 
that clinical performance and payment mechanisms are blunt and rather limited in their impact, 
whi le targeting organisational culture has a good potential for improvement. This is fol lowing 
the observations that j o b satisfaction is a strong predictor o f nursing quality, while patient-
centredness, leadership, collaboration and openness in problem solving are good predictors o f 
intensive care outcomes. At the same time, the authors warn against externally-steered and 
imposed "re-engineering" o f culture, which is likely to damage staff morale and work ethos. 
Instead, quality improvements should be achieved through a "soft", leadership-based approach 
to change. 
4.6.2. The Harding-Prcker model 
Harding and Preker (2003) go beyond neoclassical economics in order to find determinants o f 
hospital behaviour. Their synthetic approach consists o f the neoclassical framework, agency 
theory, transaction cost economics, property rights theory and political choice theory. The 
outcome is a descriptive (rather than formal) model to explain the internal and external forces 
determining hospital behaviour and predicting its responses to efficiency-inducing reforms. The 
model comprises financial incentives, market structure and a governance component (Figure 
4.2). The former two aspects are extrinsic to hospitals and seen as environmental parameters, 
whi le the latter internal environment is shaped by fornial and informal arrangements, including 
ownership and legal status. 
The hospital governance setup arises from five pillars: decision rights, market exposure, residual 
claims, accountabil ity and social functions. Decision rights range from vertical hierarchy to 
autonomous management , and are focused on the areas o f assets, capital and other inputs 
Figure 4.2: The Harding-Preker model of hospital governance 
Based on Harding & Preker (2003). 
(procurement, labour), output mix and level, pricing to organised purchasers, and management 
processes. The actual scope of decision rights may be constrained by labour market rigidities, 
political pressures, or financial constraints. Market exposure refers to the share of hospital 
revenue that hinges on selling profitable services in the market, as opposed to direct budget 
setting. Market exposure is assumed to be performance-inducing. Savings generated by cost or 
eff iciency improvements that remain for internal stakeholders ' redistribution are referred to as 
residual claims. Benefits not accruing to the agents within the hospital, and instead confiscated 
by the public purse (the principal), may limit the incentive to economise. Accountabil i ty 
concerns the forms and strength of responsibility before the sector stakeholders: owners , 
purchasers, regulators, and patients. It is put in place through mechanisms such as hierarchical 
control, rules, regulations, and contracts as well as venues for enforcement thereof Finally, 
social functions are services that bear significant economic externalities, such as health 
protection of the homeless, the uninsured or ethnic minorities. When implicitly bestowed with 
the responsibility of alleviating socio-economic inequalities, hospitals will often cross-subsidise 
those kinds of services, or exceed their budgets under the soft budget constraint. Consequently, 
formally specifying and regulating social functions requires an adequate adjustment of funding. 
Imposing a strong financial regime without providing additional resources will adversely affect 
the feasibility of this function, exposing vulnerable groups at health and financial risks. 
Accounting for social functions links to the question of equity in accessing health care, and 
especially to the provision of uncompensated care (taken here to mean health care for which the 
reiinbursement received by the provider is less than the cost of providing that care). Various 
forms of Communi ty Service Obligations (CSOs) may be imposed by regulators to ensure the 
achievement of equity objectives. They may also be pursued voluntarily by organisations which 
have objectives other than, or in addition to. profit maximisation. A CSO requires that selected 
services are made available to all eligible persons even though certain services or customers 
may predictably generate losses. Therefore, it is a fonn of restricting the provider 's choice of 
services, areas of business, or pricing policies. One way of financing services priced below their 
cost of delivery is through an internal cross-subsidy, supported by profitable activities. A CSO 
can be applied to a range of publicly owned or government-regulated private enterprises, 
including utilities (water, gas, and electricity), telecommunications, postal services, public 
transportation, as well as hospitals. Even in the lack of a CSO, both not-for-profit and for-profit 
hospitals have been shown to supply uncompensated care. The extent of the charitable provision 
has been linked to their market power, the presence of not-for-profit hospitals, the profile of 
clinical specialisations, the availability of slack resources, ownership type, and executive board 
structure and composition (Norton & Staiger 1994, Costa 2012). 
In the context of health care systems in transition, carrying out social functions under stricter 
accounting regimes necessitates a revision of conditions for the provision uncoinpensated care. 
Both obligatory (CSO) and voluntary (charity) arrangements may be relied on in achieving 
equity objectives. Importantly, however, the problem of providing care to vulnerable groups 
should be approached in an explicit manner, with a particular consideration of mechanisms for 
the financing of imcompensated care (Mirabel & Poudou 2004), the role of public-private 
partnerships (Dixon et al. 2004), the contract design for delivering social and commercial value 
for money (Hensher & Houghton 2004), and broader ethical groimds for corporate social 
responsibility to the wider community (Leduc 2004). 
The strength of the Harding-Preker model is that it provides a framew ork to anticipate, although 
not quantitatively, reactions of the hospital to compound changes in its internal and external 
environments. It provides a checklist for comprehensive sector change by showing how 
negligence of certain areas of incentive and control may undermine an otherwise well-designed 
reform package. In so doing, the model is a good platfonn for explaining deficiencies of the 
emergent hospital sector in CEE/CIS, with a particular focus on the issues of governance. In 
fact, Jakab et al. (2003) follow this logic to identity two major issues of post-communist 
hospital transition: the lack of capacity to reform (or to perform the functions of) the internal 
structure of hospitals, and the misalignment of the internal environment with external incentives 
of the financing-side reform. As of 2003, more specific obstacles included unclear roles of 
owning bodies, passive purchasing models, soft budget constraints, poor contracting 
mechanisms (with regards to quality assurance and performance monitoring), poor 
accountability, scepticism and incompetence of the medical leaders. 
Devolving hospital ownership failed to deliver expected improvements despite transferring 
considerable decision rights. The failure was due to the lack o f recognition of other essential 
pillars of governance, and specifically stemmed from the absence of (market) pressures, 
ineffective accountability and sustaining implicit social functions. In the Czech Republic, for 
example, hospitals are obligated to provide a number of medical interventions despite the fact 
that those services are not covered by the social health insurance scheme. Consequently, the 
majority of hospitals regularly report financial losses (Ditzel et al. 2006). Jakab et al. (2002a) 
assess that, until the early 2000s, Estonia, Georgia and Kazakhstan had gone the furthest in 
creating a correct internal incentive environment. 
4.7. Compilation of economic arguments behind changing hospital governance 
This chapter has reviewed a number of areas of economic theory that apply to the 
transformation of hospital governance in post-Semashko health systems. It commenced by 
summarising economic features of the communist system itself and implications of the 
departure from this model. Then, it covered the cardinal arguments of decentralisation, a variety 
of intermediate forms between central government and private ownership, and consequences of 
ownership transfomiation. as well as economic models that help understand aspects of hospital 
behaviour. All these areas to some extent explain a context for making allocation decisions that 
emerged in CEE/CIS hospitals, as well as new incentives for performance that have fallen on 
various sector participants. Yet, the above frameworks are fragmentary, and the focus on 
specific economic questions makes them individually feasible. This is problematic because, as 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this current thesis have revealed, there are many levels of causes and effects 
in the discussion of changing hospital governance, and no single framework exists to encompass 
all the relevant parameters. 
In light of the above observation, the framework presented in Table 4.1 is an attempt to integrate 
the many theoretical indications into a simple summary that would illustrate the possible overall 
effects of governance-related reforms on hospital performance. The compilation is intended to 
outline the combined direct (active powers, e.g. discretion over allocation or priorities) and 
indirect (passive, e.g. the reception of financial incentives) effects at the central, territorial, and 
hospital levels. Consequently, Table 4.1 exhibits the strength of incentives as well as the 
technical possibility to economise at each stage of the stepwise transformation of hospital 
governance. The transformation is assumed to be incremental, i.e. each stage retains or expands 
the incentives of the preceding stage. The indicative incentive intensities are relative within each 
category, that is, the ranks do not imply the relative importance of four sources o f efficiency. 
T a b l e 4.1: Indicat ive economic cl l lcicncy potential per stage of hospital governance 
C o v c m a n c c r e f o r m s tage In lurmat ion Inncivalion Financial risk E<csidual claims U n c o m p e n s a t e d care 
Non-relbrm 7 
[)c-concenlratcd admin + + _ _ ^ ^ ^ 
Devolved ownership + -H- + ^ ^ 
Corporalisation ++ +++ -H- ++ ^ 
Privatisation -H- ++-H- +-H- , , I 
In format ion advan tages stem f rom decentral isat ion o f l i o sp i t a l network supervision as well as 
improved accoun t ing and informat ion sys tems at unit level. This dimension depicts the 
increas ing capaci ty to ident i fy needs, resources and technologies for achieving higher 
p roduc t ive and al locat ive e f f ic iency . Innovation refers to the capacity or necessity to introduce 
new products or services or to improve exist ing solutions. Decentral isat ion, autonomisat ion and 
privat isat ion increase the room for exper imenta t ion and variation in practices, as well as 
in t roduce actual (market exposure) or quasi (benchmarking or yardst ick) compet i t ion. The 
combined internal and external envi ronments conducive to innovation can be expected to 
he ighten qual i ty , responsiveness , e f f ic iency, and cost-conscient iousness . The diinension of 
f inancial risk cor responds to hardening the budget constraint by detaching hospi tals f rom 
ne twork-based pools backed by central and regional governments . This creates pressures for 
f inancial responsibi l i ty , p lanning and anticipation effor ts , as well as the need to apply more 
prec ise account ing s tandards. Along the centra l ised—privat ised spectrum, the l ikelihood and 
magn i tude of a bail-out or other forms of public support in the case of insolvency are 
progress ive ly lower. Residual c la ims concern the fact that the hospital can retain soine of its 
extra revenues or savings froin cos t -conta inment exercises. This establishes a h igh-powered 
incent ive for o w n e r s and managers to economise under both for-profi t and not-for-profi t 
set t ings. In the latter case, the surplus may be reinvested thus increasing quality, prestige or 
work ing condi t ions , all of which are valid object ives of internal participants. 
Final ly, the last co lumn in Table 4.1 illustrates the fact that a higher eff ic iency potential 
ach ieved through hardening the budget constraint , the risk of market exit and the pursuit of 
prof i t , may d i s suade hospital manage r s f rom per fo rming social funct ions, which is here 
represented as a decreas ing availabil i ty of uncompensa ted care. To the extent this is the case, 
the objec t ives of e f f ic iency and equity can be seen as conl l ic t ing (that is, unless the equity 
d imens ion is fac tored in the e f f ic iency ou tcome measure , as in Wags ta f f 1991). For this reason, 
wi thout an adequa te counte rba lanc ing mechan i sm, advanc ing through the governance stages 
m a y have adverse implicat ions for equi table access to health care. 
4.8. Suggest ions for re form 
4.8.1. General directions 
From the theoretical standpoint, the transformation of governance in post-Semashl<o countries 
has had the potential to improve economic performance of hospitals. The leading countries have 
gone a long way in implementing the economic incentives along the lines presented in Table 
4.1. Their success stories pave the way forward for less reformed systems. Still, no country has 
avoided mistakes in the process of transition. Economic models and theories reviewed in this 
Chapter offer valuable insights regarding the role of governance in a broader hospital reform. 
The building blocks that constituted the Semashko system have been abandoned in most 
countries of the region. Nonetheless, the redefined systems continue to rely on state 
participation, avoiding certain problems with health care markets but bearing the costs of 
government failures instead. Within this still dominant public setting, decentralisation has 
brought new distribution of powers between levels of government. In fact, decentralisation can 
be argued to be the single most significant feature of post-communist health care transition, 
involving new institutional mechanisms for revenue collection, pooling and contract-based 
purchasing, predominantly performed by newly established health care financing authorities, 
devolution of health care provision through empowering territorial government and providers, 
as well as some aspects of regulation being delegated to various quasi-independent government 
agencies. This is, in principle, a positive development, given there is evidence that shows 
decentralisation in HCS can yield lower mortality rates and strengthened political rights of 
citizens supposedly increasing public participation and accountability. It may be especially 
desired in corrupted environments, through reducing the marginal pay-off of corruptive actions 
by increasing the number of officials who hold executive powers (Robalino et al. 2001). 
This chapter also illustrates that there are economic frameworks other than decentralisation 
relevant to explaining the meaning of the hospital sector transition. More specifically, in some 
countries, there has been significant restructuring of provider ownership rights and legal forms 
assumed by the provider organisation. This has had implications in terms of powers to set 
general priorities and specific objectives, autonomous decision-making, risk bearing, 
introduction of new accountability mechanisms, and the inclusion of internal participants that 
previously were not in a position to bargain over hospital behaviour, to name a few. 
A number of intermediate forms appeared between the extremes of central government and 
privatised ownership. Steps toward greater autonomisation seem to eventually lead to 
corporatisation of public providers, in line with the still-influential strategy of New Public 
Management. (The NPM paradigm has been claimed to be overridden by "digital-era 
governance" that reintegrates public provision under the central government with the aid of 
digitisation of administrative processes. This promises the efficiency of centralised processes 
with the HexibiHty of local provision - Dunleavy el al. 2006.) As presented in Table 4.1, 
corporatisation comes with considerable advantages of information (accounting standards, 
managerial reporting), self-management of inputs and processes, as well as economic incentives 
of the internal environment. In the course of aligning costs, benefits and decision powers, 
corporatisation may also facilitate the containment of corruption, including informal payments 
and the use of public facility for private practice that take place in the context of blurred sector 
boundaries. Consequently, transforming public hospitals into joint-stock companies has the 
potential to improve their perfomtance, subject to a number of prerequisites discussed below. 
The key message emerging from this chapter is that reforms of financing and governance are in 
fact two sides of the same coin. Hospital resource allocation decisions result from a complex 
overlap of external and internal incentives, pressures and interests. Therefore, provider payment 
mechanisms and the internal environment ought to be seen as complementary in that both are 
required in order for the other one to be elTective. Only a complete approach to designing an 
incentive environment will enable synergies between its external and internal components, 
directing organisational behaviour towards policy goals. 
4.8.2. Three pillars of reform 
This conclusion has crucial implications for strategic goals of future reforms. These should 
firstly involve a transformation of passive payers into active purchasers, in order to convey 
desired incentives through payment mechanisms. The ability of payment systems to shape 
provider behaviour is a well-established fact of health economics, although calibrating the 
system to ensure intended mixes of quantity and quality of care is itself a challenging process. 
Secondly, sector governance must be crystalised through confident and clear legal provision. 
This encompasses the MOH undergoing a transfomiation into the role of "sector steward" with 
strong supervisory and monitoring capacities, defining key prerogatives of autonomised 
hospitals, clarifying the role for territorial governments as funding bodies, and furnishing 
organisational and legal tools for effective accountability. Decision rights, residual claims, 
social functions, and market exposure have to be aligned with the structure of financing, in 
order to make the hospital receptive and reactive to external signals. Creating such a governance 
environment will catalyse the desired effects of financial stimuli by making provider 
organisations respond accordingly. Conversely, lack of such an environment will lead to 
hospitals ignoring the incentives, which is reported to be the case in Russia, for example. 
Phasing out the rigid central control creates room for greater fiexibility, adaptability to local 
conditions, and quicker and better use of resources toward satisfying local needs. For these 
advantages to occur, the empowered managers need both the willingness and the ability to 
respond appropriately. This brings us to the third pillar of a successful reform, which is ensuring 
the capacity of distributed managers to exercise their powers and fulfil responsibilities. The 
capacity in question spans from technical competencies and "people" skills to diligence in 
spending, abiding by health policies and regulations, and genuine concern with the well-being 
of the population. This pillar rests on the observation that getting the financial and governance 
incentives right is not a satisfactory condition for good system performance, i f key players do 
not have the ability to understand and carry out their parts. As it clearly emerged from Chapter 
3, the deficiency in managerial capacity is a common theme in countries coming from the 
communist background. Thus, in the context of CEE/CIS, successfully meeting this prerequisite 
requires raising a new managerial class that would inject a critical set of proficiencies into 
hospital administration. However, the oft-advised capacity-building is essential not only in post-
communist but also in industrialised countries. Smith et al. (2012) review governance in seven 
developed countries and emphasise the need of building national, local, practitioner and citizen 
understanding and support of health policy efforts. A lack thereof may thwart promising 
initiatives. 
4.8.3. Common mistakes of governance reform 
In CEE/CIS transition, expectations were that changes in the external incentive environment, 
most prominently the introduction of performance-based payment mechanisms, would induce 
adjustments in hospital networks leading to increased system performance. Most reforms 
focused on financing aspects of health care and overlooked the importance and complexity of 
the internal environment and broader hospital governance. As a result, the effectiveness of 
contract-based activity-related payments was undermined. A simple devolution of hospital 
ownership did not address the structural deficiencies of the hospital sector, and thus neither 
tackled the persistent problems of poor efficiency and responsiveness, nor led to de-emphasising 
of the hospital sector and preventing hospital debt from reoccurring. The above shortcomings 
come down to what Harding and Preker (2003) describe as a coherence of the reform package. 
There are clear synergies between providing financial incentives, providing market pressures 
and good governance. On the other hand, inadequacies in one of the above areas may undermine 
efforts in the others. 
What has resonated throughout this and the previous chapter, the essential preconditions for 
successful hospital autonomisation - excellent managerial qualifications, meaningful autonomy, 
orientation towards explicit goals and the presence of intensive bargaining and contracting -
have rarely been met in full. The transformations did not decisively remove the old system's 
rigidities of input, nor did they enable autonomous steering of the facilities, or altered 
organisational structures. It also failed to define the role for local governments as owners and 
equip them with tools for effective control and supervision of the health care establishments 
Ihey own. Therefore, although central control was loosened, accountability remained ineffective 
(Jakab et al. 2003). In addition, the presence of the soft budget constraint has been the key 
component of ill-conceived governance reforms. The danger of forced market exit did not 
materialise - on the contrary, the repeated bail-out of indebted facilities further retarded 
progress toward financially responsible management. 
The postulate of a pluralistic ownership of health care delivery (Kornai & Eggleston 2001b) has 
not been satisfactorily met. Reforms have been driven by ideological party politics more than 
international evidence. Bottom-up private initiatives have rarely been encouraged or fostered. 
To the contrary, rather than supporting all legally, professionally and ethically correct forms of 
ownership, regulation and protectionism continues its tendency to favour publicly owned health 
care establishments. The competitive component is often lacking, and the principle that the 
variety of organisational forms will lead to natural selection of the economically efficient ones 
has generally not been upheld. Quasi-market characteristics of the public sector are 
underdeveloped due to deficiencies in autonomy, accountability, performance-based payments, 
and exposure to competitive pressures. Boundaries of responsibility and ownership rights 
between the public, non-government and private domains as well as between various levels of 
government have not been clearly marked. This has not sufficiently encouraged legalising and 
formalising the activity undertaken in the grey economy of the health sector, and led to the 
continuation of informal payments and provision. 
4.9. Conclusions 
This chapter has provided a theoretical groundwork for the transition processes identified in 
Chapter 3. Governance has been substantiated as a key characterisation of the hospital sector, 
one that, along with provider payment mechanisms, completes the picture of incentives faced by 
providers. This is because the provider payments convey high-powered incentives and the 
governance arrangement determines the disposition to respond and the strength of response to 
those incentives. Therefore, refonns of financing and governance should be seen as 
complementary is creating conditions conducive to good performance. 
With respect to this, a common mistake of Eastern European reformers was prioritising payer 
refonns. While these refonns admittedly have served as a catalyst for the health sector 
evolution, they neglected the need to revise the scopes of autonomy, accountability and market 
exposure that determine the sensitivity to payment incentives. The outcome has too often been 
sub-par performance o f hospitals, and the permanent inability to solve the problems of 
overcapacity, inefficiency, poor responsiveness and recurring debt. 
In any health care system, governance takes place at the levels of central government, sub-
national governments and hospitals, as well as internally through bargaining by managers and 
other internal participants. The areas of theory discussed here correspond to these levels and 
help explain the meaning of CEE/CIS governance transition. The chapter started with an 
assessment of allocation mechanisms of the socialist system, the starting point for all HCSs in 
transition. It then overviewed dilemmas regarding health care sector participation o f post-
communist governments. Next, it reviewed arguments behind decentralisation, which in 
CEE/CIS has broken the budgetary and organisational dependence on the M O H and 
substantially re-shaped the structure and governance o f the system. The implications o f this 
were particularly strong for regional governments that were granted primary responsibility for 
hospital networks, as well as hospitals and their directors who gained increasing independence 
but were also faced with the necessity to perform multiple new tasks demanding active 
management. Further in relation to this, the chapter presented considerations around ownership 
and legal forms that explain the issues of autonomy and incentives, as well as economic models 
of behaviour that throw light on internal environment, intluences o f participant groups and 
relevant principal-agent problems. 
The review of relevant areas of economic theory shows that there has been substantial change in 
the conditions under which CEE/CIS hospitals operate, other than llnancial incentives. An 
original contribution of this chapter is a compilation of sources of improved efficiency and their 
relative importance (Table 4.1: Indicative economic efficiency potential per stage of hospital 
governance). The simple indicative framework summarises the potential of economic efficiency 
at each of the five stages o f governance transition identified in Chapter 3. However, the 
framework is not specific to the post-Semashko countries and, with little adaptation, can be 
applied to analyses of other systems. At the same time, by identifying theories applicable at 
different levels of the HCS, the study and the framework contribute to the debate o f the nature 
of decentralisation, its directions and desired extents. 
The above deliberations clearly indicate that hospital autonomy can be a viable strategy for 
achieving health policy objectives, including those of quality, efficiency and equity. However, 
its successfulness critically depends on external and internal incentives, effective accountability 
mechanisms, and the competence of the cadre of managers. One related finding is that without 
ensuring the right conditions, devolution is not a magic bullet for solving the problems of 
hospitals. In fact, a simple transfer of ownership to territorial governments and decision-making 
to hospital managers will also transfer the ingrained constraints and deficiencies. In this sense, 
decentralisation is not in itself a panacea, and should be seen as a tool for a major overhaul in 
the sector rules. 
To the extent that mechanisms underlying the functioning of the hospital sector are 
internationally universal, this study can be helpful in explaining pros and cons of approaches to 
governance reform. For countries more advanced in transition, it provides an opportunity to 
look back and understand how past decisions regarding tlie structure o f hospitals' management 
and ownership affect their current situation, and what can be made to further improve it. For 
countries at earlier transition stages, it offers lessons learned by their peers, indicating potential 
reform directions and pitfalls to avoid. For non-transition countries, this study is a step toward a 
uni l lcat ion o f various arguments surrounding the HCS decentralisation, and a voice in the 
discussion o f hospital governance that has intensified in the recent years. 
G iven the increasing attention it has attracted, governance appears to be a worthwhile venue for 
research. Future studies could take a closer look at the interplay o f internal and external 
incentives, by formalising the model or contextualising the arguments. The latter could include 
the relationship o f various payment mechanisms, e.g. patient-based or fee-for-service, and 
aspects o f governance; external pressures, residual claims, decision rights, strength o f 
accoimtability, and explicitness in social functions, all o f which may hinge on the form o f 
ownership. Such a comprehensive approach would likely be more successful than previous 
studies in explaining differences in hospital performance. 
The next chapter puts the compi led framework (Table 4.1) to a test, by statistically verifying 
whether the potential for economic efficiency o f respective transition stages materialised in the 
fonn o f selected measures o f hospital perfonnance. Chapter 6 offers an insight into the equity 
aspect o f health care in selected post-Semashko HCSs. 

Chapter 5: 
Statistical evidence on effects of hospital governance reforms 
5.1. Introduct ion 
From the perspective of economic incemives, two reforms were pronounced in the liospital 
sector of CEE/CIS since 1989. Firstly, there has been a shift from line-item budgeting to various 
contractual payments, in consequence of replacing selected integrated systems with social health 
insurance. Secondly, the hospital governance setting has evolved considerably, which has been 
exposed in Chapters 3 and 4. While the former reform has been subject to investigation in a 
number of publications referred in Chapter 2. Part II of this manuscript is the first study to 
systematically describe and measure the effects of hospital governance reforms. The 
rationalisation of hospital networks has been of great relevance to ail the coimtries that come 
from the Semashko backgroimd, historically heavily reliant on inpatient care. 
The aim of this chapter is to statistically verify impacts of hospital governance refonns on the 
levels of resources, utilisation, and outcomes in the hospital sector. The health care debate o f t h e 
early 1990s and the envisaged line of the Semashko systems transition often regarded the 
concept of decentralisation as a golden bullet for improving hospital performance. Therefore, 
the research question for this chapter is whether, controlling for parallel processes taking place 
in the hospital sector, the altering hospital governance structures led to improved system 
performance. 
Higher hospital performance can manifest itself in a number of ways. Measures employed in 
this study are absolute numbers of hospital facilities (hospitals and hospital beds per capita), 
utilisation thereof (average lengths of stay - ALOS. bed occupancy, volumes of hospital 
discharges), as well as health outcomes approximated by mortality rates. The size of hospital 
resources, their utilisation, and health outcomes, can all be expected to respond to changes in the 
hospital sector institutional setting. Theoretical bases for the expectation of decentralisation. 
devolution, autonomisation and corporatisation leading to rationalised resource use and better 
outcomes have been explored in Chapter 4. The study design assumes an estimation o f multiple 
models in an attempt to verify reform impacts as widely as permitted by the available data. The 
explanatory side of the model equation is based on the random trend model (Wooldridge 2002) 
and includes system inputs, hospital sector setup, trend components, and a set o f demographic 
control variables. 
The model presented here fits in a class of quantitative studies that interpret the post-communist 
transformation as a social experiment, and econometrically explore reform impacts by assuming 
a panel data structure. Notable analyses concerned the effects of SHI introduction on utilisation, 
expenditure, and outcomes (Wagstaff & Moreno-Serra 2009); likewise evaluation of effects of 
alternative hospital payment mechanisms (Moreno-Serra & Wagstaff 2010); a follow-up study 
by Leive (2010) in which he differentiates between GP and hospital payment mechanisms as 
well as controls for selected available physical resources; a cluster analysis based on 42 
structural characteristics and a subsequent application of the clusters to explaining variations in 
life expectancy at birth (Borisova & Gerry 2010, Borisova 2011). 
The approach assumed in the above studies has the benefit of providing sizeable datasets with 
countries splitting into the "treatment" and "control" groups, depending on their transition paths. 
This opportune study design possibility resembles numerous experimental evaluations of 
welfare reforms in the United States, which make an extensive use of annual administrative 
state records for building panel datasets (Blank 2002). Consequently, rather than being 
randomised controlled trials, they share the feature of being natural experiments, thus facing the 
problem of the states' self-selection for treatment being possibly endogenous to its outcomes. 
5.2. Methods 
5.2.1. Estimation strategy 
The statistical analysis encompasses 48 models that aim to quantify the consequences o f 
governance reforms for various areas of hospital sector operation. The response variables fall 
into the following categories: resources (5 models), utilisation (6) and discharges (9), as well as 
mortality: infant and maternal deaths (5), and disease-specific SDRs (23). Each outcome 
variable is modelled using a similar formulation, that is, follows the same hypothesised function 
of inputs, institutional setting, and trends, which is expounded in the next section. The 
component that varies between models is the vector of control variables, which follows suit of 
the outcome variable. Table 5.1 presents a summary of model specifications, including control 
variables. All models are estimated in Stata 12. 
Table 5.1: Model specifications, by type ol response measure 
Response va r i ahk caURorv Sys lem inpii l I 'mv kler i iaymcnl Hospi ta l govemanee Trend Con l ro l Error 
variahles variables variables componcn l variables l e m i 
<5> urban, age, pop 
LJtilLsation (6) 
Disease-spccillc discharges (9) = tch. public% fTs, cascmix mgml, own, corp d2-d22 '" 'tan,age ^ 
Inlant and maternal deaths (5) 
SDKs (23) 
A i l var iab les i ndexed for year a nd coun t ry . A l l var iab les d o u b l e first-dilTerentiated. A l l n o n - d u m m y var iables log-
t rans lbrn ied . Fu l l descr ip t ion o f var iab les p rov ided in Chap te r 5.2.2: M o d e l spec i f ica t ion . 
5.2.2. Model specification 
For answering the research question, of primary interest are the statistical significance, tlie 
signs, and the magnitude of coefficients corresponding to hospital sector reform variables. Since 
there exists no single indicator to adequately illustrate overall performance of the health care 
system (as a matter of fact, infant mortality and life expectancy are popular proxies for health 
outcomes), the approach here is to model each outcome indicator separately, using the same set 
of explanatory variables. 
The study concerns a panel of 22 post-Semashko countries over 22 years after the fall of 
communism. The structure of the dataset calls for a panel method to be used, with each data 
point representing a country-year combination. Furthermore, the nature of data has implications 
for the choice of a specific panel data method. 
The process of transition is by definition a time of great change, and considering a period as 
long as 22 years, there may be many factors other than the problem variables contributing to 
variation in response variables. This is in contrast to the individual-level panel data setting, in 
which individuals are often observed over short time periods. In this case, heterogeneity is well-
captured by explanatory variables, and it can be safely assurned that unobserved patterns of 
behaviour do not change over time, making a time-invariant individual effect suitable. Here, 
however, given the complex and evolving nature of institutions, it cannot be convincingly 
argued that unobserved country characteristics and explanatory variables be independent. 
Formally, the core assumption of the random effects model, cov(Ci,Xi) = 0, is unlikely to hold. 
Moreover, an interpretation of individuals randomly selected from a population, sometimes used 
to explain the essence of the random effects model, does not seem to appropriately describe the 
set of countries (or any set of countries for that matter). Rather, the countries are likely to have 
their own fundamental characteristics and be "one-of-a-kind individuals" (Verbeek 2004). 
These two circumstances rule out the possibility of employing the random effects model. 
Further, since virtually every health care reform aims at improving outcomes and/or system 
efficiency, reforms unfolding in parallel are likely to have simultaneous impact on system 
performance. In addition, there may be non-reform processes taking place in the system that add 
to the variation o f performance indicators. Such contributing factors may include central and 
local policies, directives, standards and norms, international development strategies (such as 
W H O Health for All programme), as well as enforcement and implementation thereof An 
example of such a circumstance was a vast reduction in the number o f hospitals (75%) and 
hospital beds (51%) in Moldova 1995-2002 (Atun et al. 2008); these cutbacks resulted from a 
medium-term restructuring plan carried out by the central government. Likewise, centrally 
administered maximum inpatient and outpatient capacities led to reductions in hospital beds in 
Hungary in the late 1990s (Orosz & Hollo 2001). Another non-reform source o f outcomes' 
variation is diffusion of technology, a major determinant as far as the health sector is concerned. 
None of these changes can be characterised as reforms, but have influence over inputs, 
processes, and outcomes. 
Because of these parallel processes affecting the sector's operation, the possibility of 
endogeneity in the model equation ought to be treated with caution. There are a number o f 
potential sources of endogeneity. For example, changes in the institutional environment taking 
place in parallel to the reforms of interest, if unaccounted for in the model, will lead to omitted 
variable bias. Or there may be an unobservable characteristic underlying countries' propensity 
to reform. A latent variable of political agenda could drive both hospital reforms and system 
parameters, for instance, public share of expenditure on health. In effect, the presence of 
simultaneity would lead to estimator bias. There could also be a case for simultaneity if, for 
instance, achieving certain GDP thresholds triggered institutional reforms through some sort of 
a political mechanism. More specifically, levels of current or projected health care spending 
may induce policy-makers to take reform action with the goal of increasing efficiency, 
containing costs, etc. 
Given the above considerations, there are important methodological features that a model needs 
to accommodate in order to reliably estimate reform effects. Firstly, except for the variables o f 
interest, it needs to consider other reforms that determine HCS performance. Secondly, it should 
have the capacity to capture fundamental country heterogeneity. Thirdly, it needs allow for 
country-specific trends independent from the above factors, in order to cater for time-variant 
unobservables such as non-reform processes and varying paces o f technology adoption, as 
discussed above. Because of the length of the time dimension of the panel, these trends may be 
expected to considerably contribute to variation in outcome measures. Fourthly, in providing for 
the above requirements, the specification must have the flexibility necessary to accommodate 
different categories of endogenous variables. 
Accordingly, the following model is proposed by the candidate: performance measures are a 
function of system inputs, hospital sector institutional characteristics, and a trend that captures 
other processes relevant to the outcome variable. The inputs are represented by a pair of 
variables: total expenditure on health and the public portion thereof. Further, the configuration 
of the hospital sector is represented in two key dimensions: provider payments and facility 
governance arrangements. Moreover, other things being equal, the outcome indicator would 
follow a trend that is a result of iinprovements in technology, organisation, norms, expertise, 
and government-driven advancement. The trend is assumed to have a dual nature, reflected by 
the regional and individual components. The former captures the global trend, while the latter 
reflects individual countries' progress relative to the region. Finally, certain indicators may be 
also driven by socio-economic parameters, and therefore need to be standardised with respect to 
those. Hence, the model anticipates control variables: urban share of population, population 
ages 65+, and population size. The inclusion or omission of each of those variables is contingent 
on the nature of particular outcome indicators. 
The specification that constitutes the base model can be formally written as: 
Yit = a -I- inputs,'tP + payi'^y -I- goVi'(6 -I- trendJ^S -I- controlsjtcp + Uj^  (5.1) 
where 
(1) inputs,'t = (tehit, publ ic%jt) is a vector of system inputs, 
(2) pay.'t = (ffSit, casemiXjt) is a vector representing the dominant provider payinent method, 
(3) goV't = (mgmtit , ownit, corpjt) is a vector holding the hospital governance status, 
(4) trendjf = (d^, Cj, gjt) is a vector capturing regional and individual trends, 
(5) controls,'t = (urbanit ,agejt ,papjt) is a vector of control variables, 
and p, 0, y, 6, <p are corresponding vectors of coefficients. Countries and years are indexed by i 
and t, respectively. The apostrophes in equation (1) indicate vector transposition. All non-
dummy, non-time variables are log-transfonned, both on the explanatory and response side of 
the equation. Natural logarithm is applied in the transformation. The use of the log-log 
specification aims at deflating disparities in indicator values between the countries, and in 
particular enables compatibility of high income countries of Central Europe and middle income 
former Soviet states. It is also the basic safeguard against heteroskedasticity, which is likely to 
occur in the dataset. As in any log-log specification, the estimates (other than those of dummy 
and time variables) are interpretable as percentage change - percentage impact. 
The term yjt represents an outcome variable o f choice, that is, a measure o f available facilities, 
utilisation, discharges, or mortality. The parameter a is fixed across individuals and time, 
providing the base intercept for the regression; Uj^  is the usual error term. 
The vector o f inputSj't provides information on the absolute level o f resources available in the 
public sector o f the health care system. Total expenditure on health, tehjt, is assumed to 
represent the value o f inputs in the health care system, and is a basic determinant o f the HCS 
capacity for providing utilisation and health outcomes. To allow for both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal comparability, TEH is expressed in per capita 2005 US dollars terms and adjusted 
for purchasing power parity. The aggregate spending information is coupled with the variable 
pub l ic%it , representing the portion o f system inputs that are attributable to the public system. 
Controll ing for the public share o f expenditure may be crucial, for instance, should public and 
private health care sectors have different characteristics in terms o f production functions and 
economic efficiency. 
Vectors pay-j and goVj'j hold the institutional setting o f the hospital sector. Specifically, they 
represent the dominant hospital payment mechanism and the dominant form o f hospital 
governance. The institutional setting, and consequently its reforms, are potential determinants o f 
hospital sector performance by, respectively, providing financial incentives through risk and 
profit components as well as determining the level o f decentralisation in resource allocation, 
accountability and risk bearing o f founding bodies, along the lines exposed in Chapter 4. Both 
aspects o f the hospital sector are factored in the model equation using the policy dummy 
variable approach, in which combinations o f binary variables jointly represent the possible 
institutional configurations. 
A long the absolute levels o f inputs, mechanisms for resource allocation play a critical role in 
determining health system performance. Reforms o f the provider payment mechanisms 
constitute major changes to CEE/CIS health care systems, and previous analyses provide 
statistical evidence that they have had significant impacts on numerous areas o f system 
performance (Moreno-Serra & Wagstaff 2010, Leive 2010). Having been empirically 
established as a statistically significant determinant o f performance, the factor needs to be 
controlled for in modelling other reforms. This necessity is also substantiated from the 
theoretical standpoint. Harding and Preker (2003) show that external and internal incentives in 
the hospital environment complement each other, and discuss conditions under which a one-
sided reform can be thwarted by a lack o f synergy in the broader institutional environment. For 
example, stimulating accountability by allowing hospitals to claim the residual revenue will 
have no effect i f the provider payment mechanism provides no opportunity for such revenue. 
Likewise, efficiency gains from establishing providers' competition will hinge on the presence 
and strength o f financial incentives. The dominant hospital payment mechanism is incorporated 
into Equation 1 through the vector payi't = (ffsn, casemiXit). This definition allows for three 
broad payment modalities to be represented: the explicitly modelled lee-for-service and case-
mix (in the literature also referred to as patient-based payment), as well as line-item, historical 
budgeting. The latter option, typical of the unreformed Semashko system, is encoded by both 
ffSjt and casemiXjt equalling zero. 
The vector gov,'t = (mgmtjt , ownjt, corpu) specifies the dominant hospital governance setting 
in country i at time t. The possible states are embodied by three dummy variables indicating 
decentralised facility management (mgmtit = 1), devolved facility ownership (ownit = 1), 
and corporatised forms of governance (corpjt = 1). Accordingly, the base (unreformed) 
hierarchical structure is represented by goV|'t = (0,0,0). The reform stages correspond to the 
definitions and mapping of governance transition presented in Chapter 3. The vector of 
coefficients 6 holds the estimated effect of each transition stage relative to the unreformed state. 
The set of control variables is a conditional constituent of the model equation. Depending on the 
type of response variable, it may include the share of urban population, the share of population 
ages 65 and above, or population size. Urbanisation quantifies the process of modernising 
societies with its economic consequences. Higher urban concentrations of population may lead 
to increased utilisation because of facilitated access to care through lessened time and monetary 
costs of travel, information advantage, or otherwise. This control variable is included in all 
estimated models. The age structure of population is controlled for as ageing populations are 
likely to increasingly demand medical care. However, this variable is omitted where the 
outcome variable has been age-standardised (as it is in SDRs) or there is no apparent theoretical 
link between the age structure and mortality (infant and maternal deaths). Additionally, volumes 
of resources that are expressed per number of population need to be controlled for the 
population size. The reason is that, if unaccounted for population size, a change in the indicator 
due to a reduction (increase) in resources cannot be distinguished from one resulting from an 
increase (decrease) in population size. This applies to such measures as numbers of hospitals 
and hospital beds, which are expressed per 100,000 population. 
Given the length of the time dimension, it is necessary to allow for a trend in yn. The indicator 
trend may be a product of a mix of factors including technological progress, organisational 
improvements, or increasing expertise. Other things being equal, these unidirectional processes 
should over time lead to better health outcomes and more efficient resource utilisation. 
Generally speaking, there are two approaches to formally factoring the trend into the model 
equation. One is to define y.t as a linear or non-linear function of time. An alternative is to 
include a vector of year dummy variables in the equation, which is equivalent to allowing for 
year-specific intercepts. Here employed is the latter, non-functional option - a vector dj 
consisting of dummy year variables d j to d22 (i.e. all cross-sections except for the base year 
1989). Consequently, vector = (62, ...,622) comprises estimators of each year's impact on 
the response variable. In terms of Equation 1, where 0 = (0d,0c. 0g)), vector captures the 
global trend, providing each year's own deviation from the base year 1989. The preference for 
this approach is based on a discussion by Wooldridge (2002). Moreover, the year-dummy 
models explain a greater portion of response variables' variation, compared to "a function of 
time" specification. Nonetheless, in Chapter 5.4 1 explore the consequences of this choice by 
comparing the outcomes of the two approaches. 
That said, countries may vary in both their base levels of outcomes and their capacity for 
improvement and innovation, for instance, due to some structural characteristics of the hospital 
sector, available technology, formal and infonnal practices, hospitals directors' qualifications 
and managerial capacity. They may also experience varying intensities of centrally-driven, non-
reform advancements. For example, a government may focus on improving outcomes in a 
particular disease category by targeting grants or using ministerial communication channels to 
disseminate best practices. Consequently, that country's performance in this aspect may diverge 
from the regional trend. 
This kind of heterogeneity is introduced into the model by two components. First, there is a 
time-invariant term Cj that permits each country's own base indicator level. It corresponds to the 
usual fixed effects' (FE) unobserved individual heterogeneity term. Second, the term gj^ = gj x 
t, an interaction of a country dummy and the time variable, introduces the possibility of an 
individual trend. In fact, Cj and g^ are similar in the sense that they both convey information on 
individual heterogeneity. However, while Cj is constant, gu is a characteristic that has an 
additive effect over time. Thus, looking at the model specification, each country is allowed its 
own intercept a + Cj, moreover, at time t it may deviate from the regional trend by git0g. The 
global and individual trends make up the total trend expression a -I- d(0(i -I- CjO^ -I- gjjOg. This 
specification is analogous to the random trend model proposed by Wooldridge (2002). The idea 
of countries following their own trends originated from studies of economic growth and has 
been successfully adopted in modelling of institutional health care reform. 
For Equation 1 coefficients to be estimated consistently, the assumption of strict exogeneity of 
the explanatory variables has to be met. Formally, with respect to individual effects: 
E(uitlgit-Ci,Xit) = 0 
where xjt = (mgrntu, ownjt, corpjt, ffsn, casemixit, tehjt, public%it, agen, urbanjt, popj,, dt) 
This is typically a strong assumption and therefore is unlikely to hold. The parameters of 
individual heterogeneity q and git are plausibly correlated with some of the explanatory 
variables, through a latent variable or otherwise. However, conditions for obtaining consistent 
estimators can be furnished tlirougli a transformation of Equation I that eliminates Cj and g|t 
from the model. By tlrst-differencing Equation 1 we get: 
Ayit = Ainputs.'tPpD + Apayi'typo + Agov.'tSpo + Atrend^epo + Acontrols.'tcppo + Au^ (5.2) 
where Ayjt = yu - yi,(t-i). 
This transformation ehminates Cj, while the other idiosyncratic term gjj persists in the 
differenced equation, albeit as a constant (Ag^ = gjt - gi(t - 1) = gj). One possibility of doing 
away with the problematic term is to first-difference Equation 2. Eliminating gj this way is an 
attractive venue because first-differencing also safeguards against serial correlation of the term 
AUjt that is likely to occur in this setting (Wooldridge 2002). Here, the resulting loss of another 
cross-section is not critical given the longitudinal size of the panel. An alternative way would be 
to proceed with a FE regression of Equation 2 that would also eliminate g,. However, for the 
estimators to be consistent, this approach requires both homoskedasticity and no serial 
correlation of the error term. Models that display no violation of these assumptions can be 
estimated using fixed effects. While this option is considered inferior for most of the models, 
when feasible, it is explored in Chapter 5.6 as an alternative approach. 
Applying the first-difference transformation to Equation 2 results in the final specification: 
A^yit = A2inputs,'tpFD2 + A^pay,'tyFD2 + A^goVi't6pD2 + A2dtedpD2 + A^controlSi'tcppD2 
-(-A^uit (5.3) 
where A^yit = Ayjt - Ayi,(t_i) = (yit - Yut-i ) ) - (Yut-i) - yi,(t-2)) = Yit - 2yi,(t-i) + 
Yi,(t-2)- C)ouble first-differencing has reduced trendj^ to dj by eliminating both individual 
components. 
This specification has the virtue of alleviating the problem of endogeneity without forgoing 
estimation feasibility. Given that ElA^XjtA^Uit) = 0, which stems from the assumption of 
explanatory variables' strict exogeneity. Equation 3 can be estimated using pooled ordinary 
least squares (OLS). This double first-difference transformation followed by an OLS estimation 
is henceforth referred to as FD2. 
Finally, in applying pooled OLS to panel data, one has to consider the presence of intragroup 
correlation of observadons. While observations can plausibly be considered independent 
between countries, the same is not necessarily true within-country. In order to partly relax the 
assumption of independent observations, variance-covariance matrix estimates can be obtained 
with individuals (here; countries) defined as observation clusters. Using this option will render 
cluster-robust (unbiased) standard errors, which also have the virtue of neutralising the 
problems of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in pooled OLS (Wooldridge 2002). 
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Commen t on unbalanced panels 
The data panel of full dimension (i.e. balanced) would consist of 484 observations (22 
individuals, 22 cross-sections). However, due to data limitations, mainly o f outcome variables, 
the effective panels include between 125 and 417 observations (see results' tables Chapter 5.5), 
with the average of 343.3 (std. dev. 52.4). This not only reduces the panel size, by also 
necessitates that modelled are unbalanced panels. 
The question thus arises of whether the unbalanced panels have implications for the estimation 
outcomes. For settling this question it is central to understand how the missing observations are 
generated. For instance, there is a possibility that poorer, less reformed countries are also 
disadvantaged in terms of information systems and thus suffer from incomplete data. This, in 
turn, would lead to more developed countries being overrepresented in some model samples. On 
the other hand, should the selection be entirely random, the statistical method would be 
consistent and asymptotically normal. Wooldridge (2002) provides a full discussion of this. 
Here, the missing data appears to threaten neither the feasibility o f models nor the consistency 
of statistical findings. Considering the wide selection of outcome variables used in this study, 
poorer countries are not systematically disadvantaged in terms of missing data. Nor are CEE 
countries immune to the problem. Countries of both upper and lower income range may miss a 
series o f values, while providing a complete value set of another variable. An inspection of the 
dataset does not reveal a pattern in this regard. The simple correlation value between the per 
cent of missing outcome variables and GDP p.c. in the pooled sample is -0.042, which indicates 
a negligible relationship. Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, rho=0.0006 calculated on 477 
observations, indicates that the two variables are independent (p-value 0.9889). As an 
illustration, the share of missing values against a logarithm o f G D P p.c. is plotted in Figure 5.1. 
In terms of data completeness through time, the initial and most recent periods show higher 
shares of missing data, compared to the intermediate period, when the cross-section average of 
missing values is the lowest and fluctuates around 10%. This indicates there is no consistent 
improvement taking place over time, as shown in Figure 5.2. 
To further safeguard against the possibility of selection being related to idiosyncratic errors, 1 
re-estimate the base model adding a lagged selection indicator, i.e. a dummy variable indicating 
whether the preceding observation is missing (Nijman & Verbeek 1992). The new variable 
results statistically significant in two models: SDRs of cerebrovascular diseases (p-value 0.043) 
and appendicitis (0.02). In the remaining 46 models, no evidence is found to support missing 
observations as predictors of the endogenous variable. 
Figure 5.1: Per cent of missing values of 48 outcome variables, by log G D P p.c. 
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Figure 5.2: Per cent of missing values of 48 outcome variables, by year 
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Finally, none of the previous peer-reviewed studies using similar methodology (enumerated in 
the introductory section of this chapter) assumes special treatment of the unbalanced panels or 
reports this as a study obstacle. 
5.2.3. Robustness of results 
This section sets out to verify the robustness of the base model results by exploring alternative 
specifications and reform interpretations. In particular, it relaxes some of the previous 
assumptions or takes an alternative approach to data or specification. Similar outcomes imply 
that a particular method or interpretation chosen for the base model does not introduce arbitrary 
bias, and thus corroborate the robustness of the findings. Alternative models considered here 
are: (a) a quadratic function of time in place of the year-dummy vector; (b) a quadratic 
extension of individual trends; (c) a lagged effect of reform introduction; (d) fixed effects 
approach to estimation of Equation 2; and (e) alternative interpretations of governance 
arrangements. New results are examined against the base model in Chapter 5.6. 
Quadratic time function 
In order to capture the global indicator trend, the base model employs a vector of year dummy 
variables, thus capturing each year's departure from the base year 1989. An alternative approach 
to account for the trend is to use a square function of time in the model equation. Since the trend 
component plays a vital role in the model by containing the change unaccounted for by other 
explanatory and control variables, it is worthwhile inquiring whether its form has influence over 
the outcomes. Equation 4 presents the modified specification, replacing the year-dummy vector 
with a quadratic time function. As previously, the linear component is eliminated in the FD2 
transformation. 
AVit = A^inputsJtPpDj + A^payj'tYFDa + A^gov,'t6pD2 -I- A^t^e^p^^ + A2controls;tcpFD2 
+ A2uit (5.4) 
Quadratic individual country trends 
The trend factor incorporated in the base model has two components: global and individual. 
This formulation enables the country trend to be interpreted as a deviation from the trend 
common to all the countries of the region. One limitation of the base model is that it imposes a 
linear form on the individual trend. This restriction enables double first-differencing of 
Equation I to eliminate the individual trend component, thus shunning the potential presence of 
endogeneity in the system and ensuring the estimates are bias-free. However, given the number 
of cross-sections, the assumption of a linear deviation may come as overly strong to adequately 
represent the actual country progress. Some countries took rapid transformation steps in the 
early 1990s, only to slow down their transition in the second decade. In the previously discussed 
case o f Mo ldova 1995-2002, govcrnmenl-driven changes led to a dramatic reduction in hospital 
resources, a process that levelled otT in the later years (Atun et al. 2008). Under the base model 
assumption, this adjustment would be averaged out by a linear fit. Therefore, it is relevant to 
consider an extended specification that would al low a quadratic form o f the individual trend and 
to see the extent to which removing the linear restriction alters the outcomes. 
The specification is a generalised version o f the base model, i.e. the base model is nested in 
Equation 5 with the condit ion gf^ = 0. The original individual trend component g|t is replaced 
by git + gft' where gf, = gj t^ and g, is a country dummy variable. As before, by the means o f 
FD2 transformation the linear components are eliminated, and resulting is: 
A ^ i t = A2inputS,'tPFD2 + A^Payi'tYFD2 + A^gOV|'t6po2 + A2dted,pD2 + A^gftOgi PD2 
+ A2controls,'t(ppD2 + A^Ujj (5 .5) 
For the model to be estimated consistently, the condition cov(gf t ,Xi ) = 0 is required to hold. 
However, this assumption can neither be formally proven nor statistically tested, and the 
quadratic trend component cannot be eliminated through a model transformation. Consequently, 
changes in the parameter estimates relative to the base model may result both from removing 
the restriction o f individual trend linearity and from the problem o f endogeneity. The latter 
wou ld occur, for example, in case there was simultaneity between country trends and control 
variables. Therefore, given that the outcomes cannot be demonstrated bias-free, this 
specification is only estimated and discussed informally. 
Despite this methodological predicament, it is informative to know the outcomes o f the 
extended specification. Should the estimates be identical or nearly identical to those previously 
obtained, it would substantiate the base specification as unlikely to suffer from the omission o f 
the squared trend component . This is owing to the fact that it is unlikely for the patterns o f 
endogeneity to even out effects o f the individual trends" extension. 
Fixed Effects es t imat ion 
As explained in Chapter 5.2.2, Equation 2 can be estimated using either o f two methods: tirst-
differenced pooled O L S and fixed effects. The base model relies on the first approach to eschew 
the potential problems o f autocorrelation. However, where no autocorrelation is confirmed, FE 
is a viable alternative (Wooldr idge 2002). The aim o f this specification is to verify whether the 
alternative approaches lead to similar statistical outcomes and thus to consistent conclusions. 
In order to verify the sensitivity o f findings with respect to the above alternative, I first 
determine the set o f models that are suitable for both F D and FE. 1 verify the presence o f 
autocorrelation in the residuals o f Equation 2 and discard the models where the issue is detected. 
In order to verify the presence of autocorrelation, I use the xtserial Stata command that performs 
a test for serial correlation of the first-differenced error terms in a linear panel data model. The 
test was first proposed by Wooldridge (2002) and popularised by Drukker (2003) who 
demonstrated the test 's desirable characteristics in terms of statistical properties in samples of 
moderate size. As expected in this setting, a majority of models are found to suffer from the 
presence of serial correlation, supporting the original choice of the more tlexible FD2 approach 
for the base model. However, in eight models the null hypothesis of no first-order 
autocorrelation is supported by the statistical test. Thus selected models are re-estimated using 
the potentially more efficient FE. As previously, option "cluster" is used at the country level to 
prevent the issue of heteroskedasticity, which in Stata also implies robust variance estimates. 
While Stata does not allow for the option "nocons tanf in FE models, this does not pose a 
problem. The presence of the intercept only affects the interpretation of year dummy variables -
the year-specific intercept under this specification equals a -I- Gj. 
Lagged effects 
The following extension furnishes the model with the capacity to capture a delayed reform 
effect. There are a number of reasons why certain consequences may not materialise in the 
concurrent year. Firstly, reforms may become effective throughout the year rather than on 
January 1st. This may leave less time for the new setting to be reflected in the outcome 
variables. Secondly, the impact may be partly delayed because of the organisational 
unresponsiveness, legal disputes, medical professionals" protests, or other kinds of institutional 
inertia. Reform proceedings in CEE/CIS were rather choppy in this respect, particularly in the 
first decade after the fall of communism (compare Chapter 2.6 on consistency of reform). 
Thirdly, a reform of a disruptive nature could cause initial disturbances (e.g. organisational, 
legal) that only after some time of adjustment would give way to efficiencies of the new setup. 
For the above reasons, it may be justified to extend the model with a lagged reform variable to 
verify the hypothesis of the second-year effect. 
The model, Equation 6, is equivalent to the base Equation 3 other than it also includes a vector 
of lagged dummy reform variables goVi'(t_i). 
A^Yit = A2inputs;tPpD2 -I- A2payi'typD2 -I- A2gov;,6(o),pD2 + gov-(t_i)6(i),FD2 + A^dtGj.FDz 
+ A^controlSi'tcppDj + A^u.t (5 .6) 
Alternative interpretations of institutional arrangements 
The final robustness check uses alternative coding of hospital governance variables, where the 
literature is not clear-cut about the timing or scope of reform. This is further discussed in 
Chapter 5.6, in connection to variables of hospital governance. 
5.3 . Data 
5.3.1. Explanatory variables 
Hospital governance 
The explanatory side of the model equation broadly consists of institutional reform variables, 
system inputs, regional and individual trends, as well as control variables. The former are of 
central importance as they directly address the research question. As far as hospital governance 
is concerned, the policy dummy variables reflect the transition stages laid out in Chapter 3. 
Therefore, the modes of hospital sector governance are: no reform (basic state), decentralised 
management , devolved ownership, and corporatised. The variable values correspond to the full 
mapping of hospital sector transition presented in Table 3.1. However, as opposed to the 
transition mapping, the statistical model does not encompass privatisation. This is following the 
observation that privatisation, as a dominant mode of hospital governance, accounts for only 
three observations in the dataset, all within one coimtry (Georgia 2008-2010). FD2 
transfonnat ion reduces the number of observations down to a sole instance of privatisation 
(Georgia 2008), effects of which cannot be estimated; in tenns of statistical analysis, this 
situation is undistinguishable from the observation's error term. Instead, this case is unified into 
the category "corporatisation", based on the understanding of privatisation as a special case of 
corporatisation where the organisation controlled by private sector investors operates 
autonomously from the government structures. Nonetheless, since this mode of governance may 
have altogether distinctive characteristics, this interpretation is subject to model robustness 
scrutiny. 
Alternative interpretations of hospital governance 
The base model relies on governance variables according to Table 3.1: Mapping of hospital 
governance transition. The mapping is a quantification of reforms, produced in the course of 
overview of country profiles and experts ' publications. While the literature review proved 
fruitful in characterising this previously unexplored area of transition, a number of interpretation 
ambiguities arose in the process of codifying reform variables for the purposes of the 
quantitative study. The ambiguities stem from the descriptive nature of the source materials, the 
most common problems being: (a) a variety of arrangements put in place in a country at a given 
time, making it difficult to choose the predominant/most relevant one; (b) a lack of specificity in 
description, e.g. no detailed information on year of commencement , duration, scope, involved 
subjects, economic features; (c) unclear, ambiguous or contradicting descriptions; and (d) 
inconsistencies between literature positions. Practically, in terms of quantifying the collected 
information, the problem of interpretation materialised in two broad situations. One stemmed 
f rom ambiguously pictured boundaries between central and decentralised competencies. The 
other related to vaguely def ined scopes of authority, responsibility and r isk-bearing transferred 
in the process of ownership devolution; this made it difficult to mark the d i f ference between 
superficial adjus tments and actual systemic change. 
Generally speaking, most interpretation challenges concerned circumstances of the less 
developed, non-reformed CIS countries. The problems had their sources both in the quality and 
quantity of publications and in the characteristics of reforni processes. The Commonwea l th of 
Independent States experienced fewer milestone changes, and the formal continuation of some 
Semashko arrangements obscures the more subtle reformation steps that may have taken place. 
In fact, most of the CIS countries introduced a degree of local s tructures ' au tonomy, even if 
their health sectors remained headed by the Ministries of Health. However , the nature of these 
systems is largely informal and unregulated, because centrally-steered systems of the Semashko 
tradition do not rely on explicit regulation as much as on internal structures, rules and inlluence. 
Thus, the incertitude in understanding these systems results from the prominence of informal 
authority and centralisation of decision powers by influential individuals, which add up to a 
diff iculty in judg ing the actual extent of local governments ' discretion over resource allocation. 
On the other hand, to some extent it is the literature of the subject that fails to provide sufficient 
information. Despite the fact that the Health Systems in Transition series a ims at catering 
comparable country profiles, certain aspects of resource allocation remain absent f rom the 
publication template, and thus their relevance is left to local authors ' discretion. This results in 
sketchy and patchy descriptions of matters central from the economic standpoint. Also, the main 
interest in this study is in the actual rather than nominal arrangements that inl luence resource 
allocation. As the reality of CEE/CIS shows, these two areas often diverge. The interpretation 
puzzle is also in part attributable to distinguishing between real decentralisation/devolution from 
delegation/de-concentration, the latter conveying little economic incentive, that are often 
difficult to tell apart in complex institutional settings. 
Given the abovementioned concerns, it is worthwhile exploring the areas of ambigui ty and 
ver i fying the sensitivity of results to the choice of interpretation. So, the last robustness check 
concerns the base specification (Equation 3), however, estimated using an alternative coding of 
hospital governance variables. Modificat ions in the understanding of the institutional setting 
include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. Further, relaxed is the 
supposition that privatisation is a particular case of corporatisation and has the same 
characteristics, which originally led to merging the two scenarios. This problem has been a 
prominent subject of health economic studies, and it has been argued and demonstra ted that 
private hospitals may display different behaviour and have distinct properties of economic 
eff ic iency compared to those publicly owned (Sloan 2000). Thus, in the alternative 
interpretation, the observations involving privatised hospitals are discarded rather than merged 
into the corporatised category. A siimiTiary of the alternative interpretations is provided in Table 
5.2, Estimation results are discussed together with other alternative specifications in Chapter 
5.6. 
Table 5.2: Alternative interpretations of key reform variables 
IlospituI governance sta^e 
Centra l i sed Decentral ised D e v o K e d Coniorat i sed Privatised 
Country' s v s l c m manage ment ownership facilities lacilities Alternati\c interpretation 
Albania 1989-2010 
Armenia 1989-1995 1996-1997 1998-2010 
Azerba i jan 1989-2010 
Bulgaria 1989-1990 1991 1992-1998 1999-2010 
Belarus 1989-2010 
C z e c h 
Republic 
1989-1991 1992-2002 2003-2010 
Estonia 1989-1993 1994-2001 2002-2010 
cross-sect ions 2008-2010 
Georgia 1989-1994 1995-1996 1997-2007 2008-2010 removed f rom the da tase t to 
eliminate privatisation 
1lungary 1989 1990-2010 
From 1995 devolved ownership . 
K a z a k h s t a n 1989-1994 1995-2010 f r o m 2006 more than 50% of 
hospitals corporat ised 
f rom 1997 devolved ownership . 
Kyrgyzs tan 1989-1993 1994-2010 f rom 2004 most hospitals 
corporat ised 
f rom 2004 devolved ownersh ip 
with most hospitals conver ted 
Latvia 1989-1992 1993-1999 2000-2010 
into s ta te hospitats with local 
gov'ts as funding bodies 
Lithuania 1989-1990 1991-1996 1997-2010 
Moldova 1989-2002 2003-2010 
Poland 1989-1990 1991-1998 1999-2010 
Romania 1989-2001 2002-2010 
Russ ian 
1989-1992 1993-2010 
Federa t ion 
Slovakia 1989-2003 2004-2010 
Tajikistan 1989-2010 
country excluded f rom analysis 
Turkmen i s t an 1989-2010 a s data not reliable (Reche l & 
M c K e e 2007) 
f rom 1997 decentral ised 
tJkraine 1989-2010 managemen t , "functional 
deconcentra t ion" 
Uzbek i s t an 1989-2010 
Provider payment mechanisms 
The main reason for incorporating provider payment mechanisms into the model is that they 
have been substantiated as significant determinants of the quantity, quality and cost of health 
care. Fee-for-service and case-mix are the two major hospital payment modalities that emerged 
in the region as alternatives to Semashko 's line-item budgeting. The relative merits of these two 
broad payment systems are in line witin the discussion of "cost-based" and prospective 
reimbursement by Ellis and McGuire (1986). The former category includes arrangements that 
put the provider in control of the volume of services supplied, such as per procedure, per diem 
or another form of bed-days. These types of payments are susceptible to supplier induced 
demand, as they guarantee a contracted level of revenue per unit o f service utilised. In effect, 
the provider has the incentive to oversupply the services on which it profits, and undersupply 
the services reimbursed below the actual costs of provision. Case-mix reimbursement, on the 
other hand, is typically based on an average cost of provision within a group o f providers, and 
thus encourages efficiency by putting the weight of fmancial risk on the provider. The fmancial 
and health outcomes of this arrangement depend on the mechanism for price determination and 
the overall effectiveness of the case-mix systein. " D R G creep", overprovision o f profitable 
services and underprovision of the non-profitable ones, as well as risk selection, are examples of 
strategic behaviours that may exploit this system. 
Pure FFS and case-mix are by no means are the only payment schemes to be put in operation in 
CEE. Most countries employ a mix of payment mechanisms, and singling out the dominant one 
may be both challenging and conditional on interpretation of the implemented system. For 
example, in Russia formally in place is a hospital reimbursement system that involves both 
historical budgeting and a case-mix scheme. Under such a system, hospitals could be expected 
to respond at the margin to case-mix incentives. However, it has been reported that the case-mix 
component is largely ignored by facility administrators, blunting the incentive effect and 
reducing the effectiveness of the payment system to that of historical budgeting (Tragakes & 
Lessof 2003). In the Czech Republic, "'the typical purchaser-provider contract for inpatient care 
has consisted of three or four different reimbursement mechanisms, including case payments 
based on DRGs, individual contracts, global budgets and, since 2009, capped fee-for-service 
payments for hospital outpatient care" (Bryndova et al. 2009). In some cases, the ambiguity 
stems from interpretation discrepancies between publications treating of health financing. For 
instance, the period 1999-2005 in Kazakhstan is inconsistently reported as dominated by either 
FFS or case-mix, depending on source (Kulzhanov & Rechel 2007, Fuenzalida-Puelma et al. 
2010, Moreno-Serra & Wagstaff 2010, Leive 2010). To deal with the uncertainty and allow for 
a reasonable simplification for the purposes of modelling, 1 follow a few criteria in determining 
policy variables. Firstly, 1 give priority to peer-reviewed publications. Secondly, in considering 
contradicting literature indications, I choose the interpretation that is more prevalent and/or 
more specifically described than others. Thirdly, when a mix of payment methods is in place, I 
select the one that is most likely to affect hospital behaviour at the margin. 
In reality, payment mechanisms (as well as governance modalities) that go under one name may 
display considerable design differences between countries. In the often turbulent times o f 
transition, some countries introduce payment systems that are faulty altogether. Therefore, the 
levels of instrument sophistication, optimisation, as well as carefulness of implementation vary, 
vide the degree of re lmement of case-mix systems in Armenia and Hungary (cf Hakobyan et al. 
2006, Gaal et al. 2011). The model approach simplifies these mechanisms in an attempt to 
control for the incentives in hospital service provision, with the usual downside of overlooking 
the existing variety. A mapping of provider payment mechanisms used in the base specification 
is presented in the Appendix 1, Table A . l . 
Table 5.3: Reform variables characterising the hospital scctor 
Count positive Variable Variable 
name description Definition 
1 if hospital m a n a g e m e n t decent ra l i sed to 
m g m l 
Decen t r a l i s ed 81 a sub-nat ional tier of gove rnemen t but no author 's o w n mapping ba sed on literature 
m a n a g e m e n t ( 1 7 % ) devolved owne r sh ip or corpt)ratLsaiion of 
hospitals. 0 o thewise 
overv iew (Table 3.1) 
o w n 
D e v o l v e d 
o w n e r s h i p 
82 
{ 1 7 % ) 
1 if facility owne r sh ip devolved to a sub-
national tier of government but no 
coporatLsation, 0 o the rwise 
author 's o w n mapping ba sed on literature 
overv iew {Table 3.1) 
c o r p 
Corpora t i s ed 
facilities 
67 
( 1 4 % ) 
1 if hospital facilities considerablv 
au tonomous via corporat isat ion or o ther 
m e a n s , 0 o the rwise 
author ' s o w n mapping based on literature 
overv iew (Table 3.1) 
reconci led Moreno -Se r r a & W a g s t a f f 
f f s F e e for se rv ice 
50 
( 1 0 % ) 
1 il" FFS dominant hospital paymen t 
mechan i sm, 0 o therwise 
(2010) and Leive {2010), with o w n 
ad jus tments ba sed on literature overv iew 
(Appendix I, Table A . l ) 
reconci led Morcno-Se r ra & W a g s t a f f 
c a s e mix C a s e mix 
146 
( 3 0 % ) 
1 if c a s e - m i x dominant fo rm of hospital 
paymen t , 0 o the rwise 
(2010) and Leive (2010), with o w n 
ad jus tments based on literature overv iew 
(Appendix 1 ,Table A . l ) 
System inputs 
In modell ing institutional reforms a number of other factors potentially affecting system 
per fonnance ought to be taken into consideration, which is reflected in Equation 3. Total 
expenditure on health per capita reflects the value of system inputs. Ceteris paribus, higher 
health care system inputs may enable increased utilisation or better quality, potentially yielding 
improved health outcomes. TEH p.c. is calculated as a product of GDP p.c. and expenditure on 
health as per cent of GDP. The preference is given to GDP per capita expressed in terms of 
purchasing power parity, because it captures the value of goods and services forgone in 
exchange for health care inputs, thus better reflecting the real costs of the system operation. This 
real opportunity cost approach enables comparability of economies with heterogeneous 
structures of prices. 
Admittedly, an inputs ' variable reflecting specifically hospital expenditure would constitute a 
potentially superior alternative to TEH p.c. While information on hospital expenditures is 
available in O E C D System of Health Accounts (OECD.Stat) , it only concerns five CEE 
countries in years 2001-09 (over this period, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia spent on the average 36.6% of their TEH on hospitals). However, no such dataset 
exists for the time period and set of countries required by the scope of this study. Nevertheless, 
the hospital sector does not operate independently from other sectors of health care. The 
opposite is true - the inputs in public health and primary care are likely to influence both the 
hospital sector spending and its outcomes, thus to some extent justifying the prevalent use of 
total health care expenditure in previous studies. Furthermore, the model operates on log 
transformed expenditure variables. Supposing the proportion of hospital spending in TEH 
remains constant, a percentage increase in total expenditure would result in the same 
proportional increase in the hospital share of spending, and for the purpose of model estimation 
there would be no difference between the two variables. How strong is the assumption of 
constant hospital share in TEH? Looking again at the five CEE OECD countries, the average 
annual change in hospital expenditure as percentage of TEH equalled 0.2 percentage point, with 
a standard deviation of 2.84. A one-sample mean-comparison t-test fails to reject H,,: mean=0 
with p-value=0.6577, n=39. Thus, the parameter of interest does display some variation, 
however, given the model specification, the use of TEH p.c. for representing system inputs does 
not appear to pose a methodological problem. 
The data of GDP per capita and total expenditure on health as share of GDP were acquired from 
The World Bank World Development Indicators (WB WDI) database. The database covers the 
period 1995 to 2010. Values for the year 1990 were obtained from Murray et al. (1994) and the 
remaining missing values, year 1989 and the period 1991-94, were linearly interpolated (the 
1989 values were extrapolated, to be exact). In the same manner were supplemented the 
respective missing values of the indicator "public share of total health expenditure". Controlling 
for the relative level of public spending allows for public and private sectors' distinct properties 
in terms of their production functions, and coupled with TEH p.c. determines the value of public 
sector inputs. Altogether, the interpolated values amount to 0.57% of data points in the panel 
(213 estimated values in a dataset of 22 countries x 22 cross-sections x 77 variables). Not 
allowing for the interpolation would result in a loss of 21.7% of all observations, and severely 
limit the information on early transition years. 
Control variables 
The population age structure is approximated by the indicator "share of population ages 65 and 
above" and aims to represent the cost-pressures that stem from population ageing. Urban 
population as per cent of total population controls for additional care utilisation that may 
originate from urban dwellers' facilitated access to care and availability of information, as well 
as distinct lifestyles and living conditions. Both indicators were acquired from the WB WDI 
database. In addition. Equation 3 includes a set of dummy variables, which allow for estimating 
T a b l e 5.4: I n p u t a n d cont ro l ( con t inuous ) va r i ab les 
Obs 
Variable (% completeness ) 
Mean (sl.dev) 
1989 2()()9 
1989 - 2()«9 
% change Definition Source 
Total expenditure 
on health per 
capita 
Public share of 
total expenditure 
on health 
Age structure 
Urban population 
Population size 
474 
(98%) 
474 
(98%) 
484 
(100%) 
484 
(100%) 
484 
(100%) 
313.94 
(135.24) 
69.51 
(8.13) 
9.59 
(2.46) 
64.1 
(11.01) 
715.75 
(381.91) 
65.09 
(11.02) 
12.27 
(3.71) 
63.45 
(12.51) 
385,434,163* 381,698,505* 
128% 
28% 
-1% 
Product of [Total 
Health Expenditure as 
% of GDP] and | ( iDP 
per capita. P P P | 
Health expenditure, 
public (% of total 
health expenditure) 
Population ages 65 and 
above (% of total) 
Urban population 
(% of total) 
-1% Population, total 
- World Bank WDl database, accessed 22 May 
2012: GDP per capita. PPP (constant 2005 
international $) (1989-2010); I lealth expenditure, 
total (% of GDP) (1995-2010) 
- Murray et al. 1994: Total health expenditure, % of 
(iDP (1990) 
- 1989, 1991-1994 values product of actual GDP 
p.c. and estimated values of Total Health 
Expenditure as % of GDP (linear interpolation based 
on years 1990 and 1995) 
- World Bank WDl database, accessed 22 May 
2012: Health expenditure, public (% of total health 
expenditure) (1995-2010) 
- Murray ct al. 1994: Public health expenditure as % 
oftolal(1990) 
- Values for years 1989, 1991-1994 linearly 
interpolated based on values years 1990 and 1995 
World Bank WDl database, accessed 22 May 2012 
World Bank WDl database, accessed 22 May 2012 
World Bank WDl database, accessed 22 May 2012 
* CEE population total 
Means are population-weighted, except lor public share of TEH that is weighted by total health expenditure. 1989 to 2009 change is the percentage change in weighted 
2009 v a l u e - 1 9 8 9 v a l u e regional means • 
year-specific intercepts. This is a way of controlling for unidirectional technological and 
organisational progress as well as reflecting non-reform efforts in de-emphasising the hospital 
sector and improving its performance. These variables were generated from panel data 
parameters. 
5.3.2. Variables of resources and utilisation 
The study is designed to independently estimate a number of econometric models in order to 
verify the impacts of hospital governance reforms on various areas of health care system 
performance. Given that the explanatory side of the equation is similar in each case, the 
outcome indicator is both a key specification component and the model-identifying item. The 
outcome variables fall into three categories: hospital resources, utilisation and discharges, and 
mortality. The choice of variables is based on the criteria of (a) availability of data, (b) 
relevance to hospital sector performance, (c) cross-sectional and over-time comparability. 
Facility variables are standardised per 100,000 population and include numbers of hospitals, 
acute care hospitals, hospital beds, acute care hospital beds, and psychiatric hospital beds. The 
"hospital" category includes general, specialized, acute care and long-stay hospitals; it excludes 
balneological institutes, health resorts, sanatoria, nursing homes for the physically and mentally 
disabled, homes for the elderly, day centres, day hospitals. The hospital, as defined, may but 
does not have to provide outpatient services (WHO HFA-DB). 
Utilisation is expressed with two variables of average lengths of stay (in acute care hospitals as 
well as all hospitals), acute care hospitals' bed occupancy rate (in per cent terms), and hospital 
discharges. The latter category consists of both aggregate and disease-specific variables. The 
aggregate discharge measures are inpatient care discharges, acute care discharges (both per 100 
population), and inpatient surgical procedures per year (per 10,000 population). Measures of 
disease-specific discharges are expressed per year per 100,000 population and include: (1) 
neoplasms, (2) cerebrovascular diseases, (3) the circulatory system, (4) the digestive system, (5) 
infectious and parasitic diseases, (6) injury and poisoning, (7) ischaemic heart disease (IHD), (8) 
musculoskeletal system and connective tissue, and (9) the respiratory system. A summary of 
variables along with selected descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5.5. All the above data 
were derived from the W H O Health for All Database (WHO HFA-DB). 
5.3.3. Variables of mortality 
Measuring health outcomes at the aggregate system level presents serious theoretical and 
practical challenges. Here, the outcomes are approximated by measures of mortality. Certainly, 
this approach assumes away the morbidity dimension of health. This imposes a considerable 
constraint on the universality of findings, given that contemporary health care system challenges 
T a b l e 5.5: M e a s u r e s of hospi ta l r e sources a n d util isation 
O b s 
N o M e a s u r e 
Mean (st.dev) 1 9 8 9 - 2 0 0 9 
F a c i l i t i e s , p e r 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 p o p u l a t i o n 
1 Hospi ta ls 
421 6.74 3.98 
- 4 1 % 
( 8 7 % ) (2.68) (1 .9) 
2 A c u t e ( shor t - s t ay ) hospitals 291 7 .16 3.2 - 5 5 % 
( 6 0 % ) (1.23) (1.9) 
3 Hospi ta l b e d s 
414 1238.79 684.13 
- 4 5 % 
( 8 6 % ) (166.61) ( 1 7 6 2 ) 
4 A c u t e c a r e hospital beds 376 959.54 501.77 - 4 8 % 
( 7 8 % ) (188.12) (135.36) 
5 Psychia t r ic hospital beds 
4 1 9 119.11 64.3 
- 4 6 % 
( 8 7 % ) (31.88) (26.33) 
I ' t i l i sa l iun 
6 A v e r a g e length of s tay , all hospitals 
469 15.55 9 .42 
- 3 9 % 
( 9 7 % ) (1 .47) (2 .61) 
7 A v e r a g e length of s tay, a c u t e c a r e hospitals only 
316 
( 6 5 % ) 
13.42 
(0.75) 
8 .97 
(1.98) 
- 3 3 % 
8 B e d o c c u p a n c y ra te in % , a c u t e c a r e hospitals only-
287 
( 5 9 % ) 
80.98 
(4.05) 
7 9 1 9 
(16.67) 
- 2 % 
9 In-pat ient c a r e d i s c h a r g e s per 100 
470 
( 9 7 % ) 
22 
(4.21) 
19.26 
(5.27) 
- 1 2 % 
10 A c u t e c a r e hospital d i s cha rges per 100 
325 
( 6 7 % ) 
255 
22 .19 
(2.35) 
4908.81 
16.43 
(4.71) 
4747.49 
- 2 6 % 
11 Inpat ient surg ica l p r o c e d u r e s per yea r , per 100,000 
H o s p i t a l d i s c h a r g e s , d i s e a s e g r o u p s , p e r 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 
( 5 3 % ) (1132.04)* (3223.64) 
- 1 3 % 
12 
434 339.72 508 .39 
C e r e b r o v a s c u l a r 
( 9 0 % ) (152.1) (323.78) 
50% 
440 2133.44 2783.42 
13 Circula tory s y s t e m 
( 9 1 % ) (644.6) (1194.89) 
3 0 % 
441 2009.92 1736.28 
- 1 4 % 14 Digest ive s y s t e m 
( 9 1 % ) (601.17) (491.44) 
439 989.44 7 5 6 31 
- 2 4 % 15 Infec t ious and parasit ic 
( 9 1 % ) (533.43) (285.23) 
440 1435.9 1308.51 
- 9 % 16 Injury a n d poisoning 
( 9 1 % ) (371.65) (461.73) 
431 647.16 937 .78 
4 5 % 17 I s chaemic hear t d i sease 
( 8 9 % ) (215.97) (672.59) 
440 991.87 943.24 
-5%> 18 Muscu loske l e t a l s y s t e m a n d connec t ive tissue ( 9 1 % ) (529.63) (471.2) 
439 742.85 1223.21 
6 5 % 19 N e o p l a s m s , all ( 9 1 % ) (239.28) (704.22) 
438 3123.91 2448.86 
- 2 2 % 20 Resp i ra to ry s y s t e m ( 9 0 % ) (1521.06) (1005.43) 
» 1990 
Al l m e a s u r e s w e r e o b t a i n e d from a n d f o l l o w d e f i n i t i o n s in t h e W H O Healt l i F o r All d a t a b a s e . 
M e a n s a re p o p u l a t i o n - w e i g h t e d , e x c e p t for no . 6, 7, a n d 8 that a re w e i g h t e d by , respec t ive ly , n u m b e r s o f hosp i ta l 
e p i s o d e s , a c u t e h o s p i t a l e p i s o d e s , a n d beds . 1989 to 2 0 0 9 c h a n g e is t h e p e r c e n t a g e c h a n g e in w e i g h t e d reg iona l 
2009 value . 
m e a n s — : 1. 
focus primarily around the quality of life, as illustrated in the rectangularisation of the survival 
curve and the accompanying compression of morbidity (Fries 1980). There are two main 
reasons why mortality measures should nonetheless be relied on. First, they are abundant and of 
reasonably good quality, allowing comparisons of large groups of countries over long periods of 
time. This is paramount in Eastern Europe, an emerging region in which availability of past data 
cannot be taken for granted, especially in the early years of transition. Second, they illustrate 
precisely the process of tackling the mortality aspect of quali ty-adjusted life expectancy. As the 
data in Table 5.6: Measures of mortality attributable to hospitals show, the region has made 
considerable progress in this respect. However, since the morbidity dimension of health 
outcomes is left out in this study, generalised conclusions regarding HCSs have to be drawn 
with caution. 
Selection of mortality indicators poses a conceptual and methodological problem because deaths 
from certain conditions are not directly attributable to performance of the HCS. Conversely, 
some deaths may be considered avoidable and thus, to various extents, amenable to health care. 
Further still, the hospital sector might not be accountable for the whole of avoidable mortality, 
because some of it may be resulting from deficiencies in public health, primary care, emergency 
medical services, etc. This is likely to be the case with diseases in which prevention or early 
detection play critical roles for the treatment results, such as lung cancer. Therefore, in assessing 
the health sys tem's and hospital sector 's performance using mortality, one has to make a 
deliberate choice of relevant mortality variables. In order to aid this, Rutstein et al. (1976) 
develop a concept of avoidable mortality. In a more recent paper, Nolte and McKee (2004) 
produce an extensive literature review and a reconciliation of studies of mortality attributable to 
health care. Their review has served as a reference in over 200 economic and population health 
publications. 
The strategy for selection of variables is the following: I consider all the standardised death 
rates and mortality measures available in W H O Health for All Database. Firstly, I exclude those 
that are unusable due to missing data. For the remaining ones, 1 refer to Nolte and McKee 
(2004) in search of relevance to hospital care. 1 pick the SDRs that are considered fully or partly 
a consequence of hospital care dellciencies, discarding ones not considered or conf i rmed as 
unrelated to hospitals. For the majority of disease categories, W H O HFA-DB provides 
standardised death rates in two ranges: ages 0-64 and all ages. For the current analysis, the 
former age range is generally preferred, fol lowing the observation that the majority of amenable 
causes ' compilations put an age cap at each disease category, thus implying that beyond certain 
age patient death cannot be attributed to health care. However, in cases where no 0-64 range is 
available in the database, but the disease is considered avoidable, 1 opt for the all-ages measure. 
Furthermore, for categories such as adverse drug effects and ill-detmed conditions, the all-ages 
Tabic 5.6: Measures of mortality attributable to hospitals 
Obs 
.Mean (st.dev) 
1989 - 2009 
No Measure ICD-IO category (% comple teness ) 1989 2009 change References 
Infant and maternal deaths 
1 Infant deaths per 1,000 live births 432 (89%) 22.02 (9.92) 9.4 (4.91) -57% (2), (3), (4), (7), (8), (9) 
2 Early neonatal deaths per 1,000 live births 444 (92%) 8.26 (2.32) 5.56 (4.05) -33% (2), (3), (4), (7), (8), (9) 
3 Fetal deaths per 1000 births 420 (87%) 10.35 (3.84) 6.95 (3.08) -33%, (2), (3), (4), (7), (8), (9) 
4 Perinatal deaths per 1,000 births 428 (88%) 16.66 (4.28) 9.51 (4.59) -43%, (2), (3), (4), (5), (7), (8), (9) 
5 Maternal deaths per 100,000 live births 
Standardised death rates, disease-groups, 
per 100,000 
000-09 ' ) 448 (93%) 46.03 (33.98) 24.47(14.91) -47% (1), (3), (4), (6), (8), (9) 
6 Diarrhoeal diseases, under 5 years A00-A09 392 (81%) 27.37 (50.35) 2.01 (3.52) -93% (1), (2), (7), (8), (9) 
7 Infectious and parasitic disease, all ages A00-A99, B00-B99 425 (88%) 14.67 (8.97) 18.31 (8.83) 25% (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9) 
8 Tuberculosis, all ages A15-A19,B90 422 (87%) 7.81 (2.85) 11.38 (6.43) 46%, (1), (3), (4), (7), (8), (9) 
9 Malignant neoplasms, ages 0-64 C00-C97 426 (88%) 110.51 (16.3) 95.65 (9.62) -13% (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) 
10 Malignant neoplasm female breast, ages 0-64 C50 426 (88%) 14.47 (2.81) 15.45 (2.27) 7% (3), (6), (7), (8). (9) 
11 Cancer of the cervix, ages 0-64 C53 423 (87%) 5.34 (2.02) 6.05 (1.69) 13% ( l ) , (2 ) , (3 ) , (5 ) , (6), (7), (8), (9) 
12 Blood and blood-forming organs, all ages D50-D77 422 (87%) 1.21 (0.63) 0.81 (0.21) -33% (2), (4), (7) 
13 
Endocrine/nutrition/metabolic disease/disorder 
involving immune mechanism, all ages 
E00-E90 425 (88%) 10.11 (4.91) 9.27 (5.81) -8% (2), (4), (7), (8), (9) 
14 Diabetes, all ages E10-E14 425 (88%) 9.01 (4.93) 8.32 (5.55) -8% (2), (4), (5), (7), (8), (9) 
15 
Mental disorder & disease of nervous system 
& sense organ, all ages 
F00-F99, G00-G99, 
H00-H95 
423 (87%) 10.92 (2.99) 14.63 (3.84) 34% (2), (7), (9) 
16 Diseases of circulatory system, ages 0-64 100-199 426 (88%) 156.78 (14.3) 169.96(52.69) 8% (1) ,(2) , (3) , (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) 
17 Ischaemic heart disease, ages 0-64 120-125 426 (88%) 80.36(14.16) 84.01 (33.99) 5% (2), (3), (7), (8), (9) 
18 Cerebrovascular diseases, ages 0-64 160-169 426 (88%) 43.6(9.16) 39.44(14.48) -10% (3), (4), (5), (7), (8), (9) 
(table cont'd) 
— IV WW-iv 7 J ju.o/ V. i-r-'JOf -r, /o V' h y^h y-^h v-^ A w}^ v ti K'^h y^) 
23 Appendicitis, ages 0-64 K35-K38 371 (77%) 0.39(0.12) 0.05 (0.05) -86% (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) 
24 Hernia and intestinal obstruction, ages 0-64 K40-K46, K56 390(81%) 1.13(0.27) 0.56 (0.2) -51% (I), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) 
25 Genitourinary system, all ages N00-N99 414(86%) 13.66(3.39) 8.26 (3.42) -40% (I), (2), (4), (7),(8),(9) 
26 Symptoms, signs and ill-defined conditbns, all ages R00-R53, R55-R99 415(86%) 16.11 (16.29) 49.76(34.97) 209% (2) 
27 External cause injury and poison, all ages 
V00-V99, W00-W99, 
X00-X99, YOO-Y99 
425 (88%) 102.31 (26.05) 107 (41.96) 5% (7) 
28 Adverse effects of therapeutic agents, all ages Y40-Y59 185 (38%) 0.12(0.08) 0.06 (0.03) -44% (7) 
All measures were obtained from and follow definitions in the WHO Health For All database. 
Means are population-weighted, except for infant and maternal deaths that are weighted by the number of live births. 
1989 - 2009 change is the percentage change in weighted regional means, calculated as (2009-l989)/l989. 
References indicate studies that consider given disease category' fully or partly amenable to hospital care: 
(1) Charlton et al. 1983, Charlton et al. 1984 
(2) Poikolainen & Eskola 1985, 1988 
(3) Holland 1986, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1997 
(4) Mackenbach et al. 1988 
(5) Westerling 1993, Westerling et al. 1996 
(6) Simonato et al. 1998 
(7) Tobias & Jackson 2001 
(8) Nolte et al. 2002 
(9) Nolte & McKee 2004 
measure is llie preferred one. A summary of thus selected variables, along with supporting 
references and basic descriptive statistics, is provided in Table 5.6. 
A caveat: this study does not aim at providing a complete and accurate account of untimely 
deaths in Eastern Europe. Instead, its primary interest is in identifying health outcome measures 
that are available and comparable across the region. The main objective of comparability is met 
as long as the same indicator is used for all country-year combinations, and is also facilitated by 
the fact that all HFA-DB mortality indicators are age-standardised. Consequently, analysing 
corresponding subsets of avoidable mortality is informative of systems' relative performance in 
the particular area, despite the fact it represents neither the remaining amenable causes nor the 
health outcomes at large. 
HFA-DB variables that were left out include standardised death rates from transport and motor 
vehicle traffic accidents, suicide and self-inflicted injury, smoking and alcohol-related causes, 
homicide and intentional injury. While some of these causes can be linked to health care by 
arguing, for example, that a better organised hospital emergency system has a higher capacity to 
respond to accidents, measures are missing to control for the volume and composition of 
incidents. The differences in incidence rates and severity at presentation might stem from such 
factors as education, lifestyles, abidance of law, safety of the road system, as well as health 
policy and primary prevention, potentially leading to biased conclusions regarding health care 
itself (Treumiet et al. 1999). Also omitted in the analysis are trachea, bronchus, and lung cancer 
as well as chronic liver disease and cirrhosis, as attributable primarily to health education and 
primary prevention (Holland 1988, Holland 1991, Nolte et al. 2002). Neonatal, late- and post-
neonatal deaths are excluded for largely incomplete data - in each case over 30% data points are 
missing, with some countries absent altogether. Finally, the SDR indicator "all causes, all ages" 
is discarded because it contains numerous causes strictly not attributable to health care. 
It would seem appealing to substitute the discarded "all causes, all ages" with an aggregate 
indicator of total deaths across categories amenable to hospital care, hence allowing for the 
estimation of reform impacts on quantity of life proxy. However, this possibility is 
compromised by the extent of data missing. An aggregation would limit the number of 
observations to only those of which data points are available across all variables. In result, given 
that variables have different patterns of missing data, a summation of 23 SDR variables would 
generate an aggregate in which 341 out of 484 country-year observations (70%) are missing. 
This would have further consequences on the explanatory side of the model, resulting in a loss 
of some reform years. Even a limited aggregate variable consisting of IHD, hernia, diabetes, 
cerebrovascular diseases, breast cancer, appendicitis, and adverse therapeutic effects would 
result in an unbalanced panel of 173 observations, in which only 15 countries would be present, 
including two of only a single cross-section. 
Another important matter in the selection of mortahty variables is their relevance of hospital 
care, as opposed to primary care and public health, which may further vary between disease 
groups. For example, mortality from appendicitis is typically considered fully attributable to 
inpatient care and thus taken for an indicator of its quality. Tuberculosis, on the other hand, is 
primarily linked to public health, with only a fraction of mortality credited to hospitals. Tobias 
and Jackson (2001) consider 56 groups of conditions and provide their relative relevance to 
primary, secondary, and tertiary care. This proportional split has implications for the absolute 
numbers of deaths amenable to hospitals. Here, outcome variables are log-transformed, 
therefore assigning hospitals with a fixed proportion of mortality affects neither the statistical 
significance nor the estimated values of coefficients. However, it makes an implicit assumption 
that in every country secondary and tertiary inpatient care is accountable for the same 
percentage of mortality within a disease category. Arguably, in a country with strong prevention 
and high early detection rates, a higher share of mortality will rest with the hospital sector. The 
opposite is also true: weak primary care or public health increase the proportion of deaths these 
two areas are responsible for, concurrently decreasing the relative weight of hospitals. Given the 
scope of this study, no data can be applied to control for these factors across the board. Instead, 
the proportions are assumed to be constant in time and internationally. 
A final consideration is given to the fact that mortality variables may not fully match the scope 
of disease defined in the referenced studies as attributable to hospital care. For example, in 
HFA-DB the category of infectious and parasitic diseases ranges from lCD-10 codes AGO to 
B99. On the other hand, the referenced materials qualify specifically: typhoid AOl, shigellosis 
A03, intestinal/diarrhoeal infections A00-A09, tuberculosis A15-A19, brucellosis and other 
zoonoses A23-A27, tetanus A35, diphtheria A36, whooping cough A37, sepsis A40-A41, 
syphilis A50-53, gonococcal infections and other STDs A54-A64, poliomyelitis A80, viral 
meningitis A87, measles BOS, rubella B06, viral hepatids B15-B19, HIV/AIDS B20, malaria 
B50 (Alkaline Software online database was used for the reconciliation of lCD-9 and ICD-IO 
categories). It is apparent that the HFA-DB category is more broadly (or less specifically) 
defined; however, both definitions overlap to a large extent. In this and similar cases, the 
amenability to hospital care is assumed to apply in the broader group all the same. 
5.4. Expected outcomes 
5.4.1. Theoretical implications 
Theoretical considerations presented in Chapter 4 indicate that changes in governance convey 
economic efficiency incentives, or enhance existing ones, and thus create conditions for higher 
performance. This is particularly true coming from the rigid, centralised Semashko system. 
Political discourse of the transformation period often involved this line of argumentation in 
support of decentralisation and privatisation. In fact, underlying actual reforms was the belief 
that hospital governance reforms would I 'acililate the process of tr imming the oversized and 
unwieldy hospital sector. Whether or not this has occurred is the research question in this 
chapter. However , "h igher pe r fo rmance" and " improved economic eff ic iency" may imply a 
number of potential changes in inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes. Therefore, it has to be 
established how these improvements would translate into the available hospital sector 
parameters . For this purpose, specif ic hypotheses need to be fomiulated against each category of 
pe r fo rmance measures . 
The burden of fixed costs has been a major problem of the post-communist inheritance. Coining 
from this background, the reforms would aim at catalysing the process of downsizing the 
hospital network, through facility decommissioning, re-qualification for other purposes, etc. 
Therefore , the numbers of facilities are expected to go down. The magnitude of this effect may 
hinge on the extent of decision authority transferred and incentives to carry out the 
rationalisation, for which ownership devolution and corporatisation should provide particularly 
favourable circumstances. 
As for utilisation, for the same reasons, average lengths of stay are expected to diminish and bed 
occupancy rates to increase. Again, because of the strength of incentives for rationalisation, 
ef fec ts may be more apparent in the two aforementioned reforms (i.e. displaying higher 
statistical s ignif icance and/or greater absolute values of coefficients). 
The effects on the numbers of hospital admissions are ambiguous, however. Firstly, numbers of 
admission should have the highest sensitivity to provider payment mechanisms, which convey 
"ha rd" economic incentives. This is not an issue, however, because provider payments are 
controlled for in the model. Secondly, any change in admissions, both positive and negative, 
may reflect adjus tments in provision to better match local needs, preferences and priorities, an 
argument of ten raised as a merit of decentralisation. Thus, in terms of allocative efficiency, it 
cannot be determined whether fewer or more admissions represent a superior outcome. Other 
than this inconclusiveness, there is also a possibility of contradicting effects. Supposing 
constraints in supply of care are capacity-related (rather than of financial nature), organisational 
improvements may lead to higher across-the-board throughput - an important reform objective 
in the region with historically long wait times. However, elevated accountability and financial 
risk resting with territorial governments as founding bodies could induce stricter utilisation 
criteria. 
Rationalising resource use and simultaneously improving health outcomes is a challenging task. 
In fact , in the mid-1990s , most CEE/CIS countries experienced a decline in the health status, 
albeit caused primarily by falling macroeconomic output and social distress. Health care 
reforms, programs and innovations do not, in principle, trade of f health outcomes for cost-
savings (admittedly, with the exception of frugal innovation and some acceptable interventions 
falling into quadrant III of the cost-effectiveness plane). More likely, improved productive and 
allocative eff iciency are converted into higher utilisation, better quality of care, or both. Thus, 
the expected coefficient signs in mortality models are non-positive, corresponding to a 
conservative anticipation of improvement or no impact. 
A summary of expected signs of coefficients is provided in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7: Expected signs of coefficients 
Expected coef. sign 
Response variable or category irigmt own 
Facilities -/O - -
Average lenghts of stay -/O - -
Bed occupancy +/0 + + 
Discharges 9 9 9 
infant and maternal deaths -/o -/o -/o 
SDRs -/o -/o -/o 
5.4.2. Do hospital reforms have implications for aggregate health expenditures? 
Previous studies have included health expenditures (total, public, and private) among the 
endogenous variables. However, this poses a number of conceptual problems that altogether 
lead to forgoing the possibility in this study. Firstly, in the current specification, health 
expenditures stand for the level of system inputs, i.e. serve as an explanatory variable. An 
inclusion of its variant as the outcome variable would lead to the problem of endogeneity. 
Moreno-Serra and Wagstaff (2010) avoid this problem by using G D P p.c. as the system inputs ' 
variable. However, the adequacy of this choice is debatable, especially given the availability of 
TEH p.c., which can be argued to better suit this purpose. Secondly, total health expenditures 
are largely exogenous to the hospital sector, determined mainly by the fiscal circumstances and 
the priority given to the HCS, as discussed in Chapter 1. This can be seen as an upper limit set 
for the sector expenditures. It is difficult to conceive how reforms internal to the hospital sector 
could influence these constraints. Thirdly, any cost-savings resulting from hospital 
reorganisation would unlikely take the form of lower sector expenditures. Given the chronic 
underfunding of health care in CEE/CIS, reflected among other things by low salaries, long 
waiting times, hospital indebtness, and capital underinvestment, any resulting surplus would be 
immediately relocated within the sector to cover alleviate a deficiency. Thus, it would leave no 
permanent effect on the aggregate expenditure. Fourthly, considering the low materiality of 
private hospitals and voluntary health insurance, it is difficult to just i fy a mechanism through 
which non-privatisation hospital reforms would lead to significantly changing public-private 
proportions of health expenditures. 
5.5. Resu l t s a n d d i scuss ion of f ind ings 
5.5.1. Notes on the presentation of results 
Estimation results, reported in Table 5.8 and Table 5.9, are provided in sub-sections 
corresponding to categories that dependent variables fall into: resources, utilisation/discharges, 
and mortality. The tables are organised in the following way: each row represents one model, in 
which the measure provided in the second column serves as the dependent variable. Given that 
all the performance indicators are modelled with a common set of independent variables (see 
Equation 3 and Table 5.1: Model specifications, by type of response measure), a model is 
identified by its response variable. For each model provided are parameter estimates of three 
variables that represent hospital governance transition: decentralisation of management, 
devolution of ownership, and corporatisation of facilities. 
Each variable is described with four parameters resulting from the FD2 estimation. First, under 
the header " c o e f is the reform variable coefficient. Second, the column "error" reports the 
robust standard error of the coefficient. Third, "p-value" is by definition the probability of 
obtaining the t-test statistic at least as extreme as observed, assuming that the null hypothesis 
HQ: f5 = 0 is true. Therefore, a more extreme t-test result (corresponding to a lower reported p-
values) increases the likelihood that HQ is false and in fact p 0. Coefficients are presented 
with the usual indication of statistical significance, where "**", denote significance 
at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1 %, respectively. In the discussion, unless otherwise stated, these 
levels are described as weak evidence, evidence, and strong evidence, respectively. Since 
estimated models are numerous, for ease of browsing, these variables have been highlighted 
with varying shades of grey. 
Finally, reported under the header "% impact" is the percentage change in y attributable to the 
reforni dummy switching from 0 to I, practically indicating the estimated impacts of respective 
hospital governance refonns. Reform (dummy variable) impact on the log-transformed outcome 
variable was calculated as impact = 100 x (e^^ - 1), following a discussion by Halvorsen and 
Palmquist (1980). This is a dummy variable interpretation only; continuous variables read the 
usual way, that is, a switch from 0 to 1 effects in 100 x (3 per cent change in y. Impact figures, 
same as coefficient estimates, correspond to the outcome variable at the sample mean. The 
approximation of e ~ 2 .718 was used in the calculation of impact. Rounding of figures was 
applied after the impact calculations. 
T a b l e 5.8: E s t i m a t i o n results - hospi ta l re sources and uti l isat ion 
4 Acute care hospital beds 0.01 0.026 0.635 1.27 -0.01 0.019 0.793 -0.50 -0.03 0.019 0.112 -3.13 312 12.6% 
5 Psychiatric hospital beds 
Utilisation 
0.01 0.040 0.755 1.26 0.04 0.039 0.316 4.07 0.05 0.033 0.182 4.64 351 8.8% 
6 Average length of stay, all 0.01 0.009 0.431 0.74 0.01 0.009 0.304 0.91 -0.01 0.009 0.444 -0.71 417 10.1% 
7 Average length of stay, acute 0.01 0.017 0.397 1.45 0.02** 0.010 0.037 2.29 0.05*** 0.018 0.01 5.28 272 13.6% 
8 Bed occupancy rate 0.02 0.022 0.447 1.74 0.05 0.035 0.158 5.38 0.08** 0.036 0.049 7.84 278 16.9% 
9 In-patient care discharges 0.02 0.025 0.544 1.53 0.04** 0.016 0.016 4.22 0.04 0.022 0.114 3.72 412 14.4% 
10 Acute care discharges 0.05 0.027 0.116 4.62 0.03 0.023 0.185 3.23 0.04 0.037 0.266 4.34 281 17.7% 
11 
In-paticnt surgical 
procedures per year 
Disease-specific discharges 
0 0.041 0.915 0.45 -0.01 0.039 0.739 -1.32 0.06 0.056 0.299 6.20 217 21.8% 
12 Cerebrovascular 0.03 0.046 0.563 2.77 0.02 0.025 0.554 1.54 -0.01 0.032 0.824 -0.73 378 9.8% 
13 Circulatory system -0.01 0.030 0.855 -0.54 0.06** 0.028 0.039 6.31 0.04 0.047 0.398 4.10 383 17.2% 
14 Digestive system 0 0.033 0.988 -0.05 0.04 0.026 0.146 4.01 0.05 0.033 0.171 4.75 384 12.6% 
15 Inlectious and parasitic 0.04 0.049 0.460 3.76 0.04 0.052 0.403 4.55 0.08* 0.045 0.093 8.19 381 13.5% 
16 Injury and poisoning 0.02 0.039 0.530 2.49 0.06** 0.025 0.019 6.59 0.05* 0.029 0.083 5.49 383 10.0% 
17 Ischaemic heart disease 0.02 0.047 0.639 2.25 0.07** 0.028 0.025 7.06 0.09* 0.05 0.078 9.73 373 13.7% 
18 
Musculoskeletal system and 
connective tissue 
-0.03 0.039 0.517 -2.55 0.06 0.039 0.136 6.15 0.07 0.069 0.317 7.36 383 9.3% 
19 Neoplasms, all -0.03 0.031 0.286 -3.37 0.11** 0.051 0.043 11.53 0.06 0.048 0.227 6.14 381 17.2% 
20 Respiratory system 0.01 0.039 0.867 0.66 0.03 0.038 0.487 2.70 0.03 0.054 0.613 2.82 381 20.9% 
T a b l e 5.9: Es t imat ion resul ts - m e a s u r e s of mortal i ty 
No 
Model 
(dependent variable) 
DeceiUralised iminagemeiU 
coe f error p-value % impact 
Devolved ownership 
coe f error p-value % impact 
Corporalisation 
coe f error p-value % impact Obs R' 
Infant and maternal deaths 
1 Infant deaths 
2 Early neonatal deaths 
3 Fetal deaths 
4 Perinatal deaths 
5 Maternal deaths 
Standardised death rates 
6 Diarrhocal 
7 Infectious and parasitic 
8 Tuberculosis 
9 Malignant neoplasms 
Malignant neoplasm female 
breast 
II Cancer of the cervix 
10 
12 Blood and blood-forming organs 
Endocrine/nutrition/mctabolic 
13 disease/disorder involving 
immune mechanism 
14 Diabetes 
Mental disorder & disease of 
nervous system & sense organ 
16 Circulatory system 
17 Ischaemic heart disease 
18 Cerebrovascular diseases 
15 
0.03 0.029 0.400 2.54 -0.07 0.055 0.241 -6.40 -0.1 0.114 0.373 -9.84 366 12.5% 
0.09* 0.044 0.060 9.21 -0.01 0.068 0.850 -1.29 0.02 0.088 0.850 1.70 398 5.3% 
-0.06* 0.029 0.068 -5.39 0.01 0.033 0.778 0.94 0.03 0.048 0.587 2.71 372 8.1% 
-0.02 0.034 0.627 -1.64 -0.01 0.047 0.790 -1.25 0.04 0.035 0.293 3.83 380 9.0% 
-0.4* 0.199 0.058 -32.89 -0.03 0.222 0.879 -3.35 -0.07 0.361 0.845 -6.90 399 5.6% 
0.38** 0.138 0.011 46.66 -0.32 0.389 0.425 -27.11 -0.49 0.499 0.334 -38.98 298 13.4% 
0.02 0.056 0.686 2.33 -0.04 0.060 0.474 -4.31 -0.15*** 0.051 0.008 -13.86 354 9.4% 
0.02 0.052 0.673 2.26 0.04 0.084 0.652 3.93 -0.03 0.087 0.745 -2.81 351 5.1% 
0.01 0.011 0.646 0.53 0.01 0.012 0.487 0.86 0 0.026 0.956 0.14 354 9.0% 
0.01 0.041 0.791 1.09 0.09* 0.043 0.053 9.15 0.13* 0.066 0.060 13.90 354 13.0% 
0.02 0.055 0.785 1.54 -0.03 0.070 0.725 -2.47 0.14** 0.058 0.023 15.18 350 11.8% 
0.03 0.127 0.834 2.74 0.18 0.126 0.168 19.71 0.24* 0.117 0.052 27.16 351 8.0% 
-0.02 0.029 0.521 -1.89 -0.02 0.055 0.688 -2.21 -0.06 0.084 0.500 -5.60 354 8.0% 
-0.03 0.036 0.405 -3.00 -0.02 0.066 0.782 -1.83 -0.09 0.102 0.394 -8.52 354 8.8% 
-0.09* 0.051 0.085 -8.77 0.02 0.036 0.589 2.00 -0.1 0.071 0.182 -9.33 352 17.7% 
0.03 0.021 0.170 3.07 0.05*** 0.017 0.006 5.23 0.01 0.017 0.532 1.08 354 19.0% 
0.03* 0.018 0.062 3.53 0.01 0.019 0.531 1.22 0 0.016 0.787 0.43 354 19.2% 
0.01 0.023 0.675 1.00 0.05** 0.022 0.034 5.10 0.02 0.039 0.576 2.24 354 10.1% 
209 
( table c o n t ' d ) 
Model Decenlralised management Devolved ownership Corporatisation 
No (dependent variable) coef error p-value % impact coef error p-value % Impact coef error p-value % impact Obs 
19 
Acute respiratory infections, 
0.18 0.120 0.156 19.33 0.23 0.177 0.214 25.51 0.31 0.420 0.467 36.49 320 15.0% 
pneumonia and intluenza 
20 Respiratory system 0.03 0.029 0.386 2.61 0.05 0.038 0.187 5.31 -0.01 0.049 0.850 -0.94 354 25.7% 
21 Bronchitis/emphysema/asthma 0.06* 0.034 0.095 6.20 0.14*** 0.038 0.001 15.13 -0.01 0.070 0.927 -0.65 325 17.1% 
22 Digestive system 0 0.021 0.924 0.21 0.06** 0.027 0.034 6.32 0.01 0.029 0.612 1.48 354 11.7% 
23 Appendicitis -0.05 0.276 0.857 -4.89 -0.03 0.475 0.949 -3.04 0.16 0.381 0.685 16.95 287 6.1% 
24 Hernia and intestinal obstruction -0.04 0.088 0.632 -4.18 0.22** 0.094 0.026 25.11 0.38* 0.204 0.073 46.90 325 17.7% 
25 Genitourinary system 0.04 0.031 0.212 4.03 0.04 0.032 0.177 4.58 -0.01 0.047 0.913 -0.53 344 7.9% 
26 
Symptoms, signs and ill-detmed 
0 0.072 0.958 -0.38 0.05 0.097 0.631 4.85 0.04 0.091 0.674 3.95 341 9.7% 
condition 
27 External cause injury and poison 0.02 0.035 0.553 2.16 0.08* 0.041 0.052 8.76 0.04 0.057 0.501 4.01 354 5.3% 
28 Adverse effects 0.11 0.402 0.782 12.06 -1.33** 0.553 0.035 -73.46 -0.64 0.646 0.341 -47.47 125 30.8% 
5.5.2. F indings 
Tab le 5.8 and Tab le 5.9 s h o w es t imat ion results of the base .specification. A number of mode l s 
p rov ide s t rong ev idence in suppor t of the hypothes is that changes in hospital governance 
in f luence hospital sector p e r f o n n a n c e . Trans fe r r ing hospital owner sh ip is the s tep that has the 
wides t impact on o u t c o m e var iables . Look ing at groups of o u t c o m e measures , the statistical 
ev idence tends to concen t ra te wi th in the categor ies of util isation and discharges as well as in 
s tandardised death rates. 
S t rong ev idence s h o w s that the corporat isa t ion process induces a decl ine in numbers of 
hospi ta ls (es t imated reduct ion of 21 .1%) . In contrast , decentra l is ing hospital managemen t to 
sub-nat ional g o v e r n m e n t s co inc ides with a 6 .7% increase in the n u m b e r of acute care facilities. 
Rather surpr is ingly , lengths of stay in acute care hospital episodes tend to increase fo l lowing 
both devolu t ion (by 2 . 3 % ) and corporat isa t ion (5 .3%). In accord with theoretical predict ions, the 
latter leads to an increase in bed occupancy rates, by an es t imated 7.8%. Devolved ownersh ip 
resul ted in an es t imated 4 .2% increase in the number of inpatient admiss ions . With respect to 
spec i f ic d iseases , n u m b e r s of admiss ions went up in the categor ies of circulatory system (6 .3%) , 
in jury and po i son ing (6 .6%), i schaemic heart d isease (7 .1%), and neoplasms (11 .5%). 
Corpora t i sa t ion seems to fur ther dr ive up number s of admiss ions ; however , the statistical 
ev idence on 5 - 1 0 % increases in the categor ies of infect ious/parasi t ic , in jury /poisoning, and IHD 
is only weak . 
At the same t ime, countr ies devolv ing hospital ownersh ip tend to observe rises in death rates 
across a n u m b e r of d i sease ca tegor ies ( ranging f rom 5 .1% in cerebrovascular to 25.1 % in hernia 
and intestinal obs t ruct ion) . T h e statistical ev idence is especial ly s t rong in case of the circulatory 
sys tem d i seases ( 9 9 % conf idence ) and b ronch ids / emphysema /as thma (99 ,9% conf idence) . The 
ca tegory of c i rcula tory sys tem diseases is part icularly interesting, because it displays concurrent 
increases in the n u m b e r of admiss ions (6 .3%) and death rates (5 .2%). 
R e f o r m s other than o w n e r s h i p devolut ion are somewha t less evident ly t ied to death rates, with 
coe f f i c i en t s s ignif icant at 5 % in on ly three categor ies : cancer of cervix (+15 .2%) , diarrhoeal 
( + 4 6 . 7 % ) and infec t ious /paras i t ic d i seases ( -13 .9%) . Moreover , there is weak and mixed 
ev idence on changes in infant and maternal mortal i ty: cons iderab le reduct ions in maternal and 
fetal dea ths are coup led with increase in early neonata l mortal i ty . The overall infant mortal i ty 
indica tor is una f fec t ed by any of the re forms . 
W h i l e the g o v e r n a n c e r e fo rms are found to p redominan t ly enhance mortal i ty , there are 
excep t ions . T h e o u t c o m e s include s t rong ev idence of 13.9% reduct ion in infect ious/paras i t ic 
S D R and a no tab le 7 3 . 5 % drop in S D R f rom adverse e f fec t s of therapeut ic agents . 
5.5.3. Discussion of f indings 
As surprising as it is in a region tliat endeavoured to liquidate some of its inpatient facilities, 
decentralisation of hospital management prompted an increase in the numbers of acute 
hospitals. This may indicate a reclassification of selected non-acute into acute care facilities, in 
the process of adjust ing hospital networks to local needs. Rationalising networks by changing 
the purpose of hospitals would not be (and is not) reflected in the overall count of hospitals 
(Table 5.8, model I). The statistical outcome may also account for newly constructed hospitals 
being handed over for local governments ' supervision, as part of the infrastructure 
modernisation. However, under this scenario the overall number of hospitals would be expected 
to respond to the reform, which is not the case. 
On the other hand, there is very strong evidence (99.9% confidence) linking corporatisation of 
acute care hospitals to a major 21% reduction in their numbers. Given that this reform has a 
record of being highly controversial in the region (including a recent public backlash in the 
Czech Republic and Poland) and that it typically involves extensive social and political 
negotiations, the green light for corporatisation step seems to be an opportune moment to carry 
out decommissioning of selected facilities. Moreover, corporatisation has been used as a tool for 
imposing financial discipline on hospitals prone to accumulating debt, e.g. in Poland (Klinger 
2012). Under such a regulation, the financially sound hospitals are transformed into commercial 
entities, while the ones that do not manage to contain their debt are closed down. Thus, 
corporatisation directly causes or coincides with substantial reductions in hospital networks. 
Given that hospital payment mechanisms are controlled for, increases in acute care average 
lengths of stay prove that decentralisation does not necessarily induce rationalisation through 
the shortening of hospitals episodes. There are a few possible explanations why A L O S would 
increase. One is an intensifying expectation of profitability that may lead hospitals to boosting 
their revenues by extending lengths of stay. In this case, increasing ALOS reflect the strength of 
profit-seeking. Considering that late stages of hospitalisation are typically characterised by low 
intensity of care, in contrast to the initial phase following admission (McKee 2004), elongated 
hospitalisation tails bring considerable revenues at little cost under provider payment 
arrangements that include a FFS component (e.g. per diem, bed days). Secondly, with greater 
autonomy and strengthened accountability comes the responsibility (financial, legal, political) 
for poor outcomes. Extending the lengths of hospital episodes may safeguard against potenfial 
adverse outcomes and their consequences, as a form of defensive medicine (Myers & Schroeder 
1981). This line of reasoning is also supported with the finding of a 73.5% drop in deaths from 
adverse effects of therapeutic agents, a source of avoidable mortality that can be associated with 
medical errors. The same reforms do not seem to affect the broader (i.e. acute and non-acute) 
ALOS, perhaps because the statisfical effect is watered down by the inclusion of long-term stay 
hospitals in the outcome variable. Generally, both acute hospital numbers and acute ALOS 
respond to two out of the three reforms. No such relationship is detected with respect to the 
overall, acute and non-acute measures. 
An increase in bed occupancy resulting from corporatisation is a welcome finding in the CEE 
setting characterised by inefficient use of resources and excess capacity. However, the reform 
steps preceding corporatisation are not confirmed to bring abotit similar improvements. 
The evidence is strong on devolution leading to increased numbers of admissions, which is 
reflected both in the aggregate indicator of in-patient discharges and in a number of disease-
specific indicators. Devolved ownership gives local governments the opportunity to carry out 
re-prioritisation of health care (as a whole and services relative to one another) and to introduce 
various organisational changes accordingly to their preferences. Additional local funding, 
capital investments, streamlined procedures, and facilitated access may explain the 4.2% 
increase in the number of inpatient admissions. However, also strong is evidence on the same 
reform leading to increased mortality of selected diseases, an effect that is highlighted by the 
context of generally downw ard mortality trends (Table 5.6: Measures of mortality attributable to 
hospitals). Juxtaposing the two findings may suggest that local governments try to alleviate 
deficiencies in accessibility of medical care (wait times) at the expense of quality. In the case of 
circulatory system diseases, for instance, increases in numbers of admissions and deaths rates 
are triggered simultaneously. Trading-off quality for higher accessibility, responsiveness or 
utilisation may be, ceteris paribus, a sign of adjusting health care provision to local voters' 
expectations and preferences. 
The above finding is in line with that of Tiemann et al. (2012), who put payment incentives in 
the context of ownership in German hospitals. They observe that incentivising efficiency 
through DRG payments may lead to lower staffing levels and adversely affect quality of care, 
and the effect strengthens under stricter accountability arrangements. Therefore, pressures for 
efficient allocation, coupled with a transfer of financial and legal risk, ought to go hand in hand 
with intensified quality monitoring, in order to prevent compromising patient safety and 
deteriorating health outcomes. In CEE/CIS, quality assurance lags behind a prevalent shift 
toward case-mix payments (Rechel & McKee 2009, compare Appendix 1, Table A . l ) . 
Admittedly, given that the data are aggregated at the national level and analysed over a long 
term, quality may not be the only determinant of the measured outcomes. Over the course of 20 
years other processes are likely to occur. For example, the accessibility and efficacy of primary 
and emergency care, shifts between inpatient and outpafient modes of treatment including the 
continuity of care, hospital case management pathways, and available treatments that are 
considered to be the standard of care, may all be subject to change. Such changes would 
influence the quantity and quality of the hospital case-mix as well as alter the hospitalisation 
process. Therefore, the "quahty interpretation" provided above, while consistent with the 
statistical findings, may not be exclusive as conditions change over time. 
Finally, while not finding evidence for causation does not disprove its existence, there are 
reforms that failed the statistical significance tests despite being popularly believed to be means 
for the improved health care system performance. One such (lack of) finding is regarding the 
numbers of hospital beds, which show no effect of reforms despite the declared intentions of 
reformers regarding this matter. More interestingly, in the light of the statisfical evidence, 
decentralisation of facility management made little difference in hospital operation as measured 
in this study. This does not come as a surprise. This stage is the least specifically defined and 
displays the greatest variety of forms across the region. Being ambiguous at the theoretical 
level, it cannot be expected to yield meaningful statistical evidence. Yet, another explanafion is 
also conceivable: the reform design in the early years of transition involved only a simple 
delegation of tasks, and came without incentives that would induce local authorities to strive for 
a betterment of hospital care. 
5.6. A l ternat ive specif ications 
5.6.1. Estimation results 
Estimation results of alternative model specifications are gathered in Table 5.10 and Table 5.11. 
Quadrat ic time function 
The quadratic time specification estimates largely correspond to the base model. While the 
values of most coefficient estimates are similar, higher statistical significance is detected in a 
number of cases. Sixteen variables are found to be statistically significant at a higher level, that 
is, previously not significant are now significant at 10% level, and respectively 10% at 5%, and 
5% at 1%. Four coefficients found statistically significant in the base model are now 
insignificant, and further four have a reduced level of confidence. However, for the most part, 
the above changes result from slight differences in coefficients values or standard errors, and as 
a whole do not invalidate or alter the findings of the base model. 
Unsurprisingly, the base model is superior to the quadratic time function model in terms of the 
explained proportion of outcome variation. A vector of year-dummy variables used in the base 
model imposes no functional form on the time variable; instead, it allows for each cross-
section's individual intercept. The alternative fits a quadratic function of time using the least 
squares approach. In result, the average (across the estimated models) R^ of the base 
specification is 0.13 (with the standard deviation of 0.055), while the quadratic time function 
formulation on the average explains 0.05 (0.03) of the variability. 
Table 5.10: Estimation results, alternative models, hospital resources and utilisation 
Mode) 
(dependen t Nariable) 
Base model {JiHuiralic liim-fn Quadra lie indiv trends Fixed e/fecls. • "lusier II Lagged model. LACifOi Lagged model. LAG/h Ahernative interpret. 
mgml own corp mgml OH-n corp mgml own corp mgml own corp memt u » n corp mgmt own corp mgmt own corp 
0 0.03 -0.07 0 0.02 •0.08 0 0.03 •0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.09 -0.04* -0.03 •0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 
(0.031) (0,035) (0.061) (0.03) (0.031) (0.062) (0.032) (0.036) (0.063) (0.04) (0.037) (0.079) (0.023) (0.024) (0.045) (0.028) (0.032) (0.059) 
0 , 0 6 " -0.06 - 0 . 2 4 " * 0 . 0 7 " -0.06 - 0 . 2 3 " * 0 . 0 6 " -0.06 . 0 . 2 4 " ' ' 0 . 0 6 " -0.09* - 0 . 2 8 " * 0 -0.07 -0.08 0.01 •0.02 -0.1 
(0.026) (0,059) (0.059) (0.029) (0.064) (0.079) (0.028) (0.061) (0.061) (0.029) (0.043) (0.064) (0.012) (0.044) (0.064) (0,03) (0.05) (0.1) 
0 0,03 0.01 0 0.03 0.01 0 0.03 0.01 •0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 •0.03 -0,01 0.02 0 
(0.038) (0,021) (0.023) (0.037) (0.022) (0.025) (0.04) (0.022) (0.023) (0.053) (0.022) (0.028) (0.038) (0.027) (0.03) (0,039) (0.016) (0.019) 
0.01 -0,01 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0 -0.02 -0.06" *• -0.03 •0.03 -0.04 0,01 -0.02 - 0 . 0 4 " 
(0.026) (0,019) (0.019) (0.028) (0.02) (0.026) (0.027) (0.02) (0.02) (0.029) (0.015) (0.02) (0.026) (0.04) (0.035) (0.027) (0.014) (0.017) 
0.0) 0,04 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.01 •0.06** •0.06* -0.06* 0,02 0.02 0.02 
(O.Oi) (0.039) (0.033) (0.041) (0.042) (0.036) (0.041) (0.(M) (0.034) (0.047) (0.(W) (0.041) (0.027) (0.03) (0.032) (0.042) (0.029) (0.028) 
Facilities 
Hospitals 
Acutt (short-slay) hospitals 
Hospital beds 
Acute carc hospital beds 
Ps\c!iiatric hospital beds 
Utilisation 
A\ erage length of stay, all 
Average length ol'stav. atiiie 
Ik'd occupancy rate 
In-patient care discharges 
Acute care discharges 
In-paiicnt ^urgical procedures per year 
Disease-specif ic d i scharges 
Cercbro\ascubr 
Circulator) svstem 
Digestive system 
Inteciioas and parasitic 
Injury and pulstming 
Ischaemic heart dcease 
Masculoskeletal system and connccti\e 
tissue 
Neoplasms, all 
Respiratory system 
0.01 0,01 -0.01 0.01 0 0 1 •0,01 0.01 001 -0.01 -0,01 OOl -OOl • 0 0 4 ' OOl -0.01 0 0 1 0.01 0,01 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (().(KW) (0,008) (0,009) (0.01) (0.(X)9) (0.009) (0.016) (OOl 5) (0,0l3l (0023) (0013) (0016) (0.007) (0.01) (0.012) 
0.01 0 . 0 2 " 0 . 0 5 * " 0,01 0.03* *• 0 0 5 " * 0,02 0,02'* 0.05'* 0 0,02 003* • 0 0 5 - 0 0 1 - 0 0 3 0.02 0 0 ,03 ' 
(0,017) (0.01) (0.018) (0.017) (0006) (0015) (0017) (OOl) (0.018) (0022) (0,012) (0.018) (0028) (0.011) (0.022) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) 
0,02 0,05 0.08** 002 0.06* 0 0 8 * ' 0,02 0 0 5 0,08 ' 0,01 0,06*' 0 0 8 * " -0.03 -0.01 0 0 0 3 0.02 -0,05 
(0.022) (0.035) (0.036) (0.016) (0.03) (0034) (0.023) (0.037) (0,037) (0029) (0,025) (0.025) (0033) (0029) (O032) (0028) (0034) (008 ) 
0,02 0.04** 0.04 0.02 004*** 004* 0.02 0 0 4 " 0 0 4 0.01 0 0 4 * * ' 0 0 4 -OOl 0 0 0.01 003** 0,01 
(0.025) (0.016) (0,022) (01)24) (0,014) (0023) (0,025) (0016) (0,023) (0,021) (0,015) (0.023) (0,018) (0.023) (0.014) (0.028) (0013) (0,017) 
0,05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0 0 3 0,05 OlM 0.03 0(U 0 0 3 0,02 0 0 4 -0,04 -0.02 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 OOl 
(0.027) (0.023) (0,037) (0.031) (002) (0.038) (0.028) (0024) (0038) (0,027) (0.019) (0.034) (0023) (0028) (0021) (0.031) (0017) (0025) 
0 -0.01 0,06 u -OOl 007 0 -0,01 0.06 -0,01 0 0.04 -004* 0.03 -0.03 OOl -0.(M - 0 ( U 
(0,041) (0.039) (0,056) (0,035) (0032) (0,048) (0043) (0,04) (0059) (0.04) (0.026) (0048) (0,024) (0.053) (005) (0.051) (0,031) (O043) 
0,03 0.02 •0,01 0.03 0,02 U 0,03 0,01 •OOl 0.04 0.01 0 0 0 3 0 0.01 0 0 3 0,03 -OOl 
(0.046) (0.025) (0,032) (0047) (0,024) (0038) (0048) (0,026) (0033) (0046) (0,036) (0.034) (0,027) (0.045) (0025) (0.(W5) (0,019) (0.03) 
•0.01 0.06** 0.04 0.02 0 . 0 8 " 0.06 -a 01 0 , 0 6 " 0,04 •0,02 0.06 0 0 4 -0,03 •0.01 0.01 •0.01 0 , 0 4 ' " 0 
(0.03) (0.028) (0,047) (0024) (0,027) (0048) (0.031) (0,029) (0048) (01)33) (0,04) (0.052) (0.027) (0035) (0.025) (0034) (0.012) (0,022) 
0 0.04 0.05 0.02 0,05* 0.06 0 0(M 0.05 -0.03 0 0 3 002 -0.06' - 0 0 2 -0.05* 0 0.03 0 
(0.033) (0.026) (0033) (0.026) (0,024) (0.039) (0.035) (0,027) (0.034) (0036) (0,028) (0.028) (0029) (0026) (0.024) (0.039) (0018) (0018) 
0.04 0.04 0.08* 0,05 0.05 0.09** 0.04 0.04 0 0 8 0,05 0.03 0 0 5 0 - 0 0 4 - 0 0 5 0 0.03 0,06 
(0.049) (0.052) (0.045) (0.049) (0.034) (0,041) (0.051) (0,054) (0.046) (0035) (0,034) (0.041) (0.054) (0.062) (004) (0.062) (0,041) (0.042) 
0.02 0.06** 0.05* 002 0.07* *• 0 .05 ' 002 006** 005* 0 0 3 0 0 7 * ' 0 . 0 5 " -0.01 -OOl -0.02 0.04 0 0 3 0.01 
(0.039) (0.025) (0.029) (0,037) (0022) (0,027) (0(M) (0,026) (003) (0.035) (0,026) (002) (0.021) (0026) (0.028) (0038) (0,02) (0023) 
0.02 0.07** 0.09* 0 0 4 0 , 0 8 " * 0 1 ' 002 0 0 7 " 0 ,09 ' -0.03 0 0 7 0 0 6 - 0 1 3 - 0 0 3 - 0 0 6 0 1 0.06 0,04 
(0.047) (0.028) (0.05) (0,038) (0-024) (0055) (0.049) (0029) (0,052) (0.039) (004) (0.047) (01 ) (005) (0.056) (0082) (0038) (0.(W) 
-0.03 0.06 0 0 7 0 007** 0 0 8 - 0 0 3 0,06 0 0 7 -0,06 0 0 7 0.07 • 0 0 7 " 0 0 -0.(M 0,02 -0,02 
(0.039) (0.039) (0,069) (0025) (0.028) (0,073) (0.041) (0.(M) (0,072) (0,041) (005) (006) (0.029) (0.042) (0039) (005) (0028) (0.029) 
•0.03 O . l l * ' 0 0 6 -002 0 1 3 * " 0 0 8 - 0 0 3 O i l * ' 0 0 6 •0,03 0,1 0.1* 0 0 2 -0.01 0.08 -005* 0 1 " 0.04 
(0.031) (0.051) (0,048) (0035) (0,046) (0.053) (0.033) (0.052) (005) (0,055) (0.058) (0.052) (0.057) (0.036) ( 0 0 5 I ) (0.031) (0036) (0.035) 
0.01 0.03 0,03 0,05 0 0 5 0.04 OOl 0,03 0 0 3 0 0 2 0,01 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -OOl 0 0.03 - 0 0 3 
(0.039) (0.038) (0.054) (0.046) (0,034) (0,059) (0.04) (0.039) (0,056) (0047) (0.029) (0049) (0.038) (0.052) (0046) (0044) (0,032) (0051) 
Table 5,11: Estimation results, alternative models, measures of mortality 
M o d e l 
( d e p e n d e n t \ a r i a b t c ) 
Quadratic time f n Quadratic indiv trends Fixed effects, duster n Lagged model. LAG(O) Lagged model. LAG(l) Alternative interpret. 
mgml own corp mgmt OHH corp mumi own corp mem own corp m e m t own c o r p mgml own co rp mgml own c o r p 
0.03 -0.07 -0.1 0.03 -0.07 - O i l 0.03 •0.07 •0.1 0.02 -0-07 -0.07 •0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.02 - 0 0 6 -0.07 
(0.029) (0.055) (0.114) (0.032) (0.054) (0122) (0.03) (0.057) (0.117) (0.032) (0.061) (0.095) (0.027) (0.033) (0.054) (0.031) (0.056) (0.101) 
0.09- -0.01 0.02 0.11** 0 0.03 0.09* •0.01 0.02 0.1* 0,01 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.08 •0.04 -0.01 
(0.044) (0.068) (0.088) (0.039) (0,061) (0.09) (0.046) (0.07) (0.09) (0.055) (0.095) (0.0%) (0.051) (0.062) (0.094) (0.053) (0.066) (0.087) 
•0.06* 0.01 0.03 - 0 . 0 6 " 0.01 0.03 •0.06' 0.01 0.03 •0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0 .04 ' -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 0 
(0.029) (0.033) (0.(M8) (0.025) (0.035) (0039) (0.03) (0.033) (0.05) (0-029) (0.032) (0.05) (0.023) (0.039) (0.058) (0.027) (0.023) (0.057) 
-0.02 -0.01 0.04 •0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0 . 0 6 " 0.02 0.08 -0-02 -0.03 0.03 
(0.034) (0.047) (0.035) (0.03) (0.(M3) (O.Oil) (0.035) (0.048) ( 0 035) (0.037) (0.055) (00-56) (0.024) (0.023) (0.052) (0.031) (0.044) (0.041) 
-0.4* -0.03 -0.07 -0.33 -0.01 •004 -0.4 ' -0.04 -0.07 -0.25' 0.06 0.06 •0.25* 0.15 0.47 0.3 0 .5 ' 1 . 0 5 " -0.37* 0.02 0.1 
(0.)99) (0.222) (0.361) (0.215) (0.224) (0324) (0-204) (0.229) (0373) (0.12) (0106) (0.22) (0.125) (0-189) (0.342) (0.205) (0.257) (0,401) (0.192) (0.2) (0.313) 
0 . 3 8 " -0.32 •0.49 0.24 -0.33 -0.48 0 . 4 1 " ' -0.31 - 0 5 4 0 .17 ' -0.2 0 0 4 0 .35 ' -0.41 -0-14 0.04 0.05 0.8 0 .3 ' - 0 1 9 -0.23 
(0.138) (0.389) (0.499) (0.206) (0.445) (0.475) (0.145) (0.402) (0.511) (0.09) (0.256) (0.57) (0.181) (0.308) (0.608) (0.228) (0.452) (0,592) (0,152) (0.323) (0.478) 
0.02 -0.(W - 0 . I 5 — 0.02 -0.05 - 0 . 1 5 " 0.02 -0.04 • 0 . 1 5 ' " 0.04 •0.07 •0.11' 0.04 -0.04 0 . 1 " •0.01 0 •0.1 
(0.056) (0.06) (005 I ) (0048) (0.064) (0.053) (0.058) (0.063) (0.053) (0.056) (0.067) (0.059) (0.039) (0044) (0.043) (0.051) (0.061) (0.062) 
0.02 O.Ol -0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.04 •0,03 0.02 0.03 -0-01 0.02 -0.03 0.06 0 0.08 -OOl 
(0.052) (0.084) (0.087) (0045) (0.072) (0.076) (0.055) (0-087) (0-09) (0.061) (0.076) (0.083) (0.046) (0.052) (0.066) (0.046) (0.077) (0.078) 
0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.01 0 -0.01 0 0 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 •0.01 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.026) (0.01) (0.01) (0.028) (0012) (0.013) (0.027) (0.017) (0.013) (0.02) (0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0-011) (0.011) (0.022) 
OOl 0.09- 0.13 ' 0 0 .07 ' 0 . 1 3 " 0.01 0 .09 ' 0 .13 ' 0.04 0 .09 ' 0 . 1 6 " 0-04 -0.01 0.04 0 0 .08 ' 0 .11 ' 
(0.041) (0.(M3) (0.066) (0.032) (0038) (006) (0042) (0.044) (0.068) (0.052) (0.051) (0.064) (0.039) (0.044) (0.047) (0-031) (0-048) (0.057) 
0.02 -0.03 0 . I4-* OM 0.01 0 . 1 5 " 0.02 -0.03 0 . 1 4 " 0,01 -0.03 0 . 1 6 " 0 0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.05 0 . 1 5 " * 
(0.055) (0.07) (0,058) (0.047) (0.063) (0.052) (0.059) (0.072) (0.06) (0.05) (0.082) (0.066) (0.044) (0.111) (0-106) (0047) (O.OM) (0.055) 
0.03 0.18 0.24" 0-03 0.18 0.23- 0.03 0.18 0 .24 ' 0.03 0 .13 ' 0 . 2 4 ' " •0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.22* - 0 . 3 9 " 0 0 4 0.12 0.16 
(0.127) (0.126) (0.117) (0.128) (0.109) (0.124) (0.13) (0.132) (0.121) (0.065) (0.07) (0.074) (0.113) (0.121) (0.109) (0.082) (0.113) (0.181) (0.12) (0.101) (0.112) 
-0.02 -0.02 •0.06 •0.01 0 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 •0.06 -0.02 - 0 0 5 •0.08 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 •0.01 -0.06 -0.05 
(0.029) (0.055) (0.084) (0.023) (0.048) (0.071) (0.031) (0.057) (0-087) (0.029) (0.069) (0.122) (0.049) (0.053) (0.11) (0.03) (0.051) (0.077) 
-0.03 -0.02 •0.09 •0.02 0 - 0 0 7 -0.03 -0.02 •0.09 •0.03 •0.05 -0.12 0.02 •0.04 -0-03 - 0 0 2 •0.07 -0-06 
(0.036) (0.066) (0.102) (0029) (0.0.58) (0.087) (0.038) (0.068) (0106) (0035) (0.086) (0.153) (0.046) (0.058) (0-125) (0.036) (0.064) (0096) 
-0.09* 0.02 •0.1 -0.08 0.01 - O i l -0 .09 ' 0.02 -0.1 -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 0 .12 ' -0.04 0.01 -0 .08 ' 0.01 - 0 0 7 
(0.051) (0.036) (0071) (0.05) (0.041) (008) (0.054) (0.038) ( 0 073) (0.056) (0.05) (0.091) (0.068) (0.057) (0.096) (0.044) (0-036) (0.068) 
0.03 0 . 0 5 — 0.01 0 .04 ' 0 . 0 5 " 0.01 0.03 0 . 0 5 " ' 0.01 0.04 0 . 0 5 " 0.04 0.02 0 0.05 0.03 0 . 0 5 ' * ' 0.02 
(0.02i) (0.017) (0.017) (0.02) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0-017) (0.017) (0029) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.024) (0.033) (0.019) (0.013) (0.018) 
0.03- 0.01 0 0 . 0 5 " 0 0 2 0.01 O.Ot' 0,01 0 0.04 0.02 0.03 0 0.01 0.04 0 . 0 3 " 0.02 0.01 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.02) (0.022) (0.018) (0,02) (0.016) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) (0.033) (0.025) (0.043) (0-016) (0.018) (0016) 
0.01 0.05** 0.02 0.02 0 . 0 5 " 0.03 0.01 0 . 0 5 " 0.02 0-03 0 .05 ' 0 .07 ' 0.04 0 0 . 0 9 " 0.02 0 .04 ' 0.02 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.039) (0.02) (0.02) (0.039) (0.024) (0.023) (0.04) (0-03) (0.025) (0.039) (0.027) (0.031) (0.033) (0022) (0.02) (0.035) 
Infant and materna l dea ths 
Inlanl deaths 
Earlv neonatal deaths 
Fetal deaths 
Perinatal deaths 
Maternal deaths 
S tandard ised dea th rales 
Diarrhoea I 
Infectious and parasitic 
I'ubereulosis 
Malignant neoplasins 
Malignant neoplasm female breast 
Cancer of the cervix 
Bkxid and blood-fonning organs 
K ndoc rine'nutrit ion/me la bolic 
disease/disorder invoK ing ir 
mechanism 
Diabetes 
Mental disorder & disease of ner 
system & sense organ 
Circulator)- s>stem 
Ischaemic heart disease 
Cerebrovascular diseases 
(table cont 'd) 
Quadratic lime f n Fixed effects, cluster n Lagged model. lAGiO) 
corp 
Lagged model. LAG(I) 
rogmt owTi c o r p 
Alternative interpret. 
tngmt o>vTi co rp 
19 
f uc ijuv lit « lat/iv 1 
Acule respiralon infections, pneumonia and 0.18 0.23 0.31 0.17 0.23 0.32 0.18 0.23 0.31 
mai: 
0,14 0.16 0.14 0.25* 0.19 0.41 0.12 -0.13 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.26 
influcn/ii (0.12) (0.177) (0.42) (0.112) (0.187) (0.424) (0.125) (0.184) (0.436) (0.082) (0.127) (0.286) (0.127) (0.188) (0.414) (0.086) (0.148) (0.204) (0.116) (0.154) (0.347) 
20 Respiraton system 
0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0 0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.01 
(0.029) (0.038) (0.049) (0.034) (0.(H5) (0.052) (0.03) (0.039) (0.051) (0.031) (0.038) (0.045) (0.034) (0.045) (0.057) (0.025) (0.034) (0.044) 
0.06" 0.14*** •0.01 0.04 0 . 1 1 " 0.01 0.06 0 . 1 4 " ' 0 0.04 0.06 -0.08 -0.01 -0.15** -0.1 0.06** 0 . 1 4 " » 0.02 
21 BronchhLs emphysema asthina 
(0.034) (0.038) (0,07) (0.029) (0.04) (0.059) (0.036) (0.039) (0.073) (0.031) (0.039) (0.062) (0.064) (0.058) (0.074) (0.023) (0.038) (0.066) 
Digestive system 
0 0,06** 0.0! 0 0 , 0 6 " 0.01 0 0 . 0 6 " 0.01 0.03 0.06* 0.05 0.04* 0 0.06 0 0 . 0 5 " 0.03 
22 
(0.021) (0.027) (0,029) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) (0.022) (0.028) (0.03) (0.023) (0.035) (0.049) (0.022) (0.035) (O.OW) (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) 
23 Appendicitis 
-0.05 •0.03 0,16 -0.07 -0,08 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.15 0,03 0.07 -0.01 0.24 0.42 0.47 0.36 0.79 0.14 •0.06 0.06 0.23 
(0.276) (0,475) (0.381) (0.248) (0,486) (0.407) (0.29) (0.499) (0.398) (0.176) (0.272) (0.305) (0.283) (0.465) (0.474) (0.382) (0.46) (0.592) (0.251) (0.368) (0.371) 
Hernia and intestinal obsimction 
-0.04 0.22** 0,38» 0 0 . 2 2 " 0.31* -0.04 0 . 2 3 " 0.39* -0.06 0.11 0.24 -0.07 0.09 0.26 -0.04 •0.27 -0.19 0.01 0.17* 0.35* 
24 
(0.088) (0.094) (0.204) (0.097) (0.094) (0.17) (0.091) (0.098) (0,21) (0,066) (0.072) (0.147) (0.118) (0.162) (0.179) (0.09!) (0.199) (0.212) (0.084) (0.091) (0.187) 
25 
0.04 0.04 -0,01 0.03 0.{)4 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0 0,02 0.02 -0.03 0.04 0 . 0 6 " 0.03 0 0.04 0.08* 0.04 0.02 0.01 
Cicnhourinary sy stem 
(0.031) (0.032) (0,047) (0.03) (0.031) (0.049) (0.032) (0.034) (0,049) (0.031) (0.02) (0.046) (0.028) (0.024) (0.046) (0.029) (0.047) (0,039) (0.032) (0.024) (().(M2) 
0 0.05 0,04 -0.01 0.06 0.09 0 0.05 0.04 0 -0.02 -0.04 •0.01 -0.17 -0,15 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 
26 Symptoms, signs and iU-defuied conditkm 
(0.072) (0.097) (0.091) (0.068) (0.087) (0.086) (0.074) (O.lOl) (0,093) (0.072) (0.113) (0.099) (0.11) (0.109) (0.097) (0.066) (0.079) (0.101) 
0.02 0.08* 0.04 0.02 0 . 0 9 " 0.04 0.02 0.08* 0,04 0.04 0.08* 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.07* 0.04 
27 t.Ntcmal caase injury and poison 
(0.035) (0.041) (0.057) (0.036) (0.033) (0.055) (0.037) (0.042) (0.059) (0.039) (0.044) (0.071) (0.05) (0.(M5) (0.047) (0.029) (0.037) (0.053) 
Adverse etVects 
0.11 - 1 . 3 3 " -0.64 -0.11 -0.98* -0.59 0.14 .1.13* 0.09 0.33 -0.79* -0.59 0.02 - 1 . 6 7 " * -1.17 0.17 -0.01 -0.56 -0.08 -0.93 -0.33 
28 
(0.402) (0.553) (0.646) (0.516) (0.474) (0.419) (0.43) (0.535) (0,496) (0.328) (0.416) (0.581) (0.657) (0.508) (0.69) (0.471) (0.666) (1.018) (0.47) (0.521) (0.673) 
Quadra t i c individual country trends 
The estimation results remain virtually unchanged after the introduction of the individual trend 
square component. The shifts between detected levels of statistical significance are generally a 
consequence of small movements in coefficient and error values in variables that were 
originally close to 1%, 5%, and 10% significance thresholds. For instance, the estimated impact 
of corporatisation on bed occupancy rates originally estimated 0.08 (0.036 standard error) and 
significant at 5%, in the alternative model resulted 0.08 (0.037 std. err.) and qualified as 
significant at 10%. Admittedly, in a number of cases this specification fails to detect statistical 
significance established by the base model (e.g. maternal deaths, diarrhoeal SDR, mental 
disorder SDR), but only in the cases where the evidence was weak in the first place (p-values 
close to 10% in the base model). On the other hand, a number of coefficient estimates turn out 
significant at higher levels of confidence. The greatest noted difference between coefficient 
estimates was in the case of adverse therapeutic effects SDR, originally -1.33 significant at 5%, 
now -1.13 significant at 10%. The patterns of refonn impacts, that is, coefficients' signs and 
statistical significance, remain broadly unchanged. This confinns the stability of results and 
informally corroborates the base model findings, by refuting the possibility that an important 
effect of non-linear individual trends was neglected. 
Across all the models, the second order individual trend variables are found significant with 
95% confidence in 412 out of 1088 (37.9%) estimated cases. A contribution towards the 
explanatory power is represented by the new average R-squared of 0.137 (0.06 std. dev.) as 
opposed to 0.13 (0.055) in the base model. 
Fixed Effects estimation 
Comparing the fixed effects and the base model results displays a number of similarities as well 
as differences. The broad results are alike - allowing for 90% confidence level, in 7 out of eight 
models' corresponding coefficients are found significant. On the other hand, the FE magnitudes 
of reform impacts tend to be lower. For example, the estimated impacts of decentralisation on 
mortality are -22.1% for maternal deaths (-32.9% in the base model) and +18.5% in diarrhoeal 
diseases SDR (originally +46.7%). The reduction in mortality from adverse effect o f therapeutic 
agents is now 54.6% rather than 73.5%. 
The limited number of models that can be estimated using both methods limits the scope of the 
comparison. However, the available models give an idea about the methods' compatibility. 
While there may be differences in the estimated size of impacts, the patterns of coefficient signs 
and significance are closely matching. 
Lagged effects 
The model detects a number of lagged reform effects . At the 5% significance level, these 
include numbers of psychiatric hospital beds, musculoskeletal system discharges, perinatal and 
maternal deaths, as well as SDKs of the following categories: infectious/parasitic, 
cerebrovascular, bronchitis/asthma, and blood and blood-forming organs. (Further eight 
outcome variables responded to one or more reform at the 10% level of significance.) In 
addition, the modif ied specification alters some non-lagged coefficient estimates. Notably, the 
extended specification shows a highly significant, corporatisation-induced reduction in numbers 
of acute care hospital beds. Moreover, in selected models, the evidence of the reforms' impacts 
is stronger than in the base model in terms of statistical significance: this concerns bed 
occupancy rates, inpatient care admissions, injury/poisoning admissions, and a few SDR 
indicators. Bed occupancy rates are now also found to increase in response to ownership 
devolution. At the same time, this specification does not support the previous evidence in a few 
non-lagged coefficients , e.g. acute care ALOS, circulatory system, IHD and neoplasm 
admissions as well as SDR bronchitis/asthma and hernia. 
Alternative interpretations of institutional arrangements 
Compared to previous alternative specifications, estimation outcomes of the alternative reforni 
interpretation depart further from the base model. The main differences materialise in the 
categories of facilities, utilisation, and disease-specific discharges. The effect on numbers of 
acute care hospitals disappears. Corporatisation now reduces numbers of acute care beds. 
Moreover, there is no evidence on corporatisation-induced increase in bed occupancy rates, and 
the evidence of its impact on ALOS is weak. Also, to a lesser than previously extent supported 
are increases in numbers of disease-specific discharges. As far as mortality indicators are 
concerned, the patterns of reform impact remain largely unchanged, with a few coefficients 
significant at a lower level of confidence. 
In recognising these discrepancies, it has to be taken into account that estimated here is an 
extreme case scenario in which all the considered ambiguities result different from the base 
model . While there is a risk of interpretation inaccuracies, and this section aims to quantify its 
potential consequences, it is unlikely that all the original interpretations are wide of the mark. In 
a sense, presented here is the extreme case scenario. Should some but not all of the considered 
cases be incorrect, it is plausible that the outcomes would to a smaller extent depart from the 
base model. 
The above proposition could be verified in a statistical exercise where all combinations of 
reform interpretations are estimated, with a possible weight-based distinction between more and 
less likely scenarios. The outcome statistics of this quasi Monte Carlo experiment could be then 
tested for equality to respective base model estimates. However, given complexity of this 
procedure (the numbers of models and alternative scenarios, also considering the statistical tool 
limitations) and the lack of actual necessity, this exercise is not carried out. 
Finally, similar uncertainty surrounds the codification of provider payments. This topic has been 
explored by Moreno-Serra and Wagstaff (2010) in a dedicated paper. 
5.6.2. Discussion of robustness 
The base model specification and its estimation technique are justified as a solution that brings 
together theoretical considerations, econometric soundness, and study feasibility. In order to 
confirm its desired characteristics, the original specification was verified against a number of 
alternative approaches. 
The form in which the trend of outcome measure is incorporated in the model (as a quadratic 
function or non-parametrically) has no considerable effect over results. Similarly, the base 
model findings withstand the verification against a quadratic specification of the individual 
trend. While the alternative model does not rule out the possibility of endogeneity, this 
observation informally corroborates the base model outcomes are not compromised by the linear 
trend assumption. In the few models where the fixed effects estimation is feasible, the patterns 
of reform impacts are generally confirmed despite some discrepancies in the magnitude of 
coefficients. The lagged model supports the possibility of delayed reform effects and while in a 
few cases it displays statistical evidence varying from the base model, for the most part the 
results are comparable. The alternative interpretation of reforms produces outcomes that diverge 
to a somewhat larger extent. Nevertheless, the evidence on the reforms' etTecfs in the respective 
areas of perfonnance is still present. Moreover, the estimation results represent an unlikely case 
in which occur all the possible variable alterations, and all the ambiguous situations are assigned 
their alternative interpretation. 
Overall, the base model outcomes hold well in providing evidence of hospital governance 
reforms having material impact on the sector performance. Despite some differences between 
the base and alternative specifications, the general patterns of reform impacts are consistent 
across the inspected models. The robust evidence includes the instances of (a) numbers of acute 
care hospitals, (b) utilisation (ALOS in acute care, numbers of inpatient admissions), (c) 
discharges in a number of categories (circulatory system, injury/poisoning, neoplasms), (d) 
death rates from several diseases (diarrhoeal, infectious/parasitic, cancer of cervix, circulatory 
system, cerebrovascular diseases, bronchitis/asthma, digestive system, hernia), and (e) reduced 
mortality from adverse effects of therapeutic agents. 
5.6.3. Other study limitations 
The methods employed in the study enable a statistical measurement of the impacts that 
changing governance has had on hospital pertbrmance. However, the approach is not without its 
limitations. A model approach by definition simplifies reality. The grouping of institutional 
settings into strictly detmed categories is necessary, but may be overly simplifying, given that 
similar conceptual reform models, when put into operation, may turn out qualitatively distinct 
between countries. The issue of varying reform quality was explored in Chapter 2.6 and 
illustrated in Chapter 5.3.1 with contrasting levels of case-mix system refinement in Armenia 
and Hungary. Certainly, there are qualitative differences between countries that constitute the 
unexplained portion of variation and, if accounted for, could potentially detect further effects of 
reforms. These areas include non-pecuniary incentives, detailed sector regulation, quality of 
physician education, work ethos, risk factors, health care seeking behaviour, etc. 
In particular, applying the same specification to modelling physical resources, utilisation, and 
mortality (albeit with some flexibility in the choice of control variables) demands a considerable 
degree of model generality. This results in rather low proportions of explained variability: 0.13 
on the average with a standard deviation of 0.055. The maximum R" of 0.308 is achieved is the 
case of adverse effects SDR, and the minimum is 0.05 for tuberculosis SDR. 
Moreover, the study is subject to some general problems of international comparison, discussed 
by Newhouse (1977). These problems include imperfectly matching definitions and a degree of 
arbitrariness in currency conversions, both of which may introduce measurement bias. Data 
quality is another area of concern. HFA-DB collects datasets created by countries 
independently. Consequently, the quality of data collection and processing may vary 
substantially. In the extreme case of Turkmenistan, the data reported to international 
organisations are assessed as altogether unreliable (Rechel & McKee 2007). 
5.7. Conclusions 
In this chapter, the steps proposed in the conceptual model of CEE/CIS hospital sector transition 
(Chapters 3 and 4) were codified and factored as exogenous variables into an econometric 
model, in order to verify their impacts on selected performance measures. Controlling for other 
factors that contribute to outcome variation, the study provided evidence that the governance 
setting is indeed a relevant determinant of the system operation. 
More specifically, devolution of hospital ownership to local governments appears to be the most 
impactful of the three reform stages, leading to increased utilisation (acute care ALOS, inpatient 
aggregate admissions, admission within the categories of circulatory system, injury/poisoning, 
IHD, neoplasms) as well as to increases in standardised death rates (circulatory system. 
cerebrovascular diseases, bronchit is/asthma, digestive system, hernia and intestinal obstruction). 
It also results in a significant reduction in mortality from adverse effects of therapeutic agents. 
Corporatisation of hospitals has further effects on per formance , including a reduction in 
numbers of acute care hospitals, a rise in acute ALOS, an increase in bed occupancy rates, a 
reduction in mortality f rom infectious and parasitic diseases, and an increase in mortali ty f rom 
cancer of cervix. 
The early transition stage of facility management decentralisation seems to have less of an effect 
on hospital operation, perhaps because the nature of this change is less specifically def ined and, 
when taking a form of task delegation, conveys less powerful eff ic iency incentives. Even so, 
this stage was detected a statistically significant predictor of numbers of acute care hospitals and 
mortality f rom diarrhoeal diseases. 
Given the CEE/CIS problems with overcapacity, low efficiency, and limited access to care, the 
main question regarding any reform is whether it induces improvements in these areas. As far as 
hospital governance is concerned, the answer is not straightforward. On one hand, there is no 
apparent reduction in numbers of hospital beds, and average lengths of hospital episodes tend to 
increase. On the other, corporatisation can be linked to higher bed occupancy rates, and 
alternative specifications also show this being the in case after devolution. 
More likely than capacity reductions, the process of decentralisation and autonomisat ion may 
lead to adjust ing health care provision to local needs. Given the prohibitively long wait t imes 
being both a major issue and a source of low satisfaction with public health care, an expected 
response of local governments endowed with inpatient facilities is to provide greater 
accessibility and throughput. However, keeping up with the demand under the financial and 
organisational constrains may only be possible by lowering the quality of services. This 
interpretation is in line with the evidence of higher utilisation accompanied by increased 
mortality. The problem has been signalled in the literature. Preker et al. (2002) explain that 
"providers faced with enormous expectat ions and demand from the population of ten find it 
easier to allow the quality of services to deteriorate - through drug shortages, equipment 
breakdowns, depreciation of capital stock and lowering of hygiene standards - than to make 
politically and ethically difficult rationing decisions". This explanation reflects well the reality 
of CEE/CIS, and is confi rmed with the results of this study. 
Rather surprising is the finding of average lengths of hospital episodes increasing with the 
reforms of ownership and corporatisation, by 2 .3% and 5.3%, respectively. Whi le a popular 
decentralisation-related argument might point at local authorit ies ' preference for longer stays, it 
is rather unlikely to occur in the setting of already heavy reliance on inpatient care and tight 
financial constraints of hospital operation, reflected in common debt accumulat ion. An 
alternative explanation is that decentralised networks may empower doctors with more decision-
making authority. This influence may result in longer episodes requested out of genuine concern 
for patients" health status as well as supplier induced demand (possibly encouraged with 
informal payments). Moreover, the greater autonomy and responsibility for health outcomes 
may lead to defensive strategies of local authorities, hospital managers, and individual 
physicians. Devolution of ownership detaches territorial hospitals from the state-owned pool of 
providers, increasing the risks related to their activity, while autonomisation and corporatisation 
pushes provider responsibility even further. This element of risk bearing may predispose 
providers to extend lengths of hospital episodes in order to prevent adverse health events. While 
in CEE/CIS the matters of patient empowerment and providers" legal responsibility for medical 
errors are still at the outset, reputational damage may have all sorts of negative consequences for 
the facility stakeholders, including political consequences of the founding body, decreased 
institutional prestige, and lowered priority in future reorganisations or reductions. Whichever 
reasons motivated the providers" behaviour in this respect, the reforms did not provide the 
conditions for reduced ALOS in acute care. 
Two lines of policy implications stem from the above discussion. The first one relates to the fact 
that decentralisation and corporatisation provide meaningful changes in the hospital sector. 
However, the adjustments may be different from those assumed by the central policy makers. It 
is a feature of decentralised systems that they make actors respond to their local circumstances. 
These are largely determined by high powered financial incentives, and the level of 
accountability, to central authorities but also to local voters. 
The other implication concerns health care quality. An existence of a gap between resources and 
needs puts presstire health professionals, health care organisations as well as territorial 
governments, which are involved as owners and thus can be regarded indirect providers of 
medical care. This pressure for keeping up with the needs may compromise quality. Therefore, a 
stronger incentivisation of actors requires precautionary measures that will safeguard patients" 
health risk levels. There are two key components to managing this risk. First, quality can be 
seen as one of the health care production parameters, and has to be set explicitly according to 
the medical practice and stakeholders' preferences. Second, set levels of quality have to be 
warranted by an effective system of quality monitoring and enforcement. 

PART 111: 
ACCESSIBILITY O F CARE IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE 

Chapter 6: 
Unmet medical needs and health care accessibility 
in seven CEE countries 
6.1. Introduction 
Access is the first and critical prerequisite for providing an adequate response to a health care 
need at any given level of care. In the case of primary care, it creates an opportunity for a 
medical professional to assess the urgency and severity of the need, allowing for prioritisation 
of further actions towards best health outcomes and containment of costs. Access to secondary 
care enables a specialist examination and an adequate medical intervention, thus maximising the 
effects of treatment. Timely tertiary care is often life-saving. It naturally follows that ensuring 
access to health care is a matter of priority in any patient-oriented health care system. The 
OECD (2004) identifies access as a key attribute of high-performing health care systems, on a 
par with efficiency, quality, responsiveness, affordability and financial sustainability. 
Seven new EU member countries of Eastern Europe (CEE7) studied in this chapter enjoy 
comparable levels of macroeconomic and socio-demographic parameters, and share a history of 
achievements in institutional development. They also form a cluster of post-communist welfare 
states that, among other things, provide nearly universal coverage by the means of statutory 
social health insurance (Fenger 2007). Their present health care systems originated from the 
Soviet Semashko model operated before 1989, in which equitable and virtually unrestricted 
access to care was a cornerstone assumption. The period of transition brought a number of 
fundamental changes to health care in the region, including a shift from the integrated, state-run 
system towards more decentralised, pluralistic and contract-based systems. Despite favourable 
trends in overall health outcomes (Stillman 2006), issues in accessing care intensified and 
persisted, remaining a major source of dissatisfaction. The problem is politically pressing, as 
these populations have a historically built expectation of universal availability of health care 
procured by a paternalistic state (Kornai & Eggleston 2001b). 
Despite the shared historical bacl<ground o f CEE7, the choice o f strategies for health care 
transition resulted in various levels of achieved system performance. This study aims to provide 
comparative evidence on the magnitude of difficulties in accessing health care and their socio-
economic determinants. The comparative perspective is emphasised because for historical and 
macroeconomic reasons the countries constitute a peer group that is relevant for benchmarking 
of economic performance. Within-region studies have the capacity to identify best performers 
and illustrate the (wasted) potential of laggards. In so doing, these studies are more meaningful 
than somewhat abstract comparisons between the transition and industrialised countries. The 
evidence should provoke a discussion on the institutional design of the health care systems, 
leading to policy-relevant conclusions regarding gaps in coverage and the adequacy of health 
care funding mixes presently applied in the region. This has further implications for broader 
social policy, as inequalities of health and health care access form part of a bigger picture of 
growing economic differences in Eastern European countries, along such dimensions as gender, 
age, region and labour force status (Heyns 2005). 
6.2. Implications of unmet medical needs 
Barriers to accessing health care take various financial and non-tlnancial forms. Financing 
constraints relate to both public and private spheres, leading to excessive waiting times in the 
former and affordability issues in the latter. Relevant to securing an adequate level of access to 
health care are comprehensiveness of insurance coverage, the degree of cost-sharing, non-
financial factors such as information, education and geographical distribution of providers, an 
adequate structure of the supply side (including informal care) and availability of modern 
technology (OECD 2004). Social factors such as education and occupation have also been 
shown to affect health status in various direct and indirect ways, including exposure to 
environmental risk factors, risky behaviours, and affecting the capacity to access and benefit 
from health care (Adler & Newman 2002). Since the 1960s, developments in behavioural 
models of health services' use have increasingly emphasised various simultaneous interactions 
between these factors (Andersen 1995). To the extent that access is a prerequisite for utilisation, 
inequitable access to health care escalates the inequality of utilisation, and in consequence - of 
health. 
The terms "access", "need" and "equity" are inevitably entangled in the area of health and 
health care. Wagstaff and Doorslaer (2000) explore definitional complexities by reviewing a 
number of concepts of access that emerged in the literature. Two of them have proven 
contentious, namely, the extent to which access to care is synonymous to receipt of treatment, 
and whether or not time and money costs of access should be considered in the context of the 
individual ability to pay. These questions have their natural consequence for the notion of 
equity. 
In the search for a practical principle oF equity, strong arguments were formulated in favour of 
tlie equity of access principle, and against the impracticality of equity of health in setting policy 
goals (e.g. Mooney et al. 1991, Mooney et al. 1992). In fact, equal access for equal need appears 
to have become the prevalent, "working" interpretation. Other notable definitions of equity of 
access refer to the concepts of utilisation (consequently, the terms access and utilisation are 
sometimes used as synonyms), costs incurred in receiving care, maximum attainable 
consumption, and forgone utility (Culyer & Wagstaff 1993). 
Goddard and Smith (2001) describe access to health care as the ability to secure a specified set 
of healthcare services, at a specified level of quality, subject to a specified maximum level of 
personal inconvenience and cost, while in possession of a specified amount of information. The 
distinction between access and utilisation is also made by Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) who 
propose that "equity of access is all about equity of opportunity". "Potential access" is 
converted into "realised access" by the individual making an utilisation decision, often under the 
physic ian 's guidance (Aday & Andersen 1981). The definition of access as "potential 
utilisation" seems to conform to the explanation behind the question of unmet medical needs in 
the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey (Eurostat 
2009). This dif ference is also recognised by the W H O definition that considers access to health 
services "a measure of the proportion of a population that reaches appropriate health services" 
(Roberts 1998). The W H O definition appears the most appropriate for this study, as it puts the 
emphasis on the inequality of access between different groups of individuals according to 
geographical, social and medical criteria, and by recognising that access to services does not 
equate their utilisation. Analogous subtleties surroimd the idea of need, which integrates the 
individual 's pre-treatment state of health and his or her capacity to benefit from health care 
(Oliver & Mossialos 2004). 
The concept of access also has its cultural connotations. In the US it primarily concerns 
insurance coverage and is rather distinct from the European egalitarian view. The latter is 
applicable to the welfare states of CEE, where access to health care is seen as a citizen's right 
and related to the occurrence of need. This is in contrast to the libertarian view of health care as 
a reward, linked to the ability and willingness to pay (Wagstaff & Doorslaer 2000). This has 
further economic implications, because the insurance coverage is not a sufficient condition of 
access. In fact, universal or nearly universal coverage exposes other factors that restrict access, 
such as rafioning and social inequalities (Goddard & Smith 2001). 
Within the European welfare tradition there also exist differences; in particular, a distinction has 
to be made between the National Health Service (Beveridge) and the Social Health Insurance 
(Bismarck) models . In the former, access may be considered a matter of care supply, as in "the 
level of service which the health care system offers the individual" (Goddard & Smith 2001). 
This integrative definition entangles two aspects distinct from the perspective of contract-based 
systems - provision and financing - both being potential sources of access limitations. In fact, 
in CEE, problems with health care access are often a consequence of insufficient funding rather 
than of inadequate provider capacity. 
This study relies in part on an analysis of unmet needs reported by individuals. The central 
theoretical question is therefore how infonnation about unmet medical needs can be translated 
into broader conclusions regarding health care accessibility. A subjective unmet need for 
medical treatment of examination may indicate either (1) a solicited health care demand that 
was not met by an adequate supply (of either services or insurance coverage), or (2) unsolicited 
demand, resulting from either individual preferences leading to forgoing care or an 
actual/anticipated limitation of the financial capacity, mobility or infonnation. Drawing valid 
conclusions requires a careful delineation of these eventualities. While unmet solicited demand 
and demand unsolicited in result of a health care deficiency can be credited to the health care 
system, forgoing care for other reasons ought to be identified as irrelevant and excluded from 
the analysis. 
6.3. Exist ing studies 
A great part of the rich evidence of health (care) inequalities focuses on health status and health 
outcomes, while studies that centre on access and utilisation remain relatively scarce (Bambra et 
al. 2010). This is particularly the case in the former Eastern bloc, where the scarcity of suitable 
data has kept the publication numbers low. 
Kunst (2009) reviews the existing evidence on health care access and utilisation inequalities in 
Eastern Europe. In scope for his literature review are studies of socio-economic status 
implications for avoidable deaths, utilisation of health care, and cervical cancer screening. He 
concludes that inequalities in health and mortality are likely to partially result from inequalities 
in accessibility, utilisation and quality of services. 
Balabanova et al. (2004) report socio-economic determinants of health care access and 
utilisation patterns in eight former Soviet Republics. Because of its objectives and methods, 
their paper can be viewed as complementary to this current study in focusing on another set of 
the former Eastern bloc countries. The authors find that medical care displays a great variation 
in the region, ranging from readily accessible in Belarus and Russia to poor and unaffordable in 
Armenia and Georgia; additionally, they report considerable inequalities within each country. A 
follow-up study by Balabanova et al. (2012) shows some improvements in accessibility and 
financial protection, as well as lower within-country inequalities. However, they also report that 
the problem of unaffordability persists, particularly among the most disadvantaged social 
groups, and paying for care, formally or informally, has become commonplace despite the 
strengthening of public systems. In another study, Balabanova and McKee (2002) expose the 
intricacies of accessing health care in a system with prevalent informal payments, a setting that 
applies in many if not all countries of Eastern Europe. In 1997 Bulgaria, they find informal 
payments to scale accordingly to the ability to pay, and report poorer and female patients less 
likely to receive higher and more expensive forms of specialist care. 
Some light is also shed onto the problem by the Euro Health Consumer Index (Bjornberg 2012) 
that in its most recent edition included 10 EU member countries from Eastern Europe. Although 
the relevant "accessibility score" is limited to wait times in five treatment categories, the results 
are indicative of the countries" comparative performance. In the report, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic receive the highest marks in the group, indicating relatively high accessibility, while 
Latvia and Poland are the low scorers. 
6.4. Study design 
6.4.1. Study aims 
The study involves seven EU countries of Eastern Europe: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia, over five years 2005-09. By assuming a statistical 
approach, it addresses the questions of (a) the probability of experiencing an unmet health care 
need, i.e. the magnitude of access barriers; (b) primary reasons behind the reported immet needs, 
i.e. the nature of access barriers; and (e) socio-economic determinants of access to care, i.e. the 
structure of inequality. Evidence in these areas may reveal systematic differences in 
performance between countries that made varied choices regarding the evolution of their 
systems after 1989. The longitudinal dimension gives an opportunity to inspect if ongoing 
changes in health care organisation and growing health expenditure go hand in hand with more 
equitable access and lower probability of reporting unsatisfied health care needs. It also 
provides an insight on whether internationally there is a convergence or divergence in this 
aspect of health system performance. 
6.4.2. Data and variables 
The primary concern of the analysis are individual-level, self-reported unmet needs for medical 
examination or treatment within 12 months prior to survey. In scope for this question are GP, 
specialist, and other medical consultations, however, only those qualifying as real ("core") 
"mainstream medicine". This information is supplemented by a follow-up question about the 
main reason behind the unmet need. On the explanatory side, factored in are relevant individual 
and household-level socio-economic variables. The variables and their levels are presented in 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of the study sample. All variables follow the original survey 
definitions (Eurostat 2009). An excerpt of the survey documentation is enclosed in Appendix II. 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of the study sample 
2005 2006 2007 2009 
V a r i a b l e C a t e g o r j ' N % N % IN % IN % N % 
ver>' bad 4,044 4.00 4,077 3.70 4,206 3.70 4,173 3 .70 3,691 3.30 
bad 15,172 15.10 16,289 14.80 16,587 14.60 15,915 14.10 15,343 13.90 
Heal th s tatus fa i r" 31,659 31.50 34,949 31.80 35,105 30.90 3 3 7 7 3 29.40 32,992 29 .90 
gtx)d 35,979 35.80 40,184 36.60 41,989 37.00 43,857 38.80 43,050 39.00 
vcr\ ' good 13,658 13.60 14,430 13.10 15,578 13.70 15,929 14.10 15,443 14.00 
Sex 
female^ 54,608 53.80 60,853 53.90 63,254 53.80 65,382 53.80 65,263 54.00 
male 46,846 46.20 52,035 46.10 5 4 2 3 5 46,20 56,215 46 .20 55,699 46,00 
below 30 24,531 24.20 26,469 23.40 26,582 22.60 26,895 22.10 26,271 21.70 
30-39 15,080 14.90 16,653 14.80 17,574 15.00 17,956 14.80 17,786 14.70 
A g e 
40-49" 18,017 17.80 19,271 17.10 19,437 16.50 19,770 16.30 19,541 16.20 
50-59 18,117 17.90 20,104 17.80 21,273 18.10 21,897 18.00 21,842 18.10 
60-69 12,559 12.40 14,416 12.80 15,595 13.30 16,679 13.70 1 7 ^ 6 3 14.30 
70 and more 13,150 13.00 15,975 14.20 17,028 14.50 18,400 15.10 18,259 15.10 
primary 13,652 13.50 11,750 10.60 10,734 9.30 10,161 8.60 9,746 8.30 
Education s e c o n d a r y " 73,679 72.90 83,039 75.00 87,205 75.90 90,678 76.30 89,335 75.70 
tcrt iarj ' 14,123 13.90 18,099 16.00 19,550 16.60 20,758 17.10 21,881 18.10 
poorest 20,282 20.00 22,571 20.00 23,493 20.00 24,309 20.00 24,182 20.00 
I lousehold 
income 
2nd quintilc 
middle" 
20,285 
2 0 2 9 3 
20.00 
20.00 
22,579 
22,573 
20.00 
20.00 
23.494 
23.495 
20.00 
20.00 
24,321 
24,319 
20.00 
20.00 
24,192 
24,191 
20.00 
20.00 
4th quintilc 20,292 20.00 22,578 20.00 23,497 20.00 24,317 20.00 24,193 20.00 
richest 20,302 20.00 22,587 20.00 23,510 20.00 24,331 20.00 24,204 20.00 
employed" 48,306 47.60 54,990 51.70 58,317 49.60 61,211 50.30 57,898 47.90 
Basic economic unemployed 8,365 8.20 7,441 5.30 5,996 5.10 4,764 3.90 7,240 6.00 
activit\ ' retired 25,886 25.50 28,725 27.20 30,681 26.10 32,412 26.70 32,728 27.10 
otherwise inactive 18,897 18.60 21,728 19.90 22,495 19.10 23,210 19.10 23,093 1 9 1 0 
urban 35,699 35.20 38,205 33.80 39,311 33.50 40,235 33.10 40,198 33.20 
A r e a of res idence in termedia te" 14,705 14.50 16,723 14.80 17,878 15.20 19,522 16.10 18,536 15.30 
rural 51,050 50.30 57,960 51.30 60,300 51.30 61,553 50.60 62,228 51.40 
H e a l t h s t a t u s is s e l f - a s s e s s e d . H o u s e h o l d i n c o m e l e v e l s a r e q u i n t i l e s o f to t a l d i s p o s a b l e h o u s e h o l d i n c o m e in 12 m o n t h s p r i o r to 
s u r v e y . A r e a o f r e s i d e n c e f o l l o w s t h e D E G U R B A c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ( E u r o s t a t 2 0 0 9 ) . F i g u r e s r e p o r t e d in t h e ' % ' c o l u m n m a y n o t a d d 
u p t o 1 0 0 % b e c a u s e o f r o u n d i n g . 
T a b l e 6 .2 : S a m p l e size a n d s h a r e of c o u n t r y to ta l p o p u l a t i o n 
2005 2006 2007 200H 2009 
Count ry N % N % N % N % N % 
Czech Republic 8,628 0.08 14,856 0.14 19,384 0.19 22,754 0.22 19,765 0.19 
Estonia 9,643 0.72 13,007 0.97 11,971 0.89 10,851 0.81 11,308 0.84 
Hungary 14,791 0.15 16,516 0.16 18,490 0.18 18,710 0.19 20,973 0.21 
Latvia 7,913 0.34 9,071 0.40 9,270 0.41 10,910 0.48 12,207 0.54 
Lithuania 9,929 0.29 10,219 0.30 10,913 0.32 10,473 0.31 11,214 0.34 
Poland 37,671 0.10 36,589 0.10 34,888 0.09 33,801 0.09 31,674 0.08 
Slovakia 12,879 0.24 12,630 0.23 12,573 0.23 14,098 0.26 13,821 0.26 
% of total country population. 
T a b l e 6 .3 : S t u d y s a m p l e s t a t i s t i c s : m e a n a n d s t a n d a r d dev i a t i on of c o n t i n u o u s v a r i a b l e s 
Household income (EUR) Respondent age 
Count ry 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2009 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 
Czech Republic 751 (503) 827(530) 942 (588) 1047(658) 1251 (821) 47.9(18.2) 48.1 (18.3) 48.6(18.4) 49.0(18.4) 49.2(18.4) 
Estonia 598 (434) 703(487) 865 (818) 1031(682) 1134(732) 45.4(18.9) 45.5(19.0) 45.4(19.0) 45.9(19.1) 46.3(19.2) 
Hungary 647 (494) 738(647) 714(453) 795(485) 842 (480) 47.9(18.3) 48.1 (18.4) 48.0(18.3) 48.1 (18.4) 47.7(18.2) 
Latvia 424(383) 498(472) 640(561) 916(846) 1048(1018) 48.1 (18.9) 48.6(19.1) 49.2(19.3) 49.0(19.2) 49.4(19.3) 
Lithuania 426 (329) 505(375) 646 (486) 796(642) 955 (859) 46.9(18.3) 48.9(18.5) 49.6(18.7) 50.5(18.6) 50.8(18.8) 
Poland 525(398) 640 (426) 717(511) 842 (605) 1002(727) 45.1 (17.9) 45.4(18.1) 45.9(18.2) 465(18.4) 47.0(18.3) 
Slovakia 589(393) 708(804) 808(451) 990(560) 1216(707) 43.6(17.6) 44.4(17.9) 44.5(18.0) 44.5(18.2) 44.3(18.0) 
Household income is a rnontiily average of the declared 12-month disposable household income. Income data are collected in national currencies and converted 
to euro values at average marl^et exchange rates adjusted for purchasing power (Eurostat 2010a). 
The analysis is based on survey data f rom the EU-SILC. All private households and all persons 
aged 16 and over within the households are eligible for the survey procedure. EU-SILC data 
provides nationally representative samples of both households and individuals. The selection of 
countries for this study ensures that basic concepts and definit ions are fully comparable in terms 
of the reference population, private household definition and household membership (Wol f f et 
al. 2010). The dataset has been previously relied on in a number of studies of socio-economic 
determinants of health and health care access in Western Europe (e.g. Allin & Masseria 2009, 
Hernandez-Quevedo et al. 2010b). 
Data quality is managed centrally by Eurostat, with the aims of minimising the bias of non-
random missing data, ensuring consistency between results of different analyses, and providing 
a workable dataset to researchers (Eurostat 2009). A number of possible error categories are 
identified in the survey methodology: conceptual, data collection, processing, item non-
response, coverage, unit non-response, and sampling. Data accuracy and comparabili ty is 
achieved through detailed guidelines for local surveying units, and post-collection techniques. 
Handling of missing data takes into account the nature of non-response and may apply 
weighing, imputation or micro-simulation. Sampling errors are inspected using Jackknife 
Repeated Replication. The dataset is made available after confirming it has the attributes of 
relevance, accuracy, reliability, coherence and comparability. The above aspects of data quality 
are handled internally by Eurostat, and the published microdata do not contain information that 
would allow for reassessing non-response rates and re-estimating sampling errors (Verma & 
Betti 2010). 
6.4.3. Stat is t ical m e t h o d s 
The sample sizes allow for a multivariate regression of each country-year independently, 
enabling an estimation and comparison of country-specific socio-economic patterns of access. 
This approach is preferred to an analysis of cross-sectionally pooled data, which would impose 
the same coefficients across countries, effectively leading to a loss of information on regional 
variation. 
The binary answer to the question of unmet medical needs is used as the response variable in a 
logit model. The conventional logit approach is employed (McFadden 1974, Wooldridge 2002), 
with the latent variable specification of: 
y* = XiP -I- e; = /?! + healthP2 + sexp^ + agep^ + edu/is + incPf, + actPj + areaPg 
+ et (6 .1) 
In the above equation, Xi is a vector of individual characterisfics, p is a vector of unknown 
parameters, and ei is an unobserved random component assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed. In lite model , individual characteristics are represented with a set of 
binary variables that correspond to variable categories presented in Table 6.1. 
The latent function represents the capacity of a health care system to accommodate health care 
needs of a person whose socio-economic characteristics are x;. Satisfying all the needs over the 
12 month period produces the outcome yi=0, while not providing access to health care at least 
once in the t imeframe results in y i=l . Hypothesised is H„: p, = . . . = p„ = 0, which reflects the 
situation of equitable access where no individual characteristic leads to a statistically significant 
difference in the probability of reporting immet needs for examination or treatment. 
Health care needs are more likely to occur in individuals of poor health, who can be expected to 
seek medical care more often. This increased occurrence of need in any given period of time 
makes them more likely to experience trouble in accessing care. For this reason, health status is 
assumed the role of a control variable. 
The income variable, defined as monthly disposable household income, was tabbed into 
quintiles for each country-year combination. This implies thresholds for the five income bands 
are different in each case, but penni ts the estimation of effects of a relative position in the social 
income stratification, making the interpretations consistent in the light of the longitudinally and 
cross-sectionally varying income levels. Moreover, modelling income as bands allows for each 
strata having its own income effect , whereas a continuous variable approach fits an overarching 
sample coefficient estimate. 
However , in order to inspect the eventuality that this approach affects the results in an arbitrary 
way, estimates of an alternative specification using continuous (linear and quadratic) age and 
income variables are obtained. Covariate patterns are found closely similar in terms of statistical 
significance and the magnitude of coefficients, suggesting that the treatment of age and income 
as categorical variables in the base model does not introduce arbitrariness into the results. The 
only notable difference is the primary education strata in Hungary becoming a statistically 
significant predictor of unmet medical needs. Full results of the alternative specification are 
available in Appendix I, Table A.2. 
A mult inomial logit of the same latent specification (Equation 6.1) is used in the exploration of 
specific barriers to accessing health care. The probability of reporting a specific problem is 
assumed to be a non-stochastic function of observable individual characteristics and an 
unobservable error term. Formally, modelled is P(yi=j|xi), where the levels of yi j=0 , . . . , 4 are 
derived from answers to the fol low-up question about the main reason behind the unmet need. 
Accordingly, the values of j represent: ( I ) the problem of affordabili ty (including a lack of 
insurance or inadequate coverage); (2) the issue of excessive waiting times (including a lack of 
referral); (3) the problem of mobility in getting to the place of service provision, indicating an 
inadequacy of the geographical distribution of providers to the level of population mobility; 
(4) the barrier of informational or educational nature, such as not being able to identify or locate 
the right specialist, also a fear of treatment. These four groups of issues are commonly referred 
to as the health care system deficiencies. Finally, j=0 is the base category that comprises reasons 
not attributable to the health care system, such as individual preferences (e.g. for alternative 
medicine), priorities (e.g. work duties) and other personal choices (e.g. self-treatment) that lead 
to forgoing health care despite the need. 
The probability predictions correspond to the base set of characteristics denoted with in 
Table 6.1. All estimations are carried out in Stata 12. 
6.4.4. Specification tests 
In all of the logit models, the Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square test leads to a strong rejection of the 
hypothesis that all variables equal zero. The models are further scrutinised with a specification 
test ("linktesf") and the Hosmer-Lemeshow (2005) goodness-of-fit test with 10 quantiles. The 
conditions are considered satisfactorily met at the 5% significance level, with both tests passed 
by 32 (out of 35) models. The models of Lithuania 2006 and 2007 fail the specification test, 
while Lithuania 2006 and Hungary 2009 fail the goodness-of-fit test. Caution is taken in the 
interpretation of these results; more specifically, any stemming conclusions are supported with 
statistical evidence of the closest cross-sections that withheld the statistical tests. 
In the multinomial logit models, the Hausman test is used to verify whether the condition of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives is satisfied. Following a discussion of Freese and Long 
(2001), the tests are performed using the mlogtest command, version 1.7.6 jsl 2009-10-18. In 
every case the omitted alternative is found independent of other alternatives with 95% 
confidence, thus leading to the conclusion that the assumption is met. 
6.5. F ind ings 
6.5.1. Probability of experiencing an unmet health carc need 
Figure 6.1 provides a graphical and tabular presentation of predicted probabilities of 
experiencing an unmet need in each country for each year, at the base set of characteristics and 
after controlling for the effect of other covariates. These post-logit predictions show that 
considerable differences exist within the group of CEE7 countries. Populations of the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia enjoy health care that is relatively accessible, with the existing barriers 
low, stable and primarily extrinsic to the health care systems. As of 2009, in the Czech Republic 
the probability of not being able to access health care in need was 3.57%, however, only 0.28% 
in consequence of a health care system deficiency, and mainly because of waiting times and 
Figure 6.1: Predicted probability of reporting an unmet need for medical treatment or examination within a 12-month period, controlling for covariates, 
and primary reasons 
affordability Bwa i l t ime - mobi l i ty • information other (not attributable to H C S ) 
Ciech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lilhuania Poland Slovakia 
Reavon 200S 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 201)8 2(109 200S 201)6 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2Q0T 2UU8 2U09 
AfTordabilit> 1.33 0.35 0.62 0.29 0.00 5.12 4.33 0.82 0.37 0.60 900 2.29 3.04 3.03 1.40 25.56 18.90 14.69 9.74 12.21 4.41 8.09 1 48 2.30 1 42 14.87 10.27 7 21 2.83 3.74 1.76 2.14 0.65 0.69 0.65 
Wasiime 0.29 0.07 1.29 0.36 0.16 3.15 5.92 17.12 14.03 7.85 1 65 0.87 0.37 0.31 0.83 3.94 3.90 5.52 4 91 2.75 6.94 7.23 10.76 11.43 5.60 3.09 3.87 3.53 4.68 7 79 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.58 0.51 
Mobilit> 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.21 0.21 0.40 0.18 0.14 0.03 0.39 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.23 0.03 0.21 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 008 OOO 0.00 0.38 0.59 0.22 0.30 0.34 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.18 
Infomiatlon 1.88 1.21 140 1.06 0.10 0.35 1.90 1.57 1.94 0.29 1.76 1.58 2.31 1.01 0.71 2.03 1.42 0.92 1.63 0.37 1.06 2.23 0 81 0.63 0.00 1.08 1.17 0.64 0.60 1.34 1.19 0.78 0.68 0.73 0.58 
Other 12.84 7.85 8.19 2.73 3.29 3.57 6.47 3.22 1.60 1.42 19 10 18.67 19.28 16 78 17.41 14.06 17.13 17.83 13.00 6.70 3.63 7.32 5.67 2.30 0.42 8.80 11.60 9.92 10.72 10.02 6.06 5.73 3.05 4.52 4.46 
Posl-logit probability predictions at base characteristics (denoted in Table I). The probabilities provided concern population at large, not those seeking care. In the figure, the height o f each co lumn 
indicates the estimated probability o f an individual reporting at least one unmet need for examination or treatment in 12 months prior to survey ( 'Total ' in the table). The co lumn height excluding the 
grey 'other' category illustrates the probability o f reporting an unmet need because o f the heahh care system deficiencies ('Total H C S ' in the table). The table represents values corresponding to those 
presented in the figure, expressed in percentage terms. 
information issues. The corresponding numbers in Slovakia were 6 .38% and 1.92%, with 
affordabili ty and wait ing times being the most prevalent barriers. 
In Estonia and Lithuania, unmet needs ' f requency peaked in 2006-07, however, by 2009 it 
scaled down to below the level of 2005. Contrary to Czech Republic and Slovakia, in the two 
above countries waiting times were the primary factor s topping people from accessing care. In 
2009, the probability of reporting an unmet health care need for a reason attributable to the 
health care system was 8.9 and 7 per cent, in Estonia and Lithuania respectively. 
Hungary shows a distinct problem structure. The rates of unmet medical needs were 
considerably higher than in the previous coimtries (20.4%), however, this was mainly due to 
reasons not amenable to the health care system. Looking exclusively at the situations that 
emerged from health care deficiencies, over the period 2005-09, the magnitude of access 
barriers was reduced from 12.4% to 3%, with affordabili ty standing out as the major issue. 
Latvia and Poland should be considered the regional laggards, reporting in 2009 comparable 
extents of access problems, both with respect to all reasons (with the probability over 22%) and 
those attributable to the health care system (over 13%). While in Latvia affordabili ty was a 
common issue, in Poland it was coupled with waiting times. 
The longitudinal dimension of results shows that access conditions generally improved. 
Comparing years 2005 and 2009, the probability of reporting unmet health care needs decreased 
in all the countries by 17-78%, with the average reduction of 41%. 
6.5.2. Access barriers 
Over the analysed period, affordability became less of a restraint in accessing health care; in all 
the countries the probability of reporting unmet needs for an affordability reason decreased by 
52 to 88 per cent, except for Czech Republic, where in 2009 the problem was nearly non-
existent. In Latvia, on the other hand, 12.2% of the population would not access care for 
affordabili ty reasons. While Latvia is an outlier in this aspect (the remaining countries average 
1.3%), the statistical evidence also shows substantial regional differences in the prevalence of 
the problem. 
With respect to waiting times, two groups emerge from the analysis. Estonia, Poland and 
Slovakia experienced a nearly 50% expansion in the frequency of this issue. The remaining four 
countries reduced the occurrence by 19-50%. These outcomes have to be put in the context of 
the absolute materiality of the problem, however. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia 
were countries where less than 1% of the population would report waiting t imes as restricting 
them from accessing care. At the other end of the spectrum were Estonia and Poland, with 
nearly 8% of individuals indicating this problem. 
Tabic 6.4: Predicted probabili ty of report ing unmet needs for medical t rea tment or examination (odds ratios) for covariates included in the base model 
Vur iabk ' C a l f ry 
Czech Repuhlk 
2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 200H 2 0 0 9 2 0 0 5 
Estonia Hungary 
2 0 0 6 2 0 « 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 0 5 2 » « 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 0 5 
Latvia Lithtiania Palatid Slovakia 
2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 « « 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 
very bad 1.69 2.33 1.89 2.96 1.69 2.65 1.58 3.03 1.5 1.87 2.39 1.99 1.84 2.73 1.69 2.04 3.13 1.76 3.4 2.65 3.95 2.91 2.85 1.81 1.68 2.03 1.97 2.05 3.79 3.9 4.22 3.06 4 .47 
bad 1.65 1.6 1.57 1.37 1.45 1.86 1.68 1.53 1.92 1.85 1.4 1.62 1.83 1.4 1.51 2.18 1.62 1.49 1.62 1.62 1.93 1.99 2.28 1.83 1.8 1.41 1.37 1.48 1.46 1.59 2.63 2.22 2.21 2.11 2.32 
Heal th status fa ir-
good 0.38 0 .57 0.43 0.44 0.57 0.39 0.4 0 .39 0.34 0.43 0 .49 0.53 0.41 0.43 0.35 0.34 0.38 0.43 0 .29 0.25 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.42 0.46 0.43 0.44 0 .39 0.43 0.36 0.54 0.6 0.62 0.44 0 .49 
very good 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.2 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.28 0.5 0.37 0.3 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.3 0.15 0.19 0.25 0.17 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.18 0.26 0.26 0.43 0 .29 0.25 
female^ 
male 0 .86 0.86 0.79 1.13 1.11 1.12 1.19 0.78 0.8 0.72 0.83 0.85 0.86 
below 30 0.42 0.44 0.53 0.52 0.71 0.64 0.7 0.63 0.56 0.74 0.72 0.51 0.75 0.22 0.52 0.76 0.83 0.74 0.81 0.84 0.71 0.71 
30-39 1.38 0.8 1.22 0.68 
Age 
40-49- „ 
50-59 0.63 0.75 0.71 0.82 0.78 0.76 0.84 0.82 0.79 0.9 0.85 0.64 
60-69 0.59 0.51 0.65 0.52 0.44 0.69 0.55 0.73 0.62 0.7 0.69 0.61 0.75 0.75 0.61 0.8 0.68 0 .67 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.62 0.51 
70 and more 0 .49 0.58 0.54 0.41 0.5 0.35 0.6 0 .57 0.46 0.41 0.48 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.48 0.67 0.62 0.5 0.66 0.66 0 .67 0.45 0.46 0.59 0.55 0.64 0.58 0 .59 0.5 0.6 
pr imao ' 
s econda ry" 
tertiary 1.43 
17 1.35 1.59 1.47 
0.82 
1.19 
1.15 1.19 1.19 1.21 
Household 
income 
poorest 
2nd quintile 
middle-
4th quintile 
richest 
1.74 2.19 1.59 
1.54 
1.49 1.28 1.25 1.36 1.32 1.35 1.16 1.46 1.43 1.26 
1.35 1.25 1.25 
1.69 1.6 
1.27 
1.76 1.79 1.25 1.39 
1.31 
1.48 
1.51 
1.42 1.32 1.43 1.41 1.47 
1.12 1.12 
0.77 
0.84 
0.78 
0.82 
0.68 0.57 0 .77 0.71 
0.78 0.79 
0.79 
1.36 
1.47 
employed" 
Basic economic unemployed 0.64 
activity retired 0.61 0.59 
otherwise inactive 0.52 0.63 0.72 0.6 
2.51 2.42 2.11 2.18 1.35 
0.54 0.48 0.59 0.52 0.51 
0.77 0.69 0.56 0.62 
1.54 1.52 1.44 1.47 1.31 
0.68 0.74 0.75 
0.65 0.72 0.79 0.78 
1.36 1.37 2.53 1.93 
0.71 0.6 0.64 0 .7 0.71 0.53 0.7 0 .59 
0.63 0.65 0.66 0.71 0.76 0.63 0.48 
A r e a of res idence 
urban 
intermediate-
rural 
0.83 0.66 0.87 0.5 
0.82 0.5 0.74 0.65 0.74 0.83 0.71 0.59 0.71 0.62 0.8 0.61 0.49 0 . 4 
1.25 1.28 1.31 
0.46 0.42 0.85 
1.22 1.39 1.52 1.44 1.35 
0.9 
Repor ted are o d d s rat ios relat ive to tlie base ca tegory statistically s ignif icant at 5%. N o value indicates the coelTicient was found statistically insignif icant . Presented point es t imates are subjec t to 
uncer ta in ty . S tandard errors are omit ted for clarity of presentat ion. Full results including s tandard errors are supplied in Appendix I, Table A.3. 
Mobility was a less frequently reported concern. In Slovakia, Estonia and particularly Poland, 
the prevalence was relatively high with more than 0.1% individuals in 2009 experiencing 
difficulties in physically accessing a point of provision. In the other countries the respective 
figures were below 0.05%. 
It appears that, between 2005 and 2009, significant improvements took place in the area of 
patient information. In countries other than Poland, the probability of reporting informational 
access barriers was substantially reduced to below 1%. 
6.5.3. Socio-econoinic determinants of access 
In the analysed countries, education did not seem to constitute a major determinant of access to 
health care, with two exceptions. In Latvia, individuals with primary education were more likely 
to report unmet health care needs. In Poland, the same was true of the higher education stratum, 
which stands against the theoretical expectation (Aday & Andersen 1974). 
In four out of seven countries, individuals of the lowest household income quintile were 
consistently more likely to experience unmet medical needs. In the remaining three countries the 
evidence can also be found in selected cross-sections. Moreover, in 10 out of 35 country-year 
combinations, evidence supports the hypothesis that the better-off households enjoy facilitated 
access to health care. Latvia was the country with the most pronounced income-related 
inequalities of access, with strong evidence for both the disadvantageous situation of the lowest 
income quintile as well as the advantageous position of the highest. No evidence on income 
inequalities of access is found in the Czech Republic for years 2005-07, Slovakia 2007-08, and 
Lithuania 2008. However, in the most recent years in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
individuals coming from more affluent households were more likely to report access barriers. 
As for basic activity status, in Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia, the unemployed faced consistently 
higher than working individuals odds of failing to access health care. Retirees and otherwise 
inactive individuals, on the other hand, were generally less likely to report access problems, 
except in Estonia and Lithuania, where these groups did not statistically differ from the 
employed population. 
With respect to gender, statistically significant differences occur in half of the country-year 
cases. Generally, men were less likely to report access problems, except for Hungary, where the 
opposite was true. In the Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovakia, no evidence of systematic 
differences is found in four out of five cross-sections, making these countries the most 
equitable. Particularly in Estonia, Lithuania and Poland, the situation of women may need to be 
given a policy consideration. 
There are marked patterns of age dependency of health care access. Generally speaking, 
population aged 30 and less tended to enjoy a facilitated access. The problem peaked in the 
productive age cohorts, particularly in the group of 30-49 year olds, and subsequently lessened 
as the retirement age was approached. 
In Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania rural populations were less than the comparator 
group likely to report access difficulties, hi line with this is evidence from Poland and Slovakia, 
where urban populations were more exposed to the problem. Little evidence on the inlluence of 
the area of residence is found in the Czech Republic. 
Finally, the estimated coefficients and their statistical significance provide strong evidence for 
the theoretical expectation that poorer than average health makes it more likely to experience 
health care access issues. Below-average health leaves individuals increasingly exposed to the 
problem, and the odds are the highest in the lowest health status category. The opposite is also 
true: the better the health status, the lower the odds of experiencing unmet health care needs. 
This pattern is largely consistent across the countries and cross-sections. 
Notable is also an overall positive trend regarding the health status. The share of the region's 
population reporting bad or very bad health diminished from 19.1% in 2005 to 17.2% in 2009. 
At the same time, the proportion of individuals assessing their condition as good and very good 
increased from 49.4% to 53%. 
6.6. Discuss ion of results 
6.6.1. Impl ica t ions fo r health care systems 
The challenge of health care access is one of a dual nature. On one hand, in Eastern European 
systems that face financial and institutional constraints, the magnitude of access barriers is 
generally high. On the other, there are considerable within-country inequalities related to socio-
economic status. 
The results presented in Figure 6.1, which correspond to the WHO (Roberts 1998) definition of 
access as "a measure of the proportion of population that reaches appropriate health services", 
show that significant disparities exist within the CEE7 group. The consistency of individual 
country trends substantiates these differences as systematic. 
While the dataset does not provide the opportunity to inquire about the nature of specific access 
limitations, it is clear that the best performers enjoy systemic advantages. The Czech Republic 
and Slovakia both employ the competing insurer model and are the biggest per capita spenders 
on health - in 2009, ca. 1,770 constant 2005 international PPP dollars, given CEE7 average of 
1,300 (WB Databank). The levels of spending are crucial, given the fact that health care 
underfunding is one of the major headaches in the region. In spite of these common 
characteristics, the two countries have strongly dissimilar levels of public spending. While the 
Czech system sets the benchmark for its peers in providing equitable and accessible care by 
featuring the highest in CEE7 levels of public spending ( 8 4 % of total expenditure on health in 
2009), Slovakia achieves comparable per formance at the second-lowest 66%. Health care in 
Slovakia remains accessible despite the fact that high levels of private expendi tures are not 
mitigated by voluntary health insurance, and largely take the form of out-of-pocket payments . 
Still, even in the group of single payer systems, patients experience various levels of 
accessibility. Hungary provides an interesting example of a country that has had a rather bumpy 
transition in terms of health reform consistency and continuity, nevertheless displays above-
average performance. Hungary and Poland both have centralised payer agencies and matching 
levels of health expenditure. Moreover, both countries are notorious for the prevalence of 
corruption in health care (Ensor 2004). Yet in Poland, an individual is more than four t imes as 
likely to forgo medical care for reasons amenable to the health care system. 
With respect to the governance arrangements introduced in Chapters 3 and 4, there does not 
seem to be a clear pattern linking them to the equity outcomes. The seven countries represent 
Stages 3 and 4 of the hospital governance transition model (Table 3.2). In those countries, 
corporatisation of hospitals has either been achieved or is currently under way. There are three 
broad reasons why governance of hospitals might not be reflected in the accessibility of health 
care as measured in this study. Firstly, it may be of no direct consequence to the outcome 
measure. Secondly, its effect may be eclipsed by other factors, such as the system for health 
care financing. Thirdly, this study is concerned with all modes of health care, which implies 
that, other than hospital care, it also encompasses primary and specialist care. Consequent ly, the 
equitable distribution of hospital care is only partly responsible for the overall outcome. 
The issues of affordabil i ty and waiting t imes are the dominant access barriers and in fact two 
sides of the same coin - the inability to pay. Excessively long wait ing lists in countries like 
Latvia and Poland often result f rom volumes of services contracted at levels inadequate to 
population needs. This is a consequence of health insurance funds ' budget limitations, and 
should be linked to an insufficient funding in the public sphere rather than inadequate provider 
capacity (Kuszewski et al. 2005, Tragakes et al. 2008). Affordabil i ty, on the other hand, is an 
issue of individual inability to pay for services in the market or in the public system, the latter 
both in formal and informal terms, and may also stem from gaps in health insurance coverage. 
Furthermore, the two problems are connected in that prohibitively long wait ing t imes in the 
public system often force out-of-pocket market purchase of services. Despite being guaranteed 
under a statutory insurance scheme, certain services are not effect ively available, possibly 
leading to inequalities related to the ability to pay. 
Goddard and Smith (2001) emphasise the awareness of availabihty and efficacy of treatment as 
a precondition for equitable access. This aspect poses a challenge to public health, as adequately 
presented infomiation is argued to be a crucial resource in supporting individuals' conscious 
choices (Hibbard & Peters 2003). In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, tackling other access 
limitations exposed information deficiencies, which in 2009 stood behind a third of all medical 
needs unmet for reasons attributable to the health care system. Over the five-year period, 
however, countries other than Hungary and Poland experienced a decrease of infonnational 
issues' relevance, relative to the remaining health care system deficiencies. This may partly 
reflect a growing reliance on the internet as a source of medical infomiation and a space for 
opinion-sharing (Kummervold et al. 2008). 
As for socio-economic inequalities, reaching appropriate health care services remains a 
challenge for the poorest households in the region. However, there are countries that seem to be 
doing better in this respect, in Slovakia, since 2007, the odds for the 1" and 2"'* quintiles were 
not statistically different from the base middle-income category. In the Czech system, the 
inequalities only appeared in 2008-09, and have to be considered in the context of an overall 
reduction in the occurrence of unmet medical needs. It also has to be noted that the appearance 
of income-related inequalities coincided with the introduction of co-payments in the Czech 
Republic; the token co-payments for doctor visits, hospital days, selected ambulatory services 
and prescription pharmaceuticals were aimed at curbing consumer moral hazard (Bryndova et 
al. 2009). 
In all of the analysed countries, it is the working cohorts (particularly those aged 30-49) that are 
the most exposed to access difficulties. By the same token, individuals in their teens and 20s as 
well as older individuals tend to perceive health care as more accessible. These results are likely 
to be a consequence of lower time costs for the old and the young, given that health status is 
controlled for. 
Finally, the financial crisis of 2008-09, which affected the Baltic countries with sharp declines 
of economic output and soaring levels of unemployment (Masso & Krillo 2011), does not seem 
to be reflected in the accessibility of health care. Quite the opposite, from 2007 onwards, in the 
three countries there was a monotonic decrease in the frequency of unmet medical needs. 
6.6.2. Policy cons idera t ions 
The above considerations arrive at the difficult time of public sector austerity, when the 
paradigm of continuous growth in expenditures is increasingly substituted by the principles of 
integrated care, cost-effectiveness and frugality. Given current government deficits and an 
outlook of further fiscal pressures, resulting from population ageing among other things, an 
urgent question is iiow to mal<e healtli care systems perform better withiout spending more. As 
this paper sinows, in the area of health care accessibility, there are peer lessons to be learned. 
In Eastern Europe, the idea of competit ion in the health sector has been stigmatised as exclusive 
and inequitable. While the health care financing model is by no means the sole factor 
determining the accessibility of health care services, this study provides an argument against the 
single payer model being allegedly more accessible and equitable, a justif ication often repeated 
in the political rhetoric of health reform. As statistical evidence shows, the regional benchmark 
is set by the countries that employ the competit ive insurer model. A well-designed compet ing 
insurer system tends to benefit f rom market forces as well as from a more transparent structure 
and higher standards of information and governance (Bevan & van de Ven 2010). In the light of 
these observations, and given relatively poor current performance, it can be argued that the 
sickness fund reform introduced in Poland in 1999 and revoked in 2003 was a wasted 
opportunity. 
The issue of waiting times points at contracting low volumes of services relative to needs, a 
problem that could be alleviated by increased levels of contributions. However, bringing more 
funds is unlikely to prove an effective strategy in the systems that already perform poorly. In 
countries like Latvia and Poland, where gaps in coverage are substantial, this leads to the 
question of the role for private financing, in particular the capacity of private health insurance to 
promote eff iciency and equity. Moreover, prepayment options must be considered as means to 
improve financial protection, given that in the region out-of-pocket payments may constitute 
over a quarter of total expenditures on health. According to O E C D System of Health Accounts, 
2009 shares of household out-of-pocket expenses in total health expenditure were: in the Czech 
Republic 14.9%, Estonia 21.2%, Poland 24.4%, Hungary 25.9%, Slovakia 26.9%. Special 
attention must be paid to the pharmaceuticals reimbursement policy, because expenses on 
medical goods make between 54% (Hungary) and 73% (Estonia) of household out-of-pocket 
health expenditure (OECD.Stat) . The financial protection of prepayment schemes is especially 
important in the case of poorest households that face the highest risk of catastrophic expenses 
and are the most exposed to access difficulties. Given the diversity of possible private health 
insurance implementations, and considering the fact that the existence of coverage gaps is not a 
sufficient condition for the emergence of a voluntary market (Thomson & Mossialos 2009), this 
funding option has to be carefully studied by policy-makers. 
6.6.3. L imi t a t ions a n d caveats 
Authors of the original survey recognise implications of study sample exclusions that are a 
consequence of the household-based design (Wolff et al. 2010). Explicitly excluded from the 
target population are individuals qualifying as institutional population ( O E C D 2007). Some 
institutionalised groups, such as the homeless, the elderly, prisoners and refugees, are likely to 
experience higher than the average population difficulties in accessing health care. Moreover, 
access barriers they face may vary between countries, depending on the extent of health 
insurance coverage and other aspects of social security. Thus, excluding those groups may limit 
the system-wide representativeness of findings. Furthermore, transfers between the household 
and institutionalised domains could affect the longitudinal comparability of study groups. While 
the magnitude of exclusions is not addressed in quantitative terms in the EU-SILC 
methodology, other studies suggest that shifts between the household and institutional 
populations are minor and unlikely to significantly bias the outcomes of this analysis. For 
example, the 1995 census data indicates that 1.68% o f E U l S population was institutionalised, 
and the figure was projected to increase to 1.85% by 2010 and then to decline to 1.71% in 2025 
(Eurostat 2003). 
Kunst (2009) argues that the reliance on unlinked cross-sectional data is a major limitation of 
existing comparat ive studies of health (care) inequalities in Central and Eastern Europe. In the 
light of his observation, the longitudinal and cross-sectional consistency and comparability of 
data is an upside of the present study. However, this comes at the expense of a deepened 
analysis. In particular, the survey provides no distinction of the generalist, specialist, inpatient, 
and other health needs as well as forgone services. Moreover, only the primary reason behind 
forgoing care is reported, which may conceal the underlying complexity of the problem. For 
example, a reported inability to pay for services in the private market may be a consequence of 
excessive waiting times in the public system. Similarly, low materiality of informational access 
barriers in Estonia and Lithuania may be a result of these barriers being obscured by the more 
immediate problem of waiting times, rather than a signal of actual high system perfomiance in 
this aspect. Further still, the survey does not inquire how many times each person experienced 
the problem in the 12-month reference period. Each positive answer indicates that a person's 
medical needs were unmet at least once, effectively censoring information on the event 
reoccurrence. 
As defined in the questionnaire, the issue of affordability includes cases of inadequate insurance 
coverage. However, this situation cannot be clearly distinguished by the use of any available 
variables. In particular, the problem of inadequate coverage does not correspond to the 
unemployed or economically inactive status, because such persons may or may not benefit from 
welfare protection or family arrangements such as inclusion of children under statutory 
insurance. The lack of clear identification disallows reaching situation-specific conclusions. 
This extends in particular to vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities, e.g. the Roma people, 
who are also likely to be underrepresented in the study sample (Fesus et al. 2012). 
The need, as defined in this study, is a self-assessed, "core" and "real" requirement of a 
consultation with a conventional medicine specialist (Eurostat 2009). In contrast, Oliver and 
Mossialos (2004) identify two key components of a health care need: the individual's pre-
treatment state o f health and his or her capacity to benefit from health care. It is apparent that 
the EU-SILC definition of need focuses on the subjective health status. Moreover, it disregards 
the "capacity to benefit" component, to the extent the respondent takes no account of it. This 
fact renders the interpretation of equitable health care according to the principle o f "equal access 
for equal need" not applicable. 
Admittedly, countries may and do differ in patterns o f risk factors such as lifestyles and 
environmental conditions, which might result in varying levels of burden on health systems. 
Nevertheless, the findings illustrate the adequacy of each country's health system to its 
idiosyncratic conditions. In a sense, the underlying differences are internalised in the level of 
need reported the populations, and the survey responses are individual-level assessments o f the 
health care system's capacity to answer those needs. 
More problematically, nations may differ in characteristics such as perceptions of health needs, 
expectations of health care and health care seeking behaviours. These factors, relevant to the 
research problem and possible sources of bias, were not included in the analysis because o f the 
survey limitations. Another concern is the potential bias in self-reported measures o f health and 
in other variables analysed in the context of this study. A comprehensive discussion of these 
methodological issues and an assessment of the EU-SILC validity in this regard is provided by 
Hernandez-Quevedo et al. (2010a). 
6.7. Conclusions 
Despite the nearly universal statutory insurance coverage in Eastern Europe, ensuring actual, 
timely and equitable access remains a challenge. Barriers are pervasive and form a firm element 
in the health care landscapes of poorly performing systems. This study illustrates differences in 
health care accessibility within a group of seven Eastern European countries, taking into 
consideration both the magnitude of the problem and within-country inequalities. The identified 
discrepancies are significant and systemic, although in the region at large the situation improved 
considerably between 2005 and 2009. 
Countries that employ the competitive insurance model and are the biggest spenders on health 
consistently outperform their peers. Substantial differences are also found between the single 
payer systems. In the laggard states, inefficiencies and underfunding o f public systems lead to 
rationing through waiting times and informal payments, exposing individuals to financial and 
health risks. The evidence provided in this paper is indicative ot gaps in coverage and groups at 
risk that, depending on country, may include the poorest households, the unemployed, working 
age cohorts and women. These findings call for a consideration o f policy remedies that would 
either improve the allocation within the public system or provide an efficient alternative outside 
of it. One such option might be private health insurance. 
These are trouble days for welfare states. Even so, the fiscal uncertainty looming over Europe 
may well prove conducive to bold reforms. There is certainly a need to make health care 
shortcomings explicit and address them with the best available policy tools. Identifying the 
areas of underperformance and setting realistic, regional benchmarks is the first step towards 
achieving the goals of accessibility and equity. Further studies should focus on disclosing the 
nature of unmet medical needs on one hand, and on the identification of adequate policy 
responses on the other. 

PART IV: 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 

Chapter 7: 
Key findings and concluding remarks 
After the Fall of Communism, the scope and depth of reforni has varied substantially between 
the former Semashko systems, resulting in differing structures and outcomes. In regarding this 
broad and diversified region, this current dissertation made three attempts to improve our 
understanding of post-communist health transition processes. The first attempt was aimed to 
describe and synthesise what we already know about the region. The second identified patterns 
in changing hospital governance, explained its economic meaning and produced a statistical 
assessment of its impacts. The third analysed accessibility of health care in seven peer countries. 
Together, the literature review and two original studies shed new light on the developments and 
opportunities faced by the post-Semashko countries. 
7.1. The background chapter 
There are a number of lessons from the literature review in the background chapter, which are 
essential to understanding the transformation of Eastern European health systems. Possibly the 
most important one, the magnitude of institutional, social and economic change, is exogenous to 
the HCS itself. Its implications range from the absolute available levels and distribution of 
resources, mechanisms for their coordination and allocation, needs and expectations. The 
dramatic change in the context for HCS operation was illustrated by Will iamson's four levels of 
economic institutions, starting from social norms and values, new political and economic 
systems, e.g. moving towards representative democracy and shifting from central planning and 
bureaucratic coordination to market allocation and contract-based relations, as well as by rapid 
GDP growth, somewhat heightened economic inequalities, ageing population, higher education 
attainment, and increasing burden of civilisational diseases. 
The second observation is regarding similarities and contrasts within the region, both in terms of 
emerging economies and health care systems. As for the similarities, it is largely just if ied to 
consider the HCSs in question as homogenous at the beginning of the transition period, despite 
minor discrepancies existing prior to 1989, such as concerning the legality of private practice. 
Another common theme relates to the benefits and downsides of the socialist inheritance: on one 
hand, universal access to health care and dense networks of health care facilities, on the other, 
the burden of maintaining and restructuring the post-Semashko inheritance. Yet, the period of 
transition produced an increasing diversity of economic and social systems, and this 
heterogeneity is also reflected in the organisation and performance of health care systems. The 
literature overview suggests that the post-communist region can be clustered into the groups of 
Central and Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Republics, and Caucasus/Central Asia. This division 
establishes peer groups relevant for the discussion of available resources, reforni capacity and 
priorities as well as for the purposes of comparing strategies and outcomes of health care 
transition. 
Furthermore, reform efforts in CEE/CIS have suffered from a number of "qual i ty" issues, 
notably a lack of clearly defined goals, incomplete or unrealistic strategies, disregarding the 
need for evidence in aiming at optimal results, f lawed design, inadequate t iming and pacing. 
Attempts to modernise the health sector were also repeatedly thwarted by obstructive groups of 
interest. This results not only from the lack of accord as for reform measures and priorities, but 
also from defensive attitudes of entrenched powerful stakeholders striving to maintain the status 
quo. Another major problem area is corruption that transcends all levels of the HCS and the 
economy at large, affect ing political and legislative processes, strategic choices, as well as the 
use of resources at the provider level and ordinary patient-doctor situations. While the presence 
and forms of corruption are universal across the region, its magnitude varies between countries. 
Diverse transition trajectories led to today 's health systems representing various scopes and 
extents of reform. At one end of the spectrum are countries whose HCSs remain virtually 
unchanged from its Semashko form, at the other, there are highly evolved systems that feature 
competition of insurers and providers in an extensively decentralised context. Most countries 
sits in between of the two extremes, having introduced new financing principles, mixed public 
and private (primary, ambulatory) ownership, a degree of pluralisation, autonomisation, 
decentralisation and inclusion of stakeholders. More fundamental changes encompassed 
increasing individual choice and responsibility; in the instances of social health insurance, also 
terminating the universal entitlement and binding it to the payment of obligatory contributions 
(with exceptions based on social solidarity). The introduction of social health insurance in half 
of CEE/CIS countries was possibly the most impactful reform that altered the ways of 
generating health revenue, pooling of public funds, and led to an expansion of activity and 
patient-based provider payments. Chapter 2 reflects the fact that literature of health economics 
and policy has been primarily focused on these matters. 
The systems emerging from transition continue to face many old problems (constrained 
resources, liigh capital costs, obsolete facilities and clinical practices, issues in quality, equity 
and responsiveness, commonplace informal payments) as well as new pressures relating to the 
worsening fiscal situation, population ageing and the growing prevalence of diseases of 
civilisation. Problem intensity varies across the region, however, and some HCSs of 
Causasus/Central Asia struggle to ensure basic health protection for their populations. 
The hospital sector is especially burdened with the "socialist inheritance". Due to their complex 
nature, sunk costs, and the special role in the Semashko model, downsizing and modernising 
hospital networks has proven to be a herculean task for all CEE/CIS reformers. As opposed to 
primary and ambulatory care, privatisation turned out to be infeasible in the case of the 
overblown and rapidly depreciating hospital sector. The change within the public sector has 
been constrained by particularly well-entrenched interest groups. Most countries departed from 
financing of hospitals through historical budgets and moved towards providing economic 
incentives by the means of contracting and the design of payment mechanisms. This process has 
been relatively well documented in the literature of health care transition. 
7.2. Hospi ta l g o v e r n a n c e 
Parts II of the present thesis attempted to fill in gaps identified in the literature of the hospital 
sector transformation. Namely, compared to the attention given to financing of hospitals, few 
studies contemplated the meaning and implications of decentralisation, autonomy, ownership, 
and legal forms. These elements of hospital governance underwent a gradual evolution without 
crossing the public-private frontier, which may be one explanation why the process escaped the 
attention of researchers. The difficulty in describing and interpreting particular governance 
contexts and a lack of fonnal economic models offer other possible reasons. Nonetheless, 
matters of ownership and governance have recently been the subject of some internationally 
visible papers. The study in Part II corresponds with those publications focused on the OECD 
countries by accounting for developments in Eastern Europe. 
A number of research questions were stated in Chapter I to be answered in Part II. The 
questions concerned a region-wide pattern in transfomiing the post-communist hospital sector, 
stages of this pattern having distinct economic characteristics, and the possibility of measuring 
the impacts of the transfonnation phases on hospital sector performance. These questions are 
addressed in Chapters 3 through 5, respectively. 
Chapter 3 overviews individual country experiences in order to substantiate a hypothesised 
pattern of hospital governance transition (Part II, research question 1). The proposed model 
recognises five configurations of hospital governance: (1) the centralised, integrated Semashko 
system, shared by all the countries selected for the study, (2) delegated or de-concentrated 
hospital network management , (3) hospital ownership devolved to territorial governments , (4) 
corporatisation, and (5) privatisation of hospitals. The strength of this model is in its capacity to 
reflect changes taking place within the public sector, in the lack of a clear-cut privatisation 
context. In particular, the model illustrates the countr ies ' position, relative to the region at large, 
in terms of an increasing participation of territorial governments and a growing inf luence of 
hospital managers over decisions underlying provision of hospital care. 
The reviews of each country ' s individual progress add up to a regional experience of transition, 
which asks for a summary of lessons learned in the process. Transforming hospital governance, 
unfolding in parallel to financing reforms, emerges as a pivotal strategy for reorganisation of 
hospital networks and imposing financial discipline. The process is typically highly politicised 
and critically dependent on the managerial capacity of empowered managers. There are 
considerable disparities between countries in terms of quality, form, extent and t iming of de-
concentration and devolution processes. In contrast, corporatisation appears to be a wel l-defined 
t ransfonnat ional step that conveys a largely standardised set of rights and responsibilities for 
health establishments. An implication of the above shifts in power is the changing role of the 
Ministry of Health, which sheds its original role of a direct administrator to become the sector ' s 
steward and regulator. 
Finally, recognising the processes in the area of hospital governance offers an enhanced 
understanding of post-Semashko systems. An extended typology of HCSs views financing 
mechanisms in conjunction with governance arrangements, which jointly give a more accurate 
indication of the transition status. 
Chapter 4 establishes theoretical grounds for the understanding of hospital governance. Each 
stage of hospital governance transformation in CEE/CIS corresponds to an institutional 
characterisation, in which decision powers, financial risks and residual claims are distinctly 
distributed between the central government, territorial authorities and hospital managers. 
Moreover, it reflects efficiency factors associated with decentralisation, such as local 
information advantage and the possibility to innovate. Based on the above, the stages of 
transition can be argued to have distinct economic characteristics (Part II, research question 2). 
This discussion is concluded with a compilation of the potential for economic eff iciency of each 
model stage; the intensifying incentive for economising stems from the consideration of 
information advantages, the space for innovation, financial risk and residual claims. 
Moreover, in the light of the economic theory, governance should be seen as complementary to 
financing. Governance may carry its own economic incentives internal to the organisation; in 
addition, it affects the reception and response to external incentives. Thus, a governance 
arraignment, coupled with the dominant payment mechanism, constitutes a more complete 
picture of economic incentives and the managerial capacity in the sector. This extended context 
explains why financial incentives may fail to bring about their intended results. In CEE/CIS, this 
can be used to explain the persistence of hospital debts despite the shift from historical budgets 
to activity-based financing based on contractual relations. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates that changes in governance are quantifiable, and their impacts 
measurable. More specifically, statistical evidence shows that the transformation of hospital 
governance has a material impact on a number of hospital performance measures (Part II, 
research question 3). Notably, devolution of ownership leads to increases in acute care lengths 
of stay, numbers of admissions, and selected measures of mortality attributable to hospital care. 
Corporatisation of hospitals is found to increase acute lengths of stay and bed occupancy rates. 
Yet, in terms of solving idiosyncratic issues of the post-communist hospital sector, these 
reforms have to be seen as rather unsuccessful . No evidence is found of alleviating the problems 
of the excessive hospital sector capacity, nor of de-emphasising inpatient care. Instead, higher 
utilisation rates coinciding with increased mortality may suggest that territorial governments 
trade-off quality for quantity of care when they are given authority over hospital care provision. 
This may be an outcome of resource constraints that persist in the transition systems, 
additionally encouraged by flawed refonn design that fails to enforce quality. 
7.3. U n m e t n e e d s a n d access ib i l i ty of med ica l c a r e 
Part HI looked at a subset of seven post-Semashko countries that belong to a cluster 
characterised by stable democratic processes, European Union membership, high per capita 
income according to the World Bank classification, and relatively advanced health reforms. 
These common features render the group relevant for the benchmarking of health care system 
per fonnance . Chapter 6 applies the data available from European Union Statistics on Income 
and Living Condit ions in a comparative study of unmet medical needs, which are indicative of 
accessibility of health care. In terms of research questions, the study sought to identify 
systematic differences in unmet medical needs between CEE7 countries, establish how those 
differences translate into considerations of medical care accessibility, and link the relative 
per formance to HCS design choices made during transition. 
Due to the design of the EU-SILC survey questionnaire, and the conceptual link expounded in 
Chapter 6.2 between unmet medical needs and health care accessibility, findings regarding 
unmet medical needs are informative of problems with accessibility of health care (Part 111, 
research question 2). Obtained statistical evidence reveals substantial discrepancies between the 
countries that constitute an arguably homogenous group of post-communist , new EU member 
states (Part 111, research question 1). In absolute terms, health care is most easily accessible in 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while in Poland and the Baltic States affordability issues and 
prohibit ive wait ing t imes underlie considerable accessibility constraints reported by surveyed 
individuals. The problems of affordability and waiting times are interrelated in that long wait in 
the public system leads to the necessity of spot market purchase. Mobility and information 
issues also exist but constitute minor access barriers. Statistical results show that in CEE7 the 
poorest households, the unemployed, working age cohorts and women are generally more 
exposed than the population at large to problems in accessing health care. However, it has to be 
noted that an overall improvement in access conditions took place over the analysed period of 
2005-09. 
The best performers are not only the biggest per capita spenders on health, but also rely on 
competition of health care insurers and operate decentralised systems that are inclusive towards 
various non-governmental stakeholders. The remaining countries, where the state remains a key 
player in health care financing, display lower but still varying levels of performance. Sizeable 
differences in accessibility and equity show that between the single payer model has varying 
potential and the achieved capacity depends on the transition path. Moreover, the hospital 
governance arrangement, as defined in Chapter 3, cannot be evidently linked to the equity 
outcomes. Despite patterns of institutional characteristics and the accessibility of health care 
being noticeable in the group of seven countries, the available evidence is not sufficient to 
defend the claim that the achieved perfonnance can be attributed to specific reforms (Part 111, 
research question 3). 
7.4. Policy implications 
The relevance of the above conclusions is not limited to the post-communist region. Issues 
surrounding hospital governance and accessibility of health care are high on the policy agenda 
of many countries. The policy debates display a degree of universality, which might enable an 
international fiow of evidence and peer learning. In consequence, an enhanced understanding of 
functioning and organisation of health care benefits developed and developing countries alike. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the analyses provided here originate from post-Semashko systems, 
where the problems may be more persistent or particularly pronounced, the identified success 
stories as well as pitfalls offer valuable lessons on health care system design and reform. 
A number of policy implications and recommendations flow from this dissertation. Firstly, 
while the post-Semashko countries share the background and inheritance, they require reform 
strategies contextualised for their economic and social development. The capacity for reform is 
an elusive but essential concept in understanding reasons for success and failure. In the region's 
experience, other than the tangible resources measureable in the GDP terms, it is the managerial 
capacity that comes forth as one of the key assets. While building up their economic, human and 
social capital, the less reformed countries should tap into the lessons learned by their peers, set 
goals realistically, and ought to stabilise their legal environment and clarify the principles for 
the health sector operation (e.g. the scope of the statutory scheme, eligibility rules, bases for 
income and risk solidarity, explicilness in setting goals and transparency of operation, financial 
discipline) before at tempting some more advanced models involving decentralisation and 
competi t ion. The concept of re fonn capacity is also helpful in distinguishing between countries 
such as Bulgaria and Romania, already EU member states, and Belarus, a non-competi t ive 
political regime and unreformed HCS that nonetheless features comparable levels of health 
expenditures. 
A coherent and realistic governance configuration is a pillar of a well-performing hospital 
sector. It should be seen as a requirement for economic efficiency complementary to the 
t ransformation of passive payers into active purchasers. The Harding and Preker model is 
helpful in understanding the complexit ies of the hospital internal-external incentive 
environment . While not without problems of its own, corporatisation of hospitals appears to be a 
wel l-defined strategy for achieving good governance. 
Problematically, governance is strongly embedded in the broader institutional setting and its 
outcomes highly dependent on the competency of actors, which may limit or undermine the 
application of some more sophisticated models of the hospital sector in countries of high 
corruption, low transparency, and insufficient human and social capital. 
Furthermore, the experience of hospital sector transition warns against change in governance 
that is not meaningful , incomplete, structurally flawed or susceptible to political interference. A 
simple delegation of responsibility to sub-national authorities is unlikely to improve operations 
unless it is accompanied by adequate incentives. Similarly, devolution of hospital ownership to 
territorial governments cannot be expected to automatically result in restructuring, improved 
outcomes, cost-savings and end of debt, if it does not overhaul the fundamental rules of the 
sector funct ioning. Statistical evidence produced in Chapter 5 shows that while governance 
influences hospital performance, reforni outcomes may vary from those intended when the 
empowered agents are given the possibility to pursue their own agendas. 
In the context of t ightening welfare states' belts, it is increasingly relevant to seek good 
practices and directions for a successful reform. One way this can be done is by observing the 
peer countr ies ' experiences with health care organisation. In Central and Eastern Europe, the 
nature of health care access barriers is indicative of gaps in coverage and inadequacy of public 
sector resources relative to need. This can be addressed with systemic solutions that realistically 
assess the statutory scheme capability, fairly distribute the burden of maintaining the system, 
and enable eff icient operation by the means of good organisation. The regional leaders, Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, can offer important lessons based on their success stories. In particular, 
the presence of competit ion in their HCSs does not seem to undermine the equity of access, 
quite the opposite, those countries feature health care that is more accessible and equitable than 
e lsewhere in the region. 
Historically, CEE/CIS has offered some unique perspectives on the matter of health care 
organisation and its importance for health outcomes. For example, the growing gap in mortality 
rates between the USSR and the UK after 1970 revealed the incapacity o f the Semashko model 
to invent or adopt new pharmaceuticals and surgical procedures. The Eastern Bloc populations 
fell behind in life expectancy relative to industrialised countries, which substantiated the need 
for conditions conducive to innovation in health care (McKee 2005). The original contributions 
of this dissertation prove that the post-communist countries still have stories to tell that illustrate 
the ways (not) to reform HCSs. Future studies may want to tap into the size and variety o f this 
region in order to produce the much needed evidence to guide further reforms. 


A P P E N D I X I: Additional tables 
Tab le A . l : Doniii iaiit hospital payment mechanisms, by country 
Country Budget FFS Casemix 
Albania 1989-2010 
Armenia 1989-1997 1998-2010 
Azerbaijan 1989-2010 
Belarus 1989-2010 
Bulgaria 1989-2000 2001-2010 
Czech Republic 
1989-1992, 
2005-2006 
1993-2004 2007-2010 
Estonia 1989-1992 1993-2004 2005-2010 
Georgia 1989-1995 1996-2010 
1 lungary 1989-1992 1993-2010 
Kazakhstan 1989-1995 1996-2004 2005-2010 
Kyrgyzstan 1989-1996 1997-2010 
Latvia 1989-1993 1994-1997 1998-2010 
Lithuania 1989-1996 1997-2010 
Moldo\a 1989-2003 2004-2010 
Poland 1989-1998 1999 2000-2010 
Romania 1989-1998 1999-2004 2005-2010 
Russian Federation 1989-2010 
Slovakia 
1989-1992, 
1999-2001 
1993-1998 2002-2010 
Tajikistan 1989-2010 
Turkmenistan 1989-2010 
Ukraine 1989-2010 
Uzbekistan 1989-2010 
Table A.2: Predicted probability of reporting unmet needs for medical t reatment or examination (odds ratios) for covariates included in the al ternative 
model (age and income modelled as continuous variables) 
\ ariahle C- Czech Republic Eslotiia Hungary Latvia Lilhuania Pohml Slovakia 
^ alcRor> 2005 2 0 0 6 2007 2008 2 0 0 9 2005 2006 2007 2 0 0 8 2009 2005 2006 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2005 2006 2007 200« 200'> 2 0 0 5 2006 2007 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2005 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 
ver>^ bad 1.79 2.48 1.98 3.24 1.79 2.81 1.68 2.85 1.52 1.94 2.42 2.02 1.87 2 8 0 1.70 2.09 3.20 1.80 3.48 2.75 4.07 3.14 2.79 1.88 1.71 2.10 2.02 2.08 3.81 3.98 4.41 3.13 4.55 
bad 1.69 1.65 1.60 1.46 1.51 1.90 1.69 1.55 1.77 1.79 1.39 1.62 1.82 1.40 1.52 2.20 1.62 1.50 1.61 1.63 1.94 2.01 2.29 1.90 1.70 1.43 1.38 1.50 1.48 1.61 2.64 2.23 2.23 2.11 2.34 
Heahh siatas fair^ . . . . . . . . . . . . - -
good 0.40 0.58 0.45 0.46 0.59 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.27 0.30 0.49 0.54 0.43 0.45 0.36 0.34 0.39 0.45 0.30 0.26 0.35 0.32 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.44 0.44 0.40 0.43 0.36 0.56 0.61 0.65 0.47 0.52 
verv good 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.31 0.38 0.31 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.31 0.15 0.21 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.18 0.26 0.27 0.44 0.31 0.27 
Sex 
male 
-- -- --
0.84 0.85 0.82 1.13 I.IO l . l l 1.19 0.77 0.82 0.80 0.72 0.82 0.85 0.86 0.93 0.83 0.85 
-- " 
Age 1.06 1.12 1.09 1.05 1.04 1.08 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.09 1.04 1.06 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.11 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.05 
Age squared <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 •=1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 
priniat^ 1.24 1.23 1.29 1.23 1.39 1.61 1.55 1.30 1.09 1.23 1.10 
„ 
le t l ian 1.49 0.81 0.80 1.16 1.21 1.20 1.22 0.54 
income 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.95 0.89 0.89 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.93 
Income squared >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 >1 
employed^ -- -- -- - -- --
Basic economic unempbycd 0.65 0.64 3.45 2.52 2.50 2.01 2.24 1.37 1.64 1.56 1.51 1.50 1.37 1.38 2.47 1.96 
acli\'it>' retired 0.57 0.69 0.53 0.62 0.70 0.58 0.50 0.58 0.53 0.53 0.75 0.80 0.73 0.62 0.67 0.71 0.74 0.54 0.65 0.55 0.52 
othcnvise inactive 0.46 0.61 0.66 0.61 0.74 0.73 0.60 0.60 0.73 0.77 0.75 0.79 0.78 0.62 0.67 0.68 0.73 0.80 0.62 0.45 
urban 1.51 0.83 0.67 0.87 0.51 1.25 1.28 1.32 1.22 1.37 1.53 1.43 1.33 
A r e a of residence inlcrmediate^ - -
rural 0.71 0.82 0.50 0.76 0.59 0.73 0.84 0.71 0.59 0.72 0.62 0.81 0.60 0.49 0.48 0.45 0.40 0.85 
Variable uni ts are one year for ' age ' and 100 euro for ' i n c o m e ' . Reported are odds ratios statistically s ignif icant at 5%. N o value indicates the coeff ic ient was found statist ically insignif icant . The 
con t inuous var iab les ' odds ratios are of ten close to I. Where a rounded est imate f igure would appear as I, instead indicated is the posit ion relat ive to 1. 
Table A.3: Predicted probability of reporting unmet needs for medical treatment or examination (odds ratios with standard errors) for covariates included 
in the model 
1.69' 2.33' 1 89- 2.96* 1.4 1.69' 2.65* 1.58* 3.03' 1.43 1.5* 1.87- 2 39-199- 1.84' 2.73* 1.69- 2.04- 3.13' 1.76' 3.4' 
•0 S6 
2.65-
• OiS 
3.95* 2.91* 
•0 4S 
2.85' 1 81* 1.68' 2.03* 1 97* 2.05' 3.79* 3.9' 4.22' • 3.06* 4.47* 
bad 
1.65- 1.6- 1.57* 1.37' 
•0 17 -or 
1.45* 1.86* 1.68* 1.53' 1.92' 1.85- 1.4' l,62' 183- 1.4' 1.51' 2.18' 1.62' 1.49* 1.62' 1.62' 1.93* 2.28* 1.83- 1.8' 1.41' 1.37' 1.48' 1.46* 1.59- 2.63* 2.22' 2.21* 2.11' 2.32' 
Health siatui lair' 
good 
038* 0.57* 0.43- 0 44-0.57* 0.39* 0.4- 0.39* 0.34* 0.43* 049* 053* 041- 043* 0.35* 0.34- 0.38- 0.43' 0.:9- 0.25* 0.34' 0.33' 035- 0.42' 0.46' 0.43' 0.44' 0,39- 0.43' 0.36' 0,54' 0,6* 0,62' 0.44' 0 49* 
0.21' o.:4- 0.22* 0.25* 0.2* 0.18' 0.17* 0.16* 028* 0.5* 037* 0.3* 0.21* 018* 0.19* 
• 0 02 -0 0! 
0.15' 0.19* 0.3* 0.15- 0.19' o.is* 0.17* 0.23' 0.75 0 66 019* 0.23' 0.22* 0.23* 0.18' 0.26' 0.26* 
-0 02 -0 02 -0 04 -0 0-4 
0.43* 0.29- 0.25* 
OOS 
female 
0.89 l.(W 1.05 1.24* 106 0.93 O.ttft* 0.86' 0.79' 0M2 1.08 1.13' Ml- I II- 1 19- 0.78' 0.92 1 1.05 097 0.81' 0.9 0.9 08* 0.72' C.S3' 0 85 ' 0.86* 0.93 0.83* 091 0.86' 
below30 ' " " " ' 
1.27 1.03 1.06 1.38- 1.01 12 0.87 0.93 I 0.76 I 1.06 1.06 1.08 1.03 11 0.91 0.8* 1.08 1.22' 1.2 092 1.21 068* 0.73 1.08 0 95 0.98 112 1.01 1.19 l.ll 0.98 0.89 1.15 
.019 -ON -oil -0! -0,6 -0, .on -on on -oos -oos 009 -009 -oos 0, .oos oos O, on .0 ,S -on .»/» -on -0 IS -aos -ooi .006 .no' -ON -OU -OH -OH -on 
40-49 
0.63* 0.75' 0.71* 0.8 0.77 0.9S 0.8K 0 85 1.11 I 0.82* 0.78* 0.76' 084* 09 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.82- 0.91 0.82 0.83 0 9 0.79 0.99 0.79' 0.9- 0.85- 0.% 0.91 0.98 0.88 0.78 0.64* 0.88 
0.59* 0.51' 0.65* 0.52* 0.44* 0.69- 0.55- 0.73 - 0 77 0.62" 0.7' 0.69- 0.61' 0 75' 0 75' 0.61' 09 0.82 0.8- 0 9 0.85 0.95 0 78 068' 0.84 0.67- 081' 0.83' 0 88 0.84' 0.92 0.62* 0.51* 0.7 0.85 
70andmore " ^ . 8 8 
prima r> 
0.49 0.65 1.15 0.94 1.05 0 98 1 14 1 35 1.13 1.06 1.1 1.16 1.1 1.17' 1.35' 1 47' 1.17 0.95 0.95 1.09 1.23 0.93 1.05 0.97 1.05 1.19' 1.05 1.96 1.47 0.9 0.64 1.32 
Lducalioii Necondao 
1.43* 1.26 1.07 
• 0 1} 
0.87 0.71 - 0.94 1.08 1.03 1.07 1,06 0.% 1.09 0.89 0.94 0.99 082- 0 98 0.93 0.93 0.95 
• 0 1 
079* 0.98 0.94 075 1.15- 1 19* 1.08 1 21* 1.1 1.1 1.1 086 
•0 12 
0.55-
pooreil 
1.23 1.27 1.19 1.74* 2.19* 1.59' 1 49-1 28-1.25" 1.36- 1.32* 1.35* 1.16' 1.46' 1.43' 1.26' 1.69' 1 6* 1.76- 1.79- 1.25' 1.39- 1.2 1.14 1 48* I.42- 1.32* 1.43' 1.4I' 1.47- 1.6' 1.34 1.08 1.25 
Household 
2nd guimik: 
middle 
081 1.04 085 
•oil 
0.94 1.54-
• 0 2S 
0.98 0.92 1.02 1.02 1,14 1.35* 0.92 1.25' 1.25' 1.14 1.27' 1.06 1.13 i.3r 1.CM 1.07 0.89 
• 0 1 
0.97 1.51* I.12- 1,1 l.OS 1.06 1.1 1.01 1.04 1.16 
4(h quint lie 
094 0.92 1.12 1.35' 0.9 1 1.04 1.05 1 01 0 91 1.02 0.8* 1.01 1.1 084* 098 0.82* 0% 0.82 0.78* 0.79- 0.83 1.23 0.98 0.92 0.84' 0.91 0.% 1.23 0.97 1.12 0.99 1.36* 
richest 
0.77 1 0.93 
•oil 
1.17 1.25 
• 0 22 
0.84 0.87 1 095 0.77* 0.99 0.86 0.89 1.13 0.78- 0.68* 0.57* 0.77* 0.71' 0.83 0.79' 0.8 
•0 09 
087 0.91 0.97 0.96 095 1.01 1.02 091 08 0.96 1.19 1.47' 
Basic economic 
employed 
uiieinpki>ed 
0.66 079 0.6J* 0.92 1.16 3 34- 2.11- 2.18-
-0 1) 
- 0.% 0.92 
• 0 1 
1.15 1.21 1.35' 1.54* 1.52* 1.47* 1.31' 1.24 0.9 1.31 1.31 
•0 2S 
094 1.01 098 1.36* 1.37- 2.53* 1.22 1.93* 
retired 
0.61* 076 0.59* 076 0.85 1.19 1.03 1.36 0.54* 0.48' 
0 04 
059' 0.52' 0.51* 097 0.68' tl.84 0.74' 0.75* 0.83 
• OIS 
0.76 0.92 1.42 1.36 0.71- 0.6* 0 64- 07- 0.71' 053* 0 7* 0.69 077 0.59* 
P 0.52* 0.63' 0.72* 0.68' 0.82 0.91 0.87 1.03 077* 0.94 0.69* 056* 0.91 0.88 0.89 0.62* 0.65* 0.93 0.72' 0.86 08 0.79* 0.78' 1.19 063- 0 65- 0.71* 0.76- 0.78 0.63' 0.8 0.48-
-oil 
0.83 
urban •0 08 
1.01 
• Olt >va 
0.83* 0.60' 0.87' 05' 
iva tva 
1.25* vr 1 31- 1.05 1.39* 1.52* 1.44' I.35' 1.14 
Area of residence intennediate 
rural 
1.01 089 0.71' 1.13 1.04 0.85 0 82-
•no6 
0.5' 074- 0.65* 0.74* 0 83' 0.71' 0.95 097 0.59' 0.71* 0.62' 0.8' 0.92 0.61* 0.49* 0.48* 0.46* 0.42* 0.85- 0.92 1.02 0.92 0 9- 0.98 
OOS 
095 0.97 096 0.86 
Reported are odds ratios relative to the base category together with standard errors. Statistical significance at 5 % is denoted with 

A P P E N D I X II: Part III supp lementary materials 
Excerpt f rom E U - S I L C documenta t ion (Eurostat 2009) regarding key ou tcome variables in the 
s tudy of unmet needs and health care accessibi l i ty in C E E 7 . 
! EU-SILC Description Target Variables Personal Data (P-file) 
PIKMO: I n m c t need tor medica l e x a m i n a t i o n o r t r e a t m e n t 
(Unmet need for medical examination or t rea tment dur ing the last 12 months] 
HE.-iLTH (Access to health caret 
Cross-sectional 
Reference period: last tweh e months 
Unit: Selected respondent {-w here applies! or all current household members aged 16 and 
over 
Mode of collection: Personal interview /'proxy as an exception) or registers 
! \ alues 1 yes. there was al least one occasion when the person really needed examination 
or treatment but did not 
2 no. there was no occasion when the person really needed examination or 
treatment but did not 
[ F l a i r 
1 filled 
-1 missing 
-3 not selected respondent 
There were ver\- large differences between the EU countries m terms of the proportion of 
people with free access to health care or medically. In countries where all or nearly ail persons 
are covered, access to health care may still be Hnuted by the existence of aiting lists and 
other forms of rauoning. 
Concerning medical examination, the aim of the variable is to capture the person's own 
assessment of whether he or she needed to consuh a medical doctor, but was not able to. In 
prmciple. there is no need to explicitly e.\clude General Practitioners (GP». Acmally. the 
question is not aimed at assessing the access to specialists only for which there is a specific 
question in the ever>- 5 years European Health Inteniew Sun-ey I'EHIS question HC.14) but 
m general to examination by medical doctors (GPs. specialists, etc.). Othenvise. the 
magnimde of the problem of access to medical examinauon. which concerns potentially any 
rv-pe of medical examination, would be underestimated. In addition the problems listed in 
PHOSO refer to any doctor in numerous Member States. On the other hand, it should be clear 
that only real needs of medical examination are taken into account. 
As a summan-. the question aims at covering "core" need as regard to medical care. 
Regardm£ the inclusion of otlier tvpes of treatment, one strategy is to use a form of wordmg 
to make clear that we want to include what is regarded as mamstream medicme m the 
countr.-. i.e the kinds of things covered by medical insurance. The key concem is with 
restrictions m access to what would generally be regarded in the societ>- as appropriate 
treatment for a health condition. Countries will differ m terms of the extent to which 
specialists such as chiropractors, specialists in acupuncmre and so on. have become 
'mainstream" This may be best accomplished by using an interv'iewer prompt. 
In order to ensure that onlv senous needs are taken into account it is suggested addmg m the 
question the term "when you really needed .. . ' . 
The Workmg Group also suggests addmg the word 'on your own behalf to make sure that the 
consultation treatment was on the person's owti behalf rather than on behalf of children. 
2009 Operatjon 
EU-SILC Description Target Var iables Personal Data (P-f i le) ] 
spouse, etc. If this is not clarified, any comparison between men and women or between 
parents and non-parents might be confounded. 
As a model to be adapted to the current PH040, the question on unmet need for specialist 
consultation in the EHIS is as follows (the terms m italics refers to speciaUsts and should be 
deleted or adapted): 
HC.14 Was there any time during the past 12 months when you really needed to consult a 
specialist but did not'* 
• Yes, there was at least one occasion 1 
• No, there was no occasion 2 —• G O TO HC.16.PH060 
(and possibly: 
• don't know 8 — G O TO HC.16 P H 0 6 0 
» refusal 9 — G O TO HC. 16 P H 0 6 0 ) 
2009 Operation 
EU-SILC Description Target Variables Personal Data (P-file) I 
P I I 0 5 ( ) : . M a i n r e a s o n l o r u n n i c l n e e d l o r m c d i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n o r 
t r e a t n u ' n t 
HEALTH (Access to health care) 
Cross-sectional 
Reference period: last twelve months 
Unit: Selected respondent (^\ here applies} or all current household members aged 16 and 
over 
Mode of collection: Personal interview (proxy as an exception! or registers 
r \ - a l u e s 
1 Could not afford to (too expensive) 
2 Wailing list 
3 Could not take time because of work, care for children or for others 
4 Too far to travel no means of transportation 
5 Fear of doctor hospitals examination, treatment 
6 "Wanted to wait and see tf problem got better on its own 
7 Didn't know any good doctor or specialist 
8 Other reasons 
1 filled 
-1 missing 
-2 not applicable iTH040 not = 1) 
-3 not selected respondent 
This is a foUow-up question to the previous one. It aims capture the dimension of restricted 
access to health care by mcluding not only formal health care co%-erase (by insurance or 
uni\ ersal co\-erage), but also restnctions due to ratiomng. xvaiiing lists, die abilit\' to afford 
care, and other reasons. 
In the proposed classification for this item, option 2 (length of the waiting list) should be used 
for people who were actualh- on a waitmg list and were not helped, for respondents were 
discouraged firom seeking care because of perceptions of the long waiting lists, as well as 
people who have 'applied' and are still waiting to see a medical specialist. 
'Not covered by insurance" should be coded as "could not afford to" if the respondent could 
not afford to pay for the ireatmeni exanunation himself or herself 
The issue on the perception of "Could not afford to (too expensive)" should be tackled m 
order to not include reaction about "too expen5i\-e" which are relati\-e (more expensi\-e than 
before, etc.) but relate onlv to the fact that the person could not pay the price, not ha\'ing 
mone\- enough for this. The fact that the price is not covered by an insurance fund is m 
particular an important element to be taken into account 
As a model to be adapted to the current PH050, the question on unmet need for specialist 
consultation in the EHIS is as follows (the terms m italics refers to specialists and should be 
deleted or adapted): 
2009 Operation 
EU-SILC Description Target Variables Personal Data ( P - f i l ^ 
HC. \Miat was the mam reason for not consulting a specialist^ 
• Could not afford to (too expensi^•e or not co\-ered by the insurance fund) 01 
• Waiting l ist don't ha\e the referral letter 02 
• Could not take time because of work, care for children or for others 03 
• Too far to tra\-e! no means of transportation 04 
• Fear of doctor hospitals examination treatment 05 
• Wanted to wait and see if problem got bener on its own 06 
• Didn't know any good specialist 07 
• Other reason OS 
(and possibly: 
• don't know 98 
• refusal 99) 
2009 Operation 
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